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Why phishing works
                     By
Rachna Dhamija , J. D. Tygar & Marti Hearst



                       Ayaz Shahid
                       (aysh1000@student.miun.se)
Overview
• Introduction
• Why phishing works
• Study to support hypothesis
• Results of study
• Conclusion
Introduction
• Directing users to fraudulent websites
• The host website acts as the trustworthy or
  real website
• Steals user’s credentials like credit card
  information , username/passwords and
  other personal information
• Phishing is an opportunistic attack rather
  than a targeted attack
Why Phishing works
1. Lack of knowledge
2. Visual Deception
3. Bounded Attention
1. Lack of knowledge
• Computer system knowledge
   Most of the phishers exploit the user’s lack of
    knowledge of computer, applications, emails,
    internet etc

   Such users does not know about how things work
    and what are the differences for example:
    www.ebay-members-security.com &
    www.ebay.com
Lack of knowledge(cont.)
• Knowledge of security & security indicators
   Most of the users does not know about the
    security indicators indicated by the browsers
    when it detects a phishing website.
  Example: Padlock Icon
2. Visual Deception
• Visual Deceptive Text
• Images masking underlying text
• Images mimicking windows
• Window Masking
• Deceptive Look & Feel
Visual Deception Text
• Users are fooled using the syntax of the domain
  name
• Phishers substitutes the letters in the domain name
  that may go un-noticed
• Example:
   www.paypa1.com instead of www.paypal.com
   Substituted digit ‘1’ instead of letter ‘l’
Images Masking Underlying Text
• Phishers use a legitimate image as hyperlink
  which actually links to the fraudulent website


Images mimicking windows
 • Phishers use an image in the content of the
   webpage that looks same as a window or a dialog
   box
Windows Masking Underlying Windows
• Placing an illegitimate browser window over or
  beside a legitimate browser window users can be
  tricked very easily as both windows look exactly
  same

 Deceptive look & feel
 • Phishers copy the logos, images and other
   information of the target website having same
   look and feel and the user could consider it as
   original website
3. Bounded Attention
• Lack of Attention to Security Indicators
    User focuses on the main task and forgets the security
     indicators
    They might not pay attention to the warning
     messages

• Lack of Attention to the absence of security
  indicators
    Users do not notice the absence of an indicator
    Some times a spoofed indicator image might be
     inserted by the phishers to fool the users
Study to Access the Accuracy of Hypothesis
• Conducted a usability study
• Participants were asked to identify legitimate and
  phishing websites
• Selected participants were better and good in
  knowledge
• Around 200 phishing websites were selected
Study Design
• A web site was created containing random list of
  hyperlinks to different websites
• Each participant was presented 20 websites
• 7 websites were legitimate
• 9 phishing websites
• 3 special websites(created using additional phishing
  techniques)
• 1 special website (requesting users to accept a self-signed
  SSL certificate)
• All phishing websites were hosted on an Apache web
  server
Scenario and Procedure
• Participants were told that some of the websites
  are legitimate and some are not
• The participants could also interact with the
  websites
• Each participant was told to rate the website on
  a scale of 1 to 5 and reasoning of their answer
• Participants were asked about the knowledge of
  SSL certified websites and the experience on the
  phishing websites
Demographics of Participants
• A total of 22 participants from a university
  having sound knowledge of computers, email
  and web were recruited
                         Gender
         13
                                   12
         12
         11
                   10
         10
          9
                  Male            Female
Students/Staff
                 15
                                   11                        11
                 10
                  5
                  0
                                Student                  Unv. Staff


                  Staff                                           Students
10      8                                        8       7
 8                                               6
 6
                                                 4
 4                      2                                               2        2
 2                                  1            2
 0                                               0
     Bachelors        Masters   J.D. Degree          Bachelors        Masters   Ph.D
      Degree          Degree                          Degree          Degree
Web Browser
12     11
10
 8                 7
 6
 4                              2
 2                                         1
 0
     Internet    Mozilla    Mozilla   Apple Safari
     Explorer    Firefox   Unknown
                            Version


