Conferencia de Adolf Tobeña sobre Neurociencia y Libertad, realizada en Tarragona el 30/10/2010 dentro del ciclo organizado por cultura 3.0 "Verdad, belleza, bien, felicidad, libertad y justicia a la luz de la ciencia moderna".

1. Free will, freedom and the brain
Adolf Tobeña
Dept. of Psychiatry, UAB
Institute of Neurosciences
Bellaterra (Barcelona)
Cultura 3.0
Tercera Cultura
Tarragona, 2010.

2. By LIBERTY, is understood,
according to the proper
signification of the word, the
absence of external Impediments:
which Impediments, may oft take
away part of a man power to do
what he would.
Thomas Hobbes

3. Individual freedom and socially
sanctioned liberties usually collide, to
the point of converting freedom and
independence in perfectly orthogonal
properties
FREEDOM: the absence of
necessity, coercion or constraint
in choice or action.
…assumes free will, fully
autonomous agents with the abbility
to make open choices/actions.

4. Cashmore AR (2009), PNAS, 107, 10, 4499-4504.

5. Cashmore AR (2009), PNAS, 107, 10, 4499-4504.
WILL: Intention, choice
CONSCIOUS+UNCONSCIOUS
THOUGHTS: Brain workings
GES: Genes+Environmental
history+Stochasticism

6. Free agents?:
Measuring
conscious intention
Haggard P (2008) Human volition:
towards a neuroscience of will, Nature
Reviews Neuroscience, 9, 934-946

7. Measuring conscious
intention
Haggard P (2008) Human volition:
towards a neuroscience of will,
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9,
934-946

8. Layers of consciousness
Self-monitoring and insight
Recognition instant
Focused attention
Awareness
Alertness/Drowsiness
Sleep stages
Coma
Thalamus-Cortical loops
Ongoing work at
monoamine midbrain
and brainstem
Arousing Systems

9. Neurohormonal subsystems contributing to brain’s
vigilance/alertness/mood
Brainstem and midbrain arousal systems
Insight
Consciousness
Agency
Awakening
Vigilance
Sleep
Unwilled actions: sonambulisms, “alien hand” syndromes, motor jerks…

10. Self-consciousness interacting with Others´
consciousness: The Social Brain
Self-monitoring and insight
Recognition instant
Others Intentions/Actions
Focused attention
Awareness
World Objects
Alertness/Drowsiness
Sleep stages
Body movements/position/
signals Coma

11. A. Implanting intentions to act (willingness) by stimulating
directly into the brain
B. Restricted islands of consciousness permitting willing
choices
C. Moral handicaps linked to willingness deficits
THREE EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES TO WILLFUL
ACTIONS/DECISIONS

12. Desmurget M et al (2009), Science, 324, 811- 814.
Direct Electrical Stimulation (DES) in 7
patients with brain tumors

13. When points of the Posterior Parietal Cortex got stimulated patients expressed desires or intentions to move, although
no movement actually occured:
“Stimulation of all these sites produced a pure intention, that is, a felt desire to move without any overt
movement being produced... Without prompting by the examiner, all three patients spontaneously used terms
such as “will,” “desire,” and “wanting to,” which convey the voluntary character of the movement intention and
its attribution to an internal source, that is, located within the self”
High intensity stimulation of the same area made the patients believe that they had in fact moved, although they didn't
move a muscle:
“with higher electrode currents conscious motor intentions were replaced by a sensation that a movement had
been accomplished but no actual movement was observed. Thus, these patients experienced awareness of an
illusory movement. For example, patient PP3 reported after low-intensity stimulation of one site (5 mA, 4 s; site
a in Fig. 1), “I felt a desire to lick my lips” and at a higher intensity (8 mA, 4 s), “I moved my mouth, I talked, what
did I say?”

