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The Communication Challenges

At NASA on and before January 28, 1986

    Leading to the Destruction of the

       Space Shuttle: Challenger




              Prepared for

          Dr. Margaret Smith

     University of Texas at El Paso




              Prepared by

             Gabriel Ortiz

            Rebeca Sanchez

            Stephen Simon

                Group 6

              ENGL3355




              July 3, 2012
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report analyzes the deficiencies in communication at NASA which led to the destruction of
the Space Shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986 and what could have been done differently to
prevent the destruction of the shuttle and the deaths of the seven astronauts.

Launch Delays Resulted in Undue Pressure on Management

Inclement weather continually created delays in the launch schedule for the fleet of shuttles and
as a result, created frustration on the part of the Vice President who functioned as the key
spokesperson for the space program and NASA needed his goodwill. The launch delays resulted
in unnecessary travel to and from the launch site for the Vice President. Further, there was
considerable political pressure to prove the shuttle fleet could fly dependably on a very ambitious
schedule to prove the cost effectiveness of the Space Transportation System and its potential for
commercialization. When a weather front stalled in Florida, creating a launch window, the
launch for Challenger was once again a go. The weather forecast was calling for freezing
temperatures at the launch pad which was a red flag for the engineers at Morton-Thiokol, the
contractor responsible for the solid rocket boosters which failed and resulted in the loss of the
shuttle and its occupants.

Engineering Design Flaws Discovered

NASA management wanted to have all the contractors associated with the shuttle program to
sign off on the launch. All effected contractors were contacted to determine if there were any
problems with launching in cold weather. The director of the Solid Rocket Motor Project at
Morton-Thiokol, Alan McDonald, knew there were cold weather problems with the motors and
consulted with two other project engineers, Robert Ebeling and Roger Boisjoly. They had known
of cold weather issues with the boosters since 1977. They became absolutely aware of the cold
weather flaw during the November 1981 launch; the second shuttle launch. At that time they
initiated a redesign effort and in 1985 they became painfully aware that they were not supported
by their management in the redesign effort. Despite management resistance, the results of the
November 1981 launch were undeniable and new steel billets were ordered. Unfortunately, the
new booster billets were not yet ready to be deployed by January 28, 1986.

Management Pressured to Launch Despite “No Launch” Recommendation

Well before the launch, Alan McDonald asked his engineers to prepare a presentation on the
effects of cold weather on booster performance. A teleconference was scheduled the evening
before the rescheduled launch. The attendees were engineers and management from Kennedy
Space Center, Marshall Flight Center in Alabama, and Morton-Thiokol in Utah. At the
conclusion of the presentation, Thoikol’s Engineering Vice President concluded that the launch
should be delayed and made that recommendation. Marshall’s Solid Rocket Booster Project
Manager, Larry Mulloy, comments that the data is inconclusive and challenged the engineer’s
logic at Thiokol. A heated debate ensued resulting in Mulloy bypassing Lund and requesting a
decision by Joe Kilminster, a middle manager who had authority to override the engineers.
Kilminster stood by the engineer’s recommendation to delay launch. A senior manager at
Morton-Thiokol, Jerald Mason, states that a management decision is required. The
teleconference is suspended while Thiokol reviews its data and Kilminster consults his
engineers. During this period, Mason pressures Kilminster who then caves and when the
teleconference resumes, changes his position on the launch. His recommendation to launch is not
signed off on by his engineers who reject the premise that the data is inconclusive. Alan
McDonald, who was present in Florida during the teleconference, is surprised by this reversal
and appeals to NASA management not to launch. NASA managers decide to approve the
boosters for launch.



         The Communication Challenges at NASA on and before January 28, 1986

                 Leading to the Destruction of the Space Shuttle: Challenger

                                        INTRODUCTION

NASA is the agency of the United States government that is responsible for the space program
which is a civilian space program and aerospace research. Its mission statement is has been to
pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery and around aeronautical research.
NASA was established by the National Aeronautics and Space Act on July 29, 1958 and became
operational October 1, 1958. NASA has led the US space exploration efforts including the
Apollo missions, Sky Lab and later the space shuttle. Currently it supports the International
Space Station and presently overseas the Orion Multipurpose Crew Vehicle. NASA is also
responsible for the Launch Services Program which provides oversight of launch operations and
countdown management for unmanned NASA launches. NASA shares its status with various
international organizations presently. NASA activities can be independent carrying scientific
equipment or supportive testing equipment.

