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Cultural values can affect conflict
resolution. This presentation
combines face negotiation theory
with high and low context theory.
The Atoms for Peace Program [1953] was partly a
diversionary tactic.
While promoting atoms for peace we…
While promoting atoms for peace we…

-   tripled our nuclear weaponry [841 to 18, 638]
                                 [
While promoting atoms for peace we…

-   tripled our nuclear weaponry [841 to 18, 638]
                                   [
-   installed a puppet regime in Iran [the Shah]
While promoting atoms for peace we…

-   tripled our nuclear weaponry [841 to 18, 638]
                                   [
-   installed a puppet regime in Iran [the Shah]
-   did secret nuclear testing
After the Bravo incident in Japan, our secret
nuclear testing was revealed.

We were losing face, internationally, and decided
to retrieve all nuclear technology.

We reached a deal with Iran in the 70s.
In the 70s, both Iran and the U.S. cultures were
dealing with politically charged intergroup
conflict.
In 1976, the Shah had worked out a deal with
Ford.

But during campaign season, Carter accused Ford
of being weak on proliferation policy.
In 1976, the Shah had worked out a deal with
Ford.

But during campaign season, Carter accused Ford
of being weak on proliferation policy.

The deal with Iran fell through.
Carter struck a deal in 1978.
Carter struck a deal in 1978.

Then… an Iranian revolution removed the Shah
from power.
Carter struck a deal in 1978.

Then… an Iranian revolution removed the Shah
from power.

Again, the deal fell through.
This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned
from 1979-1981.

Iran’s message?
This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned
from 1979-1981.

Iran’s message?

No more puppet regimes.
This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned
from 1979-1981.

Iran’s message?

No more puppet regimes.

Don’t infringe on our freedoms.
Our response?
Our response?

Sanctions.
Our response?

Sanctions.

Financially supporting Hussein’s attempt to take
over Iran throughout the 80s.
Hussein failed [81-88].

He owed Kuwait over 30b and refused to pay.

So, he decided to invade Kuwait

We stepped in to stop him.
Bin Laden objected to our involvement in the
Middle East.

He began forming a global Al-Qaeda
network in the 90s. In 2001, they attacked the U.S.
This prompted us to go back into Iraq and
overthrow Hussein.

For the first time in decades, Iran and the U.S. had
a common enemy – Hussein.

In 2003 Iran released the rest of their Iraqi POWs.
In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where
they…
In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where
they…
- admitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollah
In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where
they…
- admitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollah

- admitted support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas
In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where
they…
- admitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollah

- admitted support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas

- offered nuclear program transparency
In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where
they…
- admitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollah

- admitted support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas

- offered nuclear program transparency

- agreed to the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002
In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where
they…
- admitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollah

- admitted support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas

- offered nuclear program transparency

- agreed to the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002

- agreed to a two-state solution and considered

   itself at peace with Israel
Cheney’s Response ?
Cheney’s Response ?
- “We don’t speak to evil.”
Cheney’s Response ?
- “We don’t speak to evil.”

- Elmer calls this ‘Negative Attribution’
Cheney’s Response ?
- “We don’t speak to evil.”

- Elmer calls this ‘Negative Attribution’



As a result
- Iran rode a wave of power until 2009.
Obama attempted to take advantage of Iran’s
intergroup conflict with negotiations.

But Iran withdrew from the table.
In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to
Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran.
In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to
Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran.

Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged
in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran.
In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to
Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran.

Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged
in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran.

And it worked!
Obama’s response?
Obama’s response?
- You’re two days too late.
Obama’s response?
- You’re two days too late.

- It wasn’t fast enough.
Obama’s response?
- You’re two days too late.

- It wasn’t fast enough.

- We’ve signed more sanctions.
Obama’s response?
- You’re two days too late.

- It wasn’t fast enough.

- We’ve signed more sanctions.




Hofstede calls this a flaw of ‘short-term’
orientation.
He says cross-cultural
negotia  tion is a process, not
ju st one meeting where
two sides   exchange ultimatums
 with each other.
In 1953 we responded to the nuclear threat by dominating
and competing. If Gudykunst is right, increasing our
tolerance for Iran’s attempts at democracy could have
possibly prevented the present-day U.S.-Iran conflict.
U.S. - Iran Conflict
   A more culturally sensitive approach, with less
    polarizing communication, could potentially
    resolve the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.

