1. Models of Civil
Protection:
The Italian Case
Modelli di Protezione
Civile: Il Caso Italia
David Alexander
University College London

2. Caveat lector: this 2010 publication
is based on self-assessment.

3. The
theoretical
stuff
(la roba
teorica)

4. VulnerabilityHazard
An asset is not
vulnerable unless
it is threatened
by something
A hazard is not
hazardous unless
it threatens
something
RISK
Extreme
events
Elements
at risk
Resilience
Exposure

5. Organisational
systems:
management
Social
systems:
behaviour
Natural
systems:
function
Technical
systems:
malfunction
VulnerabilityHazard
Resilience

6. Emergency
isolation
The Phases of Disaster

7. needs to be shortenedneeds to be
lengthened
preparation
for the
next event
warning
and
evacuation
recovery and
reconstruction
repair of
basic
services
emergency
management
and rescue
isolation
impact
needs to be
strengthenedRisk reduction and disaster mitigation

8. Armed aggression
on the part of states
Civil defence
Natural disasters
Civil protection
"Homeland security"
(civil defence)
Armed aggression
on the part of
groups of dissidents
"Generic" disasters
"Civil contingencies"
(resilience)

9. Civil defence
Hazard
Vulnerability
Threat
Exposure
Risk
Response
Mitigation Protection
Civil protection

10. Civil Defence
Civil Protection
Instability
threats
Enhanced
natural hazards
Complex
hazards
Natural
hazards
Evolving
strategic
situation
Large
technological
hazards
Evolving
climate
change
'Na-tech'
(hybrid)
hazards
Major
geophysical
events

11. Civil contingencies
Resilience
management
The risk environment
Business
continuity
Civil
protection
Civil
defence

12. DRR
Knowledge of
community
vulerability
Knowledge
of hazards
and their
impacts
Knowledge
of coping
capacity and
resilience
Disaster
Risk
Reduction

13. • civilian vs military command structure
• command function principle
versus support function principle
• centrism versus devolution.
Some dilemmas

14. Disaster risk
reduction
Incident
management
Population
(community)
protection
Plans,
procedures,
protocols
Human
and material
resources
Hazard
forecasting,
monitoring,
etc.

15. Broader
scope and
outcomes
Changing
objectives
of emergency
management
Civil Protection
Disaster
Management
Resilience
Civil Contingencies Management
Disaster Risk Reduction

16. Hierarchical
divisions
National,
regional,
local, etc.
Geographical
divisions
Catchments,
jurisdictions,
areas, etc.Organisational
divisions
Police,
Ambulance,
Fire, etc.
Functional
divisions
Government,
healthcare,
commerce, etc.
Division
and
integration

17. Organised
Spontaneous
Established
Kinship
groups
Individual
citizens
Disaster
subcultures
Emergent
groups
Citizens'
organisations Charitable
NGOs
Some public
stakeholders
in disaster
response
Schools
Workplace
groups

18. Governance:
democratic
participation
in decision
making
Livelihoods:
diversity
and security
Hazards
and risks:
disaster
preparedness
RESILIENCE:
managing risks
adapting to change
securing resources
Uncertain
future:
long-term
trends
climate
change
capacity
to adapt

19. Organisation Resources
Self-organisation
Imposed
organisation
Volunteerism
Community disaster planning
Laws, protocols, directives
Standards, norms, guidelines
Community
resources
Governmental
resources
Donations
International resources

20. Military Civilian
Armed Civil administration
forces Volunteers (civil society)
Emergency services
(army)
[residual role]
Civil defence Civil protection
Command and control Co-ordination
and co-operation
Chain of command Autonomy

21. Locus of
control
Locus of
collaboration
(support)
Tension of
opposites
Command
function
principle
Support
function
principle
Spectrum of
alternatives

22. Harmonisation from above
(national or regional levels)
Organisation and growth from below
(local level: municipalities, volunteers, etc.)
Central
control
Devolution

23. The natural tendency
from above
subordinate
control
repress
restrict
The less than natural
tendency from above
harmonise
negotiate
support
accommodate
act autonomously
empower
enable
liberate
The natural tendency
from below
conform
cede
comply
submit
The less than natural
tendency from below
The pressures of devolution and centrism

24. Global
Supernational
National
National
Regional
Local
Disaster relief as a barter
market for resources
DONATE
REQUEST
ALLOCATE
DEMAND

25. Local incident Local response A
Threshold of local capacity
Small regional
incident
Co-ordinated local response B
Threshold of intermunicipal capacity
Major regional
incident
Intermunicipal and
regional response
B
Threshold of regional capacity
National
disaster
Intermunicipal, regional
and national response
C
Threshold of national capacity
International
catastrophe
Ditto, with more
international assistance
C

26. Around Italy
in 80 disasters
(giro d'Italia
in 80 disastri)

27. Earthquakes:
• Belice Valley, Sicily, 1968
• Friuli, NE Italy, 1976
• Irpinia-Basilicata, S. Italy, 1980
• Umbria-Marche, central Italy, 1997
Floods:
• River Arno, 1966 (Florence), 1991-3
• Versilia, W. Tuscany, 1996
Landslides:
• Valtellina landslide dam, N. Italy, 1987
• Sarno, Campania, S. Central Italy, 1998
Industrial hazards:
• Seveso dioxin incident, Lombardy, 1976

28. Forgotten disasters:
• Balvano 1944:
world's worst rail
disaster
• dam collapse and
mudflow at Val di
Stava, Lombardy,
1985: 264 dead
• etc., etc.

