11/06/13 REBUTTAL MOTION TO 102313 RULING (MMS).

CHIEF District Judge
Louis Guirola, Jr.

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE
OCTOBER 23, 2013 FINAL
JUDGMENT; MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY JUDGE LOUIS
GUIROLA, JR. and
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
(Mitchell McNutt & Sams Matter)

L.F. “Sandy” Sams

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT – JACKSON DIVISION
VOGEL NEWSOME

PLAINTIFF

V.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-cv-704-HTW-FKB

MITCHELL MCNUTT & SAMS, P.A., ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE OCTOBER 23, 2013 FINAL JUDGMENT;
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE LOUIS GUIROLA, JR. and
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL1

COMES NOW Plaintiff Vogel Newsome (―Newsome‖ and/or ―Plaintiff‖) WITHOUT waiving her
request(s) to be advised of CONFLICTS-OF-INTEREST that appears may exist which requires RECUSAL of Chief
Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. and WITHOUT waiving claims/defenses set forth in Newsome‘s Complaint and subsequent
pleadings which include ―Motions to Strike/Memorandum Briefs” and her ―Motion to Show Proof of Legal
Authority/Motion Challenging Authority to Appear (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action)” (―MTSP/MCHA‖)
pursuant to 28 USC § 1654 and other statutes/laws governing matters regarding ―Appearance:‖
28 USC §1654: Appearance Personally or By Counsel - In all courts of the United
States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as,
by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein.

and files this her MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE OCTOBER 23, 2013 FINAL JUDGMENT; MOTION TO

DISQUALIFY JUDGE LOUIS GUIROLA, JR. and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL (―MFRF 10/23/13 MO&O‖)
in the preservation of her rights and pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (―FRCP‖) Rule 60:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure – Rule 60: Relief from Judgment or Order
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding.
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . .
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void; . . .
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

1

NOTE: Boldface, italics, caps, small caps and underline, etc. represents ―emphasis‖ added.
Page 1 of 37

See EXHIBIT ―1‖ – Rule 60 of the FRCP attached hereto and incorporated by reference
as if set forth in full herein.

Newsome further asserts PROTECTED and GUARANTEED right(s) to have this Lawsuit tried by a JURY (i.e.
NOT Bench Trial before Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. and/or the Court to determine these TRIABLE issues) of
Newsome‘s peers pursuant to Rule 38 of the FRCP and Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution as
well as the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and other statutes/laws of the United States
governing said matters. In support of this instant ―MFRF 10/23/13 MO&O,‖ Newsome further states:
1.

This instant ―MFRF 10/23/13 MO&O‖ is submitted in good faith and is not submitted for purposes of
delay, harassment, hindering proceedings, embarrassment, obstructing the administration of justice,
vexatious litigation, increasing the cost of litigation, etc. and is filed to protect and preserve the rights
of Newsome secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other laws of the United
States.

2.

This instant ―MFRF 10/23/13 MO&O‖ is submitted to protect the rights of Newsome and the relief
she is entitled to as a direct and proximate result of Defendants FAILURE to file a timely Answer
and/or Responsive pleading required under the statutes/laws governing said matters.

3.

Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome, as a matter of law, is entitled to have the October 23, 2013 Final
Judgment VACATED and relief from such NULL/VOID ruling as well as the relief she has sought
through the Complaint filed in this lawsuit as well as subsequent pleadings filed on her behalf.

4.

Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome is entitled, as a matter of law, to have the TRIABLE issues presented
in her Complaint and subsequent pleadings TRIED before a JURY and NOT by an individual Judge
(as Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. is attempting to do). Plaintiff further REITERATES that she does NOT
waiver her right to a JURY TRIAL.

5.

It is of PUBLIC/WORLD interest to make known that it appears this lawsuit has REPEATEDLY
been COMPROMISED by outside interests and is plagued by blackmail, extortion, corruption, etc. –
i.e. the use of CORRUPT and TAINTED Judges that appear to COMPROMISE the integrity of the
Court(s) and the judicial process due to their ALLIGENCE to Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell &
Berkowitz and its Conspirators/Co-Conspirators.

6.

There is EVIDENCE to support the CORRUPTION and the OBSTRUCTION of JUSTICE – i.e. for
example Judicial Proceedings – by the Law Firm Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz
(―Baker Donelson‖) to INFLUENCE legal actions involving Plaintiff Newsome for purposes of
protecting their PERSONAL, BUSINESS and FINANCIAL interests. Moreover, how said law firm
engages in CORRUPTION and CRIMINAL practices for purposes of obtaining rulings in its favor and
that of its Clients. It appears from the evidence that Baker Donelson has REPEATEDLY had
CORRUPT/TAINTED Judges assigned to lawsuits involving Newsome for purposes of obtaining
rulings in ITS favor and that of its Clients.
For EXAMPLE in the Newsome vs. Entergy, it appears that this is the lawsuit that Baker
Donelson decided to come out of the shadows; however, QUICKLY retreated AFTER
taking a SHELLACKING by Plaintiff Newsome. This is a lawsuit in which it appears
that Baker Donelson had TWO of its CORRUPT Judges – Morey Sear and G. Thomas
Porteous, Jr. The Court was well as Baker Donelson DELIBERATELY failing to make
KNOWN the Conflicts-Of-Interest present and it appears proceeding in lawsuit and
resorting to CRIMINAL practices of BLACKMAIL, BRIBES, EXTORTION,
CORRUPTION, etc. for purposes of obtaining rulings in favor of Baker Donelson and
that of their Client(s).

Page 2 of 37

Newsome was able to find information in regards to
Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. being IMPEACHED –
i.e for taking BRIBES, KICKBACKS, etc. in the
handling of lawsuits (See Exhibit ―8‖ of Complaint
filed in this instant lawsuit [Doc. 1, Exhibit 8]. This
document may also be viewed at the following link:
http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/120310complaint-mmsexhibits

From research, Newsome was able obtain information
where Baker Donelson BOLDLY ADVERTISED its
JUDICIAL connections – i.e. to such Judges on their
LIST: http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/bakerdonelson-ties-to-govt-officals-whitehouse
ANOTHER EXAMPLE is Newsome vs. Mitchell
McNutt & Sams where it appears that Baker
Donelson AFTER taking a SHELLACKING in the
Newsome vs. Entergy matter was EMBARRASSED
that a pro se litigant gave them a “Good Old Fashion
SHELLACKING and/or BEAT DOWN” so it appears
they have been reduced to “TUCKING TAILS” and
HIDING BEHIND THE SCENE as they turned to one
of their other CRIMINAL PARTNERING law firms
(Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada, PLLC)
for purposes of SHIELDING/HIDING the role
Baker Donelson is playing in the CRIMINAL and
CIVIL violations of Mitchell McNutt & Sams, P.A.
(―MMS‖), L.F. ―Sandy‖ Sams Jr. (―Sams‖), James T.
Allen (―Allen‖), Robert T. Gordon Jr. (―Gordon‖),
Michael T. Farrell (―Farrell‖) and Ladye Margaret
Townsend (―Townsend‖) [collectively known as
“Named Defendants”] leveled AGAINST Plaintiff
Newsome.

For the record, in Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sams - Mississippi Department of
Employment Security matter - this was a matter in which ANOTHER CORRUPT Judge
(Bobby DeLaughter) was assigned matter involving Newsome and appears was assigned
because he was KNOWN to be a CORRUPT Judge. In or about July 2009, Judge
DeLaughter pled ―GUILTY.‖ See Exhibit ―6‖ of the COMPLAINT filed in this instant
lawsuit (Doc. No. 1) – Indictment Documents Regarding Judge DeLaughter.
Page 3 of 37

For those who may be viewing this document via the INTERNET because they do NOT
have access to the record of this Court, this document may be viewed along with the
Complaint at: http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/120310-complaint-mmsexhibits
IMPORTANT TO NOTE: In the Mississippi Department of Employment Security
matter, Plaintiff Newsome was able to get the TESTIMONY of Mitchell McNutt & Sams‘
witness (James T. Allen and Robert T. Gordon) to ADMIT to the DISCRIMINATORY
and HOSTILE treatment that Plaintiff was subjected to – See Exhibit ―7‖ of the
COMPLAINT filed in this instant lawsuit (Doc. No. 1).
Therefore, a reasonable mind may conclude from the “PATTERN-OF-PRACTICE”
and the USE of CORRUPT/TAINTED Judges in lawsuits involving Newsome, if Judge
Louis Guirola, Jr. has been brought in, that he most likely is also
CORRUPT/TAINTED – i.e. which it appears can also be inferred in his handling of this
matter and DELIBERATE FAILURE to make known to Plaintiff Newsome and/or
parties to this lawsuit of the Conflicts-Of-Interest that is CLEARLY APPARENT and is
being withheld.
NOW it appears that Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. may be added to
this list of CORRUPT/TAINTED Judges ―HIRED‖ by Baker
Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz and its
CONSPIRATORS/CO-CONSPIRATORS. YES, it appears
that Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz played a
KEY/MAJOR role in his being appointed to the United States
District Court. Thinking that BECAUSE his name may not
appear on their LISTING of Judges, that he is
EXONERATED (however, he is NOT!).
Judge LOUIS GUIROLA, JR.

7.

There is EVIDENCE to support CRIMINAL and CIVIL violations by Baker Donelson in such matters;
moreover, personal, business and financial interest in the outcome of this lawsuit. Furthermore, it
appears Baker Donelson relying upon GOVERNMENT RESOURCES and CONNECTIONS (i.e.
running/control of the United States of America‘s Department of Labor – i.e. EMPHASIS added for
those who BELIEVE the ―Jobs Report‖ released by this Agency) with Government Officials for
purposes of having information obtained through CRIMINAL activities – i.e. Bribes, Blackmail,
Corruption, Coercion and/or Obstruction of Justice, etc. – posted on the INTERNET regarding
“PROTECTED activities” involving Newsome relating to Mitchell McNutt & Sams and other employers.
See for instance Exhibit ―14‖ of the Complaint filed in this instant lawsuit – i.e. United States
Department of Labor going as far as to POST information regarding “PROTECTED Activities” on the
Internet for purposes of BLACKLISTING Newsome and in keeping with in its ROLE in the
CONSPIRACIES initiated, orchestrated, manipulated and carried out by Baker Donelson Bearman
Caldwell & Berkowitz.
In another case (Lagies v. Copley, 110 Cal App 3d 958, 16 Cal Rptr 368), the plaintiff, . .
.alleged that officials and managerial employees of his corporate employer abused their
positions of authority over him by conduct including demotions, discriminatory treatment,
denial of long-accepted avenues of advancement, and defamation of his reputation to his
coworkers, . . . and to the public generally, apparently in retaliation for a story which
offended the chairperson of the board. The complaint further charged that the individual
defendants conspired to get plaintiff to quit, tarnish his reputation, and blackball him by
preventing his being hired . . .; that they published his confidential sources thus destroying
Page 4 of 37

his credibility . . .; that they virtually isolated plaintiff in his place of employment
rendering him a de facto pariah, . . ., assigning him to more and more degrading tasks . . ..
Reversing a dismissal of the complaint, the court held the plaintiff alleged facts and
circumstances which reasonably could lead trier of fact to conclude that defendants’
conduct was extreme and outrageous. The court noted that according to the pleadings,
defendants intentionally humiliated plaintiff, . . . singled him out for denial of merit raises, .
. ., blackballed him, thus precluding other employment, . . . thus destroying his credibility .
. ., all without just cause or provocation. The court concluded that the pleadings charged
more than insult and more than mere direction of job activities.

