In this note, published in January 2007, I correctly predicted months in advance that Nokia would soon stop designing its own chips and switch to merchant silicon solutions... A revolution for the wireless IC industry at the time....
1. Produced by: ABN AMRO
Bank NV
Tuesday 23 January 2007 Flashnote
Semiconductors Neutral
Sector relative to market
Big bang ahead?
Key recommendations & forecasts
Reuters Year end Recom Price Target EPS PE
price 1fcst 1fcst
ARM ARM.L Dec 2006 Hold £1.19 £1.20 0.05 24.5
ASML ASML.AS Dec 2007 Buy €19.25 €25.00 1.48 13.0
CSR CSR.L Dec 2006 Buy £6.75 £7.60 0.80 16.6
Infineon IFXGn.DE Sep 2007 Buy €10.74 €12.00 0.41 26.1
Europe
ST STM.N Dec 2006 Hold US$18.26 US$16.50 0.83 22.0
Wolfson WLF.L Dec 2006 Buy £3.10 £3.55 0.32 19.4
Source: Company data, ABN AMRO forecasts
Quick summary
Texas Instruments (TI) announced yesterday that it would stop developing
leading-edge process technology beyond 45nm. Instead, the company will rely
on foundry partners to manufacture its advanced logic/SoC chips. We believe
this is a major change in strategy for TI and has significant implications for the
industry, the most important one being that Nokia may choose to use standard
chipsets instead of its own proprietary solution in the next two to three years. As
software, IP and mixed-signal integration become the main differentiation Sector performance
(1M) (3M) (12M)
factors, companies with substantial IP and software such as Infineon, CSR and
Absolute -3.3 8.1 17.5
Wolfson look most likely to benefit, while STM looks most likely to suffer from Absolute % -2.1 5.6 12.9
this trend. In addition, TI's change of manufacturing strategy could mean ARM's Rel market % -4.8 0.9 -4.2
Physical IP business will never take off as it uses in-house IP until 45nm before
Source: Bloomberg
moving to foundries at 32nm. We maintain our Buy rating on Infineon, ASML,
CSR and Wolfson and Hold on STM and ARM.
FTSE Eurotop 300 Index: 1513.52
Why the change? Europe IT Hardware: 152.73
We believe TI has decided to abandon its leading-edge process development for
several reasons:
■ Process development is too costly: for leading-edge logic IDMs such as TI
or STM, about 1/3 of R&D is spent on process development. The other 2/3 is
spent on system-software development and application-specific designs. This
means TI spent about US$724m on process development last year. TI
indicated it would start working on 45nm this year and would stop after that,
which should result in some significant cost savings over the next 24 months.
This is also a good way for TI to expand its operating margins, in out view.
■ Foundries have caught up: While TI (and other IDMs like STM) has
claimed that in-house manufacturing for logic was a competitive advantage
vs Qualcomm and fabless companies, the company indicated that foundries Analyst
are now capable of delivering the most advanced manufacturing processes in Didier Scemama
United Kingdom
line with TI. Currently about 50% of TI’s digital chips are outsourced. This +44 20 7678 0772
will increase to 100% over time. didier.scemama@uk.abnamro.com
■ Nokia potentially changing its strategy: The key question is: ‘Why did TI Marketing analyst
change its mind?’. We believe that it has to be motivated by discussions the Harvey Robinson
+44 20 7678 1708
Important disclosures and analyst certifications regarding
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2. SEM I CO ND U C TORS
company had with its most important customer, Nokia. TI, just like STM, has
always stressed that some of its major OEM customers (read Nokia and Ericsson)
wanted to develop their own chips for cell phones (ASIC) using TI’s DSP and
advanced lithography process. The fact that TI has decided to stop process
development suggests Nokia may have changed its mind. In addition, TI has
recently lost Ericsson as an ASIC customer to STM, which may also have
contributed to the decision.
■ ODMs’ role increasingly important: Although Taiwanese ODMs have
increased their role in handset design and manufacturing at the low-end,
primarily servicing the likes of Motorola and Sony Ericsson, major OEMs have so
far kept in-house the manufacturing and/or design for mid-range and high-end
models. This is particularly true for Nokia. TI’s move on the process front may be
an indication that ODMs are likely to gain more business from Nokia and Sony
Ericsson in the mid range/high end. ODMs like to use off-the-shelf solutions ie a
standard chipset and software in order to focus on industrial design and reduce
time to market. As such, they are more likely to use a standard product from TI,
manufactured by TSMC, than a custom design chip running the OEM software.
