This document summarizes a presentation on the responsibilities of scientists regarding dual-use research and technology. It argues that basic scientific inquiry should be unrestricted, but that technology can be legitimately regulated to prevent harm. A distinction is made between exploring nature, which is a scientific commons that cannot be inhibited, and human-made artifacts, which may pose risks and be subject to oversight. Scientists have a duty to consider potential harms and self-restraint, though governments also have a role in regulating technology to protect safety.

1. Vermelding onderdeel organisatie
October 22, 2012
1
CAST seminar, Copenhagen, Denmark
David Koepsell, TU Delft, TPM Faculty, Philosophy Section
Security, whose responsibility?:
The ontological foundations for a scientific commons in
the age of Dual-Use concerns.

2. October 13, 2012 2
The Ethical Context
Rapid rate of technological progress, and increasing
availability of cheaper tools for scientific and
technological applications, make it harder to ensure
public safety.
It is becoming easier to create catastrophic technologies
without detection.

3. October 13, 2012 3
The Ethical Context
How can we help ensure a safer world? What roles do
governments have, and what roles do scientists and
technologists have?
Who is morally responsible for dangerous research and
development?
What can governments legitimately inhibit?

4. October 13, 2012 4
Aims
To provide an argument for a distinction between the
realm of science, and the realm of technology as
technologies converge.
To argue for unfettered inquiry into scientific truths
To establish where government might legitimately
regulate technology

5. October 13, 2012 5
Science and Ethics
Traditionally, individual responsibility for deployment of
dangerous technology has divorced scientists from
the consequences.
Precepts: a) science should inquire into everything
b) politicians and maybe engineers are
responsible for deployment

6. October 13, 2012 6
Science and Ethics
These precepts lead to a sort of “scientific firewall”
against moral responsibility. Scientists cannot be
morally responsible because their duty is the
unfettered exploration of everything, regardless of
potential consequences.
Is there an ontological basis for the distinction? If so,
what responsibility do scientists have as compared to
engineers and politicians?

7. October 13, 2012 7
Science and Ethics
Q: Do scientists ever have a positive moral duty to
refrain? Let’s consider a graphic example…

8. October 13, 2012 8
Smallpox Science
Smallpox was eliminated from the
environment in 1977. It could have
been eliminated altogether, and all
stores of the virus destroyed. But
as late as 2001, scientists in the
US decided to conduct
experiments to create a monkey-
model of variola infection…

9. October 13, 2012 9
The Australian Mousepox “Trick”
UPI: “CANBERRA, Australia, Jan. 11 (UPI) -- Scientists
working for the Australian government have created a
genetically engineered mousepox virus more deadly to
mice than the original virus. Even when vaccinated
with a normally effective vaccine, half the mice died
after infection with the new virus.
Biological warfare experts are worried that the current
international Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, abbreviated BTWC, may not be strong
enough to cope with the misuse of the genetic
engineering techniques. Governments from all over
the world have been meeting in Geneva for six years
to address the BTWC shortcomings, but have failed to
reach final agreement.
Dr. Ian Ramshaw, a viral engineer and the immunologist
on the mousepox experiment, told United Press
International that inserting genetic material has
hazards. His team will publish their research in the
February issue of the Journal of Virology.
"It is a potentially vile weapon," Renshaw said.”

10. October 13, 2012 10
The Australian Mousepox “Trick”
The gene splice involved with the Mousepox Trick may
easily be applied to smallpox, making a nearly
unstoppable weapon.
So why shouldn’t scientists now take the next step and
see if this is true?
Critical inquiry: is it scientifically necessary? Is it morally
permissible?

11. October 13, 2012 11
Smallpox Ethics
The Dual-Use argument ultimately is unhelpful, even a nuclear
bomb has a dual-use (like Project Orion, above). Dual-use was
used to justify smallpox research (a catch-22 argument).
Are there or should there be moral limits to some research? Is
some research morally prohibited because of its nature?
Is there a model for shaping researchers’ behaviours?
Ontology provides some guidance…

12. October 13, 2012 12
Examples
Science doesn’t kill
people; people with
technologies kill people
…

13. October 13, 2012 13
Examples
But even the most ardent gun-
rights proponent will not
support free ownership of
tactical nuclear weapons, and
international law prohibits
research and development of
such weapons.