UNDISPUTABLE FACTS: Named Defendants relied upon relationship(s) with Baker Donelson
Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz and its Conspirators/Co-Conspirators to COVER-UP their CRIMINAL
and CIVIL violations leveled against Newsome and, in so doing, WILLFULLY became
CONSPIRATORS/CO-CONSPIRATORS in the ONGOING criminal and civil wrongs (which
CONTINUES to date) by said law firm and its attorneys/lawyers/employees. TACIT AGREEMENT Occurs when two or more persons pursue by their acts the same object by the same means. One person performing
one part and the other another part, so that upon completion they have obtained the object pursued. Regardless
whether each person knew of the details or what part each was to perform, the end results being they obtained the
object pursued. Agreement is implied or inferred from actions or statements.

For instance, Named Defendant(s) relies on position(s) held by Baker Donelson employees in the United
States of America‘s EXECUTIVE Branch (White House, Department of Labor, etc.) – i.e. at the time
of the United States Department of Labor‘s handling of the Newsome vs. Mitchell McNutt & Sam matter,
it appears that Baker Donelson and those with whom it CONSPIRED (i.e. named Defendants) relied on
Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao [under President George W. Bush Administration – EMPHASIS
added] and said Department to COVER-UP the Employment violations as well as CRIMINAL and
CIVIL violations of Named Defendants and their CONSPIRATORS/CO-CONSPIRATORS. For those
who may not know, Elaine Chao is the WIFE of United States SENATE Minority Leader Mitchell
McConnell – i.e. a Senator who receives HUGE monetary DONATIONS from Baker Donelson and its
clients (such as Liberty Mutual Insurance Company) for purposes of BLACKMAIL, BRIBES,
EXTORTION, etc. in exchange for SPECIAL FAVORS in the CONSPIRACIES that have been
leveled AGAINST Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome.

Page 5 of 37

I.

OBJECTION(S) TO OCTOBER 23, 2013 FINAL JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome OBJECTS and CONTEST the October 23, 2013 Memorandum Opinion

and Order Granting Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss and the associated ―FINAL JUDGMENT‖ executed by this
Court‘s Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. (―Judge Guirola‖) and states the following in support thereof:

8. The October 23, 2013 Final Judgment is NULL/VOID pursuant to Rule 60 of the FRCP and other
statutes/laws governing said matters in that it:
(a)

Has been entered by mistake over Newsome‘s OBJECTIONS to the Conflicts-ofInterest that appears to exist in the handling of this lawsuit.

(b)

Is an ABUSE of discretion by Judge Guirola.

(c)

Has been KNOWINGLY, DELIBERATELY and with MALICIOUS intent
entered for FRAUDULENT purposes as well as CRIMINAL intent to deprive
Newsome rights secured under United States statutes/laws governing said matters.

(d)

Is NULL/VOID!

(e)

Has been obtained as a direct and proximate result of BIAS and PREJUDICE
towards Newsome, for personal and pecuniary/financial interests as well as other
reasons KNOWN to this Court/Judge Guirola and the KEY role Judge Guirola is
playing in the CONTINUED CONSPIRACIES and “Tacit Agreements” reached
with his CONSPIRATORS/CO-CONSPIRATORS:
Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1968) - Purpose of
rule requiring party to inform court at time order or ruling is made to make known the
action which he desires court to take, or his objection to action of court and his grounds
therefor, is to inform trial judge of possible errors so that he may have an opportunity to
reconsider his ruling and make any changes deemed advisable. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule
46, 28 U.S.C.A.

9.

In keeping with the ONGOING Conspiracies (i.e. which CONTINUES to date) and CRIMINAL
and CIVIL violations leveled against Newsome, a VALID question PERTINENT and
RELEVANT to this lawsuit is WHO – what EVIL/WICKED forces - was behind this Court‟s
Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. being given the Judgeship in the United States District Court? Yes, Baker
Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz – i.e. Judgeship appointment made through President
George W. Bush and APPROVED by the Senate. It is important to note that there were reports
alleging that during President Bush‘s Administration that Vice President Richard ―Dick‖ Cheney was
actually running/controlling the White House. If so, DO NOT be surprised! From research it
appears Baker Donelson also had employee(s) in the White House. For instance, David Addington
(an employee of Baker Donelson served as Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick Cheney) – i.e. the
following is information obtained through research: http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/092812david-addington-article-english

Page 6 of 37

10.

Newsome believes that the facts, evidence and legal conclusions provided herein as well as in her
previous filings will sustain that the October 23, 2013, Final Judgment entered by Judge Guirola was
entered with FRAUDULENT intent and for purposes of depriving Newsome DUE PROCESS as
well as rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and other
statutes/laws of the United States. Said acts which causes Newsome irreparable harm/injuries.

11.

This Court/Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. clearly erred and made a mistake asserting, ―The Plaintiff has
NOT filed a response to the Motion. . .‖:
Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff‘s complaint contending that Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They argue that
most of Newsome‘s claims are either time-barred, that she lacks standing, or that they fail
to state a claim as a matter of law. The Plaintiff has NOT filed a response to the Motion,
but have filed a NUMBER of OTHER motions, including TWO Motions to Strike [16,
24], a Motion for Default Judgment [17], a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions [25], a Motion
to Vacate [29], and a MOTION TO SHOW PROOF OF LEGAL
AUTHORITY/MOTION CHALLENGING AUTHORITY TO APPEAR [30]. See
Pages1-2 of Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. No. 32).

NOTE: How this Court/Judge Guirola DELIBERATELY shortens the title
on Doc. No. 30 which is properly titled, ―Motion to Show Proof of Legal
Authority/Motion Challenging Authority to Appear (Jury Trial Demanded in
this Action).” Therefore, a reasonable mind may conclude KNOWLEDGE
that issues raised therein are TRIABLE by JURY and NOT Judge Guirola and
the Court/he LACKED judicial authority to decide the UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL
―Motion To Dismiss‖ that was entered through the ABUSE of the Court‟s
ELECTRONIC FILING PROCESS by an UNAUTHORIZED person/Law Firm
to this lawsuit as well as ABUSED powers by Judge Guirola in the rendering of
the October 23, 2013 Final Judgment and Memorandum Opinion and Order
Granting Defendants‟ Motion To Dismiss. Moreover, this Court‘s/Judge
Guirola‘s KNOWLEDGE that in the Motions mentioned, Plaintiff Newsome
REPEATEDLY asserts JURY DEMAND! Thus, supporting this Court/Judge
Guirola LACKS judicial authority to enter ruling and, therefore, makes the
October 23, 2013 Final Judgment NULL/VOID and UNENFORCEABLE!
because the laws are clear that had Newsome filed a response to the UNLAWFULLY/ILLEGAL
Motion to Dismiss that was filed by an OUTSIDE person that is NOT LEGALLY NOR
LAWFULLY entitled to enter pleadings in this lawsuit, as this Court/Judge Guirola states, she would
have WAIVED her defenses (which she will NOT waive) on said issue(s). Thus, a reasonable mind
may conclude the MALICIOUS efforts by this Court/Judge Guirola to INDUCE and/or ENTRAP a
pro se litigant in to WAIVING rights through the use of DECEPTIVE, CRIMINAL and
FRAUDULENT practices and NULL/VOID rulings as the “Final Judgment.‖

12.

Pursuant to Rule 8 (i.e. specifically (b)) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (―FRCP‖), states in part:
Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;
and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different
types of relief. . . .
(e) Construing Pleadings. Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.
Page 7 of 37

See EXHIBIT ―2‖ – Rule 8 of FRCP attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in
full herein.
13.

This Court‘s/Judge Guirola‘s BIAS and PREJUDICE is also evidenced in the attack on Plaintiff
Newsome‘s Complaint asserting:
―The complaint in this case spans over 321 pages, 740 numbered paragraphs with sub-parts
and 282 pages of exhibits. To say that the complaint is a difficult read would be an
understatement. To suggest that the complaint meets the ‗short and plain statement‘
requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) would also be a stretch. Of course, the Court recognizes
that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant. But, while it is true that pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, it is also true that the Court‘s flexibility is without limits. . . ‗While pro se pleadings
are viewed less stringently, a petitioner who elects to proceed pro se must comply with the
applicable procedural and substantive rules of law.‘ . . . (‗[W]e have never suggested that
procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by
those who proceed without counsel.‘) This Plaintiff, like any other, is BOUND by
PROCEDURAL and substantial law. – Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting
Defendants‘ Motion to Dismiss at Page 4-5 (Doc. No. 32).‖

Newsome believes that upon research, that a reasonable mind may conclude that any attacks by this
Court/Judge Guirola on the ―LENGTH‖ of Newsome‘s Complaint is a FRIVOLOUS in that there
have been MANY. . . MANY. . .MANY. . .complaints filed in United States District Courts that are
WELL over the 321 pages and exhibits that are WELL over the 282 pages being ATTACKED in
this instant lawsuit. Thus, a reasonable mind may conclude that this Court‘s/Judge Guirola‘s
FRIVOLOUS attack is a mistake and is relying upon Rule 8(a) of the Civil Rules of Civil
Procedure to launch such CALLOUS and SHAM argument to shield/mask his CRIMINAL and
CIVIL violations by entering into the CONTINUED conspiracies in which Named Defendants and
their CONSPIRATORS are involved in against Newsome:
Plaintiff‘s use of twelve pages to set out claim that could have been stated in six pages did
not justify dismissal under Rule 8(a), where complaint was intelligible and gave defendants
notice of claim for relief, even though complaint could have been improved. Bennett v.
Schmidt, 153 F3d 516 (7th Cir. 1998).
Defendants‘ motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and (e)(1), asserting that, at
368 pages and 1,249 paragraphs, plaintiff‘s complaint was too long and confusing, was
DENIED because although plaintiffs‘ was lengthy, it did NOT overwhelm defendants‘
ability to understand or to mount defense. Ir re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F.Supp. 2d 278
(2005).