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U.S. - Iran Conflict

  • 1. Cultural values can affect conflict resolution. This presentation combines face negotiation theory with high and low context theory.
  • 2. The Atoms for Peace Program [1953] was partly a diversionary tactic.
  • 3. While promoting atoms for peace we…
  • 4. While promoting atoms for peace we… - tripled our nuclear weaponry [841 to 18, 638] [
  • 5. While promoting atoms for peace we… - tripled our nuclear weaponry [841 to 18, 638] [ - installed a puppet regime in Iran [the Shah]
  • 6. While promoting atoms for peace we… - tripled our nuclear weaponry [841 to 18, 638] [ - installed a puppet regime in Iran [the Shah] - did secret nuclear testing
  • 7. After the Bravo incident in Japan, our secret nuclear testing was revealed. We were losing face, internationally, and decided to retrieve all nuclear technology. We reached a deal with Iran in the 70s.
  • 8. In the 70s, both Iran and the U.S. cultures were dealing with politically charged intergroup conflict.
  • 9. In 1976, the Shah had worked out a deal with Ford. But during campaign season, Carter accused Ford of being weak on proliferation policy.
  • 10. In 1976, the Shah had worked out a deal with Ford. But during campaign season, Carter accused Ford of being weak on proliferation policy. The deal with Iran fell through.
  • 11. Carter struck a deal in 1978.
  • 12. Carter struck a deal in 1978. Then… an Iranian revolution removed the Shah from power.
  • 13. Carter struck a deal in 1978. Then… an Iranian revolution removed the Shah from power. Again, the deal fell through.
  • 14. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. Iran’s message?
  • 15. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. Iran’s message? No more puppet regimes.
  • 16. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. Iran’s message? No more puppet regimes. Don’t infringe on our freedoms.
  • 19. Our response? Sanctions. Financially supporting Hussein’s attempt to take over Iran throughout the 80s.
  • 20. Hussein failed [81-88]. He owed Kuwait over 30b and refused to pay. So, he decided to invade Kuwait We stepped in to stop him.
  • 21. Bin Laden objected to our involvement in the Middle East. He began forming a global Al-Qaeda network in the 90s. In 2001, they attacked the U.S.
  • 22. This prompted us to go back into Iraq and overthrow Hussein. For the first time in decades, Iran and the U.S. had a common enemy – Hussein. In 2003 Iran released the rest of their Iraqi POWs.
  • 23. In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where they…
  • 24. In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where they… - admitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollah
  • 25. In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where they… - admitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollah - admitted support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas
  • 26. In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where they… - admitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollah - admitted support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas - offered nuclear program transparency
  • 27. In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where they… - admitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollah - admitted support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas - offered nuclear program transparency - agreed to the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002
  • 28. In 2003, Iran submitted a proposal where they… - admitted to proxy dealings like Hezbollah - admitted support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas - offered nuclear program transparency - agreed to the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002 - agreed to a two-state solution and considered itself at peace with Israel
  • 30. Cheney’s Response ? - “We don’t speak to evil.”
  • 31. Cheney’s Response ? - “We don’t speak to evil.” - Elmer calls this ‘Negative Attribution’
  • 32. Cheney’s Response ? - “We don’t speak to evil.” - Elmer calls this ‘Negative Attribution’ As a result - Iran rode a wave of power until 2009.
  • 33. Obama attempted to take advantage of Iran’s intergroup conflict with negotiations. But Iran withdrew from the table.
  • 34. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran.
  • 35. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran.
  • 36. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked!
  • 38. Obama’s response? - You’re two days too late.
  • 39. Obama’s response? - You’re two days too late. - It wasn’t fast enough.
  • 40. Obama’s response? - You’re two days too late. - It wasn’t fast enough. - We’ve signed more sanctions.
  • 41. Obama’s response? - You’re two days too late. - It wasn’t fast enough. - We’ve signed more sanctions. Hofstede calls this a flaw of ‘short-term’ orientation.
  • 42. He says cross-cultural negotia tion is a process, not ju st one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other.
  • 43. In 1953 we responded to the nuclear threat by dominating and competing. If Gudykunst is right, increasing our tolerance for Iran’s attempts at democracy could have possibly prevented the present-day U.S.-Iran conflict.
  • 45. A more culturally sensitive approach, with less polarizing communication, could potentially resolve the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. This presentation combines face negotiation theory with high and low context theory. I technically have 8 slides here but they’re timed to an 8 minute presentation. This means new info will appear on them. The nature of the U.S.-Iran conflict stems from fear and anxiety. To paraphrase John Adams, the first conflict we should resolve is the institutionalized enmity in our minds. This presentation is targeted at foreign policy audiences and the goal here is to renegotiate our national face in the international arena.
  2. Eisenhower announced his ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative at the UN in 1953. The fear of an atomic war spread all over the world. The “Atoms for Peace” program attempted to dissuade those fears. According to Holl mention that this program was also a diversionary tactic. While the President sought to avoid nuclear war, he also used this opportunity and the CIA to restore power to a dictator, The Iranian Shah. This prevented local attempts for a democratized nationalist Iran. Under Eisenhower’s presidency, the number of nuclear weapons went from 841 to 18, 638. He called Atoms for Peace ‘psychological warfare.’ While other nations used the nuclear reactors for health discoveries, his administration built Castle Bravo. The Castle Bravo test was the most powerful nuclear device ever detonated by the U.S. It also, accidentally, resulted in huge contamination in Japan. After our secret testing was revealed, we began to lose face around the world. We went from the image of a Superman to a Mr. Burns. This loss of public image prompted president Eisenhower on a mission to retrieved all nuclear technology, Iran especially. Footnotes Richard G. Hewlet; Jack M Holl, Atoms For Peace and War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). Stephen Kinzer, All Shah’s Men (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2003). Em Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory  (New York: McGraw Hill, 1997). William Gudykunst, Theorizing About Intercultural Communication (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), 292. Robert J. Watson,  History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  vol. 4,  Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960 (Washington, D.C., 1997), 457, table 6. Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl,  Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission  (Berkeley, 1989), 172ff. Ervin Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Green City: Anchor Books, 1967), 5. Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, “In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952–1954,”  Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences  19 (1989): 267–347, on 331. Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 85.
