1. (“What about Everything”, Carbon Leaf)

2. Please only use the “play” button to
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animated content & movies

3. Glossary
 Φ : “philosophy” or “philosophical”
 NB : nota bene (Latin) for “Please Note”
 cf. : “compare”
 e.g. : exempli gratiā (Latin) for “for example”
 etc. : et cetera (Latin) for “and so forth”
 ∀ : “Universal” or “for all”
 ∃ : “there exists” or “for (at least) some”
  : “Necessary” or “necessity”
  : “Possible” or “possibility”
 ~x : “not x”
∴​ : “Therefore”

4. Agenda
 Ethics & Philosophy
 Metaphysics
 Epistemology
 Logic
 Normative Ethics vs. Metaethics
 Cf. Applied Ethics
 Our Metaethical Question:
Are there – or could there be – moral facts?

5. Upshot
 To be able to distinguish moral accounts
that are subtly different in kind, specifically
 Moral Relativism
 “Subjectivism”
 Getting on to the same page
 Despite the diversity of the rest of class
 Each moral position differs (mainly) not even
on what’s morally so, but why it is so and not
otherwise

6. Previously, we “brainstormed” what one might think
– pre-theoretically – ethics is all about:

7. Pre-theoretical Considerations
 “Right” & “wrong”?
 “Good” & “bad”?
 “Evil”?
 “Ought”? “Should”?
 Actions?
 Constraints?
 Principles?
 Some guide or guidance?
 Character? Virtues &
Vices ?
 Values?
 Origin?
 Culture? Society?
 Family?
 God? Religion?
 Conscience? A “feeling”?
 Responsibility?
 Agency?
 Evaluation & judgment?
 Praise & blame?
 Justification, excuse, &
mitigation
Etc.

9. Philosophy (Φ)
 Itself a philosophical question
 Traditionally, not distinct from science
 By analogy with artist, “scientist” coined in
1834
 by the Rev. William Whewell (1794–1866)
 Previously, “natural philosopher”; cf. “moral
philosophy”
 Latter included all of modern Φ sub-disciplines (see
below)

10. Philosophy (Φ)
 Many overly simplistic answers, including:
 φιλοσοφία; “love of wisdom”
 “Thinking about thinking”
 “The study of Big questions” or “of general and
fundamental problems”
 Etc.
 I prefer: the systematic study of the nature of the
world (widely construed, meaning all possible, in
addition to actual, reality) in all the ways that it
is immune to empirical study

11. Philosophy

13. E.g. Ontology
 What is it to be? What is it to be a thing (∃x) at all?
 As opposed to nothing (~∃x)?
 Is there a difference between
 a possible (x) but not real thing (~∃x)and
 something that is impossible (~x)?
 and could never be (~x)? (~x ?)

14. Consider … Swiss Cheese
What – exactly – are you counting when you
count the “eyes” in a piece of Swiss Cheese?

16. “Known knowns, …”
 US
Defense
Secretary
Donald
Rumsfeld
 White
House
Briefing,
February
12, 2002

19. Normative Ethics
Study of particular moral accounts.
Each, roughly …
 Argues for its own ethical norms.
 (hence the adjective ‘normative’)
 A particular understanding of terms such as
“right” & “wrong”, “good” & “bad”, etc
 (Perhaps?) action-guiding – i.e. that by which we
ought to live

20. Normative Ethics
Substantive moral principles we ought to follow?
 Norms as values?
But maybe most importantly, each argues
 why ethics must have its structure and not
some other.
NB, the vast bulk of this course

21. Possibility of Disagreement
 NB that the mere possibility of
disagreement between or amongst
normative accounts does not by itself
suggest that there isn’t a single correct moral
account!
 Disagreement ≠ ~∃ moral facts!
 (Epistemology vs. ontology/metaphysics)

22. Cf. Applied Ethics
 Application of one or a variety of normative
accounts to specific problems, disciplines,
endeavors, or cases.
 Unusual features of a particularly troubling
moral problem
 E.g. abortion; genetic engineering

23. Cf. Applied Ethics
 Special concerns and anxieties of a profession
 E.g. Medical or bioethics; business ethics
 Unconcerned with which moral account is right
 Or why it is right
 Or how each account is distinct from the other
 Or how their (observed) convergence or
consensus or moral conclusions affects these
particular areas of concern

24. Philosophy to Metaethics

25. Metaethics
Again, roughly, …
 Kinds of normative accounts there even
could be
 Exploring the logical space of morality
 The  &  structures and features of such
accounts
 Why each account is so and not otherwise
 And how we could know this