IMPORTANT TO NOTE: For those who may not know, the October 23, 2013 Memorandum
Opinion and Order Granting Defendants‟ Motion to Dismiss and “Final Judgment” may have been
drafted by a person known as a ―LAW CLERK‖ – i.e. a person perhaps STILL in Law School
(moreover, learning and in training). Therefore, this information is pertinent and/or relevant in that
the Law Clerk may be offered jobs with law firms as Baker Donelson, Butler Snow, Phelps Dunbar,
etc. in EXCHANGE for their role in the CONSPIRACIES leveled against Newsome. Nevertheless,
even if this is the case (Law Clerk‘s drafting of Memorandum Opinion and Order. . .and ―Final
Judgment‖), Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. AFFIXED his signature to documents as though it was his
work and conclusion (EMPHASIS added).
14.

There is a reason for WHY the United States of America is LOOKING ―STUPID‖ BEFORE the
WORLD RIGHT NOW! It appears from the GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL interest that while
this Court‘s Judge Guirola wants it to appear that the Complaint in this lawsuit is “DIFFICULT to
read” – what a JOKE! It is obvious from the Global/International interest of documents
presented in matters such as this; other people are having NO difficulty in understanding Plaintiff
Newsome‘s documents.

Page 8 of 37

NOTE: It is OBVIOUS that Attorney/Lawyers as well as Citizens of the International
Communities have a GOOD UNDERSTANDING and INTEREST in the pleadings/documents
shared by Newsome. Viewers are finding documents being shared by Newsome beneficial and,
therefore, DOWNLOADING, TWEETING, EMAILING, etc. information to others for purposes
of getting the word out to others! In other words, LAWYERS/ATTORNEYS/CITIZENS with NO
ties or connections to this lawsuit are finding Plaintiff Newsome‘s ARGUMENTS as well as
EVIDENCE very SUPPORTIVE and CREDIBLE of the claims asserted.
SUPPORTING WHY it appears this Court/Judge Guirola is CONSPIRING with
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens
& Cannada, PLLC and their CONSPIRATORS and are doing their best to keep
this lawsuit from getting into the hands of a JURY!
15.

It appears from the facts and evidence presented in this lawsuit, this Court’s Judge Guirola is
CONSPIRING with Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz (―Baker Donelson‖) to use its
“FRONTING” Law Firm Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada, PLLC/Paula Graves
Ardelean (―Butler Snow‖) alleging to be counsel/attorneys for Mitchell McNutt & Sams, P.A.
(―MMS‖), L.F. ―Sandy‖ Sams Jr. (―Sams‖), James T. Allen (―Allen‖), Robert T. Gordon Jr.
(―Gordon‖), Michael T. Farrell (―Farrell‖) and Ladye Margaret Townsend (―Townsend‖) [collectively
known as “Named Defendants”] for purposes of shielding/hiding their CRIMINAL/CIVIL violations
as well as the BIAS and PREJUDICE towards Newsome, EXTRAJUDICIAL sources that are at play
which are having a direct impact on Judge Guirola‘s unlawful/illegal practices as well as the
IMPROPRIETIES, etc. that exist out of view of Newsome and the PUBLIC/GLOBAL eyes.
Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994) - Revision made in 1974 to statute prohibiting
judge's participation in case which he has an interest or relationship to a party brought into
the statute elements of general bias and prejudice recusal that had previously been
addressed only in statute dealing with recusal of a district judge for bias in general; it
entirely duplicated the grounds of recusal set forth in the latter statute but made them
applicable to all justices, judges, and magistrates, not just district judges, and placed the
obligation to identify the existence of those grounds upon the judge himself, rather than
requiring recusal only in response to a party's affidavit. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 144, 455(b)(1). . .
Revisions made in 1974 to statute dealing with disqualification of judge who has an
interest in the case or relationship to a party require all interest or relationship and bias or
prejudice grounds to be evaluated on an objective basis so that what matters is not the
reality of bias or prejudice, but its appearance; recusal is required whenever impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a). . . .
Catch-all provision of the disqualification statute as a broader reach than subsection
setting forth specific grounds for disqualification, but the provisions have some ground in
common and should not be applied inconsistently. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a, b).

See Liteky v. United States: The Extrajudicial Source Doctrine and Its Implications for Judicial
Disqualification, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 1059 1995.
It appears Judge Guirola has an interest and/or relationship to Defendants and/or Baker
Donelson and Butler Snow. As a matter of law, Judge Guirola is subject to recusal; moreover, it
appears has DELIBERATELY withheld information and with MALICIOUS intent seeking to
THROW this lawsuit for purposes of rendering SPECIAL FAVORS to Named Defendants and
OUTSIDE legal counsel/attorneys attempting to MANIPULATE and ABUSE the JUDICIAL process
Page 9 of 37

through FRAUDULENT practices that are CLEARLY PROHIBITED by statutes/laws governing
said matters.
16.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and other statutes/laws governing said matters, Judge Guirola is
MANDATORILY (i.e. it is NOT discretionary) required to RECUSE/DISQUALIFY himself from
this lawsuit. Furthermore, Newsome does NOT consent to Judge Guirola presiding over this lawsuit
and USURPING authority and ABUSING discretion in the handling of this lawsuit.

17.

UNDISPUTED IS THE FACT: That Named Defendants do NOT dispute Newsome‘s TIMELY
demand as required by statutes/laws for a JURY Trial on any and all TRIABLE issues raised
allowed under Rule 38 of the FRCP, the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and
other statutes/laws governing said matters. See EXHIBIT ―3‖ – Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which states in part:
Rule 38. Right to a Jury Trial; Demand
(a) Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved to the parties inviolate.
(b) Demand. On any issue triable of right by a jury, a party may demand a jury trial by:
(1) serving the other parties with a written demand—which may be included
in a pleading—no later than 14 days after the last pleading directed to the
issue is served;. . .

and EXHIBIT ―4‖ – Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution attached hereto and
incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY (―MotionToDisqualify‖)

II.

Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome respectfully moves under 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 that the Honorable Louis
Guirola, Jr. be disqualified from presiding as Judge in the above-entitled matter. In support of said
MotionToDisqualify, Newsome attaches her supporting Affidavit. See EXHIBIT ―5‖ - Vogel Denise Newsome‟s
AFFIDAVIT of Disqualification of Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set
forth in full herein. Newsome further states the following in support of MotionToDisqualify:
A.

PRIOR TO OCTOBER 23, 2013 FINAL JUDGMENT EXECUTED BY JUDGE LOUIS GUIROLA, JR., HE HAD
KNOWLEDGE OF THE MANDATORY DISQUALIFICATION/RECUSAL REQUIREMENT OF THIS
COURT:
18.

While this Court/Judge Guirola attacks Newsome‘s pro se status, it is clear that the Court/Judge
Guirola is INCOMPETENT and is attempting to DELIBERATELY throw this lawsuit through
FRAUDULENT acts and efforts to further AID and ABET Named Defendants and their
CONSPIRATORS in criminal/civil violations that are PROHIBITED by statutes/laws governing
said matters.

19.

In keeping with Newsome‘s addressing her OBJECTIONS to bias assignments through Plaintiff’s
Request for Conflict of Interest Information, Notice of Opposition to Magistrate Judge
Assignment; and Notice of Address (Doc. No. 2) and concerns addressed in subsequent pleadings in
this instant Lawsuit, she AGAIN, respectfully REITERATES and moves under 28 U.S.C.A. § 455
that the Honorable Louis Guirola, Jr. be DISQUALIFIED from presiding as Judge in the aboveentitled matter. Newsome files with this instant ―MFRF 10/23/13 MO&O‖ her Affidavit in support
thereof as required by 28 U.S.C.A. § 144, to show that Judge Guirola has a personal bias and/or
prejudice against her in favor of Named Defendants and the Law Firms Baker Donelson and Butler
Page 10 of 37

Snow who are UNLAWFULLY/ILLEGALLY interfering in this lawsuit (i.e. by NEVER filing the
MANDATORY documents entering appearance as counsel). See EXHIBIT ―5‖ – Vogel Denise
Newsome’s AFFIDAVIT Of Disqualification Of Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. attached hereto and
Berger v. U.S., 41 S.Ct. 230 (1921) - Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 144, providing that, when a party
shall file an affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against him, the judge
shall proceed no further, but another judge shall be designated, and that such affidavit
shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, when an
affidavit legally sufficient is filed, the judge against whom it is filed cannot pass on the truth
of the matters alleged or preside on the trial .

20.

Based on the Affidavit, Newsome respectfully moves that the Honorable Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.
proceed NO further in this action and that another judge be assigned to hear this case. Furthermore,
that the Honorable Guirola declare himself DISQUALIFIED to sit as a Judge in this lawsuit and that
another judge be assigned this lawsuit in that he has KNOWINGLY acted with bias and prejudice
towards Plaintiff Newsome in the handling of this lawsuit and has DELIBERATELY failed to release
information regarding that Conflicts-Of-Interest existing and criminal and civil violations being
committed in the handling of this lawsuit.

21.

This “MotionToDisqualify” has been TIMELY and properly submitted in compliance with 28
U.S.C.A. § 455 and/or statutes/laws governing said matters as well in keeping with Request for
Conflict of Interest Information, Notice of Opposition to Magistrate Judge Assignment. . . (Doc. No.
2) as if set forth in full herein.
U.S. v. York, 888 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1989) - In regard to statute pertaining to duty of
judge to recuse himself, section which addresses appearances of impropriety, as well as
section which addresses actual bias for conflict of interest on part of judge, both require
timeliness. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a, b).
Grambling University Nat. Alumni Ass'n v. Board of Sup'rs for Louisiana System, 286
Fed.Appx. 864 (5th Cir. 2008) - Plaintiff's motion for recusal, on ground that judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, was untimely; while knowing facts
underlying recusal argument plaintiff allowed case to linger for nearly ten months and
only brought recusal motion after judge dismissed claims. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a).

The record evidence will support that this instant lawsuit was ORIGINALLY assigned to Judge Henry
T. Wingate and Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball with KNOWLEDGE of this Court‘s AWARENESS of
the CONFLICTS-OF-INTEREST present.
Nevertheless, there is NO entry in the record
ADDRESSING the issues raised in Plaintiff Newsome‘s “Request for Conflict of Interest
Information, Notice of Opposition to Magistrate Judge Assignment” (Doc. No. 2) and/or said issue(s)
in subsequent pleadings. Newsome was SURPRISED to see a ruling by this Court‘s Judge Louis
Guirola, Jr. when there was NO notification to Plaintiff Newsome this lawsuit being assigned to
another Judge and/or Magistrate Judge – i.e. thus, DEPRIVING Newsome of DUE PROCESS to
contest assignment and deprivation of EQUAL PROTECTION of the laws PRIOR to the October 23,
2013 ruling by Judge Guirola. Thus, a reasonable mind may conclude that such COVER-UPS were
DELIBERATE and MALICIOUS acts by this Court to DEPRIVE Newsome of rights secured and
guaranteed under the Constitution and other statutes/laws governing said matters. Thus, AGAIN
INFRINGING on protected and/or guaranteed rights secured under the statutes/laws governing said
matters as well as the Constitution.

