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A Secure Cloud Gateway
                based upon XML and Web Services

                            PhD Symposium, ECOWS ’11
                                   2011-09-16



     Sebastian Graf
     supervised by Prof. Marcel Waldvogel
     Distributed Systems Group
     University of Konstanz
     sebastian.graf@uni-konstanz.de     1
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Problem Statement
      What approaches support secure storage of
      data in the cloud ?




                             2
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Problem Statement
      What approaches support secure storage of
      data in the cloud ?

          Availability:                                              Integrity:
          • access to data                                           • System Integrity
          • no unauthorized deletion                                 • Data Integrity


                            Accountability:                 Confidentiality:
                            • traceability of changes       • closure of private data

 G. Stoneburner: Underlaying technical models for information technology security
 National Institute of Standards and Technology

                                                        2
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Security and Cloud Storage


                             Web                  Web
                            Services             Services
                                       Integrity Auditing


                                                    Rev874

                             Web                   Web
                            Services              Services
                                                    Rev25




                                          3
Sonntag, 18. September 11
How to provide…
                                Goals                Measurements
                             (Availability        Cloud-based Service)
                                                 R1: How can integrity be ensured
                              Integrity          within a distributed environment
                                                  with focus on fast processing?

 Security                    Confidentiality      R2: How can key handling be
                                                 adapted to support collaborative
                                                 use cases?
                            Accountability       R3: How can current versioning
                                                 approaches be adapted to fit a
                                                 distributed environment?
                                             4
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Integrity

        ‣ Data must be consistent while
          → in transfer
          → in process
          → in storage
        ‣ Data is handled in decrypted form within client but
          stored encrypted into the cloud
          → Consistency check must guard data in all
          representations


                                   5
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Dual Integrity

              Decrypted Data              Encrypted Data

         ‣ Data is wrapped in XML        ‣ XML is mapped to pages
         ‣ Tree-structure to offer       ‣ Pages are encrypted
              recursive checksums        ‣ Pages are ordered within
                                          hierarchy to offer
                                          versioning and
                                          consistency checks



                                     6
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Decrypted Integrity Check
                    <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
                    ...
                    <country id='f0_404'
                                                                                                 3   lr9c
                         name='Switzerland'
                         capital='f0_1627'
                         population='7207060'                              sl24                              19ak
                         datacode='SZ'
                                                                                    4                        7
                         total_area='41290'
                         ...>
                    ...
                    </country>
                                                                       5        6           67           8           9
                    ...
                                                                     56bd 234g mbkl 1117 345v



                                                3   lr9c                                    3        997d
                                                         19ak          8h5y                                  19ak
                                sl24   4                 7                      4                        7


                            5      6       67        8       9              5           6            8           9
                    56bd 234g mbkl 1117 345v                           56bd 234g 1117 345v




                                                                 7
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Decrypted Integrity Check
                    <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
                    ...
                    <country id='f0_404'
                                                                                                 3   lr9c
                         name='Switzerland'
                         capital='f0_1627'
                         population='7207060'                              sl24                              19ak
                         datacode='SZ'
                                                                                    4                        7
                         total_area='41290'
                         ...>
                    ...
                    </country>
                                                                       5        6           67           8           9
                    ...
                                                                     56bd 234g mbkl 1117 345v



                                                3   lr9c                                    3        997d
                                                         19ak          8h5y                                  19ak
                                sl24   4                 7                      4                        7


                            5      6       67        8       9              5           6            8           9
                    56bd 234g mbkl 1117 345v                           56bd 234g 1117 345v

 R. Merkle: A digital signature based on a conventional encryption function
 Advances in Cryptology, ’86
                                                                 7
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Decrypted Integrity Check
                                   5e+05
                                           !   Merkle−Hash                                                            !
                                                                                                                          !
                                                                                                                  !
                                                                                                              !
                                               Incremental Checksum                                       !
                                                                                                      !
                                               No Hashing                                         !
                                                                                             !
                                                                                        !
                                                                                   !
                                                                               !
                                                                          !
                                   5e+04


                                                                      !

                                                                !
                                                           !


                                                       !
                        Time[ms]

                                   5e+03




                                                   !




