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on hacking & security
Ange Albertini
@angealbertini

✉ ange@corkami.com
http://www.corkami.com
Preamble
Error is human,
so programs have bugs.
Some bugs can be exploited
to hack into a system.
Java, August 2008
Privilege escalation via hand-made object
→ silent remote execution
private static final String ser = "ACED00057372001B6A6176612E [...]";
ObjectInputStream oin = new ObjectInputStream(
new ByteArrayInputStream(
PayloadX.StringToBytes( ser )
)
);
MySQL, June 2012
Invalid authentication check
→ instant login as root
for i in `seq 1 1000`;
do mysql -u root --password= bad -h < remote host > 2>/dev/null ;
done
Skype, November 2012
Password reset loophole
→ hijack account with just e-mail address
1. enter target e-mail
2. create associated dummy account
3. login with dummy
4. request password reset for target account
→ access contacts + conversations!
Uhlmann & Zacher lock, 2008
electronic lock. uses current to unlock
1. rotate ring magnet
a. generates current

2. open lock
Kaba E-Plex 5800 lock, 2011
US Government approved (FIPS 201)
● insert pin under the light cover
○ short-circuiting

● open lock
Apple's iPhone
● the biggest company
○ focusing on a handful of products

● their flagship product
○ fully controlled, software & hardware

● yet repeatedly hacked
○ for fame(?) only
knitting machine, tamagotchis, cars, CPUs
Hacked compagnies
● Sony, Microsoft, Facebook, Google, LinkedIn..
● T.J. Maxx
○ 45.7 million CCs stolen
○ obsolete Wi-Fi encryption

● NIST's National Vulnerability Database
● Certificate authorities
○ to enable more hacks

● Equifax
○ after their "blind" CISO's keynote
With enough resources,
any-thing/one can be hacked.
No ready-made software
will save you:
your attacker can have it too,
and has time to prepare
"but I have an anti-virus!"
repeat {
1. modify(virus)
2. check(www.VirusTotal.com)
} until (NOT detected)

think "Great wall of china"
Ready-made software
can only help against
generic attacks!
think about jails
● guards
○ avoid routine, plannification

● reduce points of entry
● increase visibility
just xored with "RANDOM STRING"
Power Pwn & PwnPlug
●
●
●
●

Wireless, Bluetooth, Ethernet, GSM
internal storage
stealth mode
pre-loaded with offensive tools
Removing advanced malware
1. re-flash bios
○ infecting BIOS is a reality

2. hardware wiping
○ encrypted & hidden FileSystem is a reality

3. re-install everything
Introduction
"hackers"?
↕
"hackers", for hackers
● explorer, inventor, finder
● freedom, curiosity, experiment, technical
● use things in an unexpected way
○ get extraordinary results, out of normal things
"hackers", for others (media)
● system intruder
● illegal, malicious, thief, perpetrator
● script kiddie, defacing, "Anonymous"
Why 2 definitions?
before
● a culture
→ intruders = experts
now
● a business
→ many 1-click tools exist
→ trivial to hack a weak system
Agenda
Agenda
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

A hacking glossary
Why hacking?
Who are the actors?
What/how to hack?
A word on viruses
A hacking glossary
1. bug
2. vuln
a. CVE

3. exploit
a. 0-day
i. 1-day

4. cyber weapon
● full/responsible disclosure
"bug"
● a problem in a software/hardware
○ 180 official bugs in Intel's i7

● an unwanted path of execution
● to be fixed?
○ maybe one day, maybe "WontFix"
"vulnerability" (vuln)
● a bug that creates some weakness
○ a security bug

● crash/hang/information leak
● NOT always an exploit
● a single vuln might be enough for a hack
● minor vulns can be combined
ad published in "Hack In The Box magazine"
"Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures"
● a universal ID for a specific vuln
○ ex: CVE-2012-0217 = "Xen Escape"

● booked in advance
○ not all IDs are documented

● other companies have their own IDs
○ ex: Microsoft's MS12-042

● not all vulns have IDs
"exploit"
● using one or more vulnerabilities at your
advantage, in a user-controllable way.
○ "it's like getting random pieces at IKEA, and try to
make a piece of furniture out of it" Thomas Dullien