22.

In further support of Newsome‘s Request for Conflict of Interest Information, Notice of Opposition
to Magistrate Judge Assignment. . . and this instant Motion, it appears Judge Guirola is disqualified
from presiding as a judge in the above-numbered and entitled cause under provisions 28 U.S.C.A. §
455, due to:
a)

Bias and prejudice towards Newsome.

b)

Judge Guirola‘s direct and personal interest as well as personal financial/pecuniary interest in this
Lawsuit.

Page 11 of 37

c)

Depriving Newsome of life, liberty, pursuit of happiness and property, etc.

d)

Baker Donelson is Legal Counsel/Attorneys for the Federal Judges Association. See EXHIBIT ―6‖
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. In efforts to keep the
PUBLIC from having KNOWLEDGE of Baker Donelson‘s role in this lawsuit, it appears said firm is
using their FRONTING and/or PARTNERING Law Firm Butler Snow in which a RELATIONSHIP
and SHARING of lawsuits can be ESTABLISHED. So in other words, Baker Donelson appears to be
legal counsel for Judge Guirola and Baker Donelson‘s PARTNERING Law Firm Butler Snow is
attempting to enter this lawsuit WITHOUT legal authority and through the use of FRAUDULENT
and CRIMINAL practices. Moreover, Judge Guirola‘s October 23, 2013 ruling clearly supports the
MAJOR/KEY ROLE in such FRAUDULENT and CRIMINAL practices.

Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.
e)

It appears that in keeping with its ―PATTERN-OF-PRACTICE‖ record, Baker Donelson has played
a MAJOR/KEY role in having Judge Guirola appointed to the Judicial Bench.

f)

Baker Donelson and Butler Snow enjoy PARTNERSHIPS in lawsuits. See EXHIBIT ―7‖ attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Moreover, SHARE Clients and
information. Information they are attempting to SHIELD/HIDE from Newsome as well as the
PUBLIC-AT-LARGE!

g)

Newsome is presently engaging in Congressional and/or further legal proceedings in which a
reasonable person knowing the following facts and evidence regarding the Governmental positions
held/controlled by Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz (―Baker Donelson‖) may
conclude that CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST exist:
Page 12 of 37



Chief of Staff to the President of the United States



United States Secretary of State



United States Senate Majority Leader



Members of the United States Senate



Members of the United States House of Representatives



Department of Treasury



Director of the Administrative Office of the United States



Chief Counsel, Acting Director, and Acting Deputy Director of United States
Citizenship & Immigration Services within the United States Department of Homeland
Security – i.e. HOW do the PUBLIC/WORLD think that President Barack Obama was
able to get that FORGED/FAKE Birth Certificate he released in April 2011.
http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/042711-certificate-oflivebirthdiscrepancies
and http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/devine-robertbio-infocolb



Majority and Minority Staff Director of the Senate Committee on Appropriations



Member of United States President’s Domestic Policy Council



Counselor to the Deputy Secretary for the United States Department of HHS – HOW
do the PUBLIC/WORLD think that United States of America‘s President Barack
Obama, CONGRESS and the SUPREME COURT got ObamaCare PASSED?



Chief of Staff of the Supreme Court of the United States



Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the United States . . .



United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge



United States District Court Judges



United States Attorneys



Presidents of State and Local Bar Associations

See Exhibit ―8‖ attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full
herein.
For instance, Baker Donelson placing its employee(s) – as James C. Duff - in positions
as Director of the Administrative Office of the United States, Chief of Staff of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the
United States
h)

Judge Guirola is in a position in which he is NOW usurping powers in which he LACKS and/or is
PROHIBITED to assert and is unlawfully/illegally attempting to perform dual roles as investigator
and adjudicator; moreover JURY – i.e. encroaching upon the duties and/or responsibilities of the
Jury DEMANDED by Newsome in this Lawsuit.

i)

Judge Guirola‘s fulfillment of role in CONSPIRACY(S) involving Named Defendants and their
CONSPIRATORS is clearly PROHIBITED by the statutes/laws governing said matters.

j)

Any/All other reasons known to Judge Guirola.

the aforementioned reasons, as more fully set forth in the Affidavit attached and incorporated by
reference as if set forth in full in this Motion. See EXHIBIT ―5‖ – “Affidavit of Vogel Denise Newsome
In Support of Motion to DISQUALIFY Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.”
Tumey v. State of Ohio, 47 S.Ct. 437 (1927) - Subjecting liberty and property of
defendant to court, judge of which has direct, substantial, pecuniary interest against him,
is denial of due process. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.
Buntion v. Quarterman, 524 F.3d 664 (5th Cir. 2008) - There are three situations in
which the Supreme Court has found presumptive bias on the part of a judge: (1) the
Page 13 of 37

decision maker has a direct personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest in the outcome of
the case, (2) an adjudicator has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the
party before him, and (3) a judicial or quasi-judicial decision maker has the dual role of
investigating and adjudicating disputes and complaints.

23.

In order to preserve the issue of disqualification should further review become necessary, the record
evidence will support that Newsome has done so. Through this instant pleading, Newsome‘s Request
for Conflict of Interest Information, Notice of Opposition to Magistrate Judge Assignment . . .(Doc.
No. 2) and subsequent pleadings REITERATES and PERSERVES said issue(s) and protect her rights.
– Hardy vs. U.S., 878 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1989).

24.

UNDISPUTED IS THE FACT: That a CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST presently exist with the
assignment of this lawsuit to Judge Guirola. The record evidence CLEARLY supports that Newsome
has timely, properly and adequately NOTIFIED this Court that she wants to be advised of ALL
Conflict-Of-Interest regarding Judges/Magistrates in the handling of this lawsuit. As a direct and
proximate result of this Court‘s FAILURE to comply with the MANDATORY requirements of
statutes and laws governing said matters, Newsome has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived
rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges and immunities, and due process of laws
guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other governing laws. As a direct and proximate
result of this Court‘s unlawful/illegal practices and failure to comply with the MANDATORY
requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and any and all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters,
Newsome has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws,
privileges and immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution
and other governing laws. See EXHIBIT ―9‖ – FRCP Rule 26 and EXHIBIT ―10‖ - 28 U.S.C.A. §
455 respectively attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
Phillips v. Joint Legislative Committee on Performance and Expenditure Review Of The
State of Mississippi, et al., 637 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1981) - [3] Under statute requiring a
judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might be
reasonably questioned, judge need not accept all the allegations by moving party as true
and, in fact, no motion at all is required; the judge must disqualify himself if the facts
cast doubt on his impartiality regardless of how or by whom they are drawn to his
attention. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455.
. . . [3] Congress rewrote the second statute, section 455, in 1974. Subsection
(b) of that section lists a number of specific situations in which a judge must recuse
himself. . .Subsection (a), a more general provision, requires that
Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Section 455, unlike section 144, does not stipulate a formal procedure by which
it must be raised. Like section 144, however, it may be raised by motion. Davis, 517 F.2d
at 1051. Substantively, the two statutes are quite similar, if not identical.[FN6]
FN6. To the extent that there is a difference, section 455 imposes the
stricter standard: a movant under section 144 must allege facts to
convince a reasonable person that bias exists, Parrish, 524 F.2d at
100, while under the broader language of section 455, he must show
only that a reasonable person ―would harbor doubts about the judge's
impartiality‖, Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 5 Cir. 1980, 609
F.2d 1101, 1111 (emphasis added), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 101 S.Ct.
78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980). See Comment, Disqualification of Federal
Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 236, 243-50 (1978).
See also Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal
Courts, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 736, 745-50 (1973).
On the other hand, section 455, unlike section 144, does not require
the judge to accept all allegations by a moving party as true. Indeed,
the section requires no motion at all; the judge must disqualify
himself if the facts cast doubt on his impartiality regardless of how or
by whom they are drawn to his attention. See Fredonia Broadcasting
Corp. v. RCA Corp., 5 Cir. 1978, 569 F.2d 251, 254-57, cert. denied,
439 U.S. 859, 99 S.Ct. 177, 58 L.Ed.2d 167 (1979). Section 144, by
contrast, requires allegation by affidavit within a stringent time limit
and allows a party only one such affidavit in any case. If a party
Page 14 of 37

could bind a judge by his factual allegations in a section 455 motion,
free from the formal requirements and more demanding standard of
proof of section 144, the result would be a virtual open season for
recusal. See 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 250.
[4] The alleged bias of a judge must be personal as distinguished from
judicial in nature in order to require recusal. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 144, 455. - - See
EXHIBIT ―11‖ – Phillips matter (Headnotes ONLY) attached hereto and incorporated
by reference as if set forth in full herein.

Clearly the INTEGRITY of this Court has been compromised and the appearance of IMPROPRIETY is
inevitable through Judge Guirola‟s acts and projects an appearance that this Lawsuit can be won through
criminal acts – i.e. through bribes, blackmail, extortion, intimidation, threats, etc. - by Defendants and their
counsel. Therefore, Judge Guirola‟s acts CLEARLY VIOLATE the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct.
See Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and LITEKY vs. UNITED STATES - Jeopardizing Judicial
Integrity, 40 Loy. L. Rev. 995 1994-1995.
28 USC § 455 - Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge
(a)
Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b)

He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer
with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer
concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness
concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated
as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an
opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing
in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party
to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them,
or the spouse of such a person:
(i)

Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party;

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge‘s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
(c)

A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and
make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his
spouse and minor children residing in his household. . . .

See EXHIBIT ―10‖ - 28 USC § 455 attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if
set forth in full herein.
MANDATORY DISQUALIFICATION is required when ―ONE‖ of the grounds specifically enumerated in
statute applies – i.e. for instance, as in this instant lawsuit, grounds for Judge Guirola‘s disqualification is
required pursuant to 28 USC § 455 and/or the applicable statutes/laws governing said matters:
Page 15 of 37

Renteria v. Schellpeper, 936 F.Supp. 691 (1996) - [6] If one of grounds specifically enumerated in
statute applies, disqualification of judge is mandatory whether or not reasonable person would
question judge's impartiality. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b).
. . . [6] . . .If one of the provisions of section 455(b) applies then disqualification is mandatory
whether or not a reasonable person would question the judge's impartiality. Liljeberg v. Health
Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2202 n. 8, 100 L.Ed.2d 855
(1988).

25.