                                               !
                                   5e+02




                                           !
                                   5e+01




                                           1   2   3   4   5   6      7   8    9   10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

                                                                          xmark factor[f*0.001]




                                                                                    8
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Decrypted Integrity Check
                                   5e+05
                                           !   Merkle−Hash                                                            !
                                                                                                                          !
                                                                                                                  !
                                                                                                              !
                                               Incremental Checksum                                       !
                                                                                                      !
                                               No Hashing                                         !
                                                                                             !
                                                                                        !
                                                                                   !
                                                                               !
                                                                          !
                                   5e+04


                                                                      !

                                                                !
                                                           !


                                                       !
                        Time[ms]

                                   5e+03




                                                   !




                                               !
                                   5e+02




                                           !
                                   5e+01




                                           1   2   3   4   5   6      7   8    9   10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

                                                                          xmark factor[f*0.001]


   S. Graf, S. K. Belle, and M. Waldvogel, Rolling boles, optimal XML structure integrity for updating
   operations, in Poster on the 20th International Conference on World Wide Web
                                                                                    8
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Encrypted Integrity Check
                       Uber                                   Uber

                   Indirect                    Indirect                 Indirect

                   Indirect                    Indirect                 Indirect

                 RevRoot,0                   RevRoot,0                RevRoot,1

                            Indirect               Indirect                 Indirect
                Name




                                            Name




                                                                     Name
                            Indirect               Indirect                 Indirect

               Node,1            Node,2    Node,1         Node,2     Node,1        Node,3




  J. Bonwick, M. Ahrens,V. Henson, M. Maybee, and M. Shellenbaum, “The zettabyte file
  system,” in FAST 2003: 2nd Usenix Conference on File and Storage Technologies.
                                               9
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Summary of archiving integrity

                                 Goals                    Measurements
                               Integrity                     Dual Integrity



 Security                   ✓ Checks of decrypted data on XML within
                              Treetank
                            ✓ Checks of encrypted data in the cloud and
                              within the transfer based on pages
                            ✓ All integrity structures are persisted
                                             10
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Confidentiality
        ‣ Achieved due to encryption of the data
          → Straightforward
        ‣ Supporting collaborative workflows
          → Key-Management must take place on a trusted third-
          party




                                     11
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Versakey
                                  23   3                       23       3
                            TEK        2          TEK'                  2
                                       1
                                  01   0                      01'       0

                                                            E0 (010 )
                                                                    0
                                                  E   010   (T EK )
                                                  E23 (T EK 0 )

 M. Waldvogel, G. Caronni, D.Sun, N. Weiler, B. Plattner: “The VersaKey framework:Versatile
 group key management” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas of Communication 1999
                                             12
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Key Management on the Data
                                 DEK
                            01

             DEK
                            0
       01


         1
                                DEK
                                      23

                                       2   Key Manager
             DEK                                 23   3
                      23
                                           DEK        2

                    3                                 1
                                                 01   0
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Key Management on the Data
                                  DEK
                             01

             DEK
                             0
       01
                                                                   E0 (010 )
                                                             E010 (DEK 0 )
         1
                                 DEK                         E23 (DEK 0 )
                                       23

                                        2   Key Manager    Key Manager         Key Trails
             DEK                                  23              23
                                                       3                  3
                        23                  DEK            DEK'                     E0 (010 )
                                                       2                  2
                                                                               E010 (DEK 0 )
                                                       1                       E23 (DEK 0 )
                    3
                                                  01   0          01'     0

Sonntag, 18. September 11
Key Management on the Data
                              DEK'
                            01'                    E0 (010 )
                                              E010 (DEK 0 )

             DEK
                            0
       01
                                                                    E0 (010 )
                                                               E010 (DEK 0 )
         1
                                DEK'                           E23 (DEK 0 )
                                    23

                                     2                  E23 (DEK 0 )    Key Manager
           DEK'                                                                 23    3
               23                                                       DEK'          2

                    3
                                         15                                     01'   0
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Summary of archiving confidentiality

                                Goals                   Measurements
                            Confidentiality                    VersaKey



 Security                   ✓ Encryption itself straightforward
                            ✓ Key handling supports changing client-sets
                            ✓ Exposing & supporting versioning
                            ✓ Different handling of keys (within Key Manager)
                             and updates (within the cloud storage)
                                             16
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Accountability
 “Accountability is the requirement that actions of an entity may
                be traced uniquely to that entity.”