There have been several space flight programs the first of which was the X-15 Rocket plane from
1950 to 1968. Later it hosted Project Mercury from 1959-1963 and finally Project Gemini from
1960 to 1966. This shuttle program began in 1972 and was planned as a frequently launch able
and reusable vehicle. Its major components were a Space Plane orbiter with external fuel tanks
and 2 solid reusable rockets. During this history the shuttle fleet lost 2 orbiters in 14 astronauts in
2 separate disasters: Challenger in 1986 in Columbia in 2003. Overall NASA space shuttle
program had 135 missions in the program and on July 21, 2011 and spanned 30 years with over
300 astronauts sent into space.

The purpose of this report is to analyze the communications challenges at NASA which led to
the destruction of Challenger and the lives lost in the event. Several academic sources as well as
2


NASA documents were used to compile the report and highlight the key communication
deficiencies.

This is an informational Case Analysis highlighting communications failures which lead to the
death of astronauts and destruction of property due to managerial and financial pressures of
government contractors who are the lowest bidders on our governmental projects.

SWOT Analysis Communication Challenges at NASA on and before January 28, 1986

Leading to the Destruction of the Space Shuttle: Challenger

NASA is a very important and influential agency because of the great contributions it has given
to scientific and technological development. This is a very complex organization which is
divided into different groups which are focused on different areas. The scope of this analysis will
focus on the Challenger accident.

STRENGTHS                                           WEAKNESSES
   • It was the most important and competitive        • Usually, development and implementation
     organization in the space transportation           of projects at NASA took much more time
     business from among the Russian and                and resources than originally thought.
     European ones.                                   • Special projects and planned launches,
   • NASA had many projects and special                 before the Challenger accident, were
     programs which were going bring                    postponed many times.
     important information to the earth such as       • NASA is a very large and complex
     information about Halley’s Comet.                  structure which made communication
   • It was (and still is) composed of the most         difficult between departments and
     brilliant minds in North America not only          management.
     in the engineering and scientific fields but     • There were many people involved from
     also in the administrative and project             external organizations and companies.
     management areas too.                              NASA controls their actions through
                                                        written specifications and verification.

OPPORTUNITIES                                       THREATS
   • Better planning and more realistic
     deadlines were needed.
                                                       •   They were being threatened by the growth
   • NASA needed a better system of
                                                           of European and Russian space agencies.
     communication where every participant in
                                                           All the improvements NASA had done
     a process was aware of what the other was
                                                           before were being reached by other
     doing.
                                                           agencies in the world.
   • Data transparency is made available for
                                                       •   Budget could be cut if more delays were
     everyone in the organization.
                                                           presented and metrics not met.
   • A worst scenario and contingency plan
                                                       •   Political scenario resulted in pressuring
     with well thought out implications.
                                                           senior management and staff to sign off.
   • Final revision approval before launches
     and information systems that clearly
     identify if something deviates from the
     plan..
3


THE NATURE OF NASA’S COMMUNICATION CHALLENGE

Lack of communication during the development and launch planning for the shuttle Challenger
was the main reason of its explosion. An O-ring in the solid rocket booster was the technical
reason why the tragedy happens. Morton Thiokol was the company contracted for doing the solid
rocket booster which contained the O-ring. The launched had been postponed two times before
January 1986. The Morton Thiokol Company had the opportunity of informing NASA that there
was a problem and assumption of responsibility for the previous delays.

The first time, the delay was because bad weather was forecast for the launch day. The Vice
President was going to be present in Florida for the big event. He was the person in charge of
communicating to the White House all the important information about this launch. For this
reason NASA did not want to risk the Vice President having to needlessly travel. That is why
they regretted the delay as it became clear that the forecast of bad weather had been erroneous.
Before this, in 1977 Thiokol found some problems on the design of the solid rocket booster.
They informed NASA and started a redesign. The problem was attacked but in 1981 they found
other problem with the O-ring. It had eroded during a flight. They examined and did testing but
they did not inform NASA. In January 1985, they tested the solid rocket boost under very cold
temperatures. Since there still was a problem with the O-ring, Thiokol ordered different materials
but the fixes had not arrived by the time of the explosion. They did not communicate this to
NASA.