● it's hard!
○ exact configuration
■ OS/software version
○ escape sandbox
○ avoid compiler/system mitigations
Many vulnerabilities are
not exploitable!
↕
Several innocent bugs
might be combined into
a fully-working exploit!
"Proof of Concept"
● binary/source
● triggers the exploit
○ proves it's real
○ might not work reliably
"to pwn"
● to own, to take control, to defeat
● hacked/exploited = pwned = game over
"0-day"
● an exploit not publicly known yet
○ $5,000 - $600,000
○ In The Wild

● no documentation or PoC
"1-day"
● exploit is now known
● likely not patched everywhere yet
● generate exploit
○ from before/after patching comparison
○ from PoCs
○ from write-ups

→ exploitation is much easier
PATCHING IS
CRITICAL!
removing/isolating
obsolescence too!
"cyber weapon"
an exploit with a well built payload
(pseudo-hype word)
● stealth
○ anti-forensics
○ self-encryption to avoid memory/disk footprint
○ decrypts necessary parts only on final target
Full/responsible disclosure
report to everybody or the vendor only?
● give the vendor time to react
○ maybe the vendor will never patch, or sue you,
leaving users vulnerable

● some vulns are known yet hidden for years
○ until exploited ITW

full disclosure is:
● bad for PR
● 'good' for security
○ force people to act
Why hacking?
For fun / fame!
● "because I can"
● cool/clever
○ dark magic
■ Super Mario World stack overflow via joypad!

● not necessary over-complex
○ we exploit kids' mind all the time ☺
For money!
it takes time and skill to generate an exploit.
● why for free?
○ try to feed your family with 'thank you'...

● bug bounties
○ pwn us, tell us how, get paid
○ Facebook hiring former security employees

● pen-testing
○ try to pwn us for XX days
Why buying exploits?
● which company/country wouldn't want to get
secrets "magically"?
a. buy exploit
b. pwn your competitor
c. profit
Why attacking me?
● customer informations
a. bank accounts

● financial informations
● internal developments
a. research project
0-day prices
$600K? remote iPhone (2nd JailbreakMe)
CanSecWest's Pwn2own 2013
●
●
●
●
●

$100K Chrome + W7 / IE 10 + W8
$75K IE 9 + W7
$65K Safari + Mountain Lion
$60K Firefox + W7
plugins, IE9 + Win7
● $70K Reader 11 / Flash
● $20K Java

Google's Pwnium 3 on ChromeOS
● $150K remote + device persistence
● $110K remote
Bounties
● the original error bounty: Donald Knuth
○ $2.56 per error/mistake/suggestion
■ worth much more than the money!

● qmail
○ $500 per exploit, since 1997!

● Google, Mozilla, Avast, IDA, twitter, FB,
github
○ slowly becoming mainstream
No money for you
'thank you' only ☹
● Microsoft, Nokia...
report for free, get lawyers' threats
● sadly too many vendors ☹
Who are the actors?
Independant researcher
● whitehat/'ethical hacker'
○ for bug bounties

● blackhat
○ to get it sold via a broker

the only difference?
● if vendors gets informed
○ which doesn't mean it will be patched
Private exploit sellers
● to any customer
○ Core, ZDI, Exodus, Immunity
■ many others, 'undercover' or not

● to governments
○ VUPEN

not sellers, but active private developers
● defense contractors
○ Northrop Grumman, Crystal Clear, EndGame
Open-source scene
● metasploit
● freedom to check for exploits ITW
What/how can you hack?
Hack what?
anything (that can execute code)!
● computers, browsers, processors
● (smart)phones (SIM unlock, jailbreak)
● printers, conference phones
● routers
●
●
●
●

hotel room locks, cars, TV, camera
tamagotchi, calculator, knitting machine, toys
SCADA, Step 7
keyboard, network card, floppy drive
How is it possible?
● error is human
● nobody controls the whole process anymore
○ CPUs and OSes are documented
○ manufacturers want developers to use their product
○ 3rd parties APIs and libraries everywhere

● everything gets more complex
○ increasing attack surface
■ more applications, more libraries, more protocols
■ web browser: CSS 3D, WebGL, MathML
How do you find vulnerabilities?
● pure accident
○ "it just crashed"

