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Ruby on Rails Security




Jonathan Weiss, 30.12.2007
Peritor Wissensmanagement GmbH
Who am I ?

Jonathan Weiss

• Consultant for Peritor Wissensmanagement GmbH
• Specialized in Rails, Scaling, and Code Review
• Active member of the Rails community
• MeinProf.de - one of the first big German Rails sites
• Webistrano - Rails deployment tool
• FreeBSD Rubygems and Ruby on Rails maintainer




                                                         2
Agenda



                              Follow the application stack
                              and look for
 Setup and deployment


                            • Information leaks
 Application code
                            • Possible vulnerabilities
                            • Best practices
 Framework code


  Rails Application Stack




                                                             3

                                                                 3
Rails Application Setup




                          4
Rails Setup




              5
Rails Setup - FastCGI




                        6
Rails Setup - Mongrel




                        7
Information leaks
          and
possible vulnerabilities




                           8
Information leaks

Is the target application a Rails application?
 • Default setup for static files:
     /javascripts/application.js
     /stylesheets/application.css
     /images/foo.png


 • Pretty URLs
     /project/show/12
     /message/create
     /folder/delete/43
     /users/83



                                                 9
Information leaks

Is the target application a Rails application?
 • Rails provides default templates for 404 and 500 status pages
 • Different Rails versions use different default pages
 • 422.html only present in applications generated with Rails 2.0




                                                                    10
Sample Status Pages
 http://www.twitter.com/500.html      http://www.43people.com/500.html




http://www.strongspace.com/500.html   Rails >= 1.2 status 500 page




                                                                         11
Server Header

GET http://www.43people.com

Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 21:23:24 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.34 (Unix) mod_deflate/1.0.21 mod_fastcgi/2.4.2 mod_ssl/2.8.25 OpenSSL/0.9.7e-p1
Cache-Control: no-cache
…



GET https://signup.37signals.com/highrise/solo/signup/new

Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 21:23:24 GMT
Server: Mongrel 1.1.1Status: 200 OK
…

                                                                       Disable Server header
                                                                          # httpd.conf
                                                                          Header unset Server




                                                                                                     12
Information leaks

Subversion metadata
  • Typically Rails applications are deployed with Capistrano / Webistrano
  • This will push .svn directories to the servers



GET http://www.strongspace.com/.svn/entries

…
dir
25376
http://svn.joyent.com/joyent/deprecated_repositories/www.strongspace/trunk/public
http://svn.joyent.com/joyent
                                                                            Prevent .svn download
2006-04-14T03:06:39.902218Z                                                     <DirectoryMatch quot;^/.*/.svn/quot;>
34                                                                               ErrorDocument 403 /404.html
                                                                                 Order allow,deny
justin@joyent.com
                                                                                 Deny from all
…
                                                                                 Satisfy All
                                                                                </DirectoryMatch>

                                                                                                                 13
Cookie Session Storage

Since Rails 2.0 by default the session data is stored in the cookie




Base64(CGI::escape(SESSION-DATA))--HMAC(secret_key, SESSION-DATA)




                                                                      14
Cookie Session Storage

Security implications
 • The user can view the session data in plain text
 • The HMAC can be brute-forced and arbitrary session data could be created
 • Replay attacks are easier as you cannot flush the client-side session



Countermeasures
 • Don’t store important data in the session!
 • Use a strong password,
   Rails already forces at least 30 characters
 • Invalidate sessions after certain time on the server side


 … or just switch to another session storage
                                                                              15
Cookie Session Storage

Rails default session secret




Set HTTPS only cookies




                               16
Cross-Site Scripting - XSS



“The injection of HTML or client-side Scripts (e.g. JavaScript) by malicious users into
web pages viewed by other users.”




                                                                                          17
Cross-Site Scripting - XSS


Cases of accepted user input
 • No formatting allowed
    search query, user name, post title, …


 • Formatting allowed
    post body, wiki page, …




                                             18
XSS - No Formatting Allowed

Use the Rails `h()` helper to HTML escape user input




But using `h()` everywhere is easy to forget
 • Use safeERB plugin
 • safeERB will raise an exception whenever a tainted string is not escaped
 • Explicitly untaint string in order to not escape it


 http://agilewebdevelopment.com/plugins/safe_erb


                                                                              19
XSS - Formatting Allowed

Two approaches


 Use custom tags that will translate to HTML (vBulletin tags, RedCloth, Textile, …)