The second time, there was a technical problem in the locking mechanism, but also very cold
winds arrived to Florida and this forced NASA to ask its suppliers about the impact of
specifications on their provided components exposed to cold weather. This time Morton Thiokol,
which was the contracted company producing the solid rocket booster, explained to NASA in
1985 that there was a problem with this component and it needed to be redesigned. Doing the
redesign would take a lot of time and since the launch had been postponed twice already, there
was not more time in the budget for NASA to require more redesigns.

There were more reasons why another delay could not be possible. The Challenger needed to be
launched as soon as possible because the area of take off was going to be used to send other
mission which was going to United States wanted to do it first and NASA had to follow that
mandate because its budget was at risk.

Finally, the day of the launch arrived. The night before was very cold and temperatures
continued dropping. Morton-Thiokol engineers were worried because they know the O-rings
were going to fail under those weather conditions. They planned a conference call meeting to let
NASA know that they recommended postponing the mission because of a problem with the O-
rings. Another delay was unacceptable to NASA management and here is where the
communication problems first occur. The message was not effectively transmitted from Thiokol
4


to NASA and there were dire consequences; seven astronauts, a school teacher with her class
watching, all died and a whole nation was in shock.

THE CURRENT COMMUNICATION CHALLENGE AT NASA

       In retrospect, taking into account all the variables, we have to do analyze very carefully
the causes and consequences of the decisions made. In this tragedy we identified three main
communication issues that lead the Challenger explosion.


   •   Lack of organizational communication


       There were two companies involved in this situation, NASA and Morton-Thiokol. In the
Morton-Thiokol Company we found several communication issues. Robert Ebeling and Roger
Boisjoly were the engineers involved in the design and development of the solid rocket booster.
Alan McDonald was their boss; he was the director of the project. In 1977 was the first time this
company detected a problem, they did the right thing. Robert and Roger informed the
management at Morton-Thiokol and they did a redesign. So far so good, but the problem came
when in 1981 and later in 1985, this company did not inform NASA about the problems they
were having with the O-rings. Here we see a lack of communication between organizations.
These kinds of problems happen frequently when suppliers do not want to lose profit. Companies
hide information that they consider very important but the truth is that any concealment of
information becomes all the more critical as evidenced; it can lead to fatal consequences. In any
human relation, communication is basic and in this case a commercial communication was very
important since the company failed and lives were lost. Also, in the company the lack of
communication occurred when the project director did not inform management immediately after
he knew something was wrong.


   •   Lack of understanding between management and engineers.


The day before the launch, when the temperature was not dropping down, engineers from
Morton-Thiokol were very worried because they knew the O-rings failed when tested in cold
wheatear. They arranged a teleconference with NASA management to tell them it was not safe to
launch the Challenger under those conditions. Engineers needed to inform management the
causes and consequences of the launch under the cold weather. The information engineers
presented was deemed non-conclusive for the managers from both sides, NASA and Morton-
Thiokol. In some companies people in management are not aware of how things work
technically that is why engineers need to develop a creative and understandable way to present
information they are involved with. The main problem here is that those engineers did not
explain clearly the effects so management thought it was not a big deal and they by passed it.
5


   •   Lack of use of good persuasion techniques by people who knew the risks.


A persuasive presentation can be an effective workplace communication tool. No more than one
very good written persuasive letter would be enough to convince management to delay the
launch. The main problem here was that even when the engineers knew exactly what they were
talking about, their method of saying it was not the most appropriate. They were facing very
important people who had a big weight on their backs. But these type of people are the kind we
always have toface at work. We have to report our work to someone and if there is something
wrong with anything we have to report it too. The engineers were not very persuasive and the
consequences went very bad.

THE PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE CHALLENGE

        There were various components at fault for the failure of the launch and mission of the
shuttle Challenger. However, the most consequential factor was failure of proper communication
within the various levels in NASA management and the direct outside resources used for this
mission. The question that remains is: What could have been done differently to prevent such a
historical catastrophe? The solution is a higher level of accountability for the communication
practices used at each level of operations leading to safer and successful shuttle launches for
future generations.

        First of all, NASA should set rigorous standards for justifying actions and decisions made
at every department and appropriate level of operations participating in the mission. For
example, it is crucial every employee undergo thorough training in order to be able to understand
the jargon used for effective communication with engineers. Attendance to any training should
be mandatory. Meetings should be conducted frequently. A representative from every
department and managerial level of operations must be present and work as a team. This gives
those participating the opportunity to bring their ideas, proposals, troubleshooting issues
regarding technical and mechanical aspects, as well as resolutions. This will not only assist in
getting to know and understand the different aspects of each other jobs, but also strengthen the
communication between them.