29. The death of Alfredino Rampi
in a well at Vermicino, 1981:
the "emotional birth" of
modern Italian civil protection
Molise 2002
earthquake
collapse of
a school:
26 children
killed.

30. In Italy 60,000
schools are
attended by 6.6
million children:
18,000 of the
schools (30%)
are located in
the country's
main seismic areas.
Avaliable funds are
insufficient for a
complete retrofit.

31. 70% of population
lives in seismically
active areas, 40%
in the 2965
municipalities
subject to
moderate and
high seismicity.
13.8% of homes
are anti-seismic
(but 35.3% of
those in the main
seismic zones).

32. There are now an estimated 10,000
cars in the city centre of Florence
Florence floods, 4-5 November 1966

33. Somma-Vesuvius Portici (pop. 80,000)
1631
pyroclastic flow

34. Few areas of the world
have such complex
and intractable
volcanic problems.

35. Etna: population on flanks 700,000
In 1993-4 lava flowed for 431 days.

36. Some emergency preparedness lessons:
• emergency planning is limited by physical,
cultural and conceptual constraints
• a major eruption of Vesuvius
would instantly be a national
and European emergency
• the relationship between prediction
and warning is absolutely critical here,
especially with regard to timing
• the relationship between reference
scenario and response is critical: wrong
scenario equals inefficient response.

37. The practical stuff
(la roba pratica)

38. What is welfare?
The provision of
care to a minimum
acceptable standard
to people who are
unable adequately
to look after
themselves.
But we also need
to focus on what
welfare is NOT...

39. Analysis
• registered
• archived
• forgotten
• ignored
Vulnerability
maintained.
-
• utilised
• adopted
• learned
Disaster
risk
reduced
+
Lessons
Past
events
The process of
disaster risk
reduction
(DRR)

40. • magnitude 6.3, duration 25 seconds
• acceleration on hard rock 0.3g,
on soft sediments 0.7-1.0g
• part of an earthquake swarm
that has lasted many months
• the first earthquake with
epicentre very near a major
urban centre in Italy since 1915.
The L'Aquila earthquake of 6 April 2009

41. • 308 deaths
• 1,500 injuries: 202 serious,
550 moderate, 750 light
• 67,000 homeless survivors
• 100,000 buildings seriously damaged
• 16 towns devastated, 33 damaged.
Impact of the L'Aquila earthquake

42. • c.21,000 people in tents for summer
months, April-September 2009
• c. 22,000 people in hotels,
some far away from L'Aquila
• rapid construction of transitional
accommodation for 65% of survivors.
Government policy on shelter

43. • 4,600 apartments in 184
buildings on 19 sites
• €280,607 per apartment (€3,875
per square meter of living space).
C.A.S.E. - Complessi Antisismici
Sostenibili ed Ecocompatibili

44. • €1,427 per base isolator @40 per bldg.

45. C.A.S.E. at Assergi - built on
an unstabilised asbestos dump.

46. Lack of wastewater treatment facilities.

47. • standard prefabs without base isolation
• 54 sites, half of them in L'Aquila city
• 8,500 people accommodated.
M.A.P. - Moduli abitativi provvisori

48. • social fragmentation leads to
depression, isolation and marginalisation
• total lack of services and transportation
• induced dependence on private transport
without infrastructure improvement
• exclusion of single person 'families'.
Problems with CASE and MAP sites

49. • stagnation of reconstruction
through lack of funds and planning
• political paralysis and
intimidation by central government
• massive rise in unemployment
• local inflation, especially of house rents
• loss of basic services.
Problems with L'Aquila recovery policy

50. The L'Aquila recovery process is driven by
short-term political expediency, leading
to the repetition of ancient policy errors,
particularly lack of democratic governance

51. Organisation Resources
Self-organisation
Imposed
organisation
Volunteerism
Community disaster planning
Laws, protocols, directives
Standards, norms, guidelines
Community
resources
Governmental
resources
Donations
International resources

52. Earth-
quake
Political
response
National
Regional
Local
Permanent
reconstruction
Bad
(functional
problems)
Good
(functionality
maintained)
Elections
Public image
of politicians
Amelioration
Political impact
on reconstruction
Suff-
ering
Reco-
veryTransitional
housing and
settlement

53. Without participatory governance,
disasters can open a Pandora's box
of irrational, debatable, deleterious,
noxious and arbitrary consequences.

