Process Safety Management in Design, Construction & Commissioning | Lalit K. Vijh ED- Technical Engineers India Limited

Technical Session # 3A
Topic : Process Safety Management in Design , Construction & Commissioning
Topic:
Process Safety
Management in
Design, Construction
& Commissioning
By:
Lalit K. Vijh
ED- Technical
Engineers India Limited

MAJOR HAZARDS IN OIL INDUSTRY

SAN JUANICO DISASTER PEMEX, MEXICO, 1984
BEFORE AFTER

SAN JUANICO DISASTER, PEMEX, MEXICO, 1984
8” Pipe rupture occurred near the sphere
The Control Room operator tried to identify the cause of pressure fall but without success.
The release of LPG occurred for more than 5-10 minute
The gas cloud grew to cover a large area and ignited from a ignition by ground flare.
The VCE severely damaged the tank farm and resulted in LPG leak from other damaged tanks
Just 4 minutes later first tank underwent BLEVE.
Over the next hour, 12 separate BLEVE explosions were recorded.
The two largest BLEVE’s(from 2400 m3 spherical tanks) registered 5.0 seismic reading on R.S
The explosions destroyed the local town of San Juan Ixhuatepec.
Approximately 500-600 people killed and 5000-7000 others suffering severe burns.

LESSONS LEARNED - SAN JUANICO DISASTER
Sitting of Major Hazard Installation
• The high death toll occurred because the housing was too near to the plant. At the time the plant was constructed the area
was underdeveloped, but over the years the built-up area had gradually crept up to the site.
Layout and Protection of large LPG Storages
• The total destruction of the facility occurred because there was a failure of the overall system of protection, which includes
layout, emergency isolation and water spray systems.
Gas Detection and Emergency Isolation
• One feature which might have averted the disaster is more effective gas detection and emergency isolation. The plant had
no gas detector system and probably as a consequence, emergency isolation was too late.

LPG FIRE AT VALERO, MCKEE REFINERY, 2007

LPG FIRE AT VALERO, MCKEE REFINERY
The propane release was likely caused by the freeze-related failure of high-pressure piping at a
control station that had not been in service for approximately 15 years.
The lack of remote isolation significantly increased the duration and size of the fire, resulting in
extensive damage to the Propane Deasphalting Unit, the main pipe rack, and an adjacent process
unit.
Flame impingement on a non-fireproofed structural support caused a pipe rack to
collapse, significantly increasing the size and duration of the fire, and led to the evacuation and
extended shutdown of the refinery.
The exposure of three one-ton chlorine containers to radiant heating from the fire led to the release
of approximately 2.5 tons of highly toxic chlorine.
A butane storage sphere was exposed to radiant heating that blistered its paint. The manual firewater
deluge valve for the butane sphere was located too close to the PDA unit and could not be opened
during the fire.

JAIPUR FIRE ACCIDENT 2009
• 11 Dead
• Loss of ~ Rs.280 Crores

EXPLOSION IN VENEZUELA'S LARGEST OIL REFINERY ON 25-08-2012
• 48 Dead (official figure)
• Initial Report indicate poor maintenance
as chief cause

Source : Harry J. Toups LSU Department of Chemical Engineering ,SACHE 2003 Workshop
Mechanical
Operator Error
Unknown
Process Upsets
Natural Hazards
Design
Sabotage & Arson
0 10 20 30 40 50
44 %
22 %
12 %
11 %
5 %
5 %
1 %
CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS IN OIL INDUSTRY

APPROACH FOR SAFETY IN PLANT DESIGN?
Eliminate or minimize hazards rather than control hazards
Don’t wait for a major accident to identify need to improve major hazard management.
Need to learn lessons from accidents but don’t rely on this approach
Manage risks via Foresight rather than Hindsight i.e. be proactive rather than reactive.
More a philosophy and way of thinking than a specific set of tools and methods applicable at all levels of design and
operation from conceptual design to plant operations

INHERENT PASSIVE
ACTIVE PROCEDURAL
PROCESS SAFETY STRATEGIES

• Eliminate or reduce the hazard by changing to a process or
materials which are non-hazardous or less hazardousINHERENT
• Minimize hazard using process or equipment design features
which reduce frequency or consequence without the active
functioning of any device
PASSIVE

• Controls, safety interlocks, automatic shut down systems
• Multiple active elements : Sensors, Logic device, Control
element
ACTIVE
• Standard operating procedures, safety rules, emergency
response procedures, trainingPROCEDURAL

HSE during Project Execution
• Environment Impact Assessment
• Environmental Baseline Survey
• Process Hazard Review
• Hazard Identification (HAZID)
Project Conceptualization Stage
• P&ID Review For Operational Safety
• HSE Plan & HSE Philosophy
• HAZOP & SIL Studies
• Fire, Explosion & Dispersion Analysis/ Consequence Analysis
• HSE Action Tracking Register & PHSER
Process Design Stage
• Plot Plan Review
• Plot Plan Review Through Plot Plan Risk Review Committee
• Quantitative Risk Assessment
• Detailed HAZOP & HAZOP Close Out Report
• Fire & Gas Safety System Review
• Cause & Effects/Safety Charts Review
• Preparation of HSE Dossier & PHSER
• Safety Manual & Operating Manual Preparation
Engineering Stage
• Safety Guidelines to Contractors
• Safety Monitoring through Dedicated Safety Engineers
• Safety Meetings
• Safety Performance Evaluation
Construction Stage
• Punch List Preparation
• Startup Formats
• Pre Startup Safety Audit
Commissioning Stage

