This presentations explains some U.S. views on China-DPRK relations, some South Korean views on China-DPRK relations, signs of evolution in China’s DPRK policy, signs of continuity of China’s DPRK policy. It also looks at the question, is economic reform possible in North Korea? Finally, it shows the factors favouring continuity.

1. China’s DPRK Quandary.
Shenyang, China
July 19, 2013
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt
Northeast Asia Project Director
International Crisis Group

2. • U.S. views on China-DPRK relations
• South Korean views on China-DPRK relations
• Signs of evolution in China’s DPRK policy
• Signs of continuity of China’s DPRK policy
• Is economic reform possible in North Korea?
• Factors favouring continuity
• Conclusions
OUTLINE

3. • Sufficient pressure can compel North Korea to
abandon its nuclear program
• Chinese implementation of robust economic
sanctions are a necessary part of the pressure
• North Korea has acted against China’s interests and
could push China to implement punitive measures
U.S. VIEWS

4. U.S. VIEWS
“
“ You’re starting to see
[Beijing] recalculate and
say, ‘You know what? This
is starting to get out of
hand.”
– Barack Obama
March 2013
– John Kerry
July 2013
“ China is cooperating with
us [on North Korea
denuclearisation]. China
has helped to make a
difference.”
“

5. “There probably has been a rethinking
of Beijing’s approach given how
thoroughly the DPRK are undermining
their long-term interests.”
U.S. VIEWS
“
– Jeffrey Bader
April 2013
China “will be much more aggressive, much
more fed up and much more prepared to treat
North Korea differently than in the past.”
– Kurt Campbell
April 2013
“

6. “The teeth (China) can still suffer without
the lips (North Korea).”
SOUTH KOREAN VIEWS
– President Park Geun-hye
May 2013“
“After President Xi Jinping took office in China we
were able to see some changes…I believe that
China can exert more influence on [North] Korea,
I think they can do more.”
– Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se
July 2013“
– Chung Jae-ho
July 2013
“The idea by some scholars that North
Korea is becoming a strategic burden to
China rather than a buffer is now
shared by the Chinese leadership.”

7. • Supported UN Resolution 2094
• Stronger rhetoric
o “No country is allowed to throw the region into chaos for self-gains” - Xi
Jinping
o “No one is allowed to make troubles at China’s doorsteps.” - Wang Yi
o Destabilising the Peninsula is to “lift a rock only to drop it on one’s own
feet.” - Li Keqiang
• BoC closed North Korean FTB account
• Ministry of Transportation ordered strict enforcement of UN Resolution 2094
• Optics in bilateral relations: Xi-Obama “shirt-sleeve” meeting and Beijing’s
warm reception of Park
• Vibrant public debate
• Growing sense that DPRK belligerence undermines China’s strategic interests
o Regional stability jeopardised
o Allowing U.S. to boost its strategic position in the region
o Japan and/or South Korea could develop their own nuclear weapons
SIGNS OF EVOLUTION?

8. • Bilateral relations have cooled
o Kim Jŏng-ŭn started off tepid with China
o Kim Jŏng-ŭn not yet visited Beijing
o Difficulty in renewing party-to-party strategic talks
o Ongoing fishing disputes
• Discussion in Beijing about the absolute value of North Korea as a buffer
against the US and its allies—in the age of long-range missiles and US
naval dominance
• Concern for radioactive contamination of air and water in Northeast China
• Anger at repeated provocations despite China’s entreaties
• Outrage at Chinese fishermen being kidnapped
• Displeasure with Kim Jŏng-ŭn’s lack of respect for elder statesman Xi
Jinping
• Satirical jokes about Kim Jŏng-ŭn abound on Internet (“Fatty Kim” 金三胖)
• New push for “normal” state-to-state relations
SIGNS OF EVOLUTION?

9. • “China should righteously say ‘no’ to North Korea’s irresponsible
behaviour.”
– Chen Xiangyang, CICIR
April 2013
• “We must adjust our policy towards North Korea.”
– Zhang Liangui, Central Party School
April 2013
• “We have to tell North Korea loudly: Making China angry no doubt means
bad luck to yourself.”
– Zhu Feng, Peking University
February 2013
• “China has reached a point where it has to cut its losses and cut North
Korea loose.”
– Shen Dingli, Fudan University
February 2013
SIGNS OF EVOLUTION?