Statutes/Laws governing said matters require that a judge disqualify himself/herself under the ―general
disqualification‖ statute where he/she has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 455(b)(1). In this instant lawsuit, Judge Guirola harbors personal bias and prejudice towards
Newsome.
Recusal under the subsection of the judicial qualification statute setting forth specific
circumstances establishing partiality is MANDATORY, because the potential for
conflicts of interest is readily apparent. U.S. vs. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003).

26.

Judge Guirola has a disposition so EXTREME as to display a CLEAR INABILITY to render a fair
judgment and CANNOT perform his duties as required under the OATH taken to become Judge, Code
of Judicial Conduct, 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and other statutes/laws governing said matters which warrants
his DISQUALIFICATION/RECUSAL. U.S. vs. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2006).

27.

The general disqualification statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b)(1)) encompasses situations in which there is
an actual conflict of interest, even if there is NO appearance of one, and also describes situations that
create an apparent conflict because it provides examples of situations in which Judge Guirola‘s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Preston vs. U.S., 923 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1991)

28.

Statutes/Laws governing said matters are clear that any federal judge MUST disqualify himself/herself
in any proceeding in which his/her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In the instant lawsuit,
Judge Guirola‘s impartiality is reasonably and validly questioned. Moreover, that BIAS and
PREJUDICE towards Newsome as well as Judge Guirola‘s personal and financial/pecuniary interest in
the outcome of this Lawsuit warrants recusal. See JUDICIAL BIAS AND FINANCIAL INTEREST AS
GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 662 19841985.
Limeco, Inc. v. Division of Lime, 571 F.Supp. 710 (N.D.Miss.Greenville.Div.,1983) - Even if
no bias or prejudice of judge may actually exist, it is enough to disqualify that there be mere
appearance of partiality.
U.S. v. Miranne, 688 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1982) - Under statute requiring judge to disqualify
himself when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, actual demonstrated prejudice
need not exist in order for judge to be required to recuse himself. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a).
Bradshaw v. McCotter, 785 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1986) - Fair tribunal on appeal requires not
only an absence of actual bias but the absence of an appearance of bias.

29.

In accordance with the statutes/laws governing said matters, Newsome has timely, properly and
adequately PRESERVED said issues such as the CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST and other issues raised
in her Motions to Strike the Defendants‟ pleadings filed in this lawsuit. See for instance “Waiver Of
Loss Of Right To Disqualify Judge By Participation In Proceedings . . .” 24 ALR 4th 870.

30.

Statutes/Laws governing said matters require that a judge disqualify himself/herself under the “general
disqualification” statute where he/she has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 455(b)(1). In this instant lawsuit, Judge Guirola harbors personal bias and prejudice towards
Newsome.
Recusal under the subsection of the judicial qualification statute setting forth specific
circumstances establishing partiality is MANDATORY, because the potential for
conflicts of interest is readily apparent. U.S. vs. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003).

Page 16 of 37

31.

When a judge is the actual trier of fact, the need to preserve the appearance of impartiality is especially
pronounced. LaSalle Nat. Bank vs. First Connecticut Holding Group, LLC, 287 F.3d 279, 58
Fed.R.Evid. Serv. 1216 (3rd Cir. 2002). In fact, the impartiality provision (28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a))
requires NO determination of bias in fact (U.S. vs. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990), and thus
applies even though NO actual bias or prejudice has been shown. Fletcher vs. Conoco Pipe Line
Co., 323 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2003). For instance, it is of NO consequence that Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. is
not actually biased under the impartiality provision inasmuch as the statutes/laws governing said matters
require not ONLY fairness to individual litigants, but also the PUBLIC’s CONFIDENCE in the
judiciary, which may be IRREPARABLY harmed if this lawsuit is allowed to proceed before Judge
Louis Guirola, Jr. who appears is TAINTED and DETERMINED to COMPROMISE this lawsuit. In
Re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 353 F.3d 211 (3rd 2003). Thus, the statute governs circumstances that
constitute an APPEARANCE of PARTIALITY, even though actual partiality has not been shown.
Chase Manhatten Bank vs. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir 2003)
Because of the recusal statute is to exact the APPEARANCE of IMPARTIALITY,
recusal may be required even though the judge is not actually partial. Patterson vs.
Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003).
U.S. v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995) - Facts not known at the time of recusal
motion are nonetheless considered in determining whether judge should have been
recused, and statute governing recusal because of the appearance of partiality may be
applied retroactively by rectifying oversight and taking steps necessary to maintain
public confidence in impartiality of judiciary. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a).

32.

The IMPARTIALITY provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 places Judge Guirola under a self-enforcing
OBLIGATION to recuse himself because the proper legal grounds exist. Glassroth vs. Moore, 229
F.Supp.2d 1283 (2002).

33.

FAILURE TO DISCLOSE: Judge Guirola has with MALICIOUS and CRIMINAL intent FAILED
to DISCLOSE on the record circumstances that may give rise to a reasonable question about his
IMPARTIALITY. In Re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266 (10th 2004). Therefore, it may become necessary to
bring additional legal actions (i.e. conducting DISCOVERY) against Judge Guirola, in that this is a
matter of PUBLIC/GLOBAL interest, to ascertain the TRUTH for his arbitrary acts and ROLE in
CONSPIRACIES leveled against Newsome.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S.Ct. 692 - Purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of
arbitrary power, to make available common-sense judgment of the community as a hedge
against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or
perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge.
Washington Mut. Finance Group, LLC v. Blackmon, 925 So.2d 780 (Miss.,2004) - Canon
on disqualification of judge for having financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding requires recusal only if the judge owns an interest in a party litigant or, if
he does not, there is a showing-not mere speculation-that he will be substantially affected
by the decision of the case. Code of Jud.Conduct, Canon 3, subd. E(1)(c, d).

34.

Newsome timely, properly and adequately submit her ―MFRF 10/23/13 MO&O‖ in this instant and
supporting Affidavits and Exhibits and by so doing, PRESERVES said issue(s) regarding same. Judge
Guirola‘s acts are a clear ABUSE of discretion, USURPATION of power in which he LACKED
jurisdiction to enter Order, INFRINGES upon Newsome‘s Constitutional Rights and other rights
secured/guaranteed by statutes/laws and affect the fairness, integrity or PUBLIC reputation of judicial
proceedings if left uncorrected.
Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 1999) - [13] Court of
Appeals may exercise its discretion to reverse under plain error review only when it finds
an error that is clear and obvious under current law, that affects substantial rights, and
that seriously would affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings if left uncorrected.
[13] As a result, we review for plain error. We may exercise our
discretion to reverse under plain error review only when we find an error that is clear and
obvious under current law, that affects the defendant's substantial rights, and that
Page 17 of 37

seriously would affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings
if left uncorrected. See Marceaux, 124 F.3d at 734; United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d
160, 162-63 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc).
[20] A failure to make a procedural objection waives the error, precluding review by
Court of Appeals.
[20] Here, however, the Rushings object to the supplemental
affidavits on the ground that KCS failed to comply with the procedural rules governing
the admission of evidence. Specifically, the argument's merit rests on our interpretation
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 56. A failure to make a procedural objection waives the error,
precluding our review.FN11 Because the Rushings waived any objection to the affidavits'
untimeliness, we may not review the alleged error.
FN11. See Donaghey, 974 F.2d at 650 n. 3 (finding procedural objections
to admissibility of summary judgment evidence waived by failure to
challenge in district court); McCloud River R.R. v. Sabine River Forest
Prods., Inc., 735 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that party waived
right to raise untimeliness of supplemental affidavit by failing to object or
move to strike in district court); Hicks v. Harris, 606 F.2d 65, 68 n. 3 (5th
Cir.1979) (refusing to review procedural objection to affidavit raised for
the first time on appeal, without a motion to strike in the district court);
Auto Drive-Away Co. of Hialeah, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Com'n, 360
F.2d 446, 448-49 (5th Cir.1966) (holding that, absent timely motion to
strike, affidavit's non-compliance with procedural rules waived); see also
Calverley, 37 F.3d at 162 (discussing difference between waiver and
forfeiture).

35.

REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD: Under the ―IMPARTIALITY‖ provision of 28 U.S.C.A. §
455(a), the GENERAL disqualification statute provides that Judge Guirola be disqualified in any
proceeding in which is IMPARTIALITY might be reasonably questioned. Under this statute, it questions
whether a reasonable person perceives a SIGNIFICANT RISK that Judge Guirola will resolve the case
on a basis other than the merits. The answer being YES! Clemens vs. U.S. Dist. Court for Central
District of California, 428 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2005). Meaning that in determining whether Judge Guirola
should be disqualified for IMPARTIALTY under this provision, an objective or “reasonable person”
standard is to be used to determine whether his IMPARTIALITY is to be QUESTIONED. S.E.C. vs.
Loving Spirit Foundation Inc., 392 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2004); In Re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 368 F.3d
289 (3rd Cir. 2004); Tyler vs. Purkett, 413 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 2005)
A truly disqualifying appearance MUST be determined by a reasonable person
STANDARD and NOT by the ability of the complaining party to voice its concerns
through the media. Chase Manhattan Bank vs. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120 (2nd
Cir. 2003).
U.S. v. Dozier, 707 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1983) - Statutory provisions impose a reasonable
man standard for determining whether judge should recuse himself.

Therefore, supporting why Newsome DEMANDS a Jury Trial on issue(s) raised and NOT have matters tried
before a Judge because of the risk and temptation(s) exhibited by Judge Guirola to give in to criminal acts – i.e.
such as BRIBES, BLACKMAIL, EXTORTION, THREATS, CONSPIRACIES, etc. - as shown from the facts,
evidence and legal conclusions in this instant lawsuit. It is CLEAR that Judge Guirola is ADAMENT and
determined to DEFY the statutes/laws governing said matters
36.

The reasonable person in this context means a well-informed, thoughtful observer, as opposed to a
hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person. Sensley vs. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2004). Clemens
vs. U.S. Dist. Court for Central District of California, 428 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2005).
The TEST for
disqualification for IMPARTIALITY provision of the ―GENERAL‖ disqualification statute is whether an
OBJECTIVE observer with knowledge of ALL facts, evidence and legal conclusion(s) would QUESTION
Judge Guirola‘s IMPARTIALITY. Newsome believes the answer such said question is ―YES!‖
Fifth Circuit:
Potashnick v. Port City Const. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980) - Goal of judicial
disqualification statute is to foster appearance of impartiality. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455.
Page 18 of 37

Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1982)
- Goal of statute governing disqualification of district court judges is to foster impartiality
by requiring even its appearance. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455.
Patterson vs. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003) – Whether a reasonable and
objective person, knowing all the facts, would harbor doubts concerning the judge‘s
impartiality.
Other Courts:
In Re Brooks, 383 F.3d 1036 (2004) – Whether reasonable and informed observer would
question the judge‘s impartiality.
Comfort vs. Lynn School Committee, 418 F.3d 1, 200 Ed. Law Rep. 541 (1st Cir. 2005) –
Whether objective, knowledgeable member of the public would find a reasonable basis
for doubting judge‘s impartiality.