                Operating System
14     13
12
10
 8                 6
 6
 4                              2
 2                                         1
 0
     Win XP      MAC OS     Win 2K    Win Unknown
                                         Version
• Participants are aged between 18 to 56
• Usage of computer by users is from 10 to 135
  hrs per week
• 18 participants uses online banking
• 20 participants use online shopping regularly
Results
Participants Score and Behavior
    The sum of number of correctly identified websites
     forms the participants score
    The score range was between 6 to 18 correctly
     identified websites

Gender
    There is no difference between the comparison of
     scores of male and female participants
    The mean score for male and female is 13 & 10.5
     respectively
Age
    There is no correlation between the score and the age
     of participants

Education Level
    There is no relation between the score and the
     educational level of the participants

Usage of Computer
    There is no significant correlation between the users
     score with respect to the amount of computer usage
     per week
    A user who uses computer for 14 hrs weekly judged
     18 out of 19 sites correctly on the other hand one
     judged only 7 sites correctly while he uses computer
     for 90 hrs per week
Previous use of Browser, OS and Web


    There is no significant relation between the use of
     browser and OS previously by the participant

    Even the use of same website previously did not help
     the participants in differentiating between legitimate
     and the phishing website
Strategies for Determining Websites Legitimacy

• Participants are categorized by the type of the
  factors they used to make decision
    Type1:Security indicators in the website contents
    Type2:Content and domain name
    Type3:Content and address plus HTTPS
    Type4:Padlock icon plus type 1,2 & 3
    Type5:Certificates plus type 1,2,3 & 4
Type1: Security indicators in website
contents
• Participants looked only the contents like images,
  logos, layouts, graphic designs and the accuracy
  of information
• As the participants in this category did not focus
  on the URL of the site therefore scored the
  lowest
• 5 (23%) participants used this strategy and their
  score was (6,7,7,9,9)
Type2: Content & domain name
• 8(36%) participants checked the address bar
  along with the contents of the website
• People in this category had the idea of the
  difference the domain name and IP address
Type3 : Content, address plus HTTPS
• Only 2(9%) participants used this strategy to
  differentiate between phishing and legitimate
  website
• Participants relied on the presence of the
  HTTPS in the status bar
• Users did not notice the padlock icon
Type4: Padlock icon plus type 1,2 & 3
• 5 (23%) participants falls under this category
• They checked for all the types discussed above
  and they also looked for the padlock icon in the
  address bar
• But some participants gave preference to the
  padlock icon that appears within the content of
  the web page
Type5: Certificates plus Type 1,2,3 & 4
• Only 2 (9%) of the participants checked the
  certificates presented by their browser and the
  other strategies as discussed previously
Websites Difficulty
• Users were asked to rate the confidence of their
  judgment on a score of 1 to 5
Phishing websites
• The website discussed previously used two “V”s instead of
  “W” to fool the people
• 20 participants judged this site as the legitimate website of
  the Bank of the west
• 17 people miss judged due to the contents of the page
• 2 participants were fooled due to the animated bear video
• 8 participants relied on the link to the other websites for
  their judgment
• 6 participants were tricked due to version logo
• 2 participants correctly judged this website as a spoof
• Only 1 participant judged this phishing website due to two
  V’s
Participants Knowledge of Phishing & Security
Knowledge & experience of Phishing
    7 participants had never heard the term phishing
    9 participants were confused about the legitimacy of the websites
    5 participants had experienced phishing and web fraudulent

Knowledge of Padlock icon & HTTPS
    4 participants had no idea regarding padlock icon
    5 participants mentioned it as some sort of security but they were not sure
    10 mentioned it as the way of securing data sent from user to server
    13 participants said that they never pay attention to the
     HTTPS in the address bar
Knowledge & use of certificates
    15 participants selected the okay button without reading
     the content of the message when the browser presented
     the self signed certificate
    18 participants stated that they did not know the about
     the certificate
    3 participants selected the wrong option from the
     certificate
    Only one participant interpreted the website certificate
     correctly as he was a system administrator
    19 participants stated that they never checked the
     certificate
Conclusion
• The study reveals that even the most knowledge and well
  informed user can also be fooled and tricked by a good
  phishing site
• Security indicators and warning messages showed by the
  browser are not understood by the user and go un-
  noticed
• Indicators of trust provided by the browser can even be
  spoofed by phishers very easily