CONCEPTUAL DESIGN (Coarse HAZOP, What-if, Ranking)
SITE SELECTION (Rapid Risk Analysis, Environmental Impact Assessment)
PROCESS DESIGN (HAZOP, Safety Review, SIL)
ENGINEERING (Qualitative Risk Analysis, Plot Plan Review)
START-UP (Safety Audit, Emergency Plan)
RISK CONTROL DURING PROJECT STAGES

SAFETY AT PLANNING STAGE
Prevention of accidents should be the goal
Design options (use of chemicals, technology etc)
Layout review (various locations and configurations)
Hazard Identification (HAZID)
Environment Impact Assessment
Environmental Baseline Survey

HSE DURING ENGINEERING

SAFETY AT DESIGN STAGE
Adequate Design suitable for operations:
HAZID (Hazard Identification)
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study)
HSEIA (Health Safety Environment Impact Assessment)
• COMAH (Control of Major Accidental Hazard), OHRA (Occupational Health Risk Assessment), EIA (Environment
Impact Assessment)
• HSECES (HSE Critical Equipment System), SCE/PS (Safety Critical Elements / Performance Standards)
• Fire Safety Assessment and Dispersion Analysis, QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment)
• Noise Study, EERA (Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis), Waste Management Plan
SIL (Safety Integrity Level)
ALARP Study (As Low As Reasonably Practicable)
Active and Passive Fire Protection System

TYPICAL PROCESS SAFETY CODES & STANDARDS USED IN DESIGN
Some of the standards widely used by designers and operating companies are:
• American Petroleum Institute (API)
• American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
• National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
• Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) / Local Standards
• British Standard Institution (BSI)
• International Standard Organization (ISO)
• Static & Mobile Pressure Vessel (SMPV) Rules
• Petroleum Rules
• IBR regulation
Process Design and Hydrocarbon Services are complying to various OISD Standards
• OISD-STD-106 (Pressure Relief & Disposal System)
• OISD-STD-108 (Recommended Practices on Oil Storage and Handling)
• OISD-STD-116/117 (for Fire Protection)
• OISD-STD-118 (Layouts for Oil and Gas Installations)
• OISD-STD-144 (LPG Installations)
• OISD-STD-150 (for LPG Mounded Storage Facility)
• OISD-STD-152 (Safety instrumentation for process system in HC industry)
• OISD-STD-163 (Process Control Room Safety)
• OISD-STD-164 (Fire Proofing in Oil & Gas Industry)
• OISD-STD-194 (Standard for Storage And Handling of LNG)
• OISD-STD-197 (Guidelines for EIA)

PROCESS DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
Selection of proper Material of Construction (MOC)
Selection of proper piping class, rating.
Selection of proper design conditions (Pressure, Temperature)
Selection of hold up volume
Conformity to various codes/ standards
Adherence to good design practice
Feed Back from previous jobs, Client, Engineering, Commissioning.

PROCESS SAFETY PHILOSOPHY - LOPA
PROCESS
MITIGATION SYSTEM
OFFSITEEMERGENCY RESPONSE
ONSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE
PREVENTION SYSTEM
CONTROL & MONITORING

PROCESS SAFETY PHILOSOPHY
Pressure Venting provisions shall be in accordance with API RP 520 (Part 1 &2), API RP 521 Standards
Flare system is provided to safely dispose of the materials released from PSV in case of any malfunction of system
• Controlling case for refinery or petrochemical complexes are usually cooling water or power failure. Whenever there is
one cooling water system, cooling water failure loads for various units are added to calculate total flare load of the
complex.
• For a large complex with very high flare load for cooling water failure case, complex may be segregated in to two or
more cooling water systems and then flare load of one (controlling ) cooling water system may be considered for
further design
• Temperature profile of flare header (ISBL & OSBL) is essential in having optimum provision of expansion loops in
flare headers

PROCESS SAFETY PHILOSOPHY : LAYOUT
Key considerations/ safety features for layout
• Separation of hazardous areas from non-hazardous areas
• Safe separation distances
• Adequate escape routes, safe access for operation and maintenance of equipment
• Main ignition sources should be grouped and located upstream prevailing wind.
• Emergency response teams to have clear access to all fire fighting equipment.
• Cable trays, pipe racks and escape routes shall be positioned such that risk of damage by pool fire or explosions is
minimized.
• Optimize availability of emergency services and main safety equipment under all foreseeable events.

