1. HOW CO‐DECISION IS
AFFECTING THE
OUTCOME OF THE CAP
NEGOTIATIONS
Alan Matthews
Trinity College Dublin
alan.matthews@tcd.ie
Presentation to the AIEAA, 2nd Annual
Conference June 6‐7 2013, Parma

2. Introduction
 Political negotiations on the CAP reform
between Council, Parliament and Commission
continue at the time of this presentation
 Thus, how co-decision has affected CAP
outcome cannot yet be answered
 Instead, this presentation highlights a number
of relevant issues for future research

3. Literature
 Both theoretical and descriptive literature on
how institutional rules influence EU
agricultural policy making
 Runge and von Witzke (1987), Pokrivcak, de
Gorter and Swinnen (2001), Pokrivcak,
Crombez and Swinnen (2006), Pokrivcak,
Crombez and Swinnen (2008), Crombez and
Swinnen (2011)
 Blumann (2008), Geuguen and Marissen
(2012)
 Arovuori and Niemi (2009), Greer and Hind
(2012), Swinnen and Knops (2012)

4. Co-decision (‘Ordinary legislative
procedure’)
 Parliament gained co-decision powers over many
policy domains (not CAP) in Maastricht Treaty 1993
 Co-decision introduced into the CAP by the Lisbon
Treaty in December 2009
 Except Art 43(3) – fixing prices, levies, aid and
quantitative limitations
 Formal process includes first reading, second
reading, conciliation
 Then delegated and implementing acts, implementation
by member states
 Strong preference for first reading agreement
(possibility introduced by Amsterdam Treaty in
1999) highlights the importance of the trilogue
process
 What are implications for CAP reform of EP

5. What are implications of EP involvement?
 How much influence? (potentially measured by
number of EP amendments incorporated into final
legislation)
 What kind of influence? (has EP supported or
constrained CAP reform?)
 Who determines EP influence? (within the EP,
what is role of parties, committees, Presidency,
national interests of individual MEPs?)
 The struggle for influence (potential for contested
‘constitutional’ issues with the Council to influence
the CAP reform outcome, both substance and
timing)
 Implications for Commission’s influence (has co-
decision weakened role of Commission as ‘agenda
setter’? (Greer and Hind, 2012; Crombez and

6. What can we expect from co-decision?
 Political science literature
 Surveys experience across multiple dossiers
 Literature finds that co-decision increased
Parliament’s powers vis a vis the Council
 No previous studies have examined EP’s role in the
CAP (Greer and Hind, 2012)
 Spatial models of decision-making (Crombez
and Swinnen, 2011)
 explain policy outcomes as a function of legislative
procedures, the preferences of the political actors and
the location of the status quo
 Are not predictive models without knowing EP
preferences

7. Preference for first reading agreement
highlights importance of trilogue process
Trilogue
Political
agreement
EP
mandate
Council
general
position
Resort to conciliation committees
has decreased from 39% in 1993-
1999 to only 4% in 2009- 2011
while first readings have increased
from 28% in 1999-2004 to 78% inCo-decision process
First reading procedure

8. Further implications of trilogues
 Early trilogues avoid the ‘race against the clock’ which
starts ticking once first reading is completed
 Greater flexibility in appointing members to trilogues
 Refers especially to EP where sometimes political group
leaders become involved in addition to committee
rapporteurs and chairs
 Unlike conciliation where the committee can only
discuss amendments previously made by either the
EP or the Council, trilogues allow committee
members to introduce completely new
amendments to proposals and then to offer the
compromise text for a single vote in each chamber
 Members of trilogue negotiations have
considerable flexibility in determining the
outcome of legislation which is then voted on up-
down basis by the two bodies

9. Implications of changes in formal
procedures
 Consultation procedure (EP opinion)
 Commission proposes policy. MS can propose amendments.
Amendments need unanimity for adoption. Council votes on
(amended) proposal by QVM.
 Co-decision procedure
 Commission proposes policy. EP can propose amendments
(1st reading). Commission can decide to include in its
proposal. Council decides on (amended) proposal with QMV,
unanimity required for amendments (1st reading)
 2nd reading – similar to 1st
 Conciliation committee – Council and EP can jointly amend
Commission’s proposal in a ‘joint text’
 Commission loses much of its formal influence,
especially in CC
 Trilogue process introduces conciliation prior to 1st
reading