14. When certain points on the Premotor Cortex were stimulated, the
patients moved, but they were not aware that they had done so:
“During stimulation, patient PM1 exhibited a large multijoint movement
involving flexion of the left wrist, fingers, and elbow ... He did not
spontaneously comment on this, and when asked whether he had felt a
movement he responded negatively”

15. MRI and 3D images of the patient brain and
stimulation sites. T= tumor; 1, 5, 4 =
conscious intention+illusory movement; 3
= conscious intention; 2 = visual illusion
(background movement);

17. Haggard P (2009), Science, 324, 731-732.

18. Instant recognition/decision upon moving
world objects: awareness limits?
Rester challenge:
At 200 Km/h: 0,43 sec
At 210 Km/h: 0,41 sec
At 220 Km/h: 0,39 sec
At 230 Km/h: 0,37 sec
Nadal
problem

19. Simulation
(Fair)
Constraints Interactions
Real (unperceived) external world
The unconscious brain
Conscious ExperiencesConscious Experiences
Experienced external world
(perceived)
Public cognitive space
Inner cognitive experiences
(thoughts, images...).
Private cognitive space
Inner bodily sensations,
feelings.
Private bodily space

20. Consensual approach to the function of
consciousness
A simplified, smothed and apparently
sustained but transient and everchanging
display of external/internal world
(Late) detection of errors
ulterior adjustments + feeling of agency
Permitting

21. Gray’s model: engineers plus neuroscience minimal
system for consciousness
COMPARATOR
STORED
REGULARITIES
GENERATOR
OF PREDICTIONS
PLANS
THE WORLD

22. Simulation
(Fair)
Constraints Interactions
Real unperceived external world
The unconscious brain
Conscious ExperiencesConscious Experiences
Experienced external world
(perceived)
Public cognitive space
Inner cognitive experiences
(thoughts, images...).
Private cognitive space
Inner bodily sensations,
feelings.
Private bodily space
???

23. Research frontiers on consciousness
Gross neural “disconnections” (vegetative states,
minimally conscious brain-injured patients).
Decoding ongoing mental states in normals.
Unconscious processing (default brain systems,
burying and revealing memories, as examples).

24. “Wakefulness without awareness”
CLINICAL CRITERIA FOR PATIENTS IN A VEGETATIVE STATE
• Time duration:
One month at least; if persistent, more than one year; almost always permanent.
• No cognition: absence of consistent responses to linguistic, symbolic or mimetic
instruction.
• No semantically meaningful sounds or goal-directed movements
• No sustained head-ocular pursuit activity
• Functions usually or often preserved:
- Brain stem and autonomically controlled visceral functions:
Homeothermia, osmolar homeostasis, breathing, circulation, gastrointestinal
functions.
- Pupillary and oculovestibular reflexes.
- Brief, inconsistent shifting of head or eyes toward new sounds or sights.
- Smiles, tears or rage reactions.
- Reflex postural responses to noxious stimuli.

25. Owen AM and ColemanMR (2008) Nature Reviews
Newuroscience, 9, 235-243

26. Detecting
awareness in a
vegetative state
Owen AM et al
(2006),
Science, 313,
1402, 8 Sept.

27. Detecting
awareness in a
vegetative state
Owen AM et al
(2006),
Science, 313,
1402.

28. Detecting
awareness in a
vegetative state
Owen AM et al
(2006),
Science, 313, 1402,
8 Sept.
Dozens of statements
like “there was milk
and sugar in this
coffee”, presented in
blocks against
matched verbal noise-
segments.

29. Boly M et al (2007) Neuroimage,36, 979-992
An fMRI test based on mental imagery
tasks to detect “awareness” in vegetative-
state patients: validation studies in normal
volunteers at Cambridge and Liege (12
males at each place) .
Group conjoint
comparisons
between spatial
navigation and
tennis tasks
compared to one
another.
30 seconds of
imagery
engagement at
every step after
scarce instructions,
for seven
repetitions plus
blind SPM
analyses.