54. Public
participation in
decision making
Government
paternalism
Inclusive
outcomes
Social
exclusion
Discontent
Satisfaction
Discontent
...or...

55. The orthodox approach: emergency
response begins at the local level.
The Italian approach: in L'Aquila
local administration was swept aside
and remained paralysed for a long time.

56. The Italian approach: overwhelming
force, regardless of cost.
The orthodox approach: response should be
proportional to the size of the emergency.

57. The Italian approach: there isn't one.
The orthodox approach: emergencies
need an incident command structure.

58. The Italian approach: either supply
it all from Rome or abandon the
local forces to their own devices.
The orthodox approach: local
self-sufficiency and autonomous
decision making must be encouraged.

59. The Italian approach: mind-boggling sums
of money have been spent on transitional
settlement, and so far very few funds
have been allotted to reconstruction.
The orthodox approach: transitional settle-
ment should not impede reconstruction.

60. The Italian approach: in L'Aquila
no thought whatsoever was given
to this problem and the result is a
high incidence of socio-psychological
pathologies among the survivors.
The orthodox approach: in
transitional settlement the
social fabric should be preserved.

61. The Italian approach: the guidelines
are incomplete and out of date,
and the training has been foisted
onto the regional governments without
providing any harmonising criteria.
The orthodox approach: guidelines,
standards and norms should be issued
to ensure integrated disaster
response and training.

62. The Italian approach: in less than a
decade 600 ordinances have authorised
the expenditure of more than €10 billion,
some of that on projects that had
nothing to do with emergencies and
were not really useful at all.
The orthodox approach: emergency
measures should be used when
normal measures cannot be.

63. The Italian approach: disasters open
a Pandora's box of bad practice.
The orthodox approach: disasters lead
to improvements in safety and security.

64. The Italian approach: three municipalities
out of 8,104 have taken this to heart.
The UN's Making Cities Resilient initiative
has only one Italian signatory - Venice.
The orthodox approach: disaster risk
reduction (DRR) is a comprehensive
process of creating resilience.

65. • 1980s Pastorelli era - aid to Irpinia
• 1990s Barberi era - aid to Albania
• 2000s Bertolaso era
- misuse of ordinances
• Zamberletti era
- a remarkable interlude.
Scandals:-

66. Conclusions

67. When the next disaster occurs...
• firemen and military personnel
will be in short supply
• volunteers will be better trained
and equipped than ever before
• there are now trained emergency
planners and managers
• there is a national
civil protection system
Will that be sufficient?

68. Paramilitary forces
(National Guard)
Military
forces
Police
forces
Fire
brigades
Public
administrations
Civilian volunteer
forces
PMF
MF
FB PA
CVF
PF
Italy
PMF
MF
FB PA
CVF
PF
UK
CVF
PMF
MF
FB PA
PF
USA

69. • Italian civil protection is democratic
and well-organised at the local level.
• Much is known about hazards in
Italy - so it ought to be, as they
are the most dangerous in Europe.
• Despite the plethora of courses
(1000 in Lombardy region alone),
there is little effective training in
emergency planning and management
and no adequate standards exist.
Conclusions

70. • Disasters are excellent opportunities for
corruption and theft of public money,
largely because surveillance of, and
controls upon, expenditure are relaxed.
• The concept of personal responsibility is
not part of the civil protection culture.
• Italian civil protection responds to
a logic of political short-termism.
Conclusions

71. The development of a viable civil
protection system in Italy has been
impelled (rather selectively) by certain
key disasters, but the system is
incomplete and its maturity varies
considerably from one jurisdiction
to another at all levels.
Great improvements have been achieved
in the professionalism of emergency
planners and responders, but in a major
event it is not clear whether this would
compensate for the reduction in forces.

72. • separation of civil protection from single
ministries and its attachment to the
national Cabinet (Council of Ministers):
non-binding EC national-level directive
• fusion of domestic civil protection
and international humanitarian work:
EC CP/ECHO Directorate.
Italian gifts to European civil protection

73. The recent Italian experiences of
disaster illustrate the importance
of creating a locally-based emergency
management system and of involving the
population in the creation of resilience.

74. The Italian civil protection is
sophisticated, well-developed and
based on proper democratic principles.
Through the voluntary sector
and growth of local structures,
headed by elected mayors, it
is well placed to tackle the
main challenge of the 20th
century in civil protection:
the involvement of the general
population in the maintenance
of its own security.

75. 2009->: Neoliberalism or more
assistentialism? Vote garnering
versus economic stringency.
1908: Liberalism - the state is
not a big source of disaster relief
1980: Assistentialism - the state
is a major source of largesse.

76. david.alexander@ucl.ac.uk
protezione-civile-italia.blogspot.com
emergency-planning.blogspot.com
www.slideshare.com/dealexander