What are the implications of this change?
■ Nokia may choose to use ‘customised’ standard products: With this
announcement we believe it is becoming increasingly clear that Nokia is about to
change its chipset design strategy. So far Nokia has always used its own chipset,
designed in house, for cellular communications (ie digital baseband, power
management and RF transceiver) as it was ahead of competitors that had to rely
on standard chipsets coming from semiconductor vendors. Nokia’s
proprietary/custom chipsets are currently manufactured by TI (100% share in
baseband), STM (100% share in EDGE and UMTS RF transceivers and power
management) and Infineon (100% share in GSM/GPRS RF transceivers). We
believe Nokia could now decide to use standard chips from semiconductor
vendors that would run Nokia’s proprietary software. This would help Nokia use
two semiconductor vendors for each chip used in their phones as opposed to the
current single-sourcing strategy. In a nutshell, this means Nokia could very well
use a TI-designed UMTS chip on some models and an Infineon-designed UMTS
baseband chip on others. However, both of them would use Nokia’s proprietary
software, which would reduce its suppliers’ lock-in. Note that Nokia has already
implemented this strategy with Bluetooth using CSR and TI chips and WiFi using
STM chips running their own software. The same changes could also happen for
RF and power management, opening the door to the likes of Silicon Labs,
Infineon, RFMD and Skyworks. RF chips from these vendors are already ahead of
those designed by Nokia and manufactured by STM.
■ IP, software and mixed-signal integration becoming increasingly
important: while historically TI has lagged the likes of Qualcomm in terms of IP
and software (TI relied on its OEM partners, Nokia and Ericsson), it has always
had an advantage in terms manufacturing scale and process technology.
However, this advantage has gone, according to TI itself. Differentiation for TI
will have to come from IP and software, ie coming up first with the latest
baseband technology supporting the latest cellular standards. This implies
substantial R&D investment for TI in communication systems. TI can, however,
differentiate via the integration of mixed-signal ICs (RF for instance) in next-
generation baseband chips thanks to its leading analog/mixed signal design
teams. In any case, the ‘old’ model of IC manufacturing custom chips for big
OEMs seems to have run its course.
■ M&A may accelerate: As software and IP becomes increasingly important,
large companies such as TI may have to acquire fabless companies that have a
specific IP or software in a niche market they don’t have.
SEM I CO ND U C TORS 2 3 J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 7
2
3. SEM I CO ND U C TORS
Implications for the Euro chip vendors
■ STM may need to acquire a baseband and/or RF chipset vendor: Most of
STM’s wireless business is based on custom business with Nokia. Although it has
grown its standard chip business with bluetooth and WiFi, we believe STM does
not offer the software package that goes with the chip, essentially reducing the
opportunity to sell this chip to large OEMs like Nokia or Ericsson. STM will need
to acquire or develop its own Bluetooth, WiFi and cellular software to address
Nokia’s potential future needs and, importantly, the ODM market, whether or not
Nokia and others decide to outsource further. In addition, STM may have to
increase R&D in the medium term to improve its weak software and system IP
offering. Finally, as NXP and, potentially, Freescale (after the announcement of
their R&D partnership with IBM) leave the Crolles 2 alliance (a JV formed to
develop leading-edge manufacturing process) STM may be left alone. As such
the company may have to increase its capital and R&D spending in the short
term to continue funding Crolles 2 as its IP-poor product portfolio does not allow
for a more fablite model. While the company may benefit from the gain of EMP in
the short term, we believe the company’s business model is increasingly under
pressure if not outdated, which makes us cautious about its long-term margin
outlook.
■ Infineon, CSR and Wolfson seem to be in an ideal position to capitalise
on this trend: while Infineon has had limited business with Nokia (GSM RF only)
and Sony Ericsson due to their strategies of using proprietary design, we believe
Infineon’s technical leadership in GPRS/EDGE system solutions, single-chip
HSDPA/EDGE CMOS RF, single-chip GSM/GPRS solution and HSDPA/EDGE
baseband and as well as software, puts the company in an ideal position to
capitalise on this trend. Infineon could address not only Nokia’s internal design
platforms (through an Infineon baseband running Nokia software, for instance)
but also outsourced models to ODMs. Similarly, CSR’s bluetooth and WiFi SoCs
are based on proprietary design and software. They offer a complete off-the-
shelf solution for OEMs and ODMs that do not have internal chip design or
software development teams. As Nokia and other OEMs such as Sony Ericsson
decide potentially to use more standard solutions and/or outsource more models
to ODMs, it opens up substantial opportunities for them. Wolfson also stands to
benefit very substantially. So far Wolfson has had no business with Nokia, Sony
Ericsson and Motorola, all of which use proprietary audio solutions from STM,
Dialog and TI. Should these handset OEMs use standard components as part of a
new platform, it would substantially increase the addressable market for
Wolfson. As we have consistently argued, such a decision is highly political and
as such may take time.