Process Safety PhilosophyHazardous Area Classification
• The hazardous area classification shall be performed in accordance with IP Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15.
• Based on the above code various areas shall be classified into zones and Electrical appliances shall be selected suitably.
The Emergency Shutdown system
• The Emergency Shutdown system shall be designed to fail-safe so that, in the event of loss of any of the controls to the
system, the shutdown valves shall fail closed and the blowdown valves fail open.
• The Emergency Shutdown system shall be reviewed in accordance with IEC 61508.
PRPROCESS SAFETY PHILOSOPHY

Redundancy
Voting systems
Philosophy of alarms and trips
Emergency depressurization
Emergency shut down (ESD)
Safety valve
HIPPS – High Integrity Pressure Protection System
PROCESS SAFETY PHILOSOPHY - Instrumentation

FIRE CONTROL AND MITIGATION– F&G Detection System
• The required functions/actions on fire and/or gas detection shall be developed during detail design
phase.
• The Fire and Gas Detection systems shall be designed and installed in accordance with NFPA and OISD
Standards.
• Detector locations shall be determined by means of case by case examination of the facilities layout and
may be placed either peripherally around the facilities, at suitable intervals or placed to cover areas with
a leak potential, or both.
The fire and gas (F&G) detection system is to provide an early
warning to personnel of the existence of a potentially dangerous
situation and to enable automatic initiation of remedial actions
• Gas detectors – H2, HC, H2S, Cl
• Fire detectors –Flame, Heat, Smoke
F&G Field Devices

• The main objective of active fire protection is to:
• Provide cooling (Deluge System, Sprinkling System)
• Control the fire (ie., prevent it from spreading)
• Extinguishment of the fire incident (Fire Extinguishers, Foam System)
Active Fire Protection : A “dormant” system that needs to be activated in
order to perform its function.
• Fire Proofing/ Passive fire protection is a barrier or safeguard which provides protection against the
heat from a fire without additional intervention i.e. it performs its function without relying on
activation.
Passive Fire Protection : A system that performs its function without
relying on the requirement of activation
FIRE CONTROL AND MITIGATION – ACTIVE AND PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION

HSE DURING CONSTRUCTION

SAFETY AT CONSTRUCTION STAGE
Setting of Project specific HSE objective and targets
Implementation of Project specific HSE Plan
Preparation and Implementation of ERP
Project HSE Review (PHSER for Construction)
Dedicated Warehouse /Procedures for storage of Materials and Hazardous substances
HSE Training, Inspection & audit
HIRA & Legal register and ensuring its compliance
Pre- Deployment Inspection and Certification for Mobilization of suitable and safe equipment

Tools for Monitoring/Implementation of HSE at Sites
• HSE Specification
• HSE Plan
• HSE Procedures
• HSE Induction
• Hazard Identification & Risk Analysis (HIRA)/ Job
Safety Analysis (JSA)
• Tool Box Talks
• Mock Drills (Fire, Electrocution , Fall from height )
• HSE Inspection/ Walk-through
• HSE Meetings
• Road Safety & Movement of vehicles
• Fitness certificates for all Lifting tools & Tackles, Cranes
• HSE Permits Viz. Scaffolds, Confined space, Height
work, Excavation
• HSE Awareness/ Motivational Programs
• HSE Reporting including LTIFR, FAR
• Reporting of Near Miss Accidents & Corrective Actions
• Accident Investigations & Recommendations
• Analysis of Leading &Trailing Indicators

• Legal compliance
• HSE Management System & Competence
• HSE Performance
Pre qualification &Selection
• General Terms & Condition
• Code of Conduct
Contractor Preparation
• HSE Plan & Organization
• Competence of Personnel
• Signing of code of conduct
Contract Award
• Kick of Meeting
• Medical Check up
Pre commencement & Mobilization
• HSE Training as per approved HSE Training MatrixContractors Orientation & Training
• Periodic evaluation
• HSE Review meeting
Managing the Contractors
• HSE Performance Records
Post Contract Evaluation
CONTRACTOR’s SAFETY MANAGEMENT PROCESS

HSE DURING COMMISSIONING

SAFETY AT PRECOMMISSIONING & COMMISSIONING AND HANDOVER
SIMOPS - Simultaneous Operation study for Planning and coordination
Multilayer Safety checks to meet Aggressive Schedule
Multi disciplinary trained manpower
Manuals, SOP & Checklists
Authorization & documentation for Changes, Bypass etc
Pre Start up Safety Review
HSE Action Tracking Register/ Formal HSE Close out Report
Project HSE Review (PHSER for Pre- Commissioning)
Lesson Learnt

SUMMARY
Safety in design is of paramount importance for process safety management
Goal should be to prevent rather than control & mitigate hazards
Select inherently safe processes and Incorporate adequate active & passive safety features in design minimizing
dependence on human intervention
Select Process specifications/ design conditions, Materials to reflect normal as well as start up/ transient conditions
Ensure strict adherence to safety & design standard & codes during design/engineering/construction & commissioning
Carryout Safety Studies like RRA/ QRA, HAZID, HAZOP, SIL etc to ensure adequate safety features including control &
mitigation are built in design & to finalize location/ layout of facilities

THANK YOU

Process Safety Management in Design, Construction & Commissioning | Lalit K. Vijh ED- Technical Engineers India Limited

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Process Safety Management in Design, Construction & Commissioning | Lalit K. Vijh ED- Technical Engineers India Limited