● happy accident
○ unexpected crash while researching a topic

● monitor official sources/bug trackers
● (smart) bruteforcing
○ fuzzing, gathering crash info
○ a silent crash might do the trick

● analysis
○ disassembly (very time consuming)
Methodology
"it's like reviewing a paper: just look for errors"
"if you rely on public tools or approach,
you will limit yourself like everyone else before"
Notable vulnerabilities
Pentium's LOCK CMPXCHG8B
● computer crash in one instruction
Tavis Ormandy's KiRaiseAssertion
● Windows crash in 2 instructions
○ patched in one instruction

my own example
● researching on PE. accidental BSOD
Why turning vulns into exploit?
people don't move until they're pwned
● "I personally consider security bugs to be
just 'normal bugs' " Linus Torvald
● Oracle: critical vuln known for months until
exploited for malware
exploit = vulns + control + defeating mitigations!
(+ anti-forensics if weaponized)
Notable exploits
● Sergei Golubchik's MySQL CVE-2012-2122
○ keep knocking until (admin) door wide open

● Sergey Glazunov's Chrome Pwnium
○ 14 chained vulnerabilities
■ including downgrading privileges
○ $60K

● Tavis Ormandy's CVE-2010-0232
○ 17 year old, all 32b NT versions affected
Exploit effects
parameter checking
● sql injection (blind)
○ customer/banking information?
○ add malware contents to websites

● browser vulnerabilities
○ bypass authentication, steal token, exfiltrate files

foreign code execution
● download malware
● privilege escalation
● host escape
Mitigations
● separation
○ process: sandbox
○ network

● predictability
○ OS randomization
○ configuration randomization (difficult)
○ hardcoded passwords
Software targets
● the OS itself
most common software
● Java
● PDF
● Flash
● Office
anything else?
● lowest hanging fruit
○ any installed software increases the attack surface
Why is Java the most targeted?
● Oracle is like Adobe 5 years ago
○ no patch until public
○ started hiring known hackers only recently
● Java exploitation is (very) easy
○ hardly no mitigations
■ no mitigations at OS level
○ just a missing 'if (access==granted)' somewhere

● it's a reality
○ a "Java every-day"
■ last 0-day really went unnoticed
○ Just Another Vulnerability Announcement
○ hacked 4 times at Pwn2Own
How do you hack a company ? (1/3)
● gather information
○
○
○
○
○

search credentials via google
scan network
hack wifi
visit and plug your notebook
buy a used laptop/hard disk on e-bay
How do you hack a company ? (2/3)
● exploit information
○ any obsolete software?
■ ex: PC Anywhere
○ any internal software?
○ anyone vulnerable?
■ buy, bribe, convince
■ take hostage ☺

● exploit humanity
○ drop USB keys
○ send targeted e-mails
■ most companies have clueless employees
■ the worst the better ☺
○ waterhole attack
How do you hack a company ? (3/3)
● attack
○ use known attack
■ NMap, Nessus, AutoPwn...
○ develop your own attack
○ buy/trade a 0-day
■ "hackers' standard currency"
○ get in. elevate privileges. get further.

● stay in, stay stealth
○ in the printer,...?

● exfiltrate information
○ random copy metadata on USB sticks
○ visit again
Advanced physical attacks
"evil maid attack"
● bios/iPXE (Brossard's Rakshasa)
● boot from other drive (Bania's Kon-Boot)
● firewire/thunderbolt access (Inception)
○ bypass password + elevates privilege

● network card (Delugre)
● keyboard controller (Gazet's Sticky Finger)
Physical access = pwned
Commercial solutions failure (1/2)
bound to fail against targeted attacks!
● predictability
○ everybody's copy is identical

● limitations
○ can't be exhaustive
■ compared like washing powders on scanning
speed.