■ ARM’s Physical IP business may never take off: While ARM has indicated it
expected its physical IP business to take off with IDMs over the next five years,
we believe TI’s decision to stop process development at 45nm and move to
foundries from 32nm essentially implies TI may never buy a physical IP licence
from ARM. The in-house process development until 45nm means TI will have its
own standard cell IP library. However, as it moves to TSMC, for instance, for
32nm it will not have to license ARM’s physical IP as all foundries are already
ARM customers. It does potentially bode well for physical IP royalties, as
significantly higher volumes may channel through foundries over the next five
years. With NXP and Infineon essentially stepping out of leading-edge
manufacturing, LSI and Agere going fabless and Freescale evaluating its options,
only a handful of companies (STM, Renesas, Toshiba, Sony?) remain committed
to in-house leading-edge process development, which may reduce further the
potential opportunity for ARM’s physical IP.
SEM I CO ND U C TORS 2 3 J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 7
3
4. SEM I CO ND U C TORS
Conclusion: a major change ahead for the chip industry?
TI’s decision to stop leading-edge process manufacturing beyond 45nm is a step
change for the industry. It puts additional pressure on fellow IDMs such as STM
whose product portfolio lacks IP and system software, particularly in wireless. In
order to adapt, STM may have to make substantial R&D investments and/or
substantial acquisitions. Simply put, STM’s business model is not adapted to this
new environment, which makes us cautious about its medium-term prospects. We
maintain our Hold rating and target price of US$16.50.
As we have explained, we believe TI’s strategic evolution on the manufacturing side
may have negative implications for ARM’s Physical IP business. While royalties may
over time become substantial, we believe ARM may not be able to sell its physical IP
to IDMs, which was the basic rationale behind the US$1bn acquisition. We maintain
our Hold rating and price target of 120p.
On the other hand, we believe the trend towards asset-light, IP-rich business
models is favourable to Infineon, CSR and Wolfson. We believe TI’s decision could
indicate that Nokia may decide to open up to standard products for the digital
baseband and RF, which may benefit Infineon. We maintain our Buy rating and price
target of €12 on Infineon.
At the same time, the introduction of new platforms may open up opportunities for
Wolfson at Nokia, Sony Ericsson and Motorola, either via OEM manufactured models
or ODM-outsourced models. Wolfson currently does not supply any of these OEMs
and any indications that it may do so would be a positive for the stock. It supports
too our view that Wolfson remains a prime takeover candidate. We maintain our Buy
rating and price target of 355p.
CSR stands to gain from more outsourcing of handset models to ODMs from the
likes of Nokia, Sony Ericsson and Motorola, in our view. While CSR’s bluetooth chips
are widely used already by Nokia, the company could benefit from Sony Ericsson
and Motorola outsourcing more models to ODMs. It could also help them sell more
WiFi chips and kick start their GPS technology thanks to their off-the-shelf approach,
which is particularly appreciated by ODMs. Other companies such as STM cannot
supply ODMs today with their current portfolio and would be unable to supply ODM-
designed Nokia models, for instance. Besides CSR’s solid long-term position
confirms our view that it could be a take-over candidate. We maintain our Buy
rating and price target of 760p.
SEM I CO ND U C TORS 2 3 J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 7
4
5. DISCLOSURES APPENDIX
Recommendation structure
Absolute performance, short term (trading) recommendation: A Trading Buy recommendation implies upside of 5% or more and a Trading Sell indicates downside
of 5% or more. The trading recommendation time horizon is 0-60 days. For Australian coverage, a Trading Buy recommendation implies upside of 5% or more
from the suggested entry price range, and a Trading Sell recommendation implies downside of 5% or more from the suggested entry price range. The trading
recommendation time horizon is 0-60 days.