26. Metaethics
 How purported moral properties or terms must work
 Theory independent
 E.g. What do (or could) terms like “good”, “right”,
“ought”, or “obligation” mean in general? When
specifically moral?
 What is the epistemic status of moral claims?
 Are moral judgments different from other kinds of
judgments?
 If so, how?
 Etc. NB, all adequate normative accounts will have
their own metaethical answers to such questions
 But, one might still do metaethics independently of
normative ethics

27. Consider “ought”
 Moral ought
 You ought to x, even – perhaps especially – when
you don’t want to.
 Prudential ought
 You ought to y because it’s in your best interest
 E.g., “if you want to pass this class, you ought to
participate early an often.”
 Expectational ought
 According to the schedule, the bus ought to be here
in 5 minutes.

28. Consider “ought”
Not always clear which we mean:
“Given the inclement and dangerous weather,
UML ought to close by 2pm today.”

29. Normative vs. Metaethics
Normative Metaethics
 “what is right, what is
wrong, and why?”
 Particular moral claims
 Particular moral
judgments re moral
truths
 “what could we mean by ‘right’,
what could we mean by
‘wrong’, and what could be a
proper kind of answer to the
question, ‘why is that right?’”
 What is the metaphysical
status of moral claims? What
could they mean? What is
their ultimate nature?
 Are there moral truths? What
makes something a moral
truth? How would we know
moral truths?

30. Our Metaethical Question
Are there
– or could there be –
moral facts?

31. – or –
Can Moral Claim be True or False?

32. Are there Moral Facts?
Can Moral Claim be True or False?
Yes No
 Cognitivism
 Moral Realism
 Natrualism vs. Non-
naturalism
 Vast bulk of our
class
 NB Relativism
 Non-cognitivism
 Moral Anti-realism
 Subjectivism
 Moral Skepticism
 Error-Theory
 Emotivism &
Prescriptivism

33. Are there Moral Facts?
Can Moral Claims be True or False?
Naturalism
Yes No
Are there Moral Facts?
Can Moral Claims be True or False?
Are moral claims fact-type claims? Do moral
claims at least seem like they could be true
Cognitivism
(a.k.a. Moral Realism;
Objective Moral Theories)
What kind of moral facts?
Non-Naturalism
Non-Cognitivism
(a.k.a. Moral Anti-Realism;
“Subjective” Moral Theories)
No
Social Contract (?)
Kant
Moral
Skepticism
Further, we ‘ought’ to
(but in what sense?!)
eschew moral language…
Moral
Nihilism
Simple
“Subjectivism”
Emotivism
(Ayer, Stevenson)
Prescriptivism
(Norm-Expressivism) (Hare)
Language is more than
informative – ethical “talk”
expresses something:
Cultural
Relativism
Culture determines
Moral Truths
Error-Theory
(Projectivism;
quasi-realism (?))
Yes
Individuals determine
Moral Truths
Existentialism
(individualism)
Ethics is “Queer”
i.e., incoherent
Yes, but really “about”
attitudes, not norms
Naturalistic Fallacy?
(Is/Ought? Fact/Value??)
DCT (?);
Natural Law,
Plato, Aristotle,
Utilitarianism (?)

34. Naturalism
Yes No
Are there Moral Facts?
Can Moral Claims be True or False?
Are moral claims fact-type claims? Do moral
claims at least seem like they could be true
Cognitivism
(a.k.a. Moral Realism;
Objective Moral Theories)
What kind of moral facts?
Non-Naturalism
Non-Cognitivism
(a.k.a. Moral Anti-Realism;
“Subjective” Moral Theories)
No
Social Contract (?)
Kant
Moral
Skepticism
Further, we ‘ought’ to
(but in what sense?!)
eschew moral language…
Moral
Nihilism
Simple
“Subjectivism”
Emotivism
(Ayer, Stevenson)
Prescriptivism
(Norm-Expressivism) (Hare)
Language is more than
informative – ethical “talk”
expresses something:
Cultural
Relativism
Culture determines
Moral Truths
Error-Theory
(Projectivism;
quasi-realism (?))
Yes
Individuals determine
Moral Truths
Existentialism
(individualism)
Ethics is “Queer”
i.e., incoherent
Yes, but really “about”
attitudes, not norms
Naturalistic Fallacy?
(Is/Ought? Fact/Value??)
DCT (?);
Natural Law,
Plato, Aristotle,
Utilitarianism (?)

35. Read:
• Bernard Williams “Amoralist, Subjectivist,
Relativist”
Review:
• Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” (Denis, 119-125)
• Rachels Chs.3 & 2
• Sartre, “Existentialism is a Humanism”
(Blackboard link)