  3. Eisenhower announced his ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative at the UN in 1953. The fear of an atomic war spread all over the world. The “Atoms for Peace” program attempted to dissuade those fears. According to Holl mention that this program was also a diversionary tactic. While the President sought to avoid nuclear war, he also used this opportunity and the CIA to restore power to a dictator, The Iranian Shah. This prevented local attempts for a democratized nationalist Iran. Under Eisenhower’s presidency, the number of nuclear weapons went from 841 to 18, 638. He called Atoms for Peace ‘psychological warfare.’ While other nations used the nuclear reactors for health discoveries, his administration built Castle Bravo. The Castle Bravo test was the most powerful nuclear device ever detonated by the U.S. It also, accidentally, resulted in huge contamination in Japan. After our secret testing was revealed, we began to lose face around the world. We went from the image of a Superman to a Mr. Burns. This loss of public image prompted president Eisenhower on a mission to retrieved all nuclear technology, Iran especially. Footnotes Richard G. Hewlet; Jack M Holl, Atoms For Peace and War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). Stephen Kinzer, All Shah’s Men (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2003). Em Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory  (New York: McGraw Hill, 1997). William Gudykunst, Theorizing About Intercultural Communication (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), 292. Robert J. Watson,  History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  vol. 4,  Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960 (Washington, D.C., 1997), 457, table 6. Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl,  Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission  (Berkeley, 1989), 172ff. Ervin Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Green City: Anchor Books, 1967), 5. Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, “In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952–1954,”  Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences  19 (1989): 267–347, on 331. Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 85.
  4. Eisenhower announced his ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative at the UN in 1953. The fear of an atomic war spread all over the world. The “Atoms for Peace” program attempted to dissuade those fears. According to Holl mention that this program was also a diversionary tactic. While the President sought to avoid nuclear war, he also used this opportunity and the CIA to restore power to a dictator, The Iranian Shah. This prevented local attempts for a democratized nationalist Iran. Under Eisenhower’s presidency, the number of nuclear weapons went from 841 to 18, 638. He called Atoms for Peace ‘psychological warfare.’ While other nations used the nuclear reactors for health discoveries, his administration built Castle Bravo. The Castle Bravo test was the most powerful nuclear device ever detonated by the U.S. It also, accidentally, resulted in huge contamination in Japan. After our secret testing was revealed, we began to lose face around the world. We went from the image of a Superman to a Mr. Burns. This loss of public image prompted president Eisenhower on a mission to retrieved all nuclear technology, Iran especially. Footnotes Richard G. Hewlet; Jack M Holl, Atoms For Peace and War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). Stephen Kinzer, All Shah’s Men (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2003). Em Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory  (New York: McGraw Hill, 1997). William Gudykunst, Theorizing About Intercultural Communication (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), 292. Robert J. Watson,  History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  vol. 4,  Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960 (Washington, D.C., 1997), 457, table 6. Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl,  Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission  (Berkeley, 1989), 172ff. Ervin Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Green City: Anchor Books, 1967), 5. Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, “In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952–1954,”  Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences  19 (1989): 267–347, on 331. Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 85.
  5. Eisenhower announced his ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative at the UN in 1953. The fear of an atomic war spread all over the world. The “Atoms for Peace” program attempted to dissuade those fears. According to Holl mention that this program was also a diversionary tactic. While the President sought to avoid nuclear war, he also used this opportunity and the CIA to restore power to a dictator, The Iranian Shah. This prevented local attempts for a democratized nationalist Iran. Under Eisenhower’s presidency, the number of nuclear weapons went from 841 to 18, 638. He called Atoms for Peace ‘psychological warfare.’ While other nations used the nuclear reactors for health discoveries, his administration built Castle Bravo. The Castle Bravo test was the most powerful nuclear device ever detonated by the U.S. It also, accidentally, resulted in huge contamination in Japan. After our secret testing was revealed, we began to lose face around the world. We went from the image of a Superman to a Mr. Burns. This loss of public image prompted president Eisenhower on a mission to retrieved all nuclear technology, Iran especially. Footnotes Richard G. Hewlet; Jack M Holl, Atoms For Peace and War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). Stephen Kinzer, All Shah’s Men (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2003). Em Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory  (New York: McGraw Hill, 1997). William Gudykunst, Theorizing About Intercultural Communication (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), 292. Robert J. Watson,  History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  vol. 4,  Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960 (Washington, D.C., 1997), 457, table 6. Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl,  Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission  (Berkeley, 1989), 172ff. Ervin Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Green City: Anchor Books, 1967), 5. Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, “In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952–1954,”  Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences  19 (1989): 267–347, on 331. Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 85.
  6. Eisenhower announced his ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative at the UN in 1953. The fear of an atomic war spread all over the world. The “Atoms for Peace” program attempted to dissuade those fears. According to Holl mention that this program was also a diversionary tactic. While the President sought to avoid nuclear war, he also used this opportunity and the CIA to restore power to a dictator, The Iranian Shah. This prevented local attempts for a democratized nationalist Iran. Under Eisenhower’s presidency, the number of nuclear weapons went from 841 to 18, 638. He called Atoms for Peace ‘psychological warfare.’ While other nations used the nuclear reactors for health discoveries, his administration built Castle Bravo. The Castle Bravo test was the most powerful nuclear device ever detonated by the U.S. It also, accidentally, resulted in huge contamination in Japan. After our secret testing was revealed, we began to lose face around the world. We went from the image of a Superman to a Mr. Burns. This loss of public image prompted president Eisenhower on a mission to retrieved all nuclear technology, Iran especially. Footnotes Richard G. Hewlet; Jack M Holl, Atoms For Peace and War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). Stephen Kinzer, All Shah’s Men (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2003). Em Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory  (New York: McGraw Hill, 1997). William Gudykunst, Theorizing About Intercultural Communication (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), 292. Robert J. Watson,  History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  vol. 4,  Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960 (Washington, D.C., 1997), 457, table 6. Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl,  Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission  (Berkeley, 1989), 172ff. Ervin Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Green City: Anchor Books, 1967), 5. Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, “In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952–1954,”  Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences  19 (1989): 267–347, on 331. Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 85.