Absolute performance, long term (fundamental) recommendation: The recommendation is based on implied upside/downside for the stock from the target price. A
Buy/Sell implies upside/downside of 10% or more and a Hold less than 10%. For listed property trusts (LPT) or real estate investment trusts (REIT) the
recommendation is based upon the target price plus the dividend yield, ie total return. A Buy implies a total return of 10% or more, a Hold 5-10% and a Sell less
than 5%. This structure applies to research on Asian and European stocks published from 1 November 2005; on Australian stocks from 7 November 2006 and on
continental European small and mid cap stocks from 23 November 2006. For UK small caps a Buy/Sell implies upside/downside of 10% or more, an Add/Reduce 5-
10% and a Hold less than 5%.
Performance parameters and horizon: Given the volatility of share prices and our pre-disposition not to change recommendations frequently, these performance
parameters should be interpreted flexibly. Performance in this context only reflects capital appreciation and the horizon is 12 months.
Sector relative to market: The sector view relative to the market is the responsibility of the strategy team. Overweight/Underweight implies upside/downside of
10% or more and Neutral implies less than 10% upside/downside.
Target price: The target price is the level the stock should currently trade at if the market were to accept the analyst's view of the stock and if the necessary
catalysts were in place to effect this change in perception within the performance horizon. In this way, therefore, the target price abstracts from the need to take a
view on the market or sector. If it is felt that the catalysts are not fully in place to effect a re-rating of the stock to its warranted value, the target price will differ
from 'fair' value.
Asset allocation: The asset allocation is the responsibility of the economics team. The recommended weight (Over, Neutral and Under) for equities, cash and bonds
is based on a number of metrics and does not relate to a particular size change in one variable.
Stock borrowing rating: The stock borrowing rating is the subjective view and responsibility of the ABN AMRO equity finance team: Easy implies ready availability.
Moderate implies some availability. Hard implies availability is tight. Impossible implies no availability.
Distribution of recommendations
The tables below show the distribution of ABN AMRO's recommendations (both long term and trading). The first column displays the distribution of
recommendations globally and the second column shows the distribution for the region. Numbers in brackets show the percentage for each category where ABN
AMRO has an investment banking relationship.
Long Term recommendations (as at 23 Jan 2007) Trading recommendations (as at 23 Jan 2007)
Global total (IB%) Europe total (IB%) Global total (IB%) Europe total (IB%)
Buy 595 (22) 251 (49) Trading Buy 6 (17) 3 (33)
Add 19 (47) 17 (53)
Hold 517 (17) 229 (34)
Reduce 1 (0) 0 (0)
Sell 141 (6) 48 (17) Trading Sell 2 (100) 2 (100)
Total (IB%) 1273 (19) 545 (40) Total (IB%) 8 (38) 5 (60)
Valuation and risks to target price
ARM (RIC: ARM.L, Rec: Hold, CP: £1.19, TP: £1.20): Main upside risks to our DCF-based target price are significant market share gains, better-than-expected
demand for 3G phone and smartphones and a lower-than-expected GBP/USD exchange rate. Main downside risks are a larger-than-expected inventory correction
and a growing proportion of low-end phones.
CSR (RIC: CSR.L, Rec: Buy, CP: £6.75, TP: £7.60): Our target price is based on CY07F PE ex cash of 20x, which reflects CSR's mono-product nature but also
its growth potential. Our target price is backed by a DCF-based valuation. Risks to our target price include: 1) loss of market share in bluetooth to competitors
Broadcom, TI and others, 2) inventory build in headsets, 3) increased pricing pressure in the cell phone space due to lower-than-expected attach rate and
increased competition, and 4) delay in the ramp-up of new products such as BC5-FM or UniFi.
Infineon (RIC: IFXGn.DE, Rec: Buy, CP: €10.74, TP: €12.00): Downside risks to our DCF-based target include (1) market share loss in cellular baseband, (2)
inventory build in cell phones, (3) increased price pressure in automotive and smart cards, and (4) lower demand for DRAM chips driving down the value of its
stake in Qimonda. Upside risks are (1) new customer wins and (2) better pricing.
STMicroelectronics (RIC: STM.N, Rec: Hold, CP: US$18.26, TP: US$16.50): The main upside risks to our rating and DCF-based price target are: (1)
announcement of a JV for the memory group, (2) a lower EUR/USD rate, and (3) new design wins. The main downside risks are: (1) more severe than expected
inventory correction, (2) lower demand for 3G and higher-end handsets in 2007, and (3) market share losses in the company's target markets.