          ‣ Achieved due to versioning the data
            → Tracing of insertions, deletions and modifications
          ‣ Together with signatures on the action
            → Non-Repudiation of modifications

G.Stoneburner: Underlaying technical models for information technology security
National Institute of Standards and Technology
                                           17
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Classic Approaches
                                Differential            Differential

                            4                       5

                            3                       4

                            2                       4

                            1                       …

                            0                       0




                                               18
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Classic Approaches
                                Differential            Differential

                            4                       5

                            3                       4

                            2                       4

                            1                       …

                            0                       0




                                Incremental             Incremental

                            4                       6

                            3                       5

                            2                       4

                            1                       …

                            0                       0



                                               18
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Paging the data
                       Uber                                    Uber

                   Indirect                     Indirect                 Indirect

                   Indirect                     Indirect                 Indirect

                 RevRoot,0                    RevRoot,0                RevRoot,1

                            Indirect                Indirect                 Indirect
                Name




                                             Name




                                                                      Name
                            Indirect                Indirect                 Indirect

               Node,1            Node,2     Node,1         Node,2     Node,1        Node,3



    J. Bonwick, M. Ahrens,V. Henson, M. Maybee, and M. Shellenbaum, “The zettabyte file
    system,” in FAST 2003: 2nd Usenix Conference on File and Storage Technologies.
                                               19
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Summary of archiving accountability

                                 Goals                   Measurements
                            Accountability               Adaptive Pagelayer


                            ✓ Each modification on the data results in one
 Security                    subtree
                            ✓ Versions consists out of modifications &
                             injected full-dumps
                            ✓ Robustness and consistent read-write-effort
                                             20
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Putting everything together
                        Client                                Server
             Treetank                            PaaS-Implementation
                   XML                              Data Interf.     Storage
                                                                                       Data Store
               node layer                        Key Trail Propag.
                                                                        Key Trails
               page layer

             storage layer

                                    Local Keys                         Key Manager
                                          DEK                             Key Trail Propag.
                                         01
          NoSQL              File    0
                                                                     Access Ctrl.    Key Mgmt.




                                                  21
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Workflow of Change on Clientset
                            Ext.Tigger    Cloud Storage     Key Mg
                                                                                   23                 3
                                                                       DEK                            2
                                                                                                      1
                                    Delete
                                    Client "1"                                     01                 0




                                                                     E0 (010 )
                                                                                 E010 (DEK 0 )
                                                                                                 E23 (DEK 0 )
                                                    POST
                                                    Key Trails




                                                      22
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Workflow of Storage
                            Client                             Cloud Storage
                                          Session
                                          begin
                                          Keycheck
                                          Challenge
                                      Keycheck                        Validate
                                                                      Hash
                                      H(H(DEK) ⊕ Challenge)
                       Recompute
                       Keys
                                       Key Sync
                                         [Keys differ]
                                         Send Key Trails
                                     Data                             Validate
                                                                      Request
                                     Send read/write request
                                     Data
                                     [Hashs differ]
                                     Request resend
                                            Session
                                            close



                                                  23
Sonntag, 18. September 11
the new insertion operation.

                            Figure 7. Shredding and Serializing of XMark
        XMark, Time
                                                           XMark serialize, f=0.1
                                                           XMark serialize, f=1.0
                                                           XMark shredding, f=0.1
                                   2e+05
                                   5e+04                   XMark shredding, f=1.0
                            [ms]
                                   2e+04
                                   5e+03




                                           0    20           40               60    80          100
                                                                  revisions
                                                                     24
Sonntag, 18. September 11   Figure 7 shows the result. The shredding represents the insertion process while the serializing stand
Figure 8. Performing random insert, Time

        Random Insert, Time
                                   20000
                                   5000
                                   2000




                                                                             250 nodes per commit
                            [ms]




                                                                             500 nodes per commit
                                                                             1000 nodes per commit
                                   1000
                                   500
                                   200
                                   100




                                           0   200   400               600        800        1000
                                                           revisions
                                                               25
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Figure 9. Performing random insert, File

        Random Insert, Space

                                      2e+06
                                      5e+05
                            [bytes]




                                                                                250 nodes per commit
                                      1e+05




                                                                                500 nodes per commit
                                                                                1000 nodes per commit
                                      2e+04
                                      5e+03