● time
● modify binary until not detected
● use VirusTotal to check
○ or black market equivalent to avoid sharing
Commercial solutions failure (2/2)
might increase the attack surface!
● deeply integrated into the OS
○ present in each process

● remote connection
● trusted
→ useable as a trampoline for attack
● Tavis Ormandy's Sophail
○ "installing Sophos Antivirus exposes
machines to considerable risk"

● Kasperky's remote DoS (March 2013)
A word on viruses
Viruses (virii) glossary
how they spread
1. trojan
2. worm
3. infector
4. rootkit
○ bootkit

what they do
1. ransomware
2. fakeAV
3. infostealer
4. zombie (→ botnet)
"virus" (malware)
● malware for professional
○ virus for others

● generic name, no implication
"trojan [horse]"
● pretends to be clean
● contains ill-intentioned greek soldiers
1. hack a known open-source site
2. backdoor binaries
"worm"
● just replicates to survive
○ network, usb key, 0-days, mail, p2p
○ standard modern feature

Slammer
● one single packet containing
a. packet infos
b. MS02-039 server exploitation
■ yet patched 6 months before!
c. replication
"infectors"
● adds itself to target to spread
○ may be hard/impossible to repair
○ file or disk infectors

● true definition of a virus?
○ not trendy anymore
○ technically advanced

● known file is not innocent anymore
○ tricky for compiling environments
"infostealer/spyware"
● steals (banking/gaming/login) information
banking infostealers technics
●
●
●
●

login → keylogger
virtual keypad → take screenshot
Tan → hook display / fake page
mTan
○ Bochum's Nokia
○ smartphone → infect smartphone

● chipTan → fake transaction message
■ there's no patch for human stupidity
"ransomware"
● pay to unlock your system
● either
○ prevent booting
■ usually (very) easy
○ encrypt your personal documents
■ can be hard
■ or impossible if buggy
"rootkit"
● hider, cloaker
○ used by Sony, Blizzard,...

● just a component to hide the main part
"zombie"
● a device (most likely PC)
● pwned by a generic malware

"botnet"
a set of zombies connected together
typically in a P2P way.
"sinkholing"
exploit a botnet to it take over
standard malware
● a bit of everything
● just rent services
○
○
○
○

binary obfuscation
credit card checking
captcha solvers
hosting

● uses of a botnet
○
○
○
○
○
○

spying
distributed parallel filestorage (child pornography)
anonymous proxy
spam, DDOS
click ads
bitcoin mining
"exploit kit"
● ready-made malware infection kit
● complete infection and maintenance
software
● from a single script on a page to full remote
management of the botnet
easy 0-days (java/pdf/html/flash) → download
"bootkit"
● boot infector + on-the-fly patcher
● the OS is modified during loading
○ no file footprint

● originally used to install rootkit
● bootkit-based tools
○ Piotr Bania's Kon-Boot
■ bypass log-in+elevate rights
○ Saferbytes x86 memory bootkit
■ enable more memory usage
"Advanced Persistant Threat"
● hype
○ created by US AirForce in 2005
■ public for operation Aurora, 3/2010
○ you're just pwned, but your company is famous

● targeted attack? not even always

StuxNet, Flame = awesome
most others are just 'standard'
resilient yet ITW
● bootkit + encrypted FS at the end of the
drive
● no visible file from the system
○ yet updateable

● resist formatting
state-sponsorised spyware
● a reality
○ Finfisher
○ Bundestrojan
○ got a job offer for that!

● stealth
○ low footprint (Duqu)
○ no replication

● recent laws make it possible
○ public french regrets
■ for not having one!
generic vs targeted
Generic:quick and efficient, avoid AV
● malicious from the start
● evades AVs, infect
Targeted: stealth
● look 100% clean
○ even at 2nd look (integrate in existing software)
○ does nothing on non-target
■ might be impossible to get it working
○ don't disclose any information
Conclusion
security is hard!
secure = powered off
not good for business ☹
"secure"
=
resisting to attack
the more predictable,
the more manageable...
...and the more hackable!
Face reality
error is human
software have bugs
hardware have bugs
→ you will be pwned, if someone really wants
● but for how long?
○ kill the time factor

● and to what extend?
○ kill the predictability factor

● anything can be a target
○ any minor hack will lead to "X has been hacked"
Thank YOU!