• So the study suggests that some other method or
  approach is needed to overcome the phishing
Questions
& Comments

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Why phishing works

  • 1. Why phishing works By Rachna Dhamija , J. D. Tygar & Marti Hearst Ayaz Shahid (aysh1000@student.miun.se)
  • 2. Overview • Introduction • Why phishing works • Study to support hypothesis • Results of study • Conclusion
  • 3. Introduction • Directing users to fraudulent websites • The host website acts as the trustworthy or real website • Steals user’s credentials like credit card information , username/passwords and other personal information • Phishing is an opportunistic attack rather than a targeted attack
  • 4. Why Phishing works 1. Lack of knowledge 2. Visual Deception 3. Bounded Attention
  • 5. 1. Lack of knowledge • Computer system knowledge  Most of the phishers exploit the user’s lack of knowledge of computer, applications, emails, internet etc  Such users does not know about how things work and what are the differences for example: www.ebay-members-security.com & www.ebay.com
  • 6. Lack of knowledge(cont.) • Knowledge of security & security indicators  Most of the users does not know about the security indicators indicated by the browsers when it detects a phishing website. Example: Padlock Icon
  • 7. 2. Visual Deception • Visual Deceptive Text • Images masking underlying text • Images mimicking windows • Window Masking • Deceptive Look & Feel
  • 8. Visual Deception Text • Users are fooled using the syntax of the domain name • Phishers substitutes the letters in the domain name that may go un-noticed • Example: www.paypa1.com instead of www.paypal.com Substituted digit ‘1’ instead of letter ‘l’
  • 9. Images Masking Underlying Text • Phishers use a legitimate image as hyperlink which actually links to the fraudulent website Images mimicking windows • Phishers use an image in the content of the webpage that looks same as a window or a dialog box
  • 10. Windows Masking Underlying Windows • Placing an illegitimate browser window over or beside a legitimate browser window users can be tricked very easily as both windows look exactly same Deceptive look & feel • Phishers copy the logos, images and other information of the target website having same look and feel and the user could consider it as original website
  • 11. 3. Bounded Attention • Lack of Attention to Security Indicators  User focuses on the main task and forgets the security indicators  They might not pay attention to the warning messages • Lack of Attention to the absence of security indicators  Users do not notice the absence of an indicator  Some times a spoofed indicator image might be inserted by the phishers to fool the users
  • 12. Study to Access the Accuracy of Hypothesis • Conducted a usability study • Participants were asked to identify legitimate and phishing websites • Selected participants were better and good in knowledge • Around 200 phishing websites were selected
  • 13. Study Design • A web site was created containing random list of hyperlinks to different websites • Each participant was presented 20 websites • 7 websites were legitimate • 9 phishing websites • 3 special websites(created using additional phishing techniques) • 1 special website (requesting users to accept a self-signed SSL certificate) • All phishing websites were hosted on an Apache web server
  • 14. Scenario and Procedure • Participants were told that some of the websites are legitimate and some are not • The participants could also interact with the websites • Each participant was told to rate the website on a scale of 1 to 5 and reasoning of their answer • Participants were asked about the knowledge of SSL certified websites and the experience on the phishing websites
  • 15. Demographics of Participants • A total of 22 participants from a university having sound knowledge of computers, email and web were recruited Gender 13 12 12 11 10 10 9 Male Female
  • 16. Students/Staff 15 11 11 10 5 0 Student Unv. Staff Staff Students 10 8 8 7 8 6 6 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 0 0 Bachelors Masters J.D. Degree Bachelors Masters Ph.D Degree Degree Degree Degree
  • 17. Web Browser 12 11 10 8 7 6 4 2 2 1 0 Internet Mozilla Mozilla Apple Safari Explorer Firefox Unknown Version Operating System 14 13 12 10 8 6 6 4 2 2 1 0 Win XP MAC OS Win 2K Win Unknown Version
  • 18. • Participants are aged between 18 to 56 • Usage of computer by users is from 10 to 135 hrs per week • 18 participants uses online banking • 20 participants use online shopping regularly