                                              0   200   400               600        800        1000
                                                              revisions
                                                              26
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Next Steps
          Dual Integrity
        ✓Implementation of XML-check
        ‣ Improving performance within cryptographic checksums
        ‣ Extending with signatures
        ‣ Introducing page-based integrity-check
          VersaKey
        ✓Implementation of encryption
        ✓Versakey implementation
        ‣ Access to old revisions within new client-joins
                                      27
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Next Steps, .cont
          Versioning
        ✓Implementation and first results
        ✓Analysis of read-/write-effort
        ‣ Working directly on Versioning

          Framework
        ✓ Client partly released
        ✓ Key Management
        ‣ Server

                                    28
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Thanks for your attention…
                           Questions?
                 (or even better: Suggestions!)



        Sebastian Graf
        Distributed Systems Group
        University of Konstanz
        sebastian.graf@uni-konstanz.de

                                         29
Sonntag, 18. September 11
Publications
        1. S.Graf, M.Kramis, M.Waldvogel, "Distributing XML with Focus on Parallel
           Evaluation" in Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on DBISP2P
        2. S. Graf, L. Lewandowski, and M. Waldvogel, “Integrity assurance for
           RESTful XML,” in Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on Web Information
           Systems
        3. S. Graf, M. Kramis, and M. Waldvogel, “Treetank: Designing a versioned
           XML storage,” in XMLPrague’11, 2011.
        4. S.Graf, V.Zhouldev, L. Lewandowski, and M. Waldvogel, “Hecate, managing
           authorization with restful xml,” in Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on
           RESTful Services,
        5. S. Graf, S. K. Belle, and M. Waldvogel, “Rolling boles, optimal XML
           structure integrity for updating operations,” in Poster on the 20th
           International Conference on World Wide Web, ser. WWW ‘11.2011
        6. Trailing Versioning (joint work with Marc Kramis, in progress)
        7. Versakey on distributed storage (in planning)

                                            30
Sonntag, 18. September 11

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A Secure Cloud Gateway based upon XML and Web Services

