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MERE PAAS TEENSY HAI
OR
COMPROMISING A HIGHLY SECURE
ENVIRONMENT PART 2




      Nikhil Mittal (SamratAshok)
ABOUT ME
 SamratAshok
 Twitter - @nikhil_mitt
 Penetration Tester with PwC India
 I am interested in Offensive Information Security,
  new attack vectors and methodologies to pwn
  systems.
 Creator of Kautilya and Maareech
 Previous Talks
       Ultimate Pen Testing: Compromising a highly secure
        environment Clubhack’10
       Here are your Keystrokes Hackfest’11
   Upcoming Talks
       Kautilya: Teensy beyond shell Blackhat Abu Dhabi’11
OVERVIEW
 Why the Title?
 Current State of Pentesting

 Questions being raised to us

 The answer to the questions

 What’s done

 What we will do

 Limitations

 Future

 Conclusion
WHY THE TITLE?
   What I Told to the ClubHack team:
       I talked about compromising a highly secure
        environment last year, let’s continue with the pwnage!!
       Thanks to the team for buying that and allowing me to
        speak.


   The real reason:
A TYPICAL PEN TEST SCENARIO

 A client engagement comes with IP addresses.
 We need to complete the assignment in very
  restrictive time frame.
 Pressure is on us to deliver a “good” report with
  some high severity findings. (That “High” return
  inside a red colored box)
CURRENT STATE OF PENTESTING




  Vuln
              Exploit         Report
  Scan
 This is a best case scenario.
 Only lucky ones find that.

 Generally legacy Enterprise Applications or
  Business Critical applications are not upgraded.
 There is almost no fun doing it that way.
SOME OF US DO IT BETTER




 Enum      Scan      Exploit   Report
SOME OF US DO IT EVEN BETTER




Enum
                          Post
   +     Scan   Exploit          Report
                          Exp
 Intel
WHY DO WE NEED TO EXPLOIT?
 To gain access to the systems.
 This shows the real threat to clients that we can
  actually make an impact on their business. No more
  “so-what” 
 We can create reports with “High” Severity findings.

 <Audience>

 <Audience>
WHAT DO WE EXPLOIT?
   Memory Corruption bugs.
       Server side
       Client Side
 Humans
 Mis-configurations

 Design Problems

 <Audience>

 <Audience>
QUESTIONS BEING RAISED TO US
   Many times we get some vulnerabilities but can’t
    exploit.
       No public exploits available.
       Not allowed on the system.
       Countermeasure blocking it.
       Exploit completed but no session was generated :P



                                             Kya hai tumhare
                                                 paas?
QUESTIONS BEING RAISED TO US
 Hardened Systems
 Patches in place

 Countermeasures blocking scans and exploits

 Security incident monitoring and blocking




                                      Kya hai tumhare
                                          paas?
QUESTIONS BEING RAISED TO US
 Just a bad day.
 Exploit completed but no session was generated :P




                                     Kya hai tumhare
                                         paas?
ALTERNATIVES
 Open file shares.
 Sticky slips.

 Social Engineering attacks.

 Man In The Middle (many types)

 SMB Relay

 <Audience>

 <Audience>
THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS
TEENSY
 A USB Micro-controller device.
 We will use Teensy ++ which is a newer version of
  Teensy.
 Available for $24 from pjrc.com




      Mere paas Teensy hai
USING TEENSY
 Find an unattended system and insert the teensy
  device in USB port.
 Fool your victim by disguising it as a mouse, USB
  toy, Thumb drive etc.
 Generally Teensy needs just a minute to complete
  the job.
 You can program it according to your needs.

 Undetected and unblocked, Teensy works great for
  popping shells.
WHAT’S DONE
 Arduino-Based attack vector in Social Engineering
  Toolkit by David Kennedy
 Contains some really awesome payloads.

 Almost all payloads are for popping shells.
WHAT WE WILL DO
 Teensy can be used for much more than popping
  shells.
 It can be used to perform pre and post exploitation.

 We will have a detailed look at some of these
  payloads and will understand how to create
  payloads as per our needs.
DESCRIPTION OF PAYLOADS
 More for Windows as desktops are generally based
  on Windows.
 Payloads vary from one line commands to powerful
  scripts.
 If you know powershell scripting, payloads will
  make more sense and will be easier to customize.
DEMO
WINDOWS USER ADD
THANK YOU
DEFAULT DNS
EDIT HOSTS FILE
ENABLE RDP
BUT
 What if even Teensy doesn’t work? With other
  options not working already?
 If USB ports are ripped off?

 Would it be impossible to pwn such environment?
ENABLE TELNET
FORCEFUL BROWSING
DOWNLOAD AND EXECUTE
SETHC AND UTILMAN BACKDOOR
UNINSTALL APPLICATION
REGISTRY EXPORT
TWEET
HASHDUMP
CODE EXECUTION
KEYLOGGING
LIMITATIONS
 Limited storage in Teensy. Resolved if you attach a
  SD card with Teensy.
 Inability to “read” from the system. You have to
  assume the responses of victim OS and there is
  only one way traffic.
FUTURE
 Kautilya
 Improvement in current payloads.

 New payloads for non-traditional shells.

 Dropping executables using additional storage
  (already done).
CONCLUSION
 If used wisely Teensy can be used as a complete
  penetration testing device though with its own
  limitations.
 It’s a cheap device so use it.