30. Boly M et al (2007) Neuroimage,36, 979-992.
Group results (right)
and individual results
(above), showing pre-
SMA activations
during all tasks.

31. Monti MM et al (2010), The New England Journal of Medicine, 362,7, 579-589.

32. Unconscious (working) modes
Typical:
Preconscious (i.e. procedural memories)
Repressed unconscious (i.e. buried images)
Deep unconscious (i.e. grammatical rules)
Nonconscious (i.e. secretion of serotonin)
Added:
Agency (intentions+choices) readiness

33. There are ways to connect the domain of individual freedom and the
domain of political liberty, spanning from the personal, psychological
features of agency constitutive of (free) will to the social, relational
aspects of agency constitutive of political freedom.
Freedom in the agent
(i) the freedom of the action performed by the agent;
(ii) the freedom of the self implicit in the agent’s ability to identify with the
things thereby done, rather than having to look on them as a bystander;
(iii) the freedom of the person involved in enjoying a social status that
makes the action truly her own, not an action produced under pressure by
others.
“Connotations” of freedom: (i) responsibility: the agent can be rightly held
responsible for what he or she did; (ii. ownership: the action is one that the
agent can own or identify with; and (iii) underdetermination: the agent’s
choice was not fully determined at least by certain sorts of antecedents
(e.g., hypnotic suggestion).
Freedom as property to be held responsible
Ph. Pettit (2001): A theory of freedom: from the psychology to the politics of agency

34. Origins of Morality
• “Of all the differences between man and the lower
animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the
most important. This sense has a rightful supremacy
over every other principle of human action; it is
summed up in that short but imperious word ought,
so full of high significance. It is the most noble of all
the attributes of man, leading him without a
moment's hesitation to risk his life for that of a
fellow creature; or after due deliberation, impelled
simply by the deep feeling of right or duty, to
sacrifice it in some great cause.”
• Charles Darwin (1871): The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation
to Sex.

35. BIOLOGY OF THE PROBLEM OF CHOICE
How nervous systems:
1. Frame the finite choices available
2. Value the choices
3. Choose an option based on these valuations
Humans may choose courses of action against biological
imperatives and constraints .…they do not have free
choice but they posses a capacity for flexible choice. A
capacity which is behind cognitive innovation
“Freedom is the capacity to achieve what is of value in a range of
circumstances” Nicholas Maxwell

36. Neural deficits
Adult ventromedial-orbital prefrontal lesions (Gage type) *
Early onset prefrontal lesions *
Others…
Neural typologies (Normative Exceptional temperaments)
Psychopaths *
Narcissistic
Messianic
Glory cravers ....
Amoral/hypermoral tendencies within the brain
* Solid evidence
FROM FREE AND FULLY RESPONSIBLE
INDIVIDUALS TO AMORAL MINDS
Will has been also conceived as a faculty providing discipline (top-down
hard mental work) in the face of ease and temptation…

37. Moral cognition and its neural constituents
WD Casebeer (2004) Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 840.
From moral intuitions to
moral agency and ethics

38. Impairment of social and moral behavior related to
early damage in human prefrontal cortex
• Steven W. Anderson, Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel &
Antonio R. Damasio
Department of Neurology, Division of Behavioral Neurology and Cognitive Neuroscience, The University of Iowa
College of Medicine, Iowa City, Iowa 52242, USA
• Nature Neuroscience, November 1999, Volume 2, Number 11, pp 1032 - 1037.
The long-term consequences of early prefrontal cortex lesions
occurring before 16 months were investigated in two adults. As is the
case when such damage occurs in adulthood, the two early-onset
patients had severely impaired social behavior despite normal basic
cognitive abilities, and showed insensitivity to future consequences of
decisions, defective autonomic responses to punishment
contingencies and failure to respond to behavioral interventions.
Unlike adult-onset patients, however, the two patients had defective
social and moral reasoning, suggesting that the acquisition of
complex social conventions and moral rules had been impaired. Thus
early-onset prefrontal damage resulted in a syndrome resembling
psychopathy.

