This document discusses continuous monitoring of industrial networks to detect problems. It describes what aspects of the network should be monitored, including servers, operating systems, processes, protocols, and controllers. It outlines how a test monitoring environment was prepared with a PLC, simulator, monitoring server, and traffic sniffer. Several attacks were performed, like DoS, ARP poisoning, malware infection. The results of monitoring detected these attacks by observing unusual traffic and system behaviors. The conclusion is that establishing a baseline and configuring triggers can help detect anomalies indicating network compromise.
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Detecting Problems in Industrial Networks Through Continuous Monitoring, Level 301 Marcelo Ayres Branquinho
1. Detecting problems in industrial networks
through continuous monitoring
Marcelo Branquinho & Jan Seidl
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2. Presentors
Marcelo Branquinho
Jan Seidl
marcelo.branquinho@tisafe.com
jan.seidl@tisafe.com
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CEO at TI Safe.
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Technical Coordinator at TI Safe.
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Senior member of ISA and committee
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Expert in risk analysis in
member of ANSI/ISA-99.
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Researcher in security technologies to
protect critical infrastructure.
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automation systems.
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Researcher in the field of malware
engineering.
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5. Agenda
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What should be monitored in an automation network?
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Preparation of the monitoring environment.
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The attacks performed.
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Results of monitored attacks.
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Conclusion.
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6. What should be monitored in an
automation network?
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7. What to monitor in an automation network?
• The “Health" of critical servers
• Runtime errors in operating systems
• Processes
• High Availability
• Data traffic on industrial protocols
• Controllers (PLCs)
• SNMP traps
• ICMP Packets (Ping)
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8. The “Health” of critical servers
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Critical servers need to have stability and continuity of operations ensured.
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Monitor the health allows the prevention of certain failures, as well as some malicious
compromise, according to certain symptoms.
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The main technical features that can be monitored in critical servers are:
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Free disk space.
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CPU and Memory.
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Unsuccessful login attempts.
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Input and Output packets rate.
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9. O.S. runtime erros
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Useful in anticipating hardware failures.
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The anticipation of failures, in turn, protects the automation technical team from
unscheduled stop for components replacement.
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The main runtime errors in operating systems that can be monitored are :
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Memory allocation.
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Disk read/write.
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CPU temperature.
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Fan speed.
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10. Processes
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The monitoring of process stability can contribute in two situations :
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Alerting the responsible team in case of failures in the execution of critical
processes.
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Restart the process automatically, when possible.
It is also recommended to monitor known exploited process names and ports, such as :
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RDP
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HTTP/HTTPS
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TeamViewer
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Cmd.exe
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Windows PowerShell
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11. High Availability
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Aims to minimize the downtime of the monitored resource, anticipating potential
failures.
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Link states can be checked to see if the plant’s network enters into contingency state.
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The monitoring agent can perform automated tasks when necessary.
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12. Data traffic in industrial protocols
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Is recommended to do a port mirroring to monitor data traffic on industrial protocols.
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In the case of Modbus, for example, a network sniffer can be used to monitor several
parameters.
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The main parameter to be monitored are:
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Disallowed function codes.
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Tag values.
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Command origin.
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Sent and received commands.
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13. Controllers (PLCs)
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SNMP monitoring
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Monitors network I/O, droped packets, network errors, etc.
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Has higher reliability and, according to the errors, diagnose something wrong that
might be happening.
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ICMP Monitoring (Ping)
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Alternatively if SNMP is not supported by the controller.
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Used to check connectivity and response time.
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Limited information therefore lower accuracy and less reliability.
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14. Preparation of the monitoring
environment
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15. The Test Environment
The sandbox mounted inside TI Safe’s Laboratory includes:
• A Wago 741-800 PLC
• A simulator of a natural gas plant (Tofino Scada Security Simulator)
• A Windows 7 Station (physical) to the supervisory system
• A virtual machine acting as the monitoring server (Debian Linux 6 with Zabbix)
• A virtual machine acting as Modbus traffic sniffer server (Debian Linux 6 with script in python +
scapy)
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16. The Monitoring Environment
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The monitoring server is a virtual machine running Debian
Linux operating system.
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This server has been downloaded and installed by running the
open source monitoring solution Zabbix 2.0.6 using MySQL
5.1 as the data backend.
Figure: The network Sniffer and its structure
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17. Checking Frequency
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Depending on the load that the machine performs, items can be configured to be polled
in a defined interval.
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Servers with lighter load can have shorter checks (each 15 to 30 seconds).
Servers with hogher load can have more delayed checks (1 minute or more).
The main idea is to preserve the machine computational power and the network
bandwidth.
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18. Alerting
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Designed to alert the response team.
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Best used when launched from a set of probes and reducing the possibility of false
positive.
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Can generate sound alerts and display visual signaling on a panel, as a blinking server .
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The recommended alerts are:
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SMS
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Jabber
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E-mail
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20. The Attacker Machine
• The attacker machine is a HP laptop directly connected at the plant switch, running Kali Linux 1.0
from a Live-CD.
Below is a list of software used on tests:
Software / Tool
Description
Attack
Author
Hping3
ICMP flood tool
Network Layer 3
denial of service
http://www.hping.org/
T50
Flood tool
Network Layer 3
denial of service
https://github.com/merces/t50
Meterpreter
Remote access shell
Remote compromise, http://www.metasploit.com/
malware infection
Arpspoof
ARP poison/spoofing
tool
ARP poison
Pymodbus
Modbus python library Unauthorized
modbus traffic
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http://arpspoof.sourceforge.net/
https://github.com/bashwork/pym
odbus
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21. Attacks performed
Attack
Attack Vector
PLC Denial of Service
Communications interception
ARP poison
PLC, Supervisory Stations
PLC Denial of Service
Layer 3 network flood, 0day
PLC
Supervisory station malware
infection
Modbus malware, Meterpreter shell
backdoor
Supervisory Stations, Network
Supervisory station
compromise
Meterpreter shell backdoor
Supervisory Station
Unauthorized remote logon
Enabling remote desktop on
machine, accessing machine from
other machine on network
Supervisory Station
Unauthorized modbus traffic
Sending commands from attacker
machine
PLC
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22. Results of monitored attacks
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23. Results of monitored attacks
• $ nmap –sV 192.168.1.1
• Communications interception
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24. Results of monitored attacks
• Denial of Service
• Malware infection
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25. Results of monitored attacks
• Unauthorized Modbus traffic
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27. Conclusion
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The homogeneity of the cyclical behavior in industrial networks and servers allows us to
establish the 'healthy' network parameters.
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Network and servers analysis and applications monitoring are critical for the detection
of unusual network traffic.
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More tangible results can be achieved through behavior monitoring than through the
monitoring of known keywords, the 'signatures'.
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The establishment of a baseline traffic in the network control system is necessary for
the detection of anomalous traffic through the analysis of differences.
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Triggers can be configured to indicate parameters outside the usual data ranges that
can mean a compromise of the assets being monitored.
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Alarms (including sounds) can be configured based on triggers.
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Only a few commercial tools for IACS monitoring are available for purchase, and we
recommend the customization of an open source tool for your own monitoring needs.
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29. We can help you!
Marcelo.branquinho@tisafe.com
Jan.seidl@tisafe.com
Rio de Janeiro: +55 (21) 2173-1159
São Paulo: +55 (11) 3040-8656
Twitter: @tisafe
Skype: ti-safe
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