10. Parallelism with MFF negotiations
 CAP reform and CAP budget are being decided
simultaneously
 Lisbon Treaty gave EP enhanced powers in MFF
negotiations, but not co-decision
 Two issues
 EP has linked timing of CAP agreement to MFF agreement
 this issue defused by the very limited cuts to CAP budget
in the European Council conclusions but could still delay
final ratification of CAP agreement
 MFF agreement extended to key parameters in the CAP
debate
 European Council MFF positions incorporated into
Agricultural Council general position – what role for co-
decision for these paragraphs?
 Next slide shows the overlap between MFF and CAP
negotiations

11. CAP issues in European Council agreement
(adopted into Ag Council general position)
 Overall level of commitment appropriations for Heading 2, including
specific ceilings for direct payments
 Level and model for redistribution of direct support – details of
convergence across Member States
 The model for capping support to large farms - voluntary
 Method for financial discipline
 Allocation of 30% of Pillar 1 payments to greening
 Recommendation that EFAs will be implemented in ways that do not
take land out of production and that avoid unjustified income losses
to farmers
 Flexibility between pillars
 Principles for allocation of rural development support, including
‘sweets’
 Co-financing rates for rural development support
 Operation of the crisis reserve
 Introduces macro-economic conditionality in deciding on the release
of EAFRD rural development funds (as well as for the structural and
cohesion funds) as part of Common Strategic Framework regulation

12. The co-decision process to date
– lengthy, messy but working!
 EP Resolution on Lyon Report July 2010 to influence
Commission’s consultation paper in November 2010
 EP Resolution on Dess Report June 2011 responded to
Commission’s consultation paper
 Dess draft report heavily amended in COMAGRI
 COMAGRI report strongly backed by Parliament plenary
 COMAGRI rapporteurs’ reports responded to Commission’s
legislative proposals October 2011
 Over 7,000 amendments to Commission proposals reduced to
smaller number of consolidated amendments
 The Parliament’s mandate March 2013
 Largely backed COMAGRI amendments
 Confusion over greening amendments
 The Agricultural Council’s general position March 2013
 Evidence that Presidency incorporated EP’s text where there
was no substantive disagreement

13. The Parliament’s position on CAP
reform
(dimensions of market orientation, targeting, subsidiarity,
simplification)
Example Direct Payments regulation
Art Issue Pro Con
9 Active farmer – negative list approach x
18 Payment entitlements – allow SAPS to continue x
22 Flexibility in internal convergence x
28(a) Complementary payment for first hectares x
29 Flexibility wrt greening measures C
30 Crop diversification x? x?
31 Maintenance of permanent pasture x? x?
32 Ecological focus areas x
33 Mandatory payment to young farmers x
38-9 Voluntary coupled support x
C implies EP position agrees with Commission proposal, which in turn is placed in Pro or

14. ‘Constitutional’ issues
 Distribution of powers between Council and EP
post-Lisbon still to be clarified
 Article 43(3) exceptions on fixing prices, levies, aid and
quantitative limitations
 Choice between delegated and implementing acts
 Council and Parliament failed to reach agreement on
Commission 2010 proposals on alignment of CAP
regulations with Lisbon Treaty provisions
 EP favours greater use of delegated acts, Council
favours more use of implementing acts where MS
exercise influence through comitology
 Contested ‘constitutional’ issues may yet complicate
completion of CAP2020 negotiations

15. Co-decision and Commission’s role
 Commission’s power of initiative determined by:
 power to propose
 power to amend
 power to withdraw a proposal
 The CAP2020 experience
 Initial proposal based on most extensive consultation process yet
 Cautious initial proposal – result of Commissioner preferences or
realistic assessment of what might be possible to achieve?
 Commission has lost ability to control legislation
 EP proposal to introduce milk supply control measures
 Council proposal on approximation for internal convergence
 From ‘co-participant’ to ‘honest broker’
 Mandate must be renewed as negotiations proceed

16. Discussion
 Co-decision has given the EP greater influence
 Evidence of EP positions influencing the Council
legislative track
 Outcome of trilogue process will shift
Council/Commission positions on at least some
issues
 EP influence has largely pulled CAP2020 reform
in a backward direction
 The critical role played by COMAGRI
 Question mark over administrative and technical
resources
 Disagreements on constitutional issues could
provide unexpected last-minute sticking point for
EP agreement
 What happens if no political agreement in June?