 Use HTML and remove unwanted tags and attributes
    • Blacklist - Rails 1.2
    • Whitelist - Rails 2.0




                                                                                      20
XSS - Custom Tags

Relying on the external syntax is not really secure




              Filter HTML anyhow




                                                      21
XSS - HTML Filtering

Use the Rails `sanitize()` helper




Only effective with Rails 2.0:
  • Filters HTML nodes and attributes
  • Removes protocols like “javascript:”
  • Handles unicode/ascii/hex hacks



                                           22
XSS - HTML Filtering

sanitize(html, options = {})




http://api.rubyonrails.com/classes/ActionView/Helpers/SanitizeHelper.html

                                                                            23
XSS - HTML Filtering

Utilize Tidy if you want to be more cautious




                                               24
Session Fixation



Provide the user with a session that he shares with the attacker:




                                                                    25
Session Fixation

Rails uses only cookie-based sessions


Still, you should reset the session after a login




The popular authentication plugins like restful_authentication are not doing this!

                                                                                     26
Cross-Site Request Forgery - CSRF



You visit a malicious site which has an image like this




Only accepting POST does not really help




                                                          27
CSRF Protection in Rails



By default Rails 2.0 will check all POST requests for a session token




All forms generated by Rails will supply this token

                                                                        28
CSRF Protection in Rails


Very useful and on-by-default, but make sure that
 • GET requests are safe and idempotent
 • Session cookies are not persistent (expires-at)




                                                     29
SQL Injection


The users input is not correctly escaped before using it in SQL statements




                                                                             30
SQL Injection Protection in Rails


Always use the escaped form




If you have to manually use a user-submitted value, use `quote()`




                                                                    31
JavaScript Hijacking

http://my.evil.site/




 JSON response




The JSON response will be evaled by the Browser’s JavaScript engine.
With a redened `Array()` function this data can be sent back to http://my.evil.site
                                                                                       32
JavaScript Hijacking Prevention

 • Don’t put important data in JSON responses
 • Use unguessable URLs
 • Use a Browser that does not support the redefinition of Array & co,
   currently only FireFox 3.0
 • Don’t return a straight JSON response, prefix it with garbage:




The Rails JavaScript helpers don’t support prefixed JSON responses


                                                                        33
Mass Assignment

User model




                  34
Mass Assignment

Handling in Controller




A malicious user could just submit any value he wants




                                                        35
Mass Assignment

Use `attr_protected` and `attr_accessible`




                       Vs.




Start with `attr_protected` and migrate to `attr_accessible` because of the different
default policies for new attributes.



                                                                                        36
Rails Plugins

Re-using code through plugins is very popular in Rails


Plugins can have their problems too
 • Just because somebody wrote and published a plugin it doesn’t mean the plugin is
   proven to be mature, stable or secure
 • Popular plugins can also have security problems, e.g. restful_authentication
 • Don’t use svn:externals to track external plugins,
   if the plugin’s home page is unavailable you cannot deploy your site




                                                                                      37
Rails Plugins

How to handle plugins
 • Always do a code review of new plugins and look for obvious problems
 • Track plugin announcements
 • Track external sources with Piston, a wrapper around svn:externals




   http://piston.rubyforge.org/



                                                                          38
Rails Denial of Service Attacks

Rails is single-threaded and a typical setup concludes:
 • Limited number of Rails instances
     • ~8 per CPU
     • Even quite active sites (~500.000 PI/day ) use 10-20 CPUs


 • All traffic is handled by Rails




                                                                   39
Rails Denial of Service Attacks

A denial of service attack is very easy if Rails is handling down/uploads.
Just start X (= Rails instances count) simultaneous down/uploads over a throttled line.




This is valid for all slow requests, e.g.
  • Image processing
  • Report generation
  • Mass mailing




                                                                                          40
Rails Slow Request DoS Prevention

 Serve static les directly through the web server
    • Apache, Lighttpd, nginx (use x-sendfile for private files)
    • Amazon S3


 Contaminate slow requests
    • Define several clusters for several tasks
    • Redirect depending on URL




                                                                 41
Conclusion




             42
Conclusion


 Rails has many security features enabled by default
    • SQL quoting
    • HTML sanitization
    • CSRF protection


 The setup can be tricky to get right




 Rails is by no means a “web app security silver bullet” but adding security
  is easy and not a pain like in many other frameworks