37.

For a violation of the statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 455) to occur, it requires that Judge Guirola disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his IMPARTIALITY might reasonably be questioned does NOT
require scienter Scienter Defined: 1. A degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act‘s having been done knowingly, esp.
as a ground for civil damages or criminal punishment. 2. A mental state consisting of an intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Black‟s Law Dictionary (8th Edition)

Even if Judge Guirola wanted to assert “lack of knowledge of a disqualifying circumstance” bearing
on the question of remedy, it does NOT eliminate the possibility that his IMPARTIALTY might
easily be questioned by other persons based on the facts, evidence and legal conclusions set forth in
this instant ―MFRF 10/23/13 MO&O‖ and the supporting Affidavit at EXHIBIT ―5‖ filed in this
Lawsuit. Liljeberg vs. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d
855, 47 Ed. Law Rep. 366, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 433 (1988). See EXHIBIT ―12‖ - Liljeberg
(Headnotes ONLY) attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
38.

39.

III.

KNOWLEDGE OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS: The facts, evidence and legal conclusion in this instant
―MFRF 10/23/13 MO&O‖ as well as Newsome‘s pleadings filed in this lawsuit will support Judge
Guirola‘s disqualification because he has personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary facts
concerning this lawsuit. W. Clay Jackson Enterprises Inc. vs. Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp.,
467 F.Supp. 801 (1979).
Judge Guirola‘s disqualification is further required in that his KNOWLEDGE of disputed facts consist of
matters of EXTRAJUDICIAL source. U.S. vs. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1985); Hale vs. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 17 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 928, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1602 (8th Cir. 1985).

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE:
While it appears that the “sleeping dog” appears to have awakened and this case is moving forward, let us see

HOW long it takes for Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome to get this matter before a JURY and the DEFAULT
JUDGMENT to which she is legally and lawfully entitled to. This Court/Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. mistakenly asserts
through its FRAUDLENT practices and in keeping with this Court‘s/Judge Guirola‘s AIDING and ABETTING in the
CONTINUED CONSPIRACIES leveled against Newsome that the six-year statute of limitations asserted by Newsome is
in error. If so, then WHY has this Court DELIBERATELY and with MALICIOUS and FRAUDULENT intent withheld
information regarding the Conflicts-of-Interest present as well as its knowledge of “CONTINUING TORT” laws which
Page 19 of 37

clearly TOLLS any such claims to strip, shut down and shield/hide the fact that Newsome‘s Complaint has been filed
within the statute of limitations governing ―CONTINUING TORT‖ actions. In further support, Newsome states:
40.

Under Federal Law, the Mississippi‘s CATCH-ALL statute, the SIX years statute is applicable:
Truvillion vs. King's Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. Miss. 1980) - .
. .(4) claim against employer grounded on civil rights statute was governed by
Mississippi six-year catchall statute of limitations rather than three-year statute
of limitations governing unwritten contracts. . . .
[6] Job discrimination suit filed under civil rights statute was
governed by Mississippi six-year catchall statute of limitations, rather than
three-year statute of limitations governing unwritten contracts. . .
[6] . . ."(a) person suing under Section 1981 to enforce his right to
be free of discrimination predicates his claim on the right to contract
guaranteed in the statute. The contractual nature of claim under Section 1981
dictates application. . . But the statutory right Ms. Truvillion asserts is not the
right to enforce an unwritten contract as the district court assumed . . .
Because Mississippi has no statute of limitations designed to cover actions
seeking redress for the tort of employment discrimination, the State's catch-all
statute is applicable. [FN16] See Heath v. D.H. Baldwin Co., N.D. Miss. 1979,
447 F.Supp. 495, 504; Walton v. Utility Products, Inc., N.D. Miss. 1976, 424
F.Supp. 1145, 1147. The statute runs for six years, and does not bar Ms.
Truvillion's claim.
FN16. The statute provides:
All actions for which no other period of limitation is
prescribed shall be commenced within six years next after
the cause of such action accrued, and not after.
See EXHIBIT ―13‖ – Truvillion matter (Headnotes ONLY) attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

41.

Newsome‘s Complaint is premised on § 1981 claims and other supporting statutes/laws governing
said matters.
While this Court/Judge Guirola wants to assert that Newsome erred in the application
of the SIX-year statute of limitations to the claims/issues raised in her Complaint, it is
UNDISPUTED that Newsome‘s Complaint claims and provide supporting documentation of the
ONGOING civil rights violations leveled against her and the ONGOING conspiracies which
CONTINUES to date by Named Defendants and those with whom they CONSPIRE and, therefore,
are governed by the “CONTINUING TORT” claims and, therefore, tolls any alleged statute of
limitations claimed to have expired. While it appears that Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. mocks
Newsome‘s Complaint alleging it ― spans over 321 pages, 740 numbered paragraphs with sub-parts
and 282 pages of exhibits‖ [See Doc. No. 32 at Pgs. 4-5] and asserts that her claims are BARRED by
the THREE-year statute of limitation, this Court will find that through DECEPTIVE and
FRAUDULENT practices in his role of fulfilling conspiracy duties, it is CLEAR he CRAFTILY
steers clear of addressing the TIMELY defense of Newsome supporting the CONTINUING TORT
claims in which the statute of limitation begins to run AFTER each/every OVERT act committed
until desisted – i.e. which to date CONTINUES and has NOT stopped.

42.

¶30 at Pgs. 10-11
¶40 at Pg. 14
¶50 at Pg. 15
¶90 at Pg. 26
¶91 at Pgs. 26-27
¶92 at Pg. 28

This Court/Judge Guirola mistakenly asserts, “Newsome is apparently unaware that Miss. Code Ann.
§ 15-1-49 has been amended since July of 1989 to provide that „all actions for which no other period
of limitations is prescribed shall be commenced with three (3) years next after the cause of such
action accrued, and not after.‟” See at Page 6, FN 2 (Doc. 32).
However, NOTE how
DELIBERATE this Court/Judge Guirola steers CLEAR of the “CONTINUE TORT” issues/claims
that is REPEATEDLY supported throughout the Complaint in this lawsuit and supporting
EXHIBITS; for instance at following Paragraphs/Page(s) of the Complaint [Doc. No. 1]:
¶188 at Pgs. 62-64
¶189 at Pg. 64
¶207 at Pg. 70
¶209 at Pg. 70
¶210 at Pgs. 71-72
¶211 at Pg. 72

¶337 at Pg. 122
¶348 at Pg. 127
¶352 at Pg. 127
¶353 at Pgs. 128-129
¶354 at Pg. 129
¶366 at Pg. 135
Page 20 of 37

¶502 at Pg. 214
¶512 at Pg. 216
¶521 at Pg. 218
¶522 at Pgs. 219-220
¶523 at Pg. 220
¶543 at Pg. 228

¶631 at Pg. 278
¶646 at Pg. 288
¶647 at Pg. 288
¶648 at Pg. 288
¶650 at Pgs. 288-289
¶651 at Pg. 289

¶98 at Pg. 32
¶99 at Pgs. 33-34
¶100 at Pg. 34
¶118 at Pg. 40
¶154 at Pgs. 48-49
¶155 at Pgs. 49-50
¶156 at Pg. 50
¶159 at Pg. 53
¶166 at Pg. 54
¶167 at Pgs. 55-56
¶168 at Pg. 56
¶187 at Pg. 62

¶235 at Pg. 78
¶236 at Pg. 78
¶237 at Pg. 78
¶241 at Pg. 79
¶246 at Pg. 80
¶251 at Pgs. 80-81
¶256 at Pg.82
¶257 at Pgs. 83-84
¶258 at Pg. 84
FN 37 at Pg. 86 (xvii)
¶268 at Pg. 89
¶335 at Pg. 121

¶368 at Pg. 137
¶382 at Pgs. 145-146
¶410 at Pgs. 154-155
¶411 at Pg. 155
¶441 at Pg. 172
¶469 at Pgs. 203-204
¶475 at Pg. 206
¶479 at Pg. 206
¶480 at Pgs. 207-208
¶481 at Pg. 208
¶487 at Pg. 213
¶497 at Pg. 214

¶557 at Pg. 230
¶585 at Pg. 245
¶586 at Pgs. 246-247
¶587 at Pg. 247
¶603 at Pg. 258
¶607 at Pgs. 265-266
¶611 at Pg. 268
¶612 at Pgs. 269-270
¶613 at Pg. 270
¶628 at Pg. 276
¶629 at Pg. 276
¶630 at Pgs. 276-277

¶658 at Pg. 292
¶666 at Pgs. 293-294
¶672 at Pg. 295
¶673 at Pg. 296
¶674 at Pg. 296
¶692 at Pg. 301
¶704 at Pg. 305
¶708 at Pg. 305
¶713 at Pg. 306
¶714 at Pg. 307
¶715 at Pg. 308
FN11 at Pg. 314

Thus, if this Court/Judge Guirola really believed that the THREE-years statute of limitation was
applicable to this instant lawsuit (when it is NOT), then WHY the CRIMINAL and FRAUDULENT
practices in the handling of this lawsuit. Moreover, FAILURE to ACKNOWLEDGE that even to date
the CONSPIRACIES alleged in Newsome‘s Complaint giving rise to claims is CONTINUING! Thus,
supporting pleading has been filed within the THREE-years and SIX-years statutes of limitation.
43.

UNDISPUTED is the fact, that Newsome‘s instant lawsuit has been filed within the six-year statute of
limitation governing said matters but also within the three-year statute of limitation period in that, as
evidenced in this instant lawsuit, this Court and Named Defendants CONTINUE to engage in
conspiracies that affect Newsome‘s “EQUAL Rights Under the Laws!” Therefore, with EACH overt
act by Named Defendants, Newsome‘s claims become subject to ―TOLLING‖ doctrine
requirements. PERTINENT and RELEVANT information KNOWN to this Court. For instance, in
reviewing the record of this Court there is record evidence that ANOTHER one of Baker Donelson‘s
FRONTING Firm (Phelps Dunbar) in another lawsuit involving Newsome addresses the
IMPORTANCE of the ―CONTINUING TORT‖ and its applicability – Walker vs. Epps, 550 F.3d
407 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008):
Under Mississippi law, ―continuing tort,‖ for which limitations period resets at each
wrongful act, is one inflicted over period of time; it involves wrongful conduct that is
repeated until desisted. See EXHIBIT ―14‖ – Walker matter (Headnotes ONLY) attached
hereto and incorporated by reference.

44.

UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome‘s Complaint is premised on 42 USC § 1981 claims and
subject to “continuing tort” limitations. This is why it appears this Court masked through
FRIVOLOUS Opinions asserting a THREE-year statute of limitation rather than a SIX-year statute
of limitation in which regardless of which statute is applicable, the Complaint in this lawsuit meets
the PRIMA FACIE requirements for 42 USC § 1981 claims and are further protected under the
statute of limitation governing ―CONTINUING tort!‖
Newsome‘s Complaint asserts
―CONTINUING‖ violations – i.e. which, as evidenced in this instant lawsuit, continues!
Moreover, there are case laws to support that the six-year statute of limitation under the CATCHALL clause is still binding to date and NOT the THREE-year statute this Court/Judge Louis Guirola
is mistakenly and erroneously attempting to assert to deprive Newsome justice – i.e. due process and
equal protection of the laws, etc.:
Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (1973) - [18] Where continuing
violations were alleged, complaint under statute providing that all persons within United
States shall have same right to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens
was not barred by limitation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981
Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, Miss., 911 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. Miss. 1990) - In case in
which original violation occurred outside statute of limitations, but is closely related to
other violations that are not time barred, recovery may be had for all violations, on theory
that they are part of one, continuing violation.
Stevens v. Lake, 615 So.2d 1177 (Miss.,1993) - ―Continuing injury‖ doctrine did not
enable surviving business partners to avoid bar of six-year statute of limitations
applicable to legal . . . action alleging attorneys' negligent failure to record trust prepared
for now-deceased partner, even though surviving partners continued to sustain losses
each year after alleged negligence; attorneys' alleged act of negligence occurred entirely
Page 21 of 37

in year that was more than six years before malpractice suit was filed. Code 1972, § 15-149.
Randolph v. Lambert, 926 So.2d 941 (Miss.App.,2006) - If the claim is a continuing tort,
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the date of the last injury.
WW, Inc. v. Rainbow Casino-Vicksburg Partnership, L.P., 2011 WL 4037024 (Miss.
2011) - Where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the cause of action accrues
at, and limitations begin to run from, the date of the last injury, or when the tortious acts
cease.
Bryant v. Military Department of Mississippi, 597 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. Miss. 2010) - Under
Mississippi law, a ―continuing tort,‖ for which the statute of limitations is tolled, is one
inflicted over a period of time, it involves a wrongful conduct that is repeated until
desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action.

45.

UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome‘s Complaint is premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims – i.e
as RECOGNIZED and CONFIRMED by this Court/Judge Guirola. So while this Court/Judge
Guirola DELIBERATELY makes the mistake that, “since July of 1989 to provide that „all actions
for which no other period of limitations is prescribed shall be commenced with three (3) years next
after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.‟”
Gates vs. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. S.D. Miss. 1985) - FN1. Although Mrs. Gates
formally denominated her complaint as being brought pursuant to ― Title 42, U.S.C.,
Section 1981, et seq.‖, the substance of the complaint states a cause of action only under
section 1983. We therefore treat Mrs. Gates' claim as one brought pursuant to § 1983.
FN2. Section 15-1-49. Limitations applicable to actions not otherwise
specifically provided for. - All actions for which no other period of limitation is
prescribed shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of such action
accrued, and not after.
. . . The six-year statute (section 15-1-49) is more general in the sense that it is
a general residual statute that applies to a broad class of actions-tort, contract or statutorynot otherwise provided for. – See EXHIBIT ―15‖ – Gates matter (Headnotes ONLY)
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.
Boykin vs. Georgia-Pacific Corporation, 706 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. SD Miss.) - [6] Statute
of limitations applicable in employment discrimination case was six-year Mississippi
catchall statute. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.;
Miss.Code 1972, §§ 15-1-29, 15-1-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981
. . . This court held that the statute of limitations applicable to Section 1981
claims is the six year Mississippi catch-all statute. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1972).
Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 815 (5th Cir.1982). Truvillion v.
King's Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520, 528 ( 5th Cir.1980)
- See EXHIBIT
―16‖ – Boykin matter (Headnotes ONLY) attached hereto and incorporated by reference
as if set forth in full herein.

46.

UNDISPUTED is the fact that Newsome‘s Complaint is premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims;
however, are subject to the SAME rubric of analysis for Title VII claims. Raggs v. Mississippi Power
& Light Co, 278 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. Miss. 2002) i.e. EMPHASIS added in that the year 2002 is clearly
well AFTER the July of 1989 (approximately 13 years) interposed by this Court/Judge Guirola and the
Federal Courts recognize the SIX-YEAR statute of limitations governed by claims brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1981.
Payne vs. Travenol Laboratories Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. N.D. Miss) - [21] Title VII
and section 1981, although both applying to employment discrimination cases, have
independent remedies and independent statutes of limitations. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §
701 et seq. as amended 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.
[23] Mississippi's six-year statute of limitations governed civil rights claim
brought under section 1981, so that if proof supported it plaintiffs could represent section
1981 race discrimination class beginning six years before date when complaint was filed
in 1972. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; Miss.Code 1972, § 15-1-49. . . .
FN22. Mississippi Code Annotated, Section 15-1-49 (1972) provides:
Page 22 of 37

All actions for which no other period of limitations is prescribed shall be commenced
within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.
See EXHIBIT ―17‖ – Payne matter (Headnotes ONLY) attached hereto and

See EXHIBIT ―18‖ - Walton v. Utility Products, Inc. (Headnotes ONLY) attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full herein. This citation is not new to the Defendants
in this lawsuit in that it is addressed at Footnote (“Fn.”) 6 at page 7 of the Complaint. Along with other
case law provided in:
Heath v. D. H. Baldwin Co., 447 F.Supp. 495 (N.D.Miss.Greenville.Div., 1977) General six-year statute of limitations in Mississippi was applicable to suit by . .
.employee against employer . . . claiming racial discrimination. Code Miss. 1972, § 151-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981.
Howard v. Sun Oil Co., 294 F.Supp. 24 (S.D.Miss.Hattiesburg.Div.,1967) - Ordinarily,
suit in tort for damages brought more than six years after commission of tort is barred
by Mississippi six-year statute of limitations. Code Miss.1942, § 722.
Heath vs. D. H. Baldwin Company, 447 F.Supp. 495 (N.D. Miss. 1977) - . . . (4)
Mississippi six-year statute of limitations was applicable to action under Civil Rights Act
of 1870 . . .
[5] General six-year statute of limitations in Mississippi was applicable to suit
by laid off employee against employer and union claiming racial discrimination. Code
Miss. 1972, § 15-1-49; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. . . .
For the reasons set forth by Chief Judge Keady in Walton v. Utility Products,
Inc., 424 F.Supp. 1145, 1147, (N.D. Miss. 1976) the court finds that the 6-year limitation
period of Miss. Code Ann. s 15-1-49 (1972) is applicable and therefore Heath's s 1981
claim was timely filed. Defendants' motion to dismiss the s 1981 claim is not well taken
and will be denied.

47.

While this Court/Judge Guirola ACKNOWLEDGE Plaintiff Newsome‘s filing of “Motion to Show
Proof of Legal Authority/Motion Challenging Authority to Appear” (deliberately leaving of JURY
DEMAND issue) the record is SILENT on the ruling of Motion and evidence provided to support it.
Thus, a reasonable mind may conclude and support BIAS and PREJUDICE in the handling of this
matter; moreover, how “strange such a far departure from the laws when it is the MANDATORY
DUTY of this Court to superintend the conduct of officers of this Court; however, DELIBERATELY
and with MALICIOUS intent fail to inquire by what authority this stranger (Paula Graves Ardelean
and her law firm Butler Snow) is attempting to enter this lawsuit:”
Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S. 315, 47 S.Ct. 361 (U.S., 1927) - [1] The
question as to the authority of counsel was raised by motion to dismiss filed with the
answer. There was a hearing upon the motion, but the trial court of its own accord
postponed a decision upon it until final hearing on the merits, an order clearly within its
discretion. Whether, as a matter of practice, the challenge to the authority of counsel
was seasonably interposed, it is not important to decide, for in any event the trial court,
or this court, has power, at any stage of the case, to require an attorney, one of its
officers, to show his authority to appear. In The King of Spain v. Oliver, Fed. Cas. No.
7,814, 2 Wash. C. C. 429, 430, Mr. Justice Washington, sitting in the Circuit Court
said:
‗* * * It would be strange, if a court whose DUTY it is to SUPERINTEND
the conduct of its officers, should not have the power to inquire by what authority an
attorney of that court undertakes . . . to defend, in the name of another-whether that
other is a real or fictitious person, and whether its process is used for the purpose of
vexation or fraud, instead of that for which alone it is intended. The only question can
be, as to the time and manner of calling for the authority, and as to the remedy, . . . and
ought to be adapted to the case.‘
See, also, W. A. Gage & Co. v. Bell (D. C.) 124 F. 371, 380; McKiernan et al.
v. Patrick et al., 4 How, (Miss.) 333, 335; Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534, 539, 541;
Miller v. Assurance Co., 233 Mo. 91, 99, 134 S. W. 1003, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 102;
Munhall v. Mitchell, 178 Mo. App. 494, 501, 163 S. W. 912; San Francisco Savings
Union v. Long, 123 Cal. 107, 113, 55 P. 708.

Page 23 of 37

The RECORD EVIDENCE supports that each of the Named Defendants have entered “Waiver of the
Service of Summons” to support they are representing THEMSELVES in this matter. See Doc. Nos.
7, 12 and 13 of this instant lawsuit. Moreover, that Named Defendants are either Attorneys and/or
have Legal background experience to support having KNOWLEDGE and/or should have KNOWN
that they were entering the lawsuit in their INDIVIDUAL capacities and/or business capacities,
therefore, based on said document, KNEW that if indeed the law firm of Butler Snow and/or its
attorneys would be representing them, that the MANDATORY “Appearance” document(s) are
required to proceed in representation and to override the “Waiver of the Service of Summons”
EXECUTED by each of them. However, Named Defendants in CONTINUING their CRIMINAL
and CIVIL violations leveled against Newsome, elected to CONTINUE Conspiracies with their
CONSPIRATORS and in so doing have WAIVED any such claims to legal representation by the Law
Firm of Butler Snow!
No person has the right to appear as another's attorney without the other's authority
(Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S. 315, 47 S.Ct. 361, 71 L.Ed. 658 (1927); Dunkley
v. Shoemate, 350 N.C. 573, 515 S.E.2d 442 (1999)) whether the other is a natural person
or a corporation (Pueblo of Santa Rosa).
McKiernan v. Patrick, 4 Howard 333 (Miss.,1840) - Where the authority of an attorney of
record is disputed, he may be required to produce it.

48.