        Secondly, before any decisions and actions were taken, there should have been
conclusive discussions regarding the matters of concern. Again, having representatives from all
those involved in the operation present. This could have enabled them to input their perspective
and proposals. For accountability purposes, these resolutions should have been in writing and
signed for approval in accordance to the hierarchy within NASA and those outside parties
connected with the assignment. Had these recommendations taken place, someone may have
uncovered the problem regarding the O-rings and other factors thus preventing the aggressive
launch schedule of the shuttle Challenger on January 26, 1986.
6


CONCLUSION

        The simplified mission statement for the space program is to explore space while
maintaining standards of safety for the astronauts. There are no guarantees in life; NASA has
had its share of growing pains both intentional and unintentional but this disaster was avoidable.
As it became clear, the participants made a judgment call which flew in the face of conventional
wisdom. It appeared that the reasoning of profit overtook the protective directive of discovery.

         There were several causes attributable to this disaster but none more glaring than the
miscommunication between qualified engineers on the ground and management trying to
appease the funding arm of the government; all this tempered by the profit-motivation of the
lowest bidder for the O ring fabrication: Morton-Thiokol. Moreover, there was either deliberate
or ignorant interpretation of the specifications for the O-rings. The testing administered was not
verified as meeting specification at the source: NASA. This is a major oversight of a key piece of
equipment in which failure was known to be catastrophic.

         The families of those brave souls lost in 1986 on Challenger shall never forget nor shall
the children who sat in their classroom waiting to see and speak with their teacher in space only
to witness the major malfunction as their beloved teacher died in the explosion. This avoidable
accident caused by miscommunication is a hard earned lesson and will undoubtedly save the
lives of many astronauts in the future. There can be many causes of miscommunication and
whether deliberate or unintentional, its lasting effect remains. These communication lessons are
hard won and hard taught. For posterity, let’s try to remember them lest they repeat themselves.
7


Works Cited

Hall, J. (2003). Columbia and Challenger: organizational failure at NASA. Space Policy, 19(4)
239-48.

(1986). Pressure May Have Influenced Decision to Launch. Science, 231(4745), 1495-49.

(2011). NASA history. Congressional Digest, 90(7), 196-224.

(2012). NASA Fellowship in the History of Space Technology. Technology & Culture, 53(1),
146-160.

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Engl3355 case analysis group 6