Questions?
@angealbertini

✉ ange@corkami.com

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On hacking & security

  • 1. on hacking & security Ange Albertini @angealbertini ✉ ange@corkami.com http://www.corkami.com
  • 3. Error is human, so programs have bugs. Some bugs can be exploited to hack into a system.
  • 4. Java, August 2008 Privilege escalation via hand-made object → silent remote execution private static final String ser = "ACED00057372001B6A6176612E [...]"; ObjectInputStream oin = new ObjectInputStream( new ByteArrayInputStream( PayloadX.StringToBytes( ser ) ) );
  • 5. MySQL, June 2012 Invalid authentication check → instant login as root for i in `seq 1 1000`; do mysql -u root --password= bad -h < remote host > 2>/dev/null ; done
  • 6. Skype, November 2012 Password reset loophole → hijack account with just e-mail address 1. enter target e-mail 2. create associated dummy account 3. login with dummy 4. request password reset for target account → access contacts + conversations!
  • 7.
  • 8. Uhlmann & Zacher lock, 2008 electronic lock. uses current to unlock 1. rotate ring magnet a. generates current 2. open lock
  • 9.
  • 10. Kaba E-Plex 5800 lock, 2011 US Government approved (FIPS 201) ● insert pin under the light cover ○ short-circuiting ● open lock
  • 11.
  • 12. Apple's iPhone ● the biggest company ○ focusing on a handful of products ● their flagship product ○ fully controlled, software & hardware ● yet repeatedly hacked ○ for fame(?) only
  • 14. Hacked compagnies ● Sony, Microsoft, Facebook, Google, LinkedIn.. ● T.J. Maxx ○ 45.7 million CCs stolen ○ obsolete Wi-Fi encryption ● NIST's National Vulnerability Database ● Certificate authorities ○ to enable more hacks ● Equifax ○ after their "blind" CISO's keynote
  • 15. With enough resources, any-thing/one can be hacked. No ready-made software will save you: your attacker can have it too, and has time to prepare
  • 16. "but I have an anti-virus!" repeat { 1. modify(virus) 2. check(www.VirusTotal.com) } until (NOT detected) think "Great wall of china"
  • 17. Ready-made software can only help against generic attacks!
  • 18. think about jails ● guards ○ avoid routine, plannification ● reduce points of entry ● increase visibility
  • 19. just xored with "RANDOM STRING"
  • 20.
  • 21. Power Pwn & PwnPlug ● ● ● ● Wireless, Bluetooth, Ethernet, GSM internal storage stealth mode pre-loaded with offensive tools
  • 22.
  • 23. Removing advanced malware 1. re-flash bios ○ infecting BIOS is a reality 2. hardware wiping ○ encrypted & hidden FileSystem is a reality 3. re-install everything
  • 26.
  • 27. "hackers", for hackers ● explorer, inventor, finder ● freedom, curiosity, experiment, technical ● use things in an unexpected way ○ get extraordinary results, out of normal things
  • 28. "hackers", for others (media) ● system intruder ● illegal, malicious, thief, perpetrator ● script kiddie, defacing, "Anonymous"
  • 29. Why 2 definitions? before ● a culture → intruders = experts now ● a business → many 1-click tools exist → trivial to hack a weak system
  • 31. Agenda 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. A hacking glossary Why hacking? Who are the actors? What/how to hack? A word on viruses
  • 32. A hacking glossary 1. bug 2. vuln a. CVE 3. exploit a. 0-day i. 1-day 4. cyber weapon ● full/responsible disclosure
  • 33. "bug" ● a problem in a software/hardware ○ 180 official bugs in Intel's i7 ● an unwanted path of execution ● to be fixed? ○ maybe one day, maybe "WontFix"
  • 34. "vulnerability" (vuln) ● a bug that creates some weakness ○ a security bug ● crash/hang/information leak ● NOT always an exploit ● a single vuln might be enough for a hack ● minor vulns can be combined
  • 35. ad published in "Hack In The Box magazine"
  • 36. "Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures" ● a universal ID for a specific vuln ○ ex: CVE-2012-0217 = "Xen Escape" ● booked in advance ○ not all IDs are documented ● other companies have their own IDs ○ ex: Microsoft's MS12-042 ● not all vulns have IDs