  7. Eisenhower announced his ‘Atoms for Peace’ initiative at the UN in 1953. The fear of an atomic war spread all over the world. The “Atoms for Peace” program attempted to dissuade those fears. According to Holl mention that this program was also a diversionary tactic. While the President sought to avoid nuclear war, he also used this opportunity and the CIA to restore power to a dictator, The Iranian Shah. This prevented local attempts for a democratized nationalist Iran. Under Eisenhower’s presidency, the number of nuclear weapons went from 841 to 18, 638. He called Atoms for Peace ‘psychological warfare.’ While other nations used the nuclear reactors for health discoveries, his administration built Castle Bravo. The Castle Bravo test was the most powerful nuclear device ever detonated by the U.S. It also, accidentally, resulted in huge contamination in Japan. After our secret testing was revealed, we began to lose face around the world. We went from the image of a Superman to a Mr. Burns. This loss of public image prompted president Eisenhower on a mission to retrieved all nuclear technology, Iran especially. Footnotes Richard G. Hewlet; Jack M Holl, Atoms For Peace and War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). Stephen Kinzer, All Shah’s Men (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2003). Em Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory  (New York: McGraw Hill, 1997). William Gudykunst, Theorizing About Intercultural Communication (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), 292. Robert J. Watson,  History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  vol. 4,  Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960 (Washington, D.C., 1997), 457, table 6. Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl,  Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission  (Berkeley, 1989), 172ff. Ervin Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Green City: Anchor Books, 1967), 5. Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, “In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952–1954,”  Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences  19 (1989): 267–347, on 331. Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 85.
  8. In 1976 the Shah had been working on a deal with Ford. In 1976, we were dealing with our own intergroup conflicts: an upcoming election. Ford was coming across as weak on proliferation policy. This caused Ford to restrict his fuel reprocessing policy. This caused his previous deal with Iran, which allowed fuel reprocessing, to fall through. When Carter took office he struck a new deal. In 1978, the Shah agreed to exchange 8 water reactors in place of the nuclear reactors. Then the Iranian revolution completely changed our relationship with Iran. Footnotes Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Jimmy Carter 1977, Book I (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 582-584. See also Walker “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation” 237-239. Memorandum from National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to the President, “Negotiation of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran,” April 19, 1976. State Department cable 132760 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Iranian Nuclear Power Agreement,” May 28, 1976; and State Department cable 135220 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Nuclear Power Agreement with Iran,” June 2, 1976. J. Samuel Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974–1980,”  Diplomatic History , vol. 12 (Spring 2001), 235–236.  
  9. In 1976 the Shah had been working on a deal with Ford. In 1976, we were dealing with our own intergroup conflicts: an upcoming election. Ford was coming across as weak on proliferation policy. This caused Ford to restrict his fuel reprocessing policy. This caused his previous deal with Iran, which allowed fuel reprocessing, to fall through. When Carter took office he struck a new deal. In 1978, the Shah agreed to exchange 8 water reactors in place of the nuclear reactors. Then the Iranian revolution completely changed our relationship with Iran. Footnotes Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Jimmy Carter 1977, Book I (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 582-584. See also Walker “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation” 237-239. Memorandum from National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to the President, “Negotiation of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran,” April 19, 1976. State Department cable 132760 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Iranian Nuclear Power Agreement,” May 28, 1976; and State Department cable 135220 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Nuclear Power Agreement with Iran,” June 2, 1976. J. Samuel Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974–1980,”  Diplomatic History , vol. 12 (Spring 2001), 235–236.  
  10. In 1976 the Shah had been working on a deal with Ford. In 1976, we were dealing with our own intergroup conflicts: an upcoming election. Ford was coming across as weak on proliferation policy. This caused Ford to restrict his fuel reprocessing policy. This caused his previous deal with Iran, which allowed fuel reprocessing, to fall through. When Carter took office he struck a new deal. In 1978, the Shah agreed to exchange 8 water reactors in place of the nuclear reactors. Then the Iranian revolution completely changed our relationship with Iran. Footnotes Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Jimmy Carter 1977, Book I (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 582-584. See also Walker “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation” 237-239. Memorandum from National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to the President, “Negotiation of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran,” April 19, 1976. State Department cable 132760 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Iranian Nuclear Power Agreement,” May 28, 1976; and State Department cable 135220 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Nuclear Power Agreement with Iran,” June 2, 1976. J. Samuel Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974–1980,”  Diplomatic History , vol. 12 (Spring 2001), 235–236.  
  11. In 1976 the Shah had been working on a deal with Ford. In 1976, we were dealing with our own intergroup conflicts: an upcoming election. Ford was coming across as weak on proliferation policy. This caused Ford to restrict his fuel reprocessing policy. This caused his previous deal with Iran, which allowed fuel reprocessing, to fall through. When Carter took office he struck a new deal. In 1978, the Shah agreed to exchange 8 water reactors in place of the nuclear reactors. Then the Iranian revolution completely changed our relationship with Iran. Footnotes Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Jimmy Carter 1977, Book I (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 582-584. See also Walker “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation” 237-239. Memorandum from National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to the President, “Negotiation of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran,” April 19, 1976. State Department cable 132760 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Iranian Nuclear Power Agreement,” May 28, 1976; and State Department cable 135220 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Nuclear Power Agreement with Iran,” June 2, 1976. J. Samuel Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974–1980,”  Diplomatic History , vol. 12 (Spring 2001), 235–236.  
  12. In 1976 the Shah had been working on a deal with Ford. In 1976, we were dealing with our own intergroup conflicts: an upcoming election. Ford was coming across as weak on proliferation policy. This caused Ford to restrict his fuel reprocessing policy. This caused his previous deal with Iran, which allowed fuel reprocessing, to fall through. When Carter took office he struck a new deal. In 1978, the Shah agreed to exchange 8 water reactors in place of the nuclear reactors. Then the Iranian revolution completely changed our relationship with Iran. Footnotes Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Jimmy Carter 1977, Book I (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 582-584. See also Walker “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation” 237-239. Memorandum from National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to the President, “Negotiation of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran,” April 19, 1976. State Department cable 132760 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Iranian Nuclear Power Agreement,” May 28, 1976; and State Department cable 135220 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Nuclear Power Agreement with Iran,” June 2, 1976. J. Samuel Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974–1980,”  Diplomatic History , vol. 12 (Spring 2001), 235–236.  
  13. In 1976 the Shah had been working on a deal with Ford. In 1976, we were dealing with our own intergroup conflicts: an upcoming election. Ford was coming across as weak on proliferation policy. This caused Ford to restrict his fuel reprocessing policy. This caused his previous deal with Iran, which allowed fuel reprocessing, to fall through. When Carter took office he struck a new deal. In 1978, the Shah agreed to exchange 8 water reactors in place of the nuclear reactors. Then the Iranian revolution completely changed our relationship with Iran. Footnotes Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Jimmy Carter 1977, Book I (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 582-584. See also Walker “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation” 237-239. Memorandum from National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to the President, “Negotiation of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran,” April 19, 1976. State Department cable 132760 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Iranian Nuclear Power Agreement,” May 28, 1976; and State Department cable 135220 to U.S. Embassy, Tehran, “Nuclear Power Agreement with Iran,” June 2, 1976. J. Samuel Walker, “Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: The Controversy over Nuclear Exports, 1974–1980,”  Diplomatic History , vol. 12 (Spring 2001), 235–236.  