  • 1. The Communication Challenges At NASA on and before January 28, 1986 Leading to the Destruction of the Space Shuttle: Challenger Prepared for Dr. Margaret Smith University of Texas at El Paso Prepared by Gabriel Ortiz Rebeca Sanchez Stephen Simon Group 6 ENGL3355 July 3, 2012
  • 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report analyzes the deficiencies in communication at NASA which led to the destruction of the Space Shuttle Challenger on January 28, 1986 and what could have been done differently to prevent the destruction of the shuttle and the deaths of the seven astronauts. Launch Delays Resulted in Undue Pressure on Management Inclement weather continually created delays in the launch schedule for the fleet of shuttles and as a result, created frustration on the part of the Vice President who functioned as the key spokesperson for the space program and NASA needed his goodwill. The launch delays resulted in unnecessary travel to and from the launch site for the Vice President. Further, there was considerable political pressure to prove the shuttle fleet could fly dependably on a very ambitious schedule to prove the cost effectiveness of the Space Transportation System and its potential for commercialization. When a weather front stalled in Florida, creating a launch window, the launch for Challenger was once again a go. The weather forecast was calling for freezing temperatures at the launch pad which was a red flag for the engineers at Morton-Thiokol, the contractor responsible for the solid rocket boosters which failed and resulted in the loss of the shuttle and its occupants. Engineering Design Flaws Discovered NASA management wanted to have all the contractors associated with the shuttle program to sign off on the launch. All effected contractors were contacted to determine if there were any problems with launching in cold weather. The director of the Solid Rocket Motor Project at Morton-Thiokol, Alan McDonald, knew there were cold weather problems with the motors and consulted with two other project engineers, Robert Ebeling and Roger Boisjoly. They had known of cold weather issues with the boosters since 1977. They became absolutely aware of the cold weather flaw during the November 1981 launch; the second shuttle launch. At that time they initiated a redesign effort and in 1985 they became painfully aware that they were not supported by their management in the redesign effort. Despite management resistance, the results of the November 1981 launch were undeniable and new steel billets were ordered. Unfortunately, the new booster billets were not yet ready to be deployed by January 28, 1986. Management Pressured to Launch Despite “No Launch” Recommendation Well before the launch, Alan McDonald asked his engineers to prepare a presentation on the effects of cold weather on booster performance. A teleconference was scheduled the evening before the rescheduled launch. The attendees were engineers and management from Kennedy Space Center, Marshall Flight Center in Alabama, and Morton-Thiokol in Utah. At the conclusion of the presentation, Thoikol’s Engineering Vice President concluded that the launch
  • 3. should be delayed and made that recommendation. Marshall’s Solid Rocket Booster Project Manager, Larry Mulloy, comments that the data is inconclusive and challenged the engineer’s logic at Thiokol. A heated debate ensued resulting in Mulloy bypassing Lund and requesting a decision by Joe Kilminster, a middle manager who had authority to override the engineers. Kilminster stood by the engineer’s recommendation to delay launch. A senior manager at Morton-Thiokol, Jerald Mason, states that a management decision is required. The teleconference is suspended while Thiokol reviews its data and Kilminster consults his engineers. During this period, Mason pressures Kilminster who then caves and when the teleconference resumes, changes his position on the launch. His recommendation to launch is not signed off on by his engineers who reject the premise that the data is inconclusive. Alan McDonald, who was present in Florida during the teleconference, is surprised by this reversal and appeals to NASA management not to launch. NASA managers decide to approve the boosters for launch. The Communication Challenges at NASA on and before January 28, 1986 Leading to the Destruction of the Space Shuttle: Challenger INTRODUCTION NASA is the agency of the United States government that is responsible for the space program which is a civilian space program and aerospace research. Its mission statement is has been to pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery and around aeronautical research. NASA was established by the National Aeronautics and Space Act on July 29, 1958 and became operational October 1, 1958. NASA has led the US space exploration efforts including the Apollo missions, Sky Lab and later the space shuttle. Currently it supports the International Space Station and presently overseas the Orion Multipurpose Crew Vehicle. NASA is also responsible for the Launch Services Program which provides oversight of launch operations and countdown management for unmanned NASA launches. NASA shares its status with various international organizations presently. NASA activities can be independent carrying scientific equipment or supportive testing equipment. There have been several space flight programs the first of which was the X-15 Rocket plane from 1950 to 1968. Later it hosted Project Mercury from 1959-1963 and finally Project Gemini from 1960 to 1966. This shuttle program began in 1972 and was planned as a frequently launch able and reusable vehicle. Its major components were a Space Plane orbiter with external fuel tanks and 2 solid reusable rockets. During this history the shuttle fleet lost 2 orbiters in 14 astronauts in 2 separate disasters: Challenger in 1986 in Columbia in 2003. Overall NASA space shuttle program had 135 missions in the program and on July 21, 2011 and spanned 30 years with over 300 astronauts sent into space. The purpose of this report is to analyze the communications challenges at NASA which led to the destruction of Challenger and the lives lost in the event. Several academic sources as well as