  • 37. "exploit" ● using one or more vulnerabilities at your advantage, in a user-controllable way. ○ "it's like getting random pieces at IKEA, and try to make a piece of furniture out of it" Thomas Dullien ● it's hard! ○ exact configuration ■ OS/software version ○ escape sandbox ○ avoid compiler/system mitigations
  • 38. Many vulnerabilities are not exploitable! ↕ Several innocent bugs might be combined into a fully-working exploit!
  • 39. "Proof of Concept" ● binary/source ● triggers the exploit ○ proves it's real ○ might not work reliably
  • 40. "to pwn" ● to own, to take control, to defeat ● hacked/exploited = pwned = game over
  • 41. "0-day" ● an exploit not publicly known yet ○ $5,000 - $600,000 ○ In The Wild ● no documentation or PoC
  • 42. "1-day" ● exploit is now known ● likely not patched everywhere yet ● generate exploit ○ from before/after patching comparison ○ from PoCs ○ from write-ups → exploitation is much easier
  • 44. "cyber weapon" an exploit with a well built payload (pseudo-hype word) ● stealth ○ anti-forensics ○ self-encryption to avoid memory/disk footprint ○ decrypts necessary parts only on final target
  • 45. Full/responsible disclosure report to everybody or the vendor only? ● give the vendor time to react ○ maybe the vendor will never patch, or sue you, leaving users vulnerable ● some vulns are known yet hidden for years ○ until exploited ITW full disclosure is: ● bad for PR ● 'good' for security ○ force people to act
  • 47. For fun / fame! ● "because I can" ● cool/clever ○ dark magic ■ Super Mario World stack overflow via joypad! ● not necessary over-complex ○ we exploit kids' mind all the time ☺
  • 48. For money! it takes time and skill to generate an exploit. ● why for free? ○ try to feed your family with 'thank you'... ● bug bounties ○ pwn us, tell us how, get paid ○ Facebook hiring former security employees ● pen-testing ○ try to pwn us for XX days
  • 49. Why buying exploits? ● which company/country wouldn't want to get secrets "magically"? a. buy exploit b. pwn your competitor c. profit
  • 50. Why attacking me? ● customer informations a. bank accounts ● financial informations ● internal developments a. research project
  • 51. 0-day prices $600K? remote iPhone (2nd JailbreakMe) CanSecWest's Pwn2own 2013 ● ● ● ● ● $100K Chrome + W7 / IE 10 + W8 $75K IE 9 + W7 $65K Safari + Mountain Lion $60K Firefox + W7 plugins, IE9 + Win7 ● $70K Reader 11 / Flash ● $20K Java Google's Pwnium 3 on ChromeOS ● $150K remote + device persistence ● $110K remote
  • 52. Bounties ● the original error bounty: Donald Knuth ○ $2.56 per error/mistake/suggestion ■ worth much more than the money! ● qmail ○ $500 per exploit, since 1997! ● Google, Mozilla, Avast, IDA, twitter, FB, github ○ slowly becoming mainstream
  • 53. No money for you 'thank you' only ☹ ● Microsoft, Nokia... report for free, get lawyers' threats ● sadly too many vendors ☹
  • 54. Who are the actors?
  • 55. Independant researcher ● whitehat/'ethical hacker' ○ for bug bounties ● blackhat ○ to get it sold via a broker the only difference? ● if vendors gets informed ○ which doesn't mean it will be patched
  • 56. Private exploit sellers ● to any customer ○ Core, ZDI, Exodus, Immunity ■ many others, 'undercover' or not ● to governments ○ VUPEN not sellers, but active private developers ● defense contractors ○ Northrop Grumman, Crystal Clear, EndGame
  • 57. Open-source scene ● metasploit ● freedom to check for exploits ITW
  • 59. Hack what? anything (that can execute code)! ● computers, browsers, processors ● (smart)phones (SIM unlock, jailbreak) ● printers, conference phones ● routers ● ● ● ● hotel room locks, cars, TV, camera tamagotchi, calculator, knitting machine, toys SCADA, Step 7 keyboard, network card, floppy drive
  • 60. How is it possible? ● error is human ● nobody controls the whole process anymore ○ CPUs and OSes are documented ○ manufacturers want developers to use their product ○ 3rd parties APIs and libraries everywhere ● everything gets more complex ○ increasing attack surface ■ more applications, more libraries, more protocols ■ web browser: CSS 3D, WebGL, MathML
