1. Security Best Practices for Mobile
Development
Developer Track
Tom Gersic, Model Metrics / Salesforce.com
Director, Technical Solutions
Twitter: @tomgersic

2. Safe Harbor
Safe harbor statement under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
This presentation may contain forward-looking statements that involve risks, uncertainties, and assumptions. If any such uncertainties materialize or if
any of the assumptions proves incorrect, the results of salesforce.com, inc. could differ materially from the results expressed or implied by the forward-
looking statements we make. All statements other than statements of historical fact could be deemed forward-looking, including any projections of
product or service availability, subscriber growth, earnings, revenues, or other financial items and any statements regarding strategies or plans of
management for future operations, statements of belief, any statements concerning new, planned, or upgraded services or technology developments
and customer contracts or use of our services.
The risks and uncertainties referred to above include – but are not limited to – risks associated with developing and delivering new functionality for our
service, new products and services, our new business model, our past operating losses, possible fluctuations in our operating results and rate of growth,
interruptions or delays in our Web hosting, breach of our security measures, the outcome of intellectual property and other litigation, risks associated
with possible mergers and acquisitions, the immature market in which we operate, our relatively limited operating history, our ability to expand, retain,
and motivate our employees and manage our growth, new releases of our service and successful customer deployment, our limited history reselling
non-salesforce.com products, and utilization and selling to larger enterprise customers. Further information on potential factors that could affect the
financial results of salesforce.com, inc. is included in our annual report on Form 10-Q for the most recent fiscal quarter ended July 31, 2012. This
documents and others containing important disclosures are available on the SEC Filings section of the Investor Information section of our Web site.
Any unreleased services or features referenced in this or other presentations, press releases or public statements are not currently available and may
not be delivered on time or at all. Customers who purchase our services should make the purchase decisions based upon features that are currently
available. Salesforce.com, inc. assumes no obligation and does not intend to update these forward-looking statements.

3. All about Model Metrics
 Now a Salesforce.com Company
 10 year track record - 2,000+ cloud engagements
 Passionate & innovative World-class skills - CRM,
Force.com, Heroku, Radian6, Rypple, iOS and Android
 In-house design studio – ModelFX
 Mobile experts - iPhone, iPad and Android

4. Agenda
1. Fundamental Principles
2. What iOS and Android Share
3. iOS Specific Characteristics
4. Android Specific Characteristics
5. Salesforce Mobile Offerings

5. Throwing down the gauntlet…
Rules
1. Don’t break the phone or do
anything that might break it.
2. You need to be done before
Q&A starts.
3. If you are successful, you need
to tell us how you did it.

6. Who thinks the data on their phone is secure?

7. Welcome to Dreamforce 20.12 LTS (GNU)
Last login: Fri Sep 02 12:00:00 2011 from nat-
204-14-239-209-sfo.net.salesforce.com
@tomgersic:~$ FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES

9. Vulnerability

10. Threat

11. Consequence

12. Mitigation

13. Separation of Concerns – Principle of Least Privilege

14. Security Stack

15. Welcome to Dreamforce 20.12 LTS (GNU)
Last login: Fri Sep 02 12:00:00 2011 from nat-
204-14-239-209-sfo.net.salesforce.com
@tomgersic:~$ FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES
@tomgersic:~$ WHAT iOS AND ANDROID SHARE

16. Welcome to Dreamforce 20.12 LTS (GNU)
Last login: Fri Sep 02 12:00:00 2011 from nat-
204-14-239-209-sfo.net.salesforce.com
@tomgersic:~$ FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES
@tomgersic:~$ WHAT iOS AND ANDROID SHARE
device security

17. Mobile Device Management Providers
http://bit.ly/magicmdm

18. MDM Compliance

19. Welcome to Dreamforce 20.12 LTS (GNU)
Last login: Fri Sep 02 12:00:00 2011 from nat-
204-14-239-209-sfo.net.salesforce.com
@tomgersic:~$ FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES
@tomgersic:~$ WHAT iOS AND ANDROID SHARE
device security
OS / data security

20. Data Security – Hardware Encryption
Requires PIN/Passcode on both iOS and Android
Supported on
 iPhone 3GS w/ iOS v4+ (AES 256 bit)
 Android Honeycomb+ (AES 128 bit)
• Some manufacturers increase to AES 256 bit (Samsung SAFE)
SD Card encryption on Android is manufacturer specific.

21. Last login: Fri Sep 02 12:00:00 2011 from nat-
204-14-239-209-sfo.net.salesforce.com
@tomgersic:~$ FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES
@tomgersic:~$ WHAT iOS AND ANDROID SHARE
device security
OS / data security
OS / application security

22. Application Sandboxing

23. Application Signing

24. In-App Encryption

25. ASLR (PIE) and DEP

26. nat-204-14-239-209-sfo.net.salesforce.com
@tomgersic:~$ FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES
@tomgersic:~$ WHAT iOS AND ANDROID SHARE
device security
OS / data security
OS / application security
@tomgersic:~$ iOS SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS

27. @tomgersic:~$ FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES
@tomgersic:~$ WHAT iOS AND ANDROID SHARE
device security
OS / data security
OS / application security
@tomgersic:~$ iOS SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
known historical exploits

28. Libtiff Image Exploit / Jailbreak
• iPhone 1 – patched in 1.1.2
• Tiff buffer overflow
• No DEP/ASLR – nothing to prevent executing code on the
heap
• Gained root access from viewing an image on the web

29. Concatenated SMS Exploit – Charlie Miller

30. Concatenated SMS Exploit
• Takes 519 SMS messages – all but 1 is invisible
• Send message -1 of X to underflow the array buffer
• Can’t be stopped by the user
• Used to write an entire binary executable to the heap, and run
it, taking over the phone.