12. • China provides food, energy assistance and investment
o Cross-border trade continues apace
o Pace of construction of Hwanggumpyong joint special economic zone
has quickened since December 2012
o Massive cross-border infrastructure projects
o Majority of DPRK’s food and energy imports provided by China
• In large part due to this robust economic relationship, North Korea’s overall
economic situation continues to improve (despite drastic reductions in
trade with South Korea since 2008 and the currency reform in 2009).
SIGNS OF CONTINUITY –
ECONOMIC

13. • Has Kim Jŏng-ŭn shown any personal inclination toward economic reform ?
• If so, could he make bold economic reform moves in the current political context
in DRPK?
• If he thinks so, could he actually deliver the successful economic reform-based
growth necessary to compensate for the legitimacy lost by exposing the
propaganda?
• Would economic reforms require the young leader to abandon the command
economy and renounce the same state ideologies and political legacies of his
father and grandfather which form the basis of his own legitimacy? What would
he use to replace that legitimacy?
• What to make of experiments like Rason? “Mosquito net reform” or harbingers
of wider North Korean reform and opening?
• New “Masikryong Speed” slogan
o Stakhanovite-style exhortation towards construction projects, i.e. the
Masikyrong ski resort
• The new Pyŏngjin line
o Simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and the economy
ECONOMIC REFORM

14. • Appointment of Pak Pong Ju as Premier
o Signifies that DPRK could be invested in long-term economic reform
• The Korea Workers’ Party Central Committee reported to have set up a new
Department of Economics
o Consolidation of all economic matters under one branch; could become “the
strongest department in the Party”
o Change of responsibility; not liberalisation
• Can North Korea reform and keep nuclear weapons? Aren't the two inter-
connected?
o Reform in what way? More marketisation? Some privatisation?
ECONOMIC REFORM

15. • Do Chinese analysts believe economic reform and opening would resolve
the NK issue?
o Empower NK actors seeking relations with outside world to promote
business?
• Or, do Chinese policy makers believe economic reform would strengthen
the Kim regime by improving economy performance?
o Could regime stability due to economic security lead NK to abandon its
nuclear weapon?
• How does that work within the Pyŏngjin line?
o If the Pyŏngjin line succeeds in the context of NK economic reform,
does that solve the problem? Whose problem is it anyway?
ECONOMIC REFORM

16. • Bilateral relations show signs of recovery
o Kim Jŏng-ŭn sent an envoy to Beijing in May
o 1st Vice FM Kim Kye Gwan visited Beijing in June
o After Kim Kye Gwan’s Beijing visit, MFA stated that tensions had
definitively eased.
o KJU’s congratulatory message on Xi’s 60th’s birthday: “strengthen and
develop DPRK-China friendship for generations to come”
o Li Yuanchao to lead a delegation to DPRK for ceasefire anniversary
SIGNS OF CONTINUITY -
POLITICAL

17. • System characterised by consensus decision-making and bureaucratic
inertia
• “Traditionalists” still hold sway in the party, military and bureaucracy
• Prevalent views in Beijing:
o North Korea’s nuclear program is non-negotiable / no amount of
pressure can induce Pyongyang to give it up
o The amount of pressure required to achieve it would cause
destabilisation of the peninsula if not regime collapse
• Domestic challenges prioritised over changes in foreign policy
• Status quo preferred over uncertainty
• Priorities remain “no war, no instability, no nukes” The U.S. Factor
o China sees the U.S. as a larger strategic threat than DPRK
o Rebalancing deepened China’s suspicion
o Beijing sees DPRK mainly as a problem between Pyongyang and
Washington
FACTORS FAVOURING
CONTINUITY

18. • China is less indulgent of North Korea’s provocations
• China wants to bring DPRK back to talks, but is averse to applying real pressure
to achieve tangible steps towards denuclearisation
• Beijing remains committed to both sustaining the country and integrating it
more deeply into the Chinese economy
• Beijing expects economic interdependence to increase the pressure and
likelihood for the DPRK to undertake economic reform, which China sees as
the ultimate solution to the entire North Korean issue
• Yet, while Chinese policymakers and establishment commentators seem to
agree that Beijing can, at most, rebuke North Korea, there are uncomfortable
questions about what that entails.
• The cost of China’s current policy may be implicitly accepting North Korea as a
nuclear state, or tolerating additional destabilising acts by the North, both of
which would further imperil China’s priority of regional stability
• China’s youth overwhelmingly view DPRK with pity and contempt, and these
opinions are likely to alter policy in the longer term
• Achieving normal state-to-state relations is a gradual and long-term process
CONCLUSION