  • 61. How do you find vulnerabilities? ● pure accident ○ "it just crashed" ● happy accident ○ unexpected crash while researching a topic ● monitor official sources/bug trackers ● (smart) bruteforcing ○ fuzzing, gathering crash info ○ a silent crash might do the trick ● analysis ○ disassembly (very time consuming)
  • 62. Methodology "it's like reviewing a paper: just look for errors" "if you rely on public tools or approach, you will limit yourself like everyone else before"
  • 63. Notable vulnerabilities Pentium's LOCK CMPXCHG8B ● computer crash in one instruction Tavis Ormandy's KiRaiseAssertion ● Windows crash in 2 instructions ○ patched in one instruction my own example ● researching on PE. accidental BSOD
  • 64. Why turning vulns into exploit? people don't move until they're pwned ● "I personally consider security bugs to be just 'normal bugs' " Linus Torvald ● Oracle: critical vuln known for months until exploited for malware exploit = vulns + control + defeating mitigations! (+ anti-forensics if weaponized)
  • 65. Notable exploits ● Sergei Golubchik's MySQL CVE-2012-2122 ○ keep knocking until (admin) door wide open ● Sergey Glazunov's Chrome Pwnium ○ 14 chained vulnerabilities ■ including downgrading privileges ○ $60K ● Tavis Ormandy's CVE-2010-0232 ○ 17 year old, all 32b NT versions affected
  • 66. Exploit effects parameter checking ● sql injection (blind) ○ customer/banking information? ○ add malware contents to websites ● browser vulnerabilities ○ bypass authentication, steal token, exfiltrate files foreign code execution ● download malware ● privilege escalation ● host escape
  • 67. Mitigations ● separation ○ process: sandbox ○ network ● predictability ○ OS randomization ○ configuration randomization (difficult) ○ hardcoded passwords
  • 68. Software targets ● the OS itself most common software ● Java ● PDF ● Flash ● Office anything else? ● lowest hanging fruit ○ any installed software increases the attack surface
  • 69. Why is Java the most targeted? ● Oracle is like Adobe 5 years ago ○ no patch until public ○ started hiring known hackers only recently ● Java exploitation is (very) easy ○ hardly no mitigations ■ no mitigations at OS level ○ just a missing 'if (access==granted)' somewhere ● it's a reality ○ a "Java every-day" ■ last 0-day really went unnoticed ○ Just Another Vulnerability Announcement ○ hacked 4 times at Pwn2Own
  • 70. How do you hack a company ? (1/3) ● gather information ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ search credentials via google scan network hack wifi visit and plug your notebook buy a used laptop/hard disk on e-bay
  • 71. How do you hack a company ? (2/3) ● exploit information ○ any obsolete software? ■ ex: PC Anywhere ○ any internal software? ○ anyone vulnerable? ■ buy, bribe, convince ■ take hostage ☺ ● exploit humanity ○ drop USB keys ○ send targeted e-mails ■ most companies have clueless employees ■ the worst the better ☺ ○ waterhole attack
  • 72. How do you hack a company ? (3/3) ● attack ○ use known attack ■ NMap, Nessus, AutoPwn... ○ develop your own attack ○ buy/trade a 0-day ■ "hackers' standard currency" ○ get in. elevate privileges. get further. ● stay in, stay stealth ○ in the printer,...? ● exfiltrate information ○ random copy metadata on USB sticks ○ visit again
  • 73. Advanced physical attacks "evil maid attack" ● bios/iPXE (Brossard's Rakshasa) ● boot from other drive (Bania's Kon-Boot) ● firewire/thunderbolt access (Inception) ○ bypass password + elevates privilege ● network card (Delugre) ● keyboard controller (Gazet's Sticky Finger)
  • 75. Commercial solutions failure (1/2) bound to fail against targeted attacks! ● predictability ○ everybody's copy is identical ● limitations ○ can't be exhaustive ■ compared like washing powders on scanning speed. ● time ● modify binary until not detected ● use VirusTotal to check ○ or black market equivalent to avoid sharing