  • 19. Results Participants Score and Behavior  The sum of number of correctly identified websites forms the participants score  The score range was between 6 to 18 correctly identified websites Gender  There is no difference between the comparison of scores of male and female participants  The mean score for male and female is 13 & 10.5 respectively
  • 20. Age  There is no correlation between the score and the age of participants Education Level  There is no relation between the score and the educational level of the participants Usage of Computer  There is no significant correlation between the users score with respect to the amount of computer usage per week  A user who uses computer for 14 hrs weekly judged 18 out of 19 sites correctly on the other hand one judged only 7 sites correctly while he uses computer for 90 hrs per week
  • 21. Previous use of Browser, OS and Web  There is no significant relation between the use of browser and OS previously by the participant  Even the use of same website previously did not help the participants in differentiating between legitimate and the phishing website
  • 22. Strategies for Determining Websites Legitimacy • Participants are categorized by the type of the factors they used to make decision  Type1:Security indicators in the website contents  Type2:Content and domain name  Type3:Content and address plus HTTPS  Type4:Padlock icon plus type 1,2 & 3  Type5:Certificates plus type 1,2,3 & 4
  • 23. Type1: Security indicators in website contents • Participants looked only the contents like images, logos, layouts, graphic designs and the accuracy of information • As the participants in this category did not focus on the URL of the site therefore scored the lowest • 5 (23%) participants used this strategy and their score was (6,7,7,9,9)
  • 24. Type2: Content & domain name • 8(36%) participants checked the address bar along with the contents of the website • People in this category had the idea of the difference the domain name and IP address
  • 25. Type3 : Content, address plus HTTPS • Only 2(9%) participants used this strategy to differentiate between phishing and legitimate website • Participants relied on the presence of the HTTPS in the status bar • Users did not notice the padlock icon
  • 26. Type4: Padlock icon plus type 1,2 & 3 • 5 (23%) participants falls under this category • They checked for all the types discussed above and they also looked for the padlock icon in the address bar • But some participants gave preference to the padlock icon that appears within the content of the web page
  • 27. Type5: Certificates plus Type 1,2,3 & 4 • Only 2 (9%) of the participants checked the certificates presented by their browser and the other strategies as discussed previously
  • 28. Websites Difficulty • Users were asked to rate the confidence of their judgment on a score of 1 to 5
  • 30. • The website discussed previously used two “V”s instead of “W” to fool the people • 20 participants judged this site as the legitimate website of the Bank of the west • 17 people miss judged due to the contents of the page • 2 participants were fooled due to the animated bear video • 8 participants relied on the link to the other websites for their judgment • 6 participants were tricked due to version logo • 2 participants correctly judged this website as a spoof • Only 1 participant judged this phishing website due to two V’s
  • 31. Participants Knowledge of Phishing & Security Knowledge & experience of Phishing  7 participants had never heard the term phishing  9 participants were confused about the legitimacy of the websites  5 participants had experienced phishing and web fraudulent Knowledge of Padlock icon & HTTPS  4 participants had no idea regarding padlock icon  5 participants mentioned it as some sort of security but they were not sure  10 mentioned it as the way of securing data sent from user to server  13 participants said that they never pay attention to the HTTPS in the address bar
  • 32. Knowledge & use of certificates  15 participants selected the okay button without reading the content of the message when the browser presented the self signed certificate  18 participants stated that they did not know the about the certificate  3 participants selected the wrong option from the certificate  Only one participant interpreted the website certificate correctly as he was a system administrator  19 participants stated that they never checked the certificate
  • 33. Conclusion • The study reveals that even the most knowledge and well informed user can also be fooled and tricked by a good phishing site • Security indicators and warning messages showed by the browser are not understood by the user and go un- noticed • Indicators of trust provided by the browser can even be spoofed by phishers very easily • So the study suggests that some other method or approach is needed to overcome the phishing