14. October 13, 2012 14
Examples
I contend that the bulwark against regulation must stand
between the realms of science and technology
Science demands free and unfettered investigation into
nature.
Technology may be ethically regulated, however…

15. October 13, 2012 15
Converging Technologies
Converging technologies (synthetic biology,
nanotechnology) pose a theoretical conundrum for
previously clear distinctions between nature and man-
made…
Where components of new technologies are molecular,
at what level is it possible to regulate without
infringing on the right of inquiry? Is it morally right to
restrict or track precursors?

16. A Defense of Basic Science
Regardless the scale, the distinction between nature
and artifice is always the border between what may
and may not be ethically regulated.
E.g., Research into fission cannot be legitimately
curtailed, even to the point of producing nuclear chain
reactions, when
a) science demands it (something remains unknown)
and
b) the intent is to further human knowledge
October 13, 2012 16

17. A Defense of Basic Science
Freedom of conscience and expression demand that
free, unfettered exploration into nature continue,
which sometimes requires testing of hypotheses
through experiment or proof of concept.
The first successful nuclear test could have been
morally defensible if
a) it aimed to test hypotheses as part of exploration
into nature, and
b) if the science gained were then made open and
public
October 13, 2012 17

18. A Defense of Basic Science
Failing to disclose the basic science undermines its role
in inquiry, and impedes the scientific commons. Only
by disclosure can hypotheses be properly tested.
Scientific truths (laws of nature) are a “commons-by-
necessity” and cannot be justly monopolized by
scientists (as opposed to their applications through
technology)
October 13, 2012 18

19. A Defense of Basic Science
The dividing lines:
nature experiment technology
free inquiry free inquiry may be limited
(as nec to (significant harm,
test hypotheses) least restr.
means)
October 13, 2012 19

20. A Defense of Basic Science
How to distinguish nature from artifacts:
Nature: no human intention or design. This is a commons-
by (logical/material) necessity, and may be freely
explored by all
Artifice (artifacts and man-made processes): human
intention and design. Inhibiting impedes rights to
expression, but does not impede the scientific commons-
by-necessity
October 13, 2012 20

21. Regulation of Artifice
Artifice is legitimately regulated, but must be recognized as
curtailing free expression, thus burden is to show:
a) substantial harm without regulation
and compelling state interest in preventing the harm
b) least restrictive means and amount of censorship
October 13, 2012 21

22. Regulation of Artifice
Thus, e.g., “mousepox trick”
Basic science, including proof of concept in mice, should
be unfettered. Must also be published as truths of nature
are scientific commons. Discoveries must be open and
free to fulfill aims and methods of basic science.
BUT: smallpox testing poses significant harm, and arguably
unnecessary. Mousepox model sufficient, and not
harmful.
October 13, 2012 22

23. Regulation of Artifice
H5N1 research:
Basic science, including proof of concept in ferrets, should
be unfettered. Must also be published as truths of nature
are scientific commons. Discoveries must be open and
free to fulfill aims and methods of basic science.
BUT: further testing poses significant harm, and arguably
unnecessary.
October 13, 2012 23

24. Conclusions
1) Basic science must not be regulated. Free inquiry is
necessary, including experiments when
• Necessary to delve into a truth of nature
(Nature is a commons)
• Results published freely and openly
(without this, science cannot proceed, hypotheses
cannot be tested, challenged)
October 13, 2012 24

25. Conclusions
2) Artifice can be regulated, just as certain other
expressions may be regulated, when
• A significant harm could result, and
• Least restrictive means used to regulate
October 13, 2012 25

26. Conclusions
3) distinction between nature and artifice marks a dividing
line beyond which scientists and others must impose
greater self-restraint and reflection:
• Nature (no human intention or design, may be freely
inquired into)
• Artifice (human intention and design), may be
regulated to a degree
October 13, 2012 26

27. Conclusions
4) scientists have a primary, moral responsibility to
consider the potential harms of their research, anticipate
and avoid them as best they can. Moral education
should be a part of scientific training. The scientific
firewall is a myth.
October 13, 2012 27

28. Conclusions
The ontology informs the ethics.
October 13, 2012 28

29. October 13, 2012 29
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