                                                                               43
Peritor Wissensmanagement GmbH
Lenbachstraße 2
12157 Berlin
Telefon: +49 (0)30 69 40 11 94
Telefax: +49 (0)30 69 40 11 95
Internet: www.peritor.com
E-Mail: kontakt@peritor.com




                                                             44
Š勵Peritor Wissensmanagement GmbH - Alle Rechte vorbehalten
                                                                  44

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Ruby on Rails Security

  • 1. Ruby on Rails Security Jonathan Weiss, 30.12.2007 Peritor Wissensmanagement GmbH
  • 2. Who am I ? Jonathan Weiss • Consultant for Peritor Wissensmanagement GmbH • Specialized in Rails, Scaling, and Code Review • Active member of the Rails community • MeinProf.de - one of the rst big German Rails sites • Webistrano - Rails deployment tool • FreeBSD Rubygems and Ruby on Rails maintainer 2
  • 3. Agenda Follow the application stack and look for Setup and deployment • Information leaks Application code • Possible vulnerabilities • Best practices Framework code Rails Application Stack 3 3
  • 6. Rails Setup - FastCGI 6
  • 7. Rails Setup - Mongrel 7
  • 8. Information leaks and possible vulnerabilities 8
  • 9. Information leaks Is the target application a Rails application? • Default setup for static les: /javascripts/application.js /stylesheets/application.css /images/foo.png • Pretty URLs /project/show/12 /message/create /folder/delete/43 /users/83 9
  • 10. Information leaks Is the target application a Rails application? • Rails provides default templates for 404 and 500 status pages • Different Rails versions use different default pages • 422.html only present in applications generated with Rails 2.0 10
  • 11. Sample Status Pages http://www.twitter.com/500.html http://www.43people.com/500.html http://www.strongspace.com/500.html Rails >= 1.2 status 500 page 11
  • 12. Server Header GET http://www.43people.com Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 21:23:24 GMT Server: Apache/1.3.34 (Unix) mod_deflate/1.0.21 mod_fastcgi/2.4.2 mod_ssl/2.8.25 OpenSSL/0.9.7e-p1 Cache-Control: no-cache … GET https://signup.37signals.com/highrise/solo/signup/new Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 21:23:24 GMT Server: Mongrel 1.1.1Status: 200 OK … Disable Server header # httpd.conf Header unset Server 12
  • 13. Information leaks Subversion metadata • Typically Rails applications are deployed with Capistrano / Webistrano • This will push .svn directories to the servers GET http://www.strongspace.com/.svn/entries … dir 25376 http://svn.joyent.com/joyent/deprecated_repositories/www.strongspace/trunk/public http://svn.joyent.com/joyent Prevent .svn download 2006-04-14T03:06:39.902218Z <DirectoryMatch quot;^/.*/.svn/quot;> 34 ErrorDocument 403 /404.html Order allow,deny justin@joyent.com Deny from all … Satisfy All </DirectoryMatch> 13
  • 14. Cookie Session Storage Since Rails 2.0 by default the session data is stored in the cookie Base64(CGI::escape(SESSION-DATA))--HMAC(secret_key, SESSION-DATA) 14
  • 15. Cookie Session Storage Security implications • The user can view the session data in plain text • The HMAC can be brute-forced and arbitrary session data could be created • Replay attacks are easier as you cannot flush the client-side session Countermeasures • Don’t store important data in the session! • Use a strong password, Rails already forces at least 30 characters • Invalidate sessions after certain time on the server side … or just switch to another session storage 15
  • 16. Cookie Session Storage Rails default session secret Set HTTPS only cookies 16
  • 17. Cross-Site Scripting - XSS “The injection of HTML or client-side Scripts (e.g. JavaScript) by malicious users into web pages viewed by other users.” 17
  • 18. Cross-Site Scripting - XSS Cases of accepted user input • No formatting allowed search query, user name, post title, … • Formatting allowed post body, wiki page, … 18
  • 19. XSS - No Formatting Allowed Use the Rails `h()` helper to HTML escape user input But using `h()` everywhere is easy to forget • Use safeERB plugin • safeERB will raise an exception whenever a tainted string is not escaped • Explicitly untaint string in order to not escape it http://agilewebdevelopment.com/plugins/safe_erb 19
  • 20. XSS - Formatting Allowed Two approaches Use custom tags that will translate to HTML (vBulletin tags, RedCloth, Textile, …) Use HTML and remove unwanted tags and attributes • Blacklist - Rails 1.2 • Whitelist - Rails 2.0 20