  • 76. Commercial solutions failure (2/2) might increase the attack surface! ● deeply integrated into the OS ○ present in each process ● remote connection ● trusted → useable as a trampoline for attack ● Tavis Ormandy's Sophail ○ "installing Sophos Antivirus exposes machines to considerable risk" ● Kasperky's remote DoS (March 2013)
  • 77. A word on viruses
  • 78. Viruses (virii) glossary how they spread 1. trojan 2. worm 3. infector 4. rootkit ○ bootkit what they do 1. ransomware 2. fakeAV 3. infostealer 4. zombie (→ botnet)
  • 79. "virus" (malware) ● malware for professional ○ virus for others ● generic name, no implication
  • 80. "trojan [horse]" ● pretends to be clean ● contains ill-intentioned greek soldiers 1. hack a known open-source site 2. backdoor binaries
  • 81. "worm" ● just replicates to survive ○ network, usb key, 0-days, mail, p2p ○ standard modern feature Slammer ● one single packet containing a. packet infos b. MS02-039 server exploitation ■ yet patched 6 months before! c. replication
  • 82. "infectors" ● adds itself to target to spread ○ may be hard/impossible to repair ○ file or disk infectors ● true definition of a virus? ○ not trendy anymore ○ technically advanced ● known file is not innocent anymore ○ tricky for compiling environments
  • 84. banking infostealers technics ● ● ● ● login → keylogger virtual keypad → take screenshot Tan → hook display / fake page mTan ○ Bochum's Nokia ○ smartphone → infect smartphone ● chipTan → fake transaction message ■ there's no patch for human stupidity
  • 85. "ransomware" ● pay to unlock your system ● either ○ prevent booting ■ usually (very) easy ○ encrypt your personal documents ■ can be hard ■ or impossible if buggy
  • 86. "rootkit" ● hider, cloaker ○ used by Sony, Blizzard,... ● just a component to hide the main part
  • 87. "zombie" ● a device (most likely PC) ● pwned by a generic malware "botnet" a set of zombies connected together typically in a P2P way. "sinkholing" exploit a botnet to it take over
  • 88. standard malware ● a bit of everything ● just rent services ○ ○ ○ ○ binary obfuscation credit card checking captcha solvers hosting ● uses of a botnet ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ spying distributed parallel filestorage (child pornography) anonymous proxy spam, DDOS click ads bitcoin mining
  • 89. "exploit kit" ● ready-made malware infection kit ● complete infection and maintenance software ● from a single script on a page to full remote management of the botnet easy 0-days (java/pdf/html/flash) → download
  • 90. "bootkit" ● boot infector + on-the-fly patcher ● the OS is modified during loading ○ no file footprint ● originally used to install rootkit ● bootkit-based tools ○ Piotr Bania's Kon-Boot ■ bypass log-in+elevate rights ○ Saferbytes x86 memory bootkit ■ enable more memory usage
  • 91. "Advanced Persistant Threat" ● hype ○ created by US AirForce in 2005 ■ public for operation Aurora, 3/2010 ○ you're just pwned, but your company is famous ● targeted attack? not even always StuxNet, Flame = awesome most others are just 'standard'
  • 92. resilient yet ITW ● bootkit + encrypted FS at the end of the drive ● no visible file from the system ○ yet updateable ● resist formatting
  • 93. state-sponsorised spyware ● a reality ○ Finfisher ○ Bundestrojan ○ got a job offer for that! ● stealth ○ low footprint (Duqu) ○ no replication ● recent laws make it possible ○ public french regrets ■ for not having one!
  • 94. generic vs targeted Generic:quick and efficient, avoid AV ● malicious from the start ● evades AVs, infect Targeted: stealth ● look 100% clean ○ even at 2nd look (integrate in existing software) ○ does nothing on non-target ■ might be impossible to get it working ○ don't disclose any information
  • 96. security is hard! secure = powered off not good for business ☹
  • 98. the more predictable, the more manageable... ...and the more hackable!
  • 99. Face reality error is human software have bugs hardware have bugs → you will be pwned, if someone really wants ● but for how long? ○ kill the time factor ● and to what extend? ○ kill the predictability factor ● anything can be a target ○ any minor hack will lead to "X has been hacked"