  • 4. 2 NASA documents were used to compile the report and highlight the key communication deficiencies. This is an informational Case Analysis highlighting communications failures which lead to the death of astronauts and destruction of property due to managerial and financial pressures of government contractors who are the lowest bidders on our governmental projects. SWOT Analysis Communication Challenges at NASA on and before January 28, 1986 Leading to the Destruction of the Space Shuttle: Challenger NASA is a very important and influential agency because of the great contributions it has given to scientific and technological development. This is a very complex organization which is divided into different groups which are focused on different areas. The scope of this analysis will focus on the Challenger accident. STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES • It was the most important and competitive • Usually, development and implementation organization in the space transportation of projects at NASA took much more time business from among the Russian and and resources than originally thought. European ones. • Special projects and planned launches, • NASA had many projects and special before the Challenger accident, were programs which were going bring postponed many times. important information to the earth such as • NASA is a very large and complex information about Halley’s Comet. structure which made communication • It was (and still is) composed of the most difficult between departments and brilliant minds in North America not only management. in the engineering and scientific fields but • There were many people involved from also in the administrative and project external organizations and companies. management areas too. NASA controls their actions through written specifications and verification. OPPORTUNITIES THREATS • Better planning and more realistic deadlines were needed. • They were being threatened by the growth • NASA needed a better system of of European and Russian space agencies. communication where every participant in All the improvements NASA had done a process was aware of what the other was before were being reached by other doing. agencies in the world. • Data transparency is made available for • Budget could be cut if more delays were everyone in the organization. presented and metrics not met. • A worst scenario and contingency plan • Political scenario resulted in pressuring with well thought out implications. senior management and staff to sign off. • Final revision approval before launches and information systems that clearly identify if something deviates from the plan..
  • 5. 3 THE NATURE OF NASA’S COMMUNICATION CHALLENGE Lack of communication during the development and launch planning for the shuttle Challenger was the main reason of its explosion. An O-ring in the solid rocket booster was the technical reason why the tragedy happens. Morton Thiokol was the company contracted for doing the solid rocket booster which contained the O-ring. The launched had been postponed two times before January 1986. The Morton Thiokol Company had the opportunity of informing NASA that there was a problem and assumption of responsibility for the previous delays. The first time, the delay was because bad weather was forecast for the launch day. The Vice President was going to be present in Florida for the big event. He was the person in charge of communicating to the White House all the important information about this launch. For this reason NASA did not want to risk the Vice President having to needlessly travel. That is why they regretted the delay as it became clear that the forecast of bad weather had been erroneous. Before this, in 1977 Thiokol found some problems on the design of the solid rocket booster. They informed NASA and started a redesign. The problem was attacked but in 1981 they found other problem with the O-ring. It had eroded during a flight. They examined and did testing but they did not inform NASA. In January 1985, they tested the solid rocket boost under very cold temperatures. Since there still was a problem with the O-ring, Thiokol ordered different materials but the fixes had not arrived by the time of the explosion. They did not communicate this to NASA. The second time, there was a technical problem in the locking mechanism, but also very cold winds arrived to Florida and this forced NASA to ask its suppliers about the impact of specifications on their provided components exposed to cold weather. This time Morton Thiokol, which was the contracted company producing the solid rocket booster, explained to NASA in 1985 that there was a problem with this component and it needed to be redesigned. Doing the redesign would take a lot of time and since the launch had been postponed twice already, there was not more time in the budget for NASA to require more redesigns. There were more reasons why another delay could not be possible. The Challenger needed to be launched as soon as possible because the area of take off was going to be used to send other mission which was going to United States wanted to do it first and NASA had to follow that mandate because its budget was at risk. Finally, the day of the launch arrived. The night before was very cold and temperatures continued dropping. Morton-Thiokol engineers were worried because they know the O-rings were going to fail under those weather conditions. They planned a conference call meeting to let NASA know that they recommended postponing the mission because of a problem with the O- rings. Another delay was unacceptable to NASA management and here is where the communication problems first occur. The message was not effectively transmitted from Thiokol
  • 6. 4 to NASA and there were dire consequences; seven astronauts, a school teacher with her class watching, all died and a whole nation was in shock. THE CURRENT COMMUNICATION CHALLENGE AT NASA In retrospect, taking into account all the variables, we have to do analyze very carefully the causes and consequences of the decisions made. In this tragedy we identified three main communication issues that lead the Challenger explosion. • Lack of organizational communication There were two companies involved in this situation, NASA and Morton-Thiokol. In the Morton-Thiokol Company we found several communication issues. Robert Ebeling and Roger Boisjoly were the engineers involved in the design and development of the solid rocket booster. Alan McDonald was their boss; he was the director of the project. In 1977 was the first time this company detected a problem, they did the right thing. Robert and Roger informed the management at Morton-Thiokol and they did a redesign. So far so good, but the problem came when in 1981 and later in 1985, this company did not inform NASA about the problems they were having with the O-rings. Here we see a lack of communication between organizations. These kinds