7. The Goldilocks
Problem• Articles too weak –
needed stronger
national government
for nation-building.
• Needed to avoid
strengthening central
government too
much to avoid
tyrannical
government.
8. The Goldilocks
Problem• Articles too weak –
needed stronger
national government
for nation-building.
• Needed to avoid
strengthening central
government too
much to avoid
tyrannical
government.
9. The Goldilocks
Problem• Articles too weak –
needed stronger
national government
for nation-building.
• Needed to avoid
strengthening central
government too
much to avoid
tyrannical
government.
10.
11. The Articles (1777) created
in law what had already
existed in practice since
Declaration of
Independence…
12. The Articles (1777) created
in law what had already
existed in practice since
Declaration of
Independence…
…a loose confederation
of independent states.
13.
14. Provisions of the Articles
1. Could make war/peace, but no power to
levy taxes to pursue either.
2. Could not regulate interstate commerce, nor
deny states the right to collect customs
duties.
3. No independent executive to insure laws
passed by Congress enforced.
4. No national court system to settle interstate
disputes.
5. All legislation required approval of 9 of 13
states, making action almost impossible.
6. Defects in the Articles were difficult to
remedy – amendments required unanimous
approval of the states.
15. Provisions of the Articles
1. Could make war/peace, but no power to
levy taxes to pursue either.
2. Could not regulate interstate commerce, nor
deny states the right to collect customs
duties.
3. No independent executive to insure laws
passed by Congress enforced.
4. No national court system to settle interstate
disputes.
5. All legislation required approval of 9 of 13
states, making action almost impossible.
6. Defects in the Articles were difficult to
remedy – amendments required unanimous
approval of the states.
16. Provisions of the Articles
1. Could make war/peace, but no power to
levy taxes to pursue either.
2. Could not regulate interstate commerce, nor
deny states the right to collect customs
duties.
3. No independent executive to insure laws
passed by Congress enforced.
4. No national court system to settle interstate
disputes.
5. All legislation required approval of 9 of 13
states, making action almost impossible.
6. Defects in the Articles were difficult to
remedy – amendments required unanimous
approval of the states.
17. Provisions of the Articles
1. Could make war/peace, but no power to
levy taxes to pursue either.
2. Could not regulate interstate commerce, nor
deny states the right to collect customs
duties.
3. No independent executive to insure laws
passed by Congress enforced.
4. No national court system to settle interstate
disputes.
5. All legislation required approval of 9 of 13
states, making action almost impossible.
6. Defects in the Articles were difficult to
remedy – amendments required unanimous
approval of the states.
18. Provisions of the Articles
1. Could make war/peace, but no power to
levy taxes to pursue either.
2. Could not regulate interstate commerce, nor
deny states the right to collect customs
duties.
3. No independent executive to insure laws
passed by Congress enforced.
4. No national court system to settle interstate
disputes.
5. All legislation required approval of 9 of 13
states, making action almost impossible.
6. Defects in the Articles were difficult to
remedy – amendments required unanimous
approval of the states.
19. Provisions of the Articles
1. Could make war/peace, but no power to
levy taxes to pursue either.
2. Could not regulate interstate commerce, nor
deny states the right to collect customs
duties.
3. No independent executive to insure laws
passed by Congress enforced.
4. No national court system to settle interstate
disputes.
5. All legislation required approval of 9 of 13
states, making action almost impossible.
6. Defects in the Articles were difficult to
remedy – amendments required unanimous
approval of the states.
21. Problems with the
Articles
• Government unable to finance its
activities.
• Colonial money almost worthless,
government couldn’t borrow.
• Couldn’t defend US interests abroad
because no standing army.
• Difficult to make treaties: lack of single
executive, Congressional actions could
be vetoed by States.
• Government couldn’t prevent outbreak
of interstate commercial warfare.
22. Problems with the
Articles
• Government unable to finance its
activities.
• Colonial money almost worthless,
government couldn’t borrow.
• Couldn’t defend US interests abroad
because no standing army.
• Difficult to make treaties: lack of single
executive, Congressional actions could
be vetoed by States.
• Government couldn’t prevent outbreak
of interstate commercial warfare.
23. Problems with the
Articles
• Government unable to finance its
activities.
• Colonial money almost worthless,
government couldn’t borrow.
• Couldn’t defend US interests abroad
because no standing army.
• Difficult to make treaties: lack of single
executive, Congressional actions could
be vetoed by States.
• Government couldn’t prevent outbreak
of interstate commercial warfare.
24. Problems with the
Articles
• Government unable to finance its
activities.
• Colonial money almost worthless,
government couldn’t borrow.
• Couldn’t defend US interests abroad
because no standing army.
• Difficult to make treaties: lack of single
executive, Congressional actions could
be vetoed by States.
• Government couldn’t prevent outbreak
of interstate commercial warfare.
25. Problems with the
Articles
• Government unable to finance its
activities.
• Colonial money almost worthless,
government couldn’t borrow.
• Couldn’t defend US interests abroad
because no standing army.
• Difficult to make treaties: lack of single
executive, Congressional actions could
be vetoed by States.
• Government couldn’t prevent outbreak
of interstate commercial warfare.