  • 1. A Secure Cloud Gateway based upon XML and Web Services PhD Symposium, ECOWS ’11 2011-09-16 Sebastian Graf supervised by Prof. Marcel Waldvogel Distributed Systems Group University of Konstanz sebastian.graf@uni-konstanz.de 1 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 2. Problem Statement What approaches support secure storage of data in the cloud ? 2 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 3. Problem Statement What approaches support secure storage of data in the cloud ? Availability: Integrity: • access to data • System Integrity • no unauthorized deletion • Data Integrity Accountability: Confidentiality: • traceability of changes • closure of private data G. Stoneburner: Underlaying technical models for information technology security National Institute of Standards and Technology 2 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 4. Security and Cloud Storage Web Web Services Services Integrity Auditing Rev874 Web Web Services Services Rev25 3 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 5. How to provide… Goals Measurements (Availability Cloud-based Service) R1: How can integrity be ensured Integrity within a distributed environment with focus on fast processing? Security Confidentiality R2: How can key handling be adapted to support collaborative use cases? Accountability R3: How can current versioning approaches be adapted to fit a distributed environment? 4 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 6. Integrity ‣ Data must be consistent while → in transfer → in process → in storage ‣ Data is handled in decrypted form within client but stored encrypted into the cloud → Consistency check must guard data in all representations 5 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 7. Dual Integrity Decrypted Data Encrypted Data ‣ Data is wrapped in XML ‣ XML is mapped to pages ‣ Tree-structure to offer ‣ Pages are encrypted recursive checksums ‣ Pages are ordered within hierarchy to offer versioning and consistency checks 6 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 8. Decrypted Integrity Check <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> ... <country id='f0_404' 3 lr9c name='Switzerland' capital='f0_1627' population='7207060' sl24 19ak datacode='SZ' 4 7 total_area='41290' ...> ... </country> 5 6 67 8 9 ... 56bd 234g mbkl 1117 345v 3 lr9c 3 997d 19ak 8h5y 19ak sl24 4 7 4 7 5 6 67 8 9 5 6 8 9 56bd 234g mbkl 1117 345v 56bd 234g 1117 345v 7 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 9. Decrypted Integrity Check <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> ... <country id='f0_404' 3 lr9c name='Switzerland' capital='f0_1627' population='7207060' sl24 19ak datacode='SZ' 4 7 total_area='41290' ...> ... </country> 5 6 67 8 9 ... 56bd 234g mbkl 1117 345v 3 lr9c 3 997d 19ak 8h5y 19ak sl24 4 7 4 7 5 6 67 8 9 5 6 8 9 56bd 234g mbkl 1117 345v 56bd 234g 1117 345v R. Merkle: A digital signature based on a conventional encryption function Advances in Cryptology, ’86 7 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 10. Decrypted Integrity Check 5e+05 ! Merkle−Hash ! ! ! ! Incremental Checksum ! ! No Hashing ! ! ! ! ! ! 5e+04 ! ! ! ! Time[ms] 5e+03 ! ! 5e+02 ! 5e+01 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 xmark factor[f*0.001] 8 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 11. Decrypted Integrity Check 5e+05 ! Merkle−Hash ! ! ! ! Incremental Checksum ! ! No Hashing ! ! ! ! ! ! 5e+04 ! ! ! ! Time[ms] 5e+03 ! ! 5e+02 ! 5e+01 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 xmark factor[f*0.001] S. Graf, S. K. Belle, and M. Waldvogel, Rolling boles, optimal XML structure integrity for updating operations, in Poster on the 20th International Conference on World Wide Web 8 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 12. Encrypted Integrity Check Uber Uber Indirect Indirect Indirect Indirect Indirect Indirect RevRoot,0 RevRoot,0 RevRoot,1 Indirect Indirect Indirect Name Name Name Indirect Indirect Indirect Node,1 Node,2 Node,1 Node,2 Node,1 Node,3 J. Bonwick, M. Ahrens,V. Henson, M. Maybee, and M. Shellenbaum, “The zettabyte file system,” in FAST 2003: 2nd Usenix Conference on File and Storage Technologies. 9 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 13. Summary of archiving integrity Goals Measurements Integrity Dual Integrity Security ✓ Checks of decrypted data on XML within Treetank ✓ Checks of encrypted data in the cloud and within the transfer based on pages ✓ All integrity structures are persisted 10 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 14. Confidentiality ‣ Achieved due to encryption of the data → Straightforward ‣ Supporting collaborative workflows → Key-Management must take place on a trusted third- party 11 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 15. Versakey 23 3 23 3 TEK 2 TEK' 2 1 01 0 01' 0 E0 (010 ) 0 E 010 (T EK ) E23 (T EK 0 ) M. Waldvogel, G. Caronni, D.Sun, N. Weiler, B. Plattner: “The VersaKey framework:Versatile group key management” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas of Communication 1999 12 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 16. Key Management on the Data DEK 01 DEK 0 01 1 DEK 23 2 Key Manager DEK 23 3 23 DEK 2 3 1 01 0 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 17. Key Management on the Data DEK 01 DEK 0 01 E0 (010 ) E010 (DEK 0 ) 1 DEK E23 (DEK 0 ) 23 2 Key Manager Key Manager Key Trails DEK 23 23 3 3 23 DEK DEK' E0 (010 ) 2 2 E010 (DEK 0 ) 1 E23 (DEK 0 ) 3 01 0 01' 0 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 18. Key Management on the Data