 Please use Kautilya and give feedback after it is
  released.



      Mere paas Teensy hai
THANK YOU
 Questions?
 Insults?

 Feedback?

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EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
 

Mere Paas Teensy Hai (Nikhil Mittal)

  • 1. MERE PAAS TEENSY HAI OR COMPROMISING A HIGHLY SECURE ENVIRONMENT PART 2 Nikhil Mittal (SamratAshok)
  • 2. ABOUT ME  SamratAshok  Twitter - @nikhil_mitt  Penetration Tester with PwC India  I am interested in Offensive Information Security, new attack vectors and methodologies to pwn systems.  Creator of Kautilya and Maareech  Previous Talks  Ultimate Pen Testing: Compromising a highly secure environment Clubhack’10  Here are your Keystrokes Hackfest’11  Upcoming Talks  Kautilya: Teensy beyond shell Blackhat Abu Dhabi’11
  • 3. OVERVIEW  Why the Title?  Current State of Pentesting  Questions being raised to us  The answer to the questions  What’s done  What we will do  Limitations  Future  Conclusion
  • 4. WHY THE TITLE?  What I Told to the ClubHack team:  I talked about compromising a highly secure environment last year, let’s continue with the pwnage!!  Thanks to the team for buying that and allowing me to speak.  The real reason:
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  • 6. A TYPICAL PEN TEST SCENARIO  A client engagement comes with IP addresses.  We need to complete the assignment in very restrictive time frame.  Pressure is on us to deliver a “good” report with some high severity findings. (That “High” return inside a red colored box)
  • 7. CURRENT STATE OF PENTESTING Vuln Exploit Report Scan
  • 8.  This is a best case scenario.  Only lucky ones find that.  Generally legacy Enterprise Applications or Business Critical applications are not upgraded.  There is almost no fun doing it that way.
  • 9. SOME OF US DO IT BETTER Enum Scan Exploit Report
  • 10. SOME OF US DO IT EVEN BETTER Enum Post + Scan Exploit Report Exp Intel
  • 11. WHY DO WE NEED TO EXPLOIT?  To gain access to the systems.  This shows the real threat to clients that we can actually make an impact on their business. No more “so-what”   We can create reports with “High” Severity findings.  <Audience>  <Audience>
  • 12. WHAT DO WE EXPLOIT?  Memory Corruption bugs.  Server side  Client Side  Humans  Mis-configurations  Design Problems  <Audience>  <Audience>
  • 13. QUESTIONS BEING RAISED TO US  Many times we get some vulnerabilities but can’t exploit.  No public exploits available.  Not allowed on the system.  Countermeasure blocking it.  Exploit completed but no session was generated :P Kya hai tumhare paas?
  • 14. QUESTIONS BEING RAISED TO US  Hardened Systems  Patches in place  Countermeasures blocking scans and exploits  Security incident monitoring and blocking Kya hai tumhare paas?
  • 15. QUESTIONS BEING RAISED TO US  Just a bad day.  Exploit completed but no session was generated :P Kya hai tumhare paas?
  • 16. ALTERNATIVES  Open file shares.  Sticky slips.  Social Engineering attacks.  Man In The Middle (many types)  SMB Relay  <Audience>  <Audience>
  • 17. THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS TEENSY  A USB Micro-controller device.  We will use Teensy ++ which is a newer version of Teensy.  Available for $24 from pjrc.com Mere paas Teensy hai
  • 18. USING TEENSY  Find an unattended system and insert the teensy device in USB port.  Fool your victim by disguising it as a mouse, USB toy, Thumb drive etc.  Generally Teensy needs just a minute to complete the job.  You can program it according to your needs.  Undetected and unblocked, Teensy works great for popping shells.
  • 19. WHAT’S DONE  Arduino-Based attack vector in Social Engineering Toolkit by David Kennedy  Contains some really awesome payloads.  Almost all payloads are for popping shells.
  • 20. WHAT WE WILL DO  Teensy can be used for much more than popping shells.  It can be used to perform pre and post exploitation.  We will have a detailed look at some of these payloads and will understand how to create payloads as per our needs.
  • 21. DESCRIPTION OF PAYLOADS  More for Windows as desktops are generally based on Windows.  Payloads vary from one line commands to powerful scripts.  If you know powershell scripting, payloads will make more sense and will be easier to customize.
  • 22. DEMO
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  • 31. BUT  What if even Teensy doesn’t work? With other options not working already?  If USB ports are ripped off?  Would it be impossible to pwn such environment?
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  • 36. SETHC AND UTILMAN BACKDOOR
  • 39. TWEET
  • 43. LIMITATIONS  Limited storage in Teensy. Resolved if you attach a SD card with Teensy.  Inability to “read” from the system. You have to assume the responses of victim OS and there is only one way traffic.
  • 44. FUTURE  Kautilya  Improvement in current payloads.  New payloads for non-traditional shells.  Dropping executables using additional storage (already done).
  • 45. CONCLUSION  If used wisely Teensy can be used as a complete penetration testing device though with its own limitations.  It’s a cheap device so use it.  Please use Kautilya and give feedback after it is released. Mere paas Teensy hai
  • 46. THANK YOU  Questions?  Insults?  Feedback?