of problems happen frequently when suppliers do not want to lose profit. Companies hide information that they consider very important but the truth is that any concealment of information becomes all the more critical as evidenced; it can lead to fatal consequences. In any human relation, communication is basic and in this case a commercial communication was very important since the company failed and lives were lost. Also, in the company the lack of communication occurred when the project director did not inform management immediately after he knew something was wrong. • Lack of understanding between management and engineers. The day before the launch, when the temperature was not dropping down, engineers from Morton-Thiokol were very worried because they knew the O-rings failed when tested in cold wheatear. They arranged a teleconference with NASA management to tell them it was not safe to launch the Challenger under those conditions. Engineers needed to inform management the causes and consequences of the launch under the cold weather. The information engineers presented was deemed non-conclusive for the managers from both sides, NASA and Morton- Thiokol. In some companies people in management are not aware of how things work technically that is why engineers need to develop a creative and understandable way to present information they are involved with. The main problem here is that those engineers did not explain clearly the effects so management thought it was not a big deal and they by passed it.
  • 7. 5 • Lack of use of good persuasion techniques by people who knew the risks. A persuasive presentation can be an effective workplace communication tool. No more than one very good written persuasive letter would be enough to convince management to delay the launch. The main problem here was that even when the engineers knew exactly what they were talking about, their method of saying it was not the most appropriate. They were facing very important people who had a big weight on their backs. But these type of people are the kind we always have toface at work. We have to report our work to someone and if there is something wrong with anything we have to report it too. The engineers were not very persuasive and the consequences went very bad. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE CHALLENGE There were various components at fault for the failure of the launch and mission of the shuttle Challenger. However, the most consequential factor was failure of proper communication within the various levels in NASA management and the direct outside resources used for this mission. The question that remains is: What could have been done differently to prevent such a historical catastrophe? The solution is a higher level of accountability for the communication practices used at each level of operations leading to safer and successful shuttle launches for future generations. First of all, NASA should set rigorous standards for justifying actions and decisions made at every department and appropriate level of operations participating in the mission. For example, it is crucial every employee undergo thorough training in order to be able to understand the jargon used for effective communication with engineers. Attendance to any training should be mandatory. Meetings should be conducted frequently. A representative from every department and managerial level of operations must be present and work as a team. This gives those participating the opportunity to bring their ideas, proposals, troubleshooting issues regarding technical and mechanical aspects, as well as resolutions. This will not only assist in getting to know and understand the different aspects of each other jobs, but also strengthen the communication between them. Secondly, before any decisions and actions were taken, there should have been conclusive discussions regarding the matters of concern. Again, having representatives from all those involved in the operation present. This could have enabled them to input their perspective and proposals. For accountability purposes, these resolutions should have been in writing and signed for approval in accordance to the hierarchy within NASA and those outside parties connected with the assignment. Had these recommendations taken place, someone may have uncovered the problem regarding the O-rings and other factors thus preventing the aggressive launch schedule of the shuttle Challenger on January 26, 1986.
  • 8. 6 CONCLUSION The simplified mission statement for the space program is to explore space while maintaining standards of safety for the astronauts. There are no guarantees in life; NASA has had its share of growing pains both intentional and unintentional but this disaster was avoidable. As it became clear, the participants made a judgment call which flew in the face of conventional wisdom. It appeared that the reasoning of profit overtook the protective directive of discovery. There were several causes attributable to this disaster but none more glaring than the miscommunication between qualified engineers on the ground and management trying to appease the funding arm of the government; all this tempered by the profit-motivation of the lowest bidder for the O ring fabrication: Morton-Thiokol. Moreover, there was either deliberate or ignorant interpretation of the specifications for the O-rings. The testing administered was not verified as meeting specification at the source: NASA. This is a major oversight of a key piece of equipment in which failure was known to be catastrophic. The families of those brave souls lost in 1986 on Challenger shall never forget nor shall the children who sat in their classroom waiting to see and speak with their teacher in space only to witness the major malfunction as their beloved teacher died in the explosion. This avoidable accident caused by miscommunication is a hard earned lesson and will undoubtedly save the lives of many astronauts in the future. There can be many causes of miscommunication and whether deliberate or unintentional, its lasting effect remains. These communication lessons are hard won and hard taught. For posterity, let’s try to remember them lest they repeat themselves.
  • 9. 7 Works Cited Hall, J. (2003). Columbia and Challenger: organizational failure at NASA. Space Policy, 19(4) 239-48. (1986). Pressure May Have Influenced Decision to Launch. Science, 231(4745), 1495-49. (2011). NASA history. Congressional Digest, 90(7), 196-224. (2012). NASA Fellowship in the History of Space Technology. Technology & Culture, 53(1), 146-160.