DEK' 01' E0 (010 ) E010 (DEK 0 ) DEK 0 01 E0 (010 ) E010 (DEK 0 ) 1 DEK' E23 (DEK 0 ) 23 2 E23 (DEK 0 ) Key Manager DEK' 23 3 23 DEK' 2 3 15 01' 0 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 19. Summary of archiving confidentiality Goals Measurements Confidentiality VersaKey Security ✓ Encryption itself straightforward ✓ Key handling supports changing client-sets ✓ Exposing & supporting versioning ✓ Different handling of keys (within Key Manager) and updates (within the cloud storage) 16 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 20. Accountability “Accountability is the requirement that actions of an entity may be traced uniquely to that entity.” ‣ Achieved due to versioning the data → Tracing of insertions, deletions and modifications ‣ Together with signatures on the action → Non-Repudiation of modifications G.Stoneburner: Underlaying technical models for information technology security National Institute of Standards and Technology 17 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 21. Classic Approaches Differential Differential 4 5 3 4 2 4 1 … 0 0 18 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 22. Classic Approaches Differential Differential 4 5 3 4 2 4 1 … 0 0 Incremental Incremental 4 6 3 5 2 4 1 … 0 0 18 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 23. Paging the data Uber Uber Indirect Indirect Indirect Indirect Indirect Indirect RevRoot,0 RevRoot,0 RevRoot,1 Indirect Indirect Indirect Name Name Name Indirect Indirect Indirect Node,1 Node,2 Node,1 Node,2 Node,1 Node,3 J. Bonwick, M. Ahrens,V. Henson, M. Maybee, and M. Shellenbaum, “The zettabyte file system,” in FAST 2003: 2nd Usenix Conference on File and Storage Technologies. 19 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 24. Summary of archiving accountability Goals Measurements Accountability Adaptive Pagelayer ✓ Each modification on the data results in one Security subtree ✓ Versions consists out of modifications & injected full-dumps ✓ Robustness and consistent read-write-effort 20 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 25. Putting everything together Client Server Treetank PaaS-Implementation XML Data Interf. Storage Data Store node layer Key Trail Propag. Key Trails page layer storage layer Local Keys Key Manager DEK Key Trail Propag. 01 NoSQL File 0 Access Ctrl. Key Mgmt. 21 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 26. Workflow of Change on Clientset Ext.Tigger Cloud Storage Key Mg 23 3 DEK 2 1 Delete Client "1" 01 0 E0 (010 ) E010 (DEK 0 ) E23 (DEK 0 ) POST Key Trails 22 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 27. Workflow of Storage Client Cloud Storage Session begin Keycheck Challenge Keycheck Validate Hash H(H(DEK) ⊕ Challenge) Recompute Keys Key Sync [Keys differ] Send Key Trails Data Validate Request Send read/write request Data [Hashs differ] Request resend Session close 23 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 28. the new insertion operation. Figure 7. Shredding and Serializing of XMark XMark, Time XMark serialize, f=0.1 XMark serialize, f=1.0 XMark shredding, f=0.1 2e+05 5e+04 XMark shredding, f=1.0 [ms] 2e+04 5e+03 0 20 40 60 80 100 revisions 24 Sonntag, 18. September 11 Figure 7 shows the result. The shredding represents the insertion process while the serializing stand
  • 29. Figure 8. Performing random insert, Time Random Insert, Time 20000 5000 2000 250 nodes per commit [ms] 500 nodes per commit 1000 nodes per commit 1000 500 200 100 0 200 400 600 800 1000 revisions 25 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 30. Figure 9. Performing random insert, File Random Insert, Space 2e+06 5e+05 [bytes] 250 nodes per commit 1e+05 500 nodes per commit 1000 nodes per commit 2e+04 5e+03 0 200 400 600 800 1000 revisions 26 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 31. Next Steps Dual Integrity ✓Implementation of XML-check ‣ Improving performance within cryptographic checksums ‣ Extending with signatures ‣ Introducing page-based integrity-check VersaKey ✓Implementation of encryption ✓Versakey implementation ‣ Access to old revisions within new client-joins 27 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 32. Next Steps, .cont Versioning ✓Implementation and first results ✓Analysis of read-/write-effort ‣ Working directly on Versioning Framework ✓ Client partly released ✓ Key Management ‣ Server 28 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 33. Thanks for your attention… Questions? (or even better: Suggestions!) Sebastian Graf Distributed Systems Group University of Konstanz sebastian.graf@uni-konstanz.de 29 Sonntag, 18. September 11
  • 34. Publications 1. S.Graf, M.Kramis, M.Waldvogel, "Distributing XML with Focus on Parallel Evaluation" in Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on DBISP2P 2. S. Graf, L. Lewandowski, and M. Waldvogel, “Integrity assurance for RESTful XML,” in Proceedings of the 7th Workshop on Web Information Systems 3. S. Graf, M. Kramis, and M. Waldvogel, “Treetank: Designing a versioned XML storage,” in XMLPrague’11, 2011. 4. S.Graf, V.Zhouldev, L. Lewandowski, and M. Waldvogel, “Hecate, managing authorization with restful xml,” in Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on RESTful Services, 5. S. Graf, S. K. Belle, and M. Waldvogel, “Rolling boles, optimal XML structure integrity for updating operations,” in Poster on the 20th International Conference on World Wide Web, ser. WWW ‘11.2011 6. Trailing Versioning (joint work with Marc Kramis, in progress) 7. Versakey on distributed storage (in planning) 30 Sonntag, 18. September 11