31. @tomgersic:~$ FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES
@tomgersic:~$ WHAT iOS AND ANDROID SHARE
device security
OS / data security
OS / application security
@tomgersic:~$ iOS SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
known historical exploits
application sandbox

32. Stripped down OS
• Unix/BSD based OS, but…
• No shell (/bin/sh).
• No typical Unix utilities like ls, rm, cd, ps, etc.
• All public apps reviewed.
• Private “Enterprise” apps contractually limited to internal
organization.

33. iOS Sandbox Specifics
• All apps (Apple’s and App Store) run as “mobile” user.
• Sandboxing is bolted on -- handled via XNU Sandbox
“Seatbelt” kernel extension.
• Applications run in separate subdirectories of
/private/var/mobile/Applications
• Any app in this directory is loaded with “container”
(sandboxed) profile.

34. Platform Apps
• Some platform apps, like Mobile Safari run with a sandbox
profile as well.

35. Limited Background Processing
Unlimited:
 Audio Streaming (Spotify, Pandora)
 GPS / Navigation
 VOIP
 Newsstand app content downloading
 Hardware integrations (bluetooth, other external accessories)
Everything else: 10 minute window after app closes to finish any
task.

36. @tomgersic:~$ FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY PRINCIPLES
@tomgersic:~$ WHAT iOS AND ANDROID SHARE
device security
OS / data security
OS / application security
@tomgersic:~$ iOS SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
known historical exploits
application sandbox
hardware encryption

37. Hardware Encryption
• Everything is encrypted, right?

38. Hardware Encryption
• With a PIN/Passcode, Email, Attachments, and some other
system files are encrypted while device is locked
• Any other app is storing the keys with the lock unless app
specifies NSFileProtectionComplete

39. @tomgersic:~$ WHAT iOS AND ANDROID SHARE
device security
OS / data security
OS / application security
@tomgersic:~$ iOS SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
known historical exploits
application sandbox
hardware encryption
simple hacking – no jailbreak required

40. Facebook

41. My Secret Apps

42. My Secret Apps

43. device security
OS / data security
OS / application security
@tomgersic:~$ iOS SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
known historical exploits
application sandbox
hardware encryption
simple hacking – no jailbreak required
jailbreak

45. data security
network security
application security
@tomgersic:~$ iOS SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
known historical exploits
application sandbox
hardware encryption
simple hacking – no jailbreak required
jailbreak
mitigation

46. Application Encryption
• Encrypt your data yourself using PIN / Passcode
• CoreData/SQLCipher
 NSIncrementalStore
 Good Dynamics
• FMDB/SQLCipher
 Salesforce Smartstore

47. Jailbreak Detection
• Sandbox integrity check: fork() should fail
• Check for jailbreak files:
 /Applications/Cydia.app
 /Library/MobileSubstrate/MobileSubstrate.dylib
 /var/cache/apt
 /bin/sh
 /bin/bash

48. Enable ASLR in your app
• ASLR: Address Space Layout Randomization

49. Stack Canaries
• AKA Stack Smashing Protection
• Protect against buffer overflows
• Places random known value (canary) before local variables
• Use Apple LLVM – won’t work with LLVM GCC

50. Hide Data from App Snapshot Images

51. application security
@tomgersic:~$ iOS SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
known historical exploits
application sandbox
hardware encryption
simple hacking – no jailbreak required
jailbreak
mitigation
@tomgersic:~$ ANDROID SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS

52. @tomgersic:~$ iOS SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
known historical exploits
application sandbox
hardware encryption
simple hacking – no jailbreak required
jailbreak
mitigation
@tomgersic:~$ ANDROID SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
newsworthy exploits

53. NFC Exploit

54. DroidDream Malware

55. @tomgersic:~$ iOS SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
known historical exploits
application sandbox
hardware encryption
simple hacking – no jailbreak required
jailbreak
mitigation
@tomgersic:~$ ANDROID SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
newsworthy exploits
android sandbox

56. Android Sandbox

57. Permissions

58. Background Processes / App Interaction

59. The Return of Separation of Concerns and the
Principle of Least Privilege

60. Types of Android Components
 Activities
 Intent
 Service
 Content Provider
 Broadcast Receiver

61. Public / Private Components

62. But what about custom keyboards?

63. Keyboard Security Risks

64. Except Passwords?
https://github.com/tomgersic/AndroidKeyLogger

65. known historical exploits
application sandbox
hardware encryption
simple hacking – no jailbreak required
jailbreak
mitigation
@tomgersic:~$ ANDROID SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS
newsworthy exploits
android sandbox
@tomgersic:~$ Salesforce SmartStore

66. Force.com Mobile SDK
https://github.com/forcedotcom

67. Salesforce.com Mobile SDK SmartStore
• SQLite ORM wrapper for Native and Hybrid apps built on the
SFDC Mobile SDK
• NoSQL style JSON-based document store

68. SmartStore Stack

69. SmartStore PIN

70. Who STILL thinks the data on their phone is secure?

71. Tom Gersic
Director, Technical Solutions
@tomgersic