  14. In 1979 Iran’s monarchy, under Shah Pahlavi, was overthrown. It was replaced by the Iranian Republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. The hostage crisis was looked at as a blow against US’s support for the Iranian monarch Shah Pahlavi. This event cost Carter his re-election. This also marked the beginning of U.S. sanctions and led to the Iraq-Iran war. These events foreshadowed Iran’s present-day claims about nuclear “rights” and increased its interest in nuclear deterrence. The U.S. hostages were released when Regan was sworn into office. The new Iran was sending a message to the U.S. They distrusted anyone who worked with the Shah. From 1980-1988, Iraq and the U.S. bonded over a common enemy – Iran. In 1980, Ayatollah called Saddam a puppet of Satan (the U.S.) and encouraged the people of Iraq to overthrow him. We have been accused of funding the Ba’ath party in the 60s, which led to Hussein’s rise to power in Iraq. There’s no official documentation to support this accusation. Both Kuwait and the U.S. officially helped to fund Hussein in the Iraq-Iran war. And Kuwait’s oil business benefited from this war. At the end of the failed war, Hussein owed Kuwait billions of dollars and refused to pay. Instead, he tried to take over their land which led to the Gulf War in the 90s. Al-Qaeda, a non-state radical terrorist group that objected to our involvement in the Middle East, began forming a global network in the 90s. In 2001 they attacked the U.S. This prompted President George W. Bush to go back into Iraq, in search of nuclear weaponry. In April of 2003, Iran and the U.S. celebrated the collapse of a common enemy - Saddam Hussein. In May 2003, Iran finally released all of their POWs from the Iraq-Iran war. Footnotes Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 87. Joseph Jude Norton; Michael H. Collins, “Reflections on the Iranian hostage Settlement.” A.B.A. J. (1981), 428. The United States responded and President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 in November 1979 freezing about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. Some assets — Iranian officials say $10 billion, U.S. officials say much less — still remain frozen pending resolution of legal claims arising from the revolution. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam,  Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 76–77; Ervan Abrahamian,  A History of Modern Iran  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 195. William Burr “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations.” Bulletin of Atomic Sciences (January 2009), 32. Sandra Mackey; W Scott Harrop, The Iranians (New York: Penguine Group, 1996), 317. Iraq President Saddam Hussein Handbook (Washington D.C.: International Business Publications), 8. Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: Volume 1 (Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 703. Stephen Gale; Michael Radu; Harvey Sicherman, War on Terrorism (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 20. Lawrence G. Potter, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9.    
  15. In 1979 Iran’s monarchy, under Shah Pahlavi, was overthrown. It was replaced by the Iranian Republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. The hostage crisis was looked at as a blow against US’s support for the Iranian monarch Shah Pahlavi. This event cost Carter his re-election. This also marked the beginning of U.S. sanctions and led to the Iraq-Iran war. These events foreshadowed Iran’s present-day claims about nuclear “rights” and increased its interest in nuclear deterrence. The U.S. hostages were released when Regan was sworn into office. The new Iran was sending a message to the U.S. They distrusted anyone who worked with the Shah. From 1980-1988, Iraq and the U.S. bonded over a common enemy – Iran. In 1980, Ayatollah called Saddam a puppet of Satan (the U.S.) and encouraged the people of Iraq to overthrow him. We have been accused of funding the Ba’ath party in the 60s, which led to Hussein’s rise to power in Iraq. There’s no official documentation to support this accusation. Both Kuwait and the U.S. officially helped to fund Hussein in the Iraq-Iran war. And Kuwait’s oil business benefited from this war. At the end of the failed war, Hussein owed Kuwait billions of dollars and refused to pay. Instead, he tried to take over their land which led to the Gulf War in the 90s. Al-Qaeda, a non-state radical terrorist group that objected to our involvement in the Middle East, began forming a global network in the 90s. In 2001 they attacked the U.S. This prompted President George W. Bush to go back into Iraq, in search of nuclear weaponry. In April of 2003, Iran and the U.S. celebrated the collapse of a common enemy - Saddam Hussein. In May 2003, Iran finally released all of their POWs from the Iraq-Iran war. Footnotes Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 87. Joseph Jude Norton; Michael H. Collins, “Reflections on the Iranian hostage Settlement.” A.B.A. J. (1981), 428. The United States responded and President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 in November 1979 freezing about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. Some assets — Iranian officials say $10 billion, U.S. officials say much less — still remain frozen pending resolution of legal claims arising from the revolution. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam,  Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 76–77; Ervan Abrahamian,  A History of Modern Iran  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 195. William Burr “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations.” Bulletin of Atomic Sciences (January 2009), 32. Sandra Mackey; W Scott Harrop, The Iranians (New York: Penguine Group, 1996), 317. Iraq President Saddam Hussein Handbook (Washington D.C.: International Business Publications), 8. Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: Volume 1 (Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 703. Stephen Gale; Michael Radu; Harvey Sicherman, War on Terrorism (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 20. Lawrence G. Potter, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9.    
  16. In 1979 Iran’s monarchy, under Shah Pahlavi, was overthrown. It was replaced by the Iranian Republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. The hostage crisis was looked at as a blow against US’s support for the Iranian monarch Shah Pahlavi. This event cost Carter his re-election. This also marked the beginning of U.S. sanctions and led to the Iraq-Iran war. These events foreshadowed Iran’s present-day claims about nuclear “rights” and increased its interest in nuclear deterrence. The U.S. hostages were released when Regan was sworn into office. The new Iran was sending a message to the U.S. They distrusted anyone who worked with the Shah. From 1980-1988, Iraq and the U.S. bonded over a common enemy – Iran. In 1980, Ayatollah called Saddam a puppet of Satan (the U.S.) and encouraged the people of Iraq to overthrow him. We have been accused of funding the Ba’ath party in the 60s, which led to Hussein’s rise to power in Iraq. There’s no official documentation to support this accusation. Both Kuwait and the U.S. officially helped to fund Hussein in the Iraq-Iran war. And Kuwait’s oil business benefited from this war. At the end of the failed war, Hussein owed Kuwait billions of dollars and refused to pay. Instead, he tried to take over their land which led to the Gulf War in the 90s. Al-Qaeda, a non-state radical terrorist group that objected to our involvement in the Middle East, began forming a global network in the 90s. In 2001 they attacked the U.S. This prompted President George W. Bush to go back into Iraq, in search of nuclear weaponry. In April of 2003, Iran and the U.S. celebrated the collapse of a common enemy - Saddam Hussein. In May 2003, Iran finally released all of their POWs from the Iraq-Iran war. Footnotes Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 87. Joseph Jude Norton; Michael H. Collins, “Reflections on the Iranian hostage Settlement.” A.B.A. J. (1981), 428. The United States responded and President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 in November 1979 freezing about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. Some assets — Iranian officials say $10 billion, U.S. officials say much less — still remain frozen pending resolution of legal claims arising from the revolution. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam,  Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 76–77; Ervan Abrahamian,  A History of Modern Iran  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 195. William Burr “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations.” Bulletin of Atomic Sciences (January 2009), 32. Sandra Mackey; W Scott Harrop, The Iranians (New York: Penguine Group, 1996), 317. Iraq President Saddam Hussein Handbook (Washington D.C.: International Business Publications), 8. Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: Volume 1 (Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 703. Stephen Gale; Michael Radu; Harvey Sicherman, War on Terrorism (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 20. Lawrence G. Potter, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9.    