31. The first constitution of the United
States was known as ________.
1. the Articles of
Confederation
2. the Virginia Plan
3. the Connecticut
Compromise
4. the original inter-
state agreement
32. Which of the following was NOT a
component of the Articles of
Confederation?
1. The absence of an
independent
judiciary.
2. The national
government lacked
the power to tax.
3. A unicameral
legislature.
4. All of these choices
ARE components of
the Articles of
Confederation.
46. Madison argued that the best way to
control self-interest in government
was to have:
1. a democratic form
of government.
2. a republican form
of government.
3. an educated
public.
4. strong religious
organizations.
54. The Virginia Plan
• Bicameral Legislature
– Lower House popularly
elected, apportioned by
population.
– Upper House elected by
Lower House.
• Single Executive
• Federal Judiciary
• Supremacy Clause
55. The Virginia Plan
• Bicameral Legislature
– Lower House popularly
elected, apportioned by
population.
– Upper House elected by
Lower House.
• Single Executive
• Federal Judiciary
• Supremacy Clause
56. The Virginia Plan
• Bicameral Legislature
– Lower House popularly
elected, apportioned by
population.
– Upper House elected by
Lower House.
• Single Executive
• Federal Judiciary
• Supremacy Clause
57. The Virginia Plan
• Bicameral Legislature
– Lower House popularly
elected, apportioned by
population.
– Upper House elected by
Lower House.
• Single Executive
• Federal Judiciary
• Supremacy Clause
58. The Virginia Plan
• Bicameral Legislature
– Lower House popularly
elected, apportioned by
population.
– Upper House elected by
Lower House.
• Single Executive
• Federal Judiciary
• Supremacy Clause
59. New Jersey Plan
• Cautious revision of Articles, not
a wholly new approach.
• Small-state delegates figured
out they were getting pwnd.
• Madison could have run
roughshod over small-state
delegates, but didn’t.
60. New Jersey Plan
• Cautious revision of Articles, not
a wholly new approach.
• Small-state delegates figured
out they were getting pwnd.
• Madison could have run
roughshod over small-state
delegates, but didn’t.
61. “You see the consequences of
pushing things too far. Some
members from the small states
wish for two branches in the
General Legislature and are
friends to a good National
Government; but we would sooner
submit to a foreign power than…
be deprived of an equality of
suffrage in both branches of
the legislature, and thereby be
thrown under the domination of
the large States.”
62. New Jersey Plan
• Cautious revision of Articles, not
a wholly new approach.
• Small-state delegates figured
out they were getting pwnd.
• Madison could have run
roughshod over small-state
delegates, but didn’t.
64. New Jersey Plan
• Favored strong national
government in principle,
opposed domination of large
states
• Unicameral legislature (one vote
each state)
• Supremacy Clause
65. New Jersey Plan
• Favored strong national
government in principle,
opposed domination of large
states
• Unicameral legislature (one vote
each state)
• Supremacy Clause
66. New Jersey Plan
• Favored strong national
government in principle,
opposed domination of large
states
• Unicameral legislature (one vote
each state)
• Supremacy Clause
72. • Paterson lost, but did
achieve his purpose…
• Connecticut delegation
actually came up with
the compromise early,
but were ignored
The Connecticut
Compromise
73. • Paterson lost, but did
achieve his purpose…
• Connecticut delegation
actually came up with
the compromise early,
but were ignored
The Connecticut
Compromise
74. • Article I, Sections 2 & 3
• Bicameral Legislature
– Lower House apportioned by
population, popularly elected.
– Upper House equal
representation (2), selected
by State Legislatures.
• Supremacy Clause (Article
VI, Section 2)
The Connecticut
Compromise
75. • Article I, Sections 2 & 3
• Bicameral Legislature
– Lower House apportioned by
population, popularly elected.
– Upper House equal
representation (2), selected
by State Legislatures.
• Supremacy Clause (Article
VI, Section 2)
The Connecticut
Compromise
76. • Article I, Sections 2 & 3
• Bicameral Legislature
– Lower House apportioned by
population, popularly elected.
– Upper House equal
representation (2), selected
by State Legislatures.
• Supremacy Clause (Article
VI, Section 2)
The Connecticut
Compromise
77. • Article I, Sections 2 & 3
• Bicameral Legislature
– Lower House apportioned by
population, popularly elected.
– Upper House equal
representation (2), selected
by State Legislatures.
• Supremacy Clause (Article
VI, Section 2)
The Connecticut
Compromise
78. • Article I, Sections 2 & 3
• Bicameral Legislature
– Lower House apportioned by
population, popularly elected.
– Upper House equal
representation (2), selected
by State Legislatures.
• Supremacy Clause (Article
VI, Section 2)
The Connecticut
Compromise
79. In order to uphold the basic values of
democracy, the Constitution was designed
to include which of the following?
1. mixed
government
2. fragmentation of
power
3. representative
government
4. all of the above
84. The formal constitutional amendment
process provides for all of the following
EXCEPT:
1. Congress may develop
proposals for amendments.
2. a national Constitutional
Convention to develop
proposals.
3. the President may develop a
proposal for an amendment.
4. state Constitutional
Conventions to ratify
amendments.