  • 21. XSS - Custom Tags Relying on the external syntax is not really secure Filter HTML anyhow 21
  • 22. XSS - HTML Filtering Use the Rails `sanitize()` helper Only effective with Rails 2.0: • Filters HTML nodes and attributes • Removes protocols like “javascript:” • Handles unicode/ascii/hex hacks 22
  • 23. XSS - HTML Filtering sanitize(html, options = {}) http://api.rubyonrails.com/classes/ActionView/Helpers/SanitizeHelper.html 23
  • 24. XSS - HTML Filtering Utilize Tidy if you want to be more cautious 24
  • 25. Session Fixation Provide the user with a session that he shares with the attacker: 25
  • 26. Session Fixation Rails uses only cookie-based sessions Still, you should reset the session after a login The popular authentication plugins like restful_authentication are not doing this! 26
  • 27. Cross-Site Request Forgery - CSRF You visit a malicious site which has an image like this Only accepting POST does not really help 27
  • 28. CSRF Protection in Rails By default Rails 2.0 will check all POST requests for a session token All forms generated by Rails will supply this token 28
  • 29. CSRF Protection in Rails Very useful and on-by-default, but make sure that • GET requests are safe and idempotent • Session cookies are not persistent (expires-at) 29
  • 30. SQL Injection The users input is not correctly escaped before using it in SQL statements 30
  • 31. SQL Injection Protection in Rails Always use the escaped form If you have to manually use a user-submitted value, use `quote()` 31
  • 32. JavaScript Hijacking http://my.evil.site/ JSON response The JSON response will be evaled by the Browser’s JavaScript engine. With a redened `Array()` function this data can be sent back to http://my.evil.site 32
  • 33. JavaScript Hijacking Prevention • Don’t put important data in JSON responses • Use unguessable URLs • Use a Browser that does not support the redenition of Array & co, currently only FireFox 3.0 • Don’t return a straight JSON response, prex it with garbage: The Rails JavaScript helpers don’t support prexed JSON responses 33
  • 35. Mass Assignment Handling in Controller A malicious user could just submit any value he wants 35
  • 36. Mass Assignment Use `attr_protected` and `attr_accessible` Vs. Start with `attr_protected` and migrate to `attr_accessible` because of the different default policies for new attributes. 36
  • 37. Rails Plugins Re-using code through plugins is very popular in Rails Plugins can have their problems too • Just because somebody wrote and published a plugin it doesn’t mean the plugin is proven to be mature, stable or secure • Popular plugins can also have security problems, e.g. restful_authentication • Don’t use svn:externals to track external plugins, if the plugin’s home page is unavailable you cannot deploy your site 37
  • 38. Rails Plugins How to handle plugins • Always do a code review of new plugins and look for obvious problems • Track plugin announcements • Track external sources with Piston, a wrapper around svn:externals http://piston.rubyforge.org/ 38
  • 39. Rails Denial of Service Attacks Rails is single-threaded and a typical setup concludes: • Limited number of Rails instances • ~8 per CPU • Even quite active sites (~500.000 PI/day ) use 10-20 CPUs • All trafc is handled by Rails 39
  • 40. Rails Denial of Service Attacks A denial of service attack is very easy if Rails is handling down/uploads. Just start X (= Rails instances count) simultaneous down/uploads over a throttled line. This is valid for all slow requests, e.g. • Image processing • Report generation • Mass mailing 40
  • 41. Rails Slow Request DoS Prevention Serve static les directly through the web server • Apache, Lighttpd, nginx (use x-sendle for private les) • Amazon S3 Contaminate slow requests • Dene several clusters for several tasks • Redirect depending on URL 41
  • 43. Conclusion Rails has many security features enabled by default • SQL quoting • HTML sanitization • CSRF protection The setup can be tricky to get right Rails is by no means a “web app security silver bullet” but adding security is easy and not a pain like in many other frameworks 43
  • 44. Peritor Wissensmanagement GmbH Lenbachstraße 2 12157 Berlin Telefon: +49 (0)30 69 40 11 94 Telefax: +49 (0)30 69 40 11 95 Internet: www.peritor.com E-Mail: kontakt@peritor.com 44 Š勵Peritor Wissensmanagement GmbH - Alle Rechte vorbehalten 44