Furthermore, a reasonable mind may conclude that Butler Snow‘s/Paula Graves Ardelean made a
CONSCIOUS and DELIBERATE defense tactic which has BACKFIRED – i.e. thinking that because
Newsome is proceeding pro se, she would not have been able to find out about the MANDATORY
legal requirement for ―Entry of Appearance.‖ A reasonable mind may further conclude that said
failure by Butler Snow was a ―STRATEGIC‖ move to SHIELD it from LIABILITY which has proven
to be a FATAL blow to any such defense that the Named Defendants may assert.

49.

If Named Defendants retained the law firm of Butler Snow (which they did NOT), then they are
therefore BOUND any acts in their FAILURE to file the MANDATORY Appearance documents as
well as by the CRIMINAL and FRAUDULENT acts of this stranger (Ardelean) and/or her law firm
(Butler Snow).
Hoffman v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 92 U.S. 161 (U.S.Ohio,1875) - Within the
sphere of authority conferred, an act of an agent is as binding upon the principal as if it
were done by the principal himself.

A.

FAILURE TO ENTER APPEARANCE:
This Court‘s/Judge Guirola‘s PREJUDICE and BIAS is also evidence in his handling of this
matter. While Judge Guirola has ATTACKED Plaintiff Newsome for being pro se and responsible for her
fate if such errors are made by stating:
―While pro se pleadings are viewed less stringently, a petitioner who elects to proceed pro
se must comply with the applicable procedural and substantive rules of law.‖

when it comes to the Named Defendants, a FAR DEPARTURE from the statutes/laws have been made;
moreover, this Court is attempting to make SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS and extend SPECIAL FAVORS that
are PROHIBITED by the Rules of this Court as well as are in violation of the statutes/laws governing said
matters:
Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S. 315, 47 S.Ct. 361 (U.S., 1927) - [1] The question as to the
authority of counsel was raised by motion to dismiss filed with the answer. There was a hearing
upon the motion, but the trial court of its own accord postponed a decision upon it until final
hearing on the merits, an order clearly within its discretion. Whether, as a matter of practice, the
challenge to the authority of counsel was seasonably interposed, it is not important to decide, for
in any event the trial court, or this court, has power, at any stage of the case, to require an
attorney, one of its officers, to show his authority to appear. In The King of Spain v. Oliver, Fed.
Cas. No. 7,814, 2 Wash. C. C. 429, 430, Mr. Justice Washington, sitting in the Circuit Court said:
‗* * * It would be strange, if a court whose DUTY it is to SUPERINTEND the conduct
of its officers, should not have the power to inquire by what authority an attorney of that court
Page 24 of 37

undertakes . . . to defend, in the name of another-whether that other is a real or fictitious person,
and whether its process is used for the purpose of vexation or fraud, instead of that for which
alone it is intended. The only question can be, as to the time and manner of calling for the
authority, and as to the remedy, . . . and ought to be adapted to the case.‘
See, also, W. A. Gage & Co. v. Bell (D. C.) 124 F. 371, 380; McKiernan et al. v.
Patrick et al., 4 How, (Miss.) 333, 335; Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534, 539, 541; Miller v.
Assurance Co., 233 Mo. 91, 99, 134 S. W. 1003, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 102; Munhall v. Mitchell, 178
Mo. App. 494, 501, 163 S. W. 912; San Francisco Savings Union v. Long, 123 Cal. 107, 113, 55
P. 708.
No person has the right to appear as another's attorney without the other's authority (Pueblo of
Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U.S. 315, 47 S.Ct. 361, 71 L.Ed. 658 (1927); Dunkley v. Shoemate, 350
N.C. 573, 515 S.E.2d 442 (1999)) whether the other is a natural person or a corporation (Pueblo
of Santa Rosa).
McKiernan v. Patrick, 4 Howard 333 (Miss.,1840) - Where the authority of an attorney of record
is disputed, he may be required to produce it.

The record evidence will sustain Named Defendants each executed “Waiver of Service of Summons” – See Doc.
Nos. 7, 12, 13 of this instant lawsuit. Furthermore, the record evidence will support that Plaintiff Newsome has timely,
properly and adequately demanded PROOF that this stranger (Paula Graves Ardelean and/or law firm Butler Snow) was
retained by Named Defendants to represent them in this lawsuit.

50.

While this Court‘s Judge Guirola states,
(‗[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.‘) This Plaintiff,
like any other, is BOUND by PROCEDURAL and substantial law.

he clearly is acting with MALICE, BIAS and PREJUDICE as well as CONSPIRING in the allowance
of FRAUDULENT practices and the OBSTRUCTING of justice by an outside person/law firm that is
NOT legally/lawfully before this Court in this instant lawsuit. Thus, a reasonable mind may conclude
that Named Defendants, like any other, are BOUND by PROCEDURAL and substantial law that this
Court/Judge Guirola has asserted that Newsome is ―BOUND‖ by. Thus a reasonable mind may
conclude that this Court/Judge Guirola is also engaging in DISCRIMINATORY practices which
INFRINGES and DEPRIVES Newsome rights secured and guaranteed under the Constitution and
other statutes/laws governing said matters.
51.

The RECORD EVIDENCE will support that Plaintiff Newsome TIMELY, PROPERLY and
ADEQUATELY submitted for filing with this Court her Motion entitled, ―Motion to Show Proof of
Legal Authority/Motion Challenging Authority to Appear (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action)”
along with SUPPORTING Exhibits which went UNDISPUTED by the Named Defendants:
Terrain Enterprises, Inc. v. Western Cas. and Sur. Co., 774 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. Miss. 1985)
- Burden of showing attorney had no authority to act is upon party denying such authority.
Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc. v. Ministry of Defense of Republic of Venezuela, 575
F.3d 491 (5th Cir. Miss. 2009) - Under Mississippi law, the burden of showing that an
attorney does not have the authority to enter a settlement is on the party denying such
authority.
Gulf Coast Motor Exp. Co. v. Lott, 157 So. 469 (Miss.,1934) - Attorney may be required to
show his authority to represent client when it is properly challenged, but when so shown, it
devolves on party challenging it to show by positive proof that it is insufficient.

Page 25 of 37

52.

There is evidence to support that the stranger, Paula Graves Ardelean, is aware that the
MANDATORY Appearance document is required BEFORE she could proceed in representing Named
Defendants in this matter. Upon doing research, Newsome was able to obtain ―APPEARANCE‖
documents on behalf of clients entered by Ardelean in other matters outside this instant lawsuit. See
EXHIBIT ―19‖ – attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

53.

Newsome again REITERATES that even with the use of MAGNIFY GLASS, this Court will NOT
find any FACTS, EVIDENCE nor LEGAL CONCLUSIONS provided in the record of this Court by
Named Defendants to sustain that an ―APPEARANCE‖ has been made by this stranger (Paula Graves
Ardelean) and/or her law firm (Butler Snow) to sustain that she and or her law firm is properly before
this Court in this instant lawsuit or has legal authority to file pleadings on behalf of Named
Defendants. The United States Supreme Court is FIRM on said requirement(s):
Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824) - In case of a corporation, as well as of an
individual, appearance by an attorney, legally admitted to practice, is received as
evidence of his authority to represent the party in court.
The entry of appearance by an attorney is itself presumptive evidence of his or her
authority to represent the person for whom he or she appears (Hill v. Mendenhall, 88
U.S. 453, 22 L.Ed. 616, 1874 WL 17477 (1874). The presumption is rebuttable (State
ex rel. A.M.T. v. Weinstein, 411 S.W.2d 267 (1967)), but the appearance of an attorney
for one of the parties is generally deemed sufficient proof of his or her authority for the
opposite party and for the court (Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 6 L.Ed. 204,
1824 WL 2682 (1824)).

54.

Through Newsome‘s ―Motion to Show Proof of Legal Authority/Motion Challenging Authority to
Appear (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action)” she DEMANDED that the relationship of attorneyclient relationship between Named Defendants and this stranger (Paula Graves Ardelean/Butler Snow)
be PROVEN by the PRODUCTION of contract/agreement (i.e. Retainer, Power of Attorney, etc.)
and/or law to sustain any such claims to legal authority to represent Named Defendants; moreover,
PROOF that an ―Entry of Appearance‖ and/or ―Appearance‖ document was entered by this stranger
and/or her law firm:
Hirsch Bros. & Co. v. R.E. Kennington Co., 124 So. 344 (Miss.,1929) - Relation of
attorney and client must be created by contract or by law.
Mere fact that one has acted as attorney for another does not alone and of
itself create relation. Id.

55.

The record evidence in this lawsuit CLEARLY sustains that each of the Named Defendants executed
―Waiver of the Service of Summons‖ on THEIR own behalf and NOT through this stranger (Paula
Graves Ardelean/Butler Snow). See Doc. Nos. 7, 12 and 13 of this instant lawsuit.
Rains v. Gardner, 719 So.2d 768 (Miss.App.,1998) - A person may waive process and
enter an appearance; that appearance may be made by an attorney authorized by the
party to do so.
Statements by the counsel for one defendant concerning the propriety of
dismissing the codefendant did not represent a waiver of process and a voluntary
appearance by the codefendant; counsel unequivocally stated that he did not represent
the codefendant, and there was no evidence that counsel actually represented the
codefendant. Id.

56.

The record evidence will further support that through Newsome‘s ―Motion to Show Proof of Legal
Authority/Motion Challenging Authority to Appear (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action)” filed with
Court the applicable relief and EVIDENCE was sought:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED Newsome moves this Court to:
(a) require Named Defendants to PRODUCE proof of evidence to sustain
that this stranger (Paula Grave Ardelean) and/or her law firm (Butler, Snow, O‘Mara,
Page 26 of 37

Stevens & Cannada, PLLC) was retained to represent them and file the pleadings
UNLAWFULLY/ILLEGAL submitted via this Court‘s Electronic Filing System;
(b) Initiate and INVESTIGATION as to whether Named Defendants, this
stranger (Ardelean) and her law firm (BSOS&C) has committed FRAUD upon this
Court – i.e. if violations of criminal acts are found that the applicable actions be taken
by this Court to PUNISH and deter Named Defendants, this stranger (Ardelean), her
law firm (BSOS&C) and those who conspired to carry out such criminal/civil wrongs
upon this Court and Newsome; . . .

See Doc. No. 30 of this instant lawsuit.

IV.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN THIS LAWSUIT
The record evidence will support that the Complaint filed in this instant lawsuit clearly sets forth request fo JURY

DEMAND [See Doc. No. 1] as well as support REPEATED claims for JURY relief in subsequent pleading filed by
Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome. In REITERATION of JURY DEMAND and in further support thereof, Newsome states:
57.

The RECORD EVIDENCE of this Court will sustain Newsome‘s REPEATEDLY REITERATING
―JURY‖ Demand and did NOT waive right to have issues presented to jury and allow this Court/