  17. In 1979 Iran’s monarchy, under Shah Pahlavi, was overthrown. It was replaced by the Iranian Republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. The hostage crisis was looked at as a blow against US’s support for the Iranian monarch Shah Pahlavi. This event cost Carter his re-election. This also marked the beginning of U.S. sanctions and led to the Iraq-Iran war. These events foreshadowed Iran’s present-day claims about nuclear “rights” and increased its interest in nuclear deterrence. The U.S. hostages were released when Regan was sworn into office. The new Iran was sending a message to the U.S. They distrusted anyone who worked with the Shah. From 1980-1988, Iraq and the U.S. bonded over a common enemy – Iran. In 1980, Ayatollah called Saddam a puppet of Satan (the U.S.) and encouraged the people of Iraq to overthrow him. We have been accused of funding the Ba’ath party in the 60s, which led to Hussein’s rise to power in Iraq. There’s no official documentation to support this accusation. Both Kuwait and the U.S. officially helped to fund Hussein in the Iraq-Iran war. And Kuwait’s oil business benefited from this war. At the end of the failed war, Hussein owed Kuwait billions of dollars and refused to pay. Instead, he tried to take over their land which led to the Gulf War in the 90s. Al-Qaeda, a non-state radical terrorist group that objected to our involvement in the Middle East, began forming a global network in the 90s. In 2001 they attacked the U.S. This prompted President George W. Bush to go back into Iraq, in search of nuclear weaponry. In April of 2003, Iran and the U.S. celebrated the collapse of a common enemy - Saddam Hussein. In May 2003, Iran finally released all of their POWs from the Iraq-Iran war. Footnotes Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 87. Joseph Jude Norton; Michael H. Collins, “Reflections on the Iranian hostage Settlement.” A.B.A. J. (1981), 428. The United States responded and President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 in November 1979 freezing about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. Some assets — Iranian officials say $10 billion, U.S. officials say much less — still remain frozen pending resolution of legal claims arising from the revolution. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam,  Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 76–77; Ervan Abrahamian,  A History of Modern Iran  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 195. William Burr “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations.” Bulletin of Atomic Sciences (January 2009), 32. Sandra Mackey; W Scott Harrop, The Iranians (New York: Penguine Group, 1996), 317. Iraq President Saddam Hussein Handbook (Washington D.C.: International Business Publications), 8. Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: Volume 1 (Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 703. Stephen Gale; Michael Radu; Harvey Sicherman, War on Terrorism (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 20. Lawrence G. Potter, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9.    
  18. In 1979 Iran’s monarchy, under Shah Pahlavi, was overthrown. It was replaced by the Iranian Republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. The hostage crisis was looked at as a blow against US’s support for the Iranian monarch Shah Pahlavi. This event cost Carter his re-election. This also marked the beginning of U.S. sanctions and led to the Iraq-Iran war. These events foreshadowed Iran’s present-day claims about nuclear “rights” and increased its interest in nuclear deterrence. The U.S. hostages were released when Regan was sworn into office. The new Iran was sending a message to the U.S. They distrusted anyone who worked with the Shah. From 1980-1988, Iraq and the U.S. bonded over a common enemy – Iran. In 1980, Ayatollah called Saddam a puppet of Satan (the U.S.) and encouraged the people of Iraq to overthrow him. We have been accused of funding the Ba’ath party in the 60s, which led to Hussein’s rise to power in Iraq. There’s no official documentation to support this accusation. Both Kuwait and the U.S. officially helped to fund Hussein in the Iraq-Iran war. And Kuwait’s oil business benefited from this war. At the end of the failed war, Hussein owed Kuwait billions of dollars and refused to pay. Instead, he tried to take over their land which led to the Gulf War in the 90s. Al-Qaeda, a non-state radical terrorist group that objected to our involvement in the Middle East, began forming a global network in the 90s. In 2001 they attacked the U.S. This prompted President George W. Bush to go back into Iraq, in search of nuclear weaponry. In April of 2003, Iran and the U.S. celebrated the collapse of a common enemy - Saddam Hussein. In May 2003, Iran finally released all of their POWs from the Iraq-Iran war. Footnotes Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 87. Joseph Jude Norton; Michael H. Collins, “Reflections on the Iranian hostage Settlement.” A.B.A. J. (1981), 428. The United States responded and President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 in November 1979 freezing about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. Some assets — Iranian officials say $10 billion, U.S. officials say much less — still remain frozen pending resolution of legal claims arising from the revolution. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam,  Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 76–77; Ervan Abrahamian,  A History of Modern Iran  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 195. William Burr “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations.” Bulletin of Atomic Sciences (January 2009), 32. Sandra Mackey; W Scott Harrop, The Iranians (New York: Penguine Group, 1996), 317. Iraq President Saddam Hussein Handbook (Washington D.C.: International Business Publications), 8. Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: Volume 1 (Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 703. Stephen Gale; Michael Radu; Harvey Sicherman, War on Terrorism (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 20. Lawrence G. Potter, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9.    
  19. In 1979 Iran’s monarchy, under Shah Pahlavi, was overthrown. It was replaced by the Iranian Republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. The hostage crisis was looked at as a blow against US’s support for the Iranian monarch Shah Pahlavi. This event cost Carter his re-election. This also marked the beginning of U.S. sanctions and led to the Iraq-Iran war. These events foreshadowed Iran’s present-day claims about nuclear “rights” and increased its interest in nuclear deterrence. The U.S. hostages were released when Regan was sworn into office. The new Iran was sending a message to the U.S. They distrusted anyone who worked with the Shah. From 1980-1988, Iraq and the U.S. bonded over a common enemy – Iran. In 1980, Ayatollah called Saddam a puppet of Satan (the U.S.) and encouraged the people of Iraq to overthrow him. We have been accused of funding the Ba’ath party in the 60s, which led to Hussein’s rise to power in Iraq. There’s no official documentation to support this accusation. Both Kuwait and the U.S. officially helped to fund Hussein in the Iraq-Iran war. And Kuwait’s oil business benefited from this war. At the end of the failed war, Hussein owed Kuwait billions of dollars and refused to pay. Instead, he tried to take over their land which led to the Gulf War in the 90s. Al-Qaeda, a non-state radical terrorist group that objected to our involvement in the Middle East, began forming a global network in the 90s. In 2001 they attacked the U.S. This prompted President George W. Bush to go back into Iraq, in search of nuclear weaponry. In April of 2003, Iran and the U.S. celebrated the collapse of a common enemy - Saddam Hussein. In May 2003, Iran finally released all of their POWs from the Iraq-Iran war. Footnotes Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 87. Joseph Jude Norton; Michael H. Collins, “Reflections on the Iranian hostage Settlement.” A.B.A. J. (1981), 428. The United States responded and President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 in November 1979 freezing about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. Some assets — Iranian officials say $10 billion, U.S. officials say much less — still remain frozen pending resolution of legal claims arising from the revolution. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam,  Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 76–77; Ervan Abrahamian,  A History of Modern Iran  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 195. William Burr “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations.” Bulletin of Atomic Sciences (January 2009), 32. Sandra Mackey; W Scott Harrop, The Iranians (New York: Penguine Group, 1996), 317. Iraq President Saddam Hussein Handbook (Washington D.C.: International Business Publications), 8. Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: Volume 1 (Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 703. Stephen Gale; Michael Radu; Harvey Sicherman, War on Terrorism (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 20. Lawrence G. Potter, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9.    