39. Impairment of social and
moral behavior related to
early damage in human
prefrontal cortex
Steven W. Anderson et al (1999), Nature
Neuroscience, 2, 11, 1032 - 1037.

40. * Initial loan: 2000 US dollars
* 4 card decks (A, B, C, D) to select with different monetary values per
card:
SAFE/GOOD A,C cards : rewards (50) punishments (40-100)
RISKY/BAD B,D cards: rewards (100) punishments (200-400)
* 4 sec. before each attempt: measure of anticipatory SCR’s.
* Every 10 trials stop: questioning taped
GAME RUNNING OVER 100 TRIALS (Unknown to the subjects)
Gambling task in Gage-type
patients vs. controls

41. Impairment of social and moral behavior related to early damage
in human prefrontal cortex
Steven W. Anderson et al (1999), Nature Neuroscience, 2, 11, 1032 - 1037.

42. Social and moral reasoning stages
Impairment of social and
moral behavior related to
early damage in human
prefrontal cortex
Anderson SW et al (1999), Nature
Neuroscience, 2, 11, 1032 - 1037.

43. Marsh AA et al (2008) American J. Psychiatry, 165, 712-70.

44. Marsh AA et al (2008) American J. Psychiatry, 165, 712-70.

45. De Oliveira-Souza, Hare RD, Bramati IE, Garrido GJ, Azevedo-Ignazio F, Tovar-Moll
F and Moll J (2008), Neuroimage, 40, 1202-1213.

46. De Oliveira-Souza et al (2008), Neuroimage, 40,
1202-1213.

47. The moral basis of human cognition
J Moll, R Zahn, R de Oliveira Souza, F Krueger and J Grafman (2005), Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, 799-809.
a. Cortical areas related to
morality
b. Subcortical areas related to
morality
c. Cortical areas non-related to
morality
Pyramid of values

48. Shenhav A and Greene JD (2010), Neuron, 67, 667-677.
34 valid subjects (17 females, age = 24,3), were studied across five
different Dilemma scenarios, with 10 self-paced variations each one. fMRI
acquisitions at a Siemens 3T equipment, Mass General Hospital (Boston).

49. Shenhav A and Greene JD (2010), Neuron, 67, 667-677.

50. Shenhav A and Greene JD (2010), Neuron, 67, 667-677.

51. …In general, life is

52. Freedom….a
MORAL AGENTS WITH EVOLVED AUTONOMOUS CAPABILITIES

53. From Laplace Demon to Biological Flexibility/Adaptiveness
Neural systems allow:
- Selfgenerated motion
- Agency monitoring of choices,
thoughts and actions
Transient and constrained autonomy
(degrees of freedom…, not freedom)

54. 1. The experience that we are free to choose our actions (on at least
some occasions). This experience of free will occurs at the time of an
act and for its duration. It may be conceived of as a perceptual
phenomenon.
2. Experiential belief, a belief "attached" to, or addressing, an ongoing
experience (and temporally related to the latter).
3. The abstract belief that we are free or not free (which may occur at
times remote from specific acts).
These aspects of free will are potentially separate. I may, for instance,
experience myself as a free agent, free in my volition, choosing to move
or act in a certain way, but I might also believe that I am not free, that
my thoughts and acts result from genetic and environmental influences,
and that at some ultimate level of analysis I am not as free as I feel (or
experience myself).
Sean A Spence (1996) Free Will in the Light of Neuropsychiatry
Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 3, 2, 75-90
The "problem of the freedom of the will" breaks down into 3 aspects
which are phenomenologically distinct

55. Cerf M et al (2010), Nature, 467, 1104-1108.

56. Cerf M et al (2010), Nature, 467, 1104-1108.