Wolfson Microelectronics (RIC: WLF.L, Rec: Buy, CP: £3.10, TP: £3.55): Risks to our DCF-based target price and recommendation on Wolfson include: 1)
loss of market share in stereo audio DAC to competitors TI, Cirrus and AKM in the portable audio segment, 2) inventory build in handsets, 3) increased pricing
pressure in the cell phone space due to lower than expected demand for multimedia models and 4) delay in the ramp up of new products such as ISP.
ARM
Stock performance, recommendations and coverage (as at 22 Jan 2007) Trading recommendation
history (as at 23 Jan 2007)
Date Rec Analyst
n/a
Didier Scemama started covering this stock on 18 Aug 04
Moved to new recommendation structure between 1 November 2005 and 31 January 2006
SEM I CO ND U C TORS 2 3 J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 7
5
6. DISCLOSURES APPENDIX
CSR
Stock performance, recommendations and coverage (as at 22 Jan 2007) Trading recommendation
history (as at 23 Jan 2007)
Date Rec Analyst
17 Aug 2006 n/a CA
12 Jul 2006 Trading Buy CA
03 May 2006 n/a CA
27 Jan 2006 Trading Buy CA
Didier Scemama started covering this stock on 8 Jun 04
Moved to new recommendation structure between 1 November 2005 and 31 January 2006
Infineon
Stock performance, recommendations and coverage (as at 22 Jan 2007) Trading recommendation
history (as at 23 Jan 2007)
Date Rec Analyst
11 Jan 2007 n/a CA
22 Nov 2006 Trading Buy CA
18 Nov 2006 n/a CA
18 Sep 2006 Trading Buy CA
Didier Scemama started covering this stock on 18 Aug 04
Moved to new recommendation structure between 1 November 2005 and 31 January 2006
STMicroelectronics
Stock performance, recommendations and coverage (as at 22 Jan 2007) Trading recommendation
history (as at 23 Jan 2007)
Date Rec Analyst
25 Oct 2006 n/a CA
18 Sep 2006 Trading Buy CA
26 Apr 2006 Trading Buy CA
26 Apr 2006 n/a CA
25 Mar 2006 n/a CA
23 Jan 2006 Trading Buy CA
Didier Scemama started covering this stock on 3 Dec 97
Moved to new recommendation structure between 1 November 2005 and 31 January 2006
SEM I CO ND U C TORS 2 3 J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 7
6
7. DISCLOSURES APPENDIX
Wolfson Microelectronics
Stock performance, recommendations and coverage (as at 22 Jan 2007) Trading recommendation
history (as at 23 Jan 2007)
Date Rec Analyst
08 Aug 2006 n/a PA
12 Jul 2006 Trading Buy PA
Didier Scemama started covering this stock on 24 Oct 06
Moved to new recommendation structure between 1 November 2005 and 31 January 2006
Regulatory disclosures
Subject companies: ARM.L, CSR.L, IFXGn.DE, STM.N, WLF.L
In the ordinary course of their business, ABN AMRO and its affiliates may effect transactions for their own account or for the account of their customers and hold
long or short positions in the securities of this company or related derivatives. In addition, ABN AMRO and any of its affiliates may engage in market-making
activities in relation to the securities of this company or related derivatives and may enter into transactions in the securities of the company or related derivatives
which may affect the market price, liquidity or value of the securities of this company.: CSR.L
ABN AMRO has received compensation for investment banking services from this company, its subsidiaries or affiliates during the previous 12 months: ARM.L,
IFXGn.DE
ABN AMRO ROTHSCHILD is appointed by Infineon as Co-Lead Manager of Qimonda AG's IPO offering.: IFXGn.DE
ABN AMRO expects to receive, or intends to seek, compensation during the next three months for investment banking services from this company, its subsidiaries
or affiliates: ARM.L, IFXGn.DE
ABN AMRO currently maintains a market in the security of this company and otherwise purchases and sells securities of this company as principal: ARM.L
ABN AMRO Rothschild was appointed as Joint Lead Manager for the GDR offering of Inotera Memories Inc.: IFXGn.DE
SEM I CO ND U C TORS 2 3 J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 7
7
8. DISCLOSURES APPENDIX
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On a general basis, the efficacy of recommendations is a factor in the performance appraisals of analysts.
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For a discussion of the valuation methodologies used to derive our price targets and the risks that could impede their achievement, please refer to our latest
published research on those stocks at www.abnamroresearch.com.
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