  20. In 1979 Iran’s monarchy, under Shah Pahlavi, was overthrown. It was replaced by the Iranian Republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. The hostage crisis was looked at as a blow against US’s support for the Iranian monarch Shah Pahlavi. This event cost Carter his re-election. This also marked the beginning of U.S. sanctions and led to the Iraq-Iran war. These events foreshadowed Iran’s present-day claims about nuclear “rights” and increased its interest in nuclear deterrence. The U.S. hostages were released when Regan was sworn into office. The new Iran was sending a message to the U.S. They distrusted anyone who worked with the Shah. From 1980-1988, Iraq and the U.S. bonded over a common enemy – Iran. In 1980, Ayatollah called Saddam a puppet of Satan (the U.S.) and encouraged the people of Iraq to overthrow him. We have been accused of funding the Ba’ath party in the 60s, which led to Hussein’s rise to power in Iraq. There’s no official documentation to support this accusation. Both Kuwait and the U.S. officially helped to fund Hussein in the Iraq-Iran war. And Kuwait’s oil business benefited from this war. At the end of the failed war, Hussein owed Kuwait billions of dollars and refused to pay. Instead, he tried to take over their land which led to the Gulf War in the 90s. Al-Qaeda, a non-state radical terrorist group that objected to our involvement in the Middle East, began forming a global network in the 90s. In 2001 they attacked the U.S. This prompted President George W. Bush to go back into Iraq, in search of nuclear weaponry. In April of 2003, Iran and the U.S. celebrated the collapse of a common enemy - Saddam Hussein. In May 2003, Iran finally released all of their POWs from the Iraq-Iran war. Footnotes Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 87. Joseph Jude Norton; Michael H. Collins, “Reflections on the Iranian hostage Settlement.” A.B.A. J. (1981), 428. The United States responded and President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 in November 1979 freezing about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. Some assets — Iranian officials say $10 billion, U.S. officials say much less — still remain frozen pending resolution of legal claims arising from the revolution. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam,  Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 76–77; Ervan Abrahamian,  A History of Modern Iran  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 195. William Burr “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations.” Bulletin of Atomic Sciences (January 2009), 32. Sandra Mackey; W Scott Harrop, The Iranians (New York: Penguine Group, 1996), 317. Iraq President Saddam Hussein Handbook (Washington D.C.: International Business Publications), 8. Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: Volume 1 (Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 703. Stephen Gale; Michael Radu; Harvey Sicherman, War on Terrorism (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 20. Lawrence G. Potter, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9.    
  21. In 1979 Iran’s monarchy, under Shah Pahlavi, was overthrown. It was replaced by the Iranian Republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. The hostage crisis was looked at as a blow against US’s support for the Iranian monarch Shah Pahlavi. This event cost Carter his re-election. This also marked the beginning of U.S. sanctions and led to the Iraq-Iran war. These events foreshadowed Iran’s present-day claims about nuclear “rights” and increased its interest in nuclear deterrence. The U.S. hostages were released when Regan was sworn into office. The new Iran was sending a message to the U.S. They distrusted anyone who worked with the Shah. From 1980-1988, Iraq and the U.S. bonded over a common enemy – Iran. In 1980, Ayatollah called Saddam a puppet of Satan (the U.S.) and encouraged the people of Iraq to overthrow him. We have been accused of funding the Ba’ath party in the 60s, which led to Hussein’s rise to power in Iraq. There’s no official documentation to support this accusation. Both Kuwait and the U.S. officially helped to fund Hussein in the Iraq-Iran war. And Kuwait’s oil business benefited from this war. At the end of the failed war, Hussein owed Kuwait billions of dollars and refused to pay. Instead, he tried to take over their land which led to the Gulf War in the 90s. Al-Qaeda, a non-state radical terrorist group that objected to our involvement in the Middle East, began forming a global network in the 90s. In 2001 they attacked the U.S. This prompted President George W. Bush to go back into Iraq, in search of nuclear weaponry. In April of 2003, Iran and the U.S. celebrated the collapse of a common enemy - Saddam Hussein. In May 2003, Iran finally released all of their POWs from the Iraq-Iran war. Footnotes Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 87. Joseph Jude Norton; Michael H. Collins, “Reflections on the Iranian hostage Settlement.” A.B.A. J. (1981), 428. The United States responded and President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 in November 1979 freezing about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. Some assets — Iranian officials say $10 billion, U.S. officials say much less — still remain frozen pending resolution of legal claims arising from the revolution. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam,  Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 76–77; Ervan Abrahamian,  A History of Modern Iran  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 195. William Burr “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations.” Bulletin of Atomic Sciences (January 2009), 32. Sandra Mackey; W Scott Harrop, The Iranians (New York: Penguine Group, 1996), 317. Iraq President Saddam Hussein Handbook (Washington D.C.: International Business Publications), 8. Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: Volume 1 (Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 703. Stephen Gale; Michael Radu; Harvey Sicherman, War on Terrorism (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 20. Lawrence G. Potter, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9.    
  22. In 1979 Iran’s monarchy, under Shah Pahlavi, was overthrown. It was replaced by the Iranian Republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This led to the Iran hostage crisis that spanned from 1979-1981. The hostage crisis was looked at as a blow against US’s support for the Iranian monarch Shah Pahlavi. This event cost Carter his re-election. This also marked the beginning of U.S. sanctions and led to the Iraq-Iran war. These events foreshadowed Iran’s present-day claims about nuclear “rights” and increased its interest in nuclear deterrence. The U.S. hostages were released when Regan was sworn into office. The new Iran was sending a message to the U.S. They distrusted anyone who worked with the Shah. From 1980-1988, Iraq and the U.S. bonded over a common enemy – Iran. In 1980, Ayatollah called Saddam a puppet of Satan (the U.S.) and encouraged the people of Iraq to overthrow him. We have been accused of funding the Ba’ath party in the 60s, which led to Hussein’s rise to power in Iraq. There’s no official documentation to support this accusation. Both Kuwait and the U.S. officially helped to fund Hussein in the Iraq-Iran war. And Kuwait’s oil business benefited from this war. At the end of the failed war, Hussein owed Kuwait billions of dollars and refused to pay. Instead, he tried to take over their land which led to the Gulf War in the 90s. Al-Qaeda, a non-state radical terrorist group that objected to our involvement in the Middle East, began forming a global network in the 90s. In 2001 they attacked the U.S. This prompted President George W. Bush to go back into Iraq, in search of nuclear weaponry. In April of 2003, Iran and the U.S. celebrated the collapse of a common enemy - Saddam Hussein. In May 2003, Iran finally released all of their POWs from the Iraq-Iran war. Footnotes Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 87. Joseph Jude Norton; Michael H. Collins, “Reflections on the Iranian hostage Settlement.” A.B.A. J. (1981), 428. The United States responded and President Carter issued Executive Order 12170 in November 1979 freezing about $12 billion in Iranian assets, including bank deposits, gold and other properties. Some assets — Iranian officials say $10 billion, U.S. officials say much less — still remain frozen pending resolution of legal claims arising from the revolution. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam,  Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic  (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 76–77; Ervan Abrahamian,  A History of Modern Iran  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 195. William Burr “A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations.” Bulletin of Atomic Sciences (January 2009), 32. Sandra Mackey; W Scott Harrop, The Iranians (New York: Penguine Group, 1996), 317. Iraq President Saddam Hussein Handbook (Washington D.C.: International Business Publications), 8. Spencer C. Tucker, The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: Volume 1 (Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 703. Stephen Gale; Michael Radu; Harvey Sicherman, War on Terrorism (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 20. Lawrence G. Potter, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9.    
  23. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  24. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  25. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  26. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  27. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  28. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  29. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  30. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  31. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  32. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  33. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  34. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  35. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  36. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  37. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  38. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  39. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  40. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  41. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  42. Iran submitted a proposal where admitted to all the proxy dealings we’ve accused them of, like Hezbollah. They said they would end all support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas. They also said they would open up the nuclear program for complete transparency. This proposal would also include the Saudi Peace Plan of 2002. In that plan Israel and Palestine had come to peaceful terms. In that plan Iran would agree to a two-state solution and consider itself at peace with Israel. Several people within the Bush administration, like Colonel Powell and Condoleezza Rice, wanted to come to the table and negotiate but Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney had the final word saying simply “we don’t speak to evil. Aside from this blanket negative attribution to an entire culture, he also believed we could get more by simply dictating our demands from a position of strength. And with that, the window of opportunity closed as soon as it opened. Iran rode a wave of power until 2009. Then in 2009 Iranian protestors rose up. The Iranian administration had to deal with fraudulent elections and human rights issues. There was a war amongst the political elites in Iran. The Obama Administration thought this intergroup conflict would present a unique opportunity to negotiate for their nuclear reactors. The Iran Republic felt they were taking on too much of the risk. They also felt as if they had no leverage. The deal fell through. In 2010, the Obama administration sent a letter to Brazil asking for help in negotiating with Iran. Brazil teamed up with Turkey and they engaged in an 18 hour marathon negotiation with Iran. And it worked. The only problem is they were two days too late. Obama employed a duel track form of negotiation. He tried one way with diplomacy while also trying another way with more coercive and forceful means (sanctions). He signed off on the sanctions two days before Iran signed off on the diplomatic resolution. Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council, says this decision highlighted a tragic flaw in our culture’s short-term orientation. Cross-cultural negotiation is a process, not just one meeting where two sides exchange ultimatums with each other. Footnotes Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 2-4. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See to Condemn or not to Condemn and New Kids on the Block. Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114.     Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. We had this opportunity and we missed it. We may miss future opportunities if we continue choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible.    
  43. Griffin describes the 5 basic movements of face negotiation theory (FNT). When high-context cultures feel anxious or uncertain they will withdraw. When low-context cultures feel anxious or uncertain they tend to compete and/or dominate. Both scenarios are equally dangerous in a global economy. FNT movements could explain why the U.S. reacted with subversive attempts to dominate nuclear weaponry, and then set up an authoritarian leader in Iran. If what Gudykunst says is true, perhaps increasing our tolerance for the ambiguity in Iran’s democracy could have prevented the present-day conflict between the U.S. and Iran over nuclear technology. Footnotes Richard G. Hewlet; Jack M Holl, Atoms For Peace and War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). Stephen Kinzer, All Shah’s Men (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2003). Em Griffin, A First Look at Communication Theory  (New York: McGraw Hill, 1997). William Gudykunst, Theorizing About Intercultural Communication (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2005), 292. Robert J. Watson,  History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,  vol. 4,  Into the Missile Age, 1956–1960 (Washington, D.C., 1997), 457, table 6. Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl,  Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission  (Berkeley, 1989), 172ff. Ervin Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (Green City: Anchor Books, 1967), 5. Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, “In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952–1954,”  Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences  19 (1989): 267–347, on 331. Jack Caravelli Beyond Sand and Oil (Santa Barbra: Praeger Security International, 2011), 85.
  44. We may miss future opportunities if we continue to polarize the communication by choosing to simply believe that these kinds of negotiations are impossible. Mohebian claims that a lot of people in Iranian government say “if we solve it, we will dissolve ourselves.” It is true that we have wrapped up so much of our own domestic power in a cultural narrative that fears Iran and vice versa. Plenty of people in the U.S., Israel, and Iran have made careers by finding new ways to be at enmity with each other. But there is another narrative trying to emerge. One way it is emerging is through social media. Through transmedia and social media an apolitical narrative is trying to emerge in Iran, U.S., and Israel. According to McCall and Hollenbeck, global leaders should not be so arrogant and judgmental, they should be more empathic. Footnotes Willem van Kemenade, “China versus the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions.” The Washington Quarterly (July 2010), 99-114. Scott Peterson, Let the Swords Encircle Me (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 458. Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), See Trapped in a Paradigm of Enmity. Morgan W. McCall; George P Hollenbeck, Developing Global Executives (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2002), 34-45.    
  45. Blessed are the peacemakers is one of the teachings, and realities, we as Christians have been commissioned to spread all over the world. [Mathew 28] The chance for negotiation, however small, is a chance we should take if we want to change the cultural narrative. We were once friends with Iran. They have tried to make deals with us before. Perhaps the right blend of FNT can resolve the decades of conflict. Because the only alternative is another war that most citizens on both sides do not want. Footnotes Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (Jackson: Public Affairs, 2011), 303.