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AMI Security Workshop Addresses Challenges of Securing Smart Grid Infrastructure
- 3. Presenters Slade Griffin – Penetration Testing & Incident Handling Engineer, EnerNex Kevin Brown – RF & Embedded Security Engineer, EnerNex Ido Dubrawsky – Security Engineering Team Lead, Itron Robert Former – Head of Security Research and Testing, Itron Stephen Chasko – Principal Security Engineer, Landis+Gyr Edward Beroset – Director of Technology and Standards, Elster Robert Humphrey – Lead IT Security Analyst, Duke Energy
- 5. Gartner Hype Cycle – Where Are We? You Are Here
- 6. Merging Two Infrastructures Electrical Infrastructure “ Intelligence” Infrastructure
- 8. Utility WAN NAN HAN Securing Communications
- 9. IT-based & Web-based WAN RF & Embedded Technologies & Protocols
- 10. Smart Meters and Infrastructure
- 12. AMI HAN Concerns
- 17. Security Development Lifecycle vs. Traditional Development Lifecycle Threat Modeling Complete and Mitigations Reflected in Specifications Product Code Complete Final Release Candidate Requirements Design Implementation Verification Release Support & Servicing Feature Lists Quality Guidelines Architecture Docs Schedules Functional Specifications Design Specifications Testing and Verification Development of New Code Bug Fixes Code Signing & Signoff RTM Product Support Service Packs/QFEs Security Updates Security Kickoff Security Design Best Practices Security Architecture & Attack Surface Review Threat Modeling Use Security Development Tools & Security Best Dev & Test Practices Create Security Documentation And Tools for Products Prepare Security Response Plan Security Push Pen Testing Final Security Review Signoff On Security Requirements Security Servicing & Response Execution Security Training
- 21. Attack Surface Example Source: Microsoft, 2009
- 24. Example Attack Tree Source: Schneier, Bruce, Attack Trees, Dr. Dobbs Journal, December 1999, accessed at: http://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-ddj-ft.html
- 31. Attack Tree Threat Assessment Security Goals Privacy Assessment Incident Response Periodic Threat Assessment Process Audits Security Test Results Audit against threat model External Penetration Testing Process Compliance Release Verification Peer Review Resolution Automated Review Results Tool Review Security Architecture Cryptography Review Security Test Plan – Attacks, Cryptography, Functionality Coding Practices
- 33. Security Focus and AMI Security Goals
- 36. Security vs Operations Mount the Box How High?
- 37. Security vs Operations Mount the Box How High?
- 38. Security vs Operations Mount the Box How High?
- 39. Security vs Operations Mount the Box How High?
- 40. Security vs Operations Mount the Box How High?
- 41. Inside the Box Memory Coms Module Coms Module USB Serial Sensor Relay Switch Actuator
- 42. The Cyber-Physical Line Memory Coms Module Coms Module USB Serial Sensor Relay Switch Actuator
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- And applications. As utilities begin to trust the information and availability of these systems the are being automated; taking the human out of the loop. Vulnerabilities are constantly changing - algorithms broken - faster computers, cloud computing, parallel computing at desktop (graphics cards) - increased availability to commodity components - etc., etc.
- May indicate this as Risk Management.. this is an ongoing process too.
- I get the notion that many utilities get just one person to do their testing vs. selecting a team where each brings value within a given skill set. Even if a utility picks a company to do their testing, only one person gets assigned. I think it is important to get the diverse skill set: power systems understanding, understanding regulation, standards, and best practices for the given industry, embedded security, network security, platform security, project management and so on. I think another thing for external engagements is knowing what the information sharing agreement is. I treat the Duke-EnerNex relationship as a closed one. Meaning we do not disclose any findings or information except to Duke. I’ve noticed in some instances where the researcher wants to retain rights to the information or set a time-limit on when they can release their findings to the general public. Another arrangement would be where there is open information sharing between the utility and vendor. In whatever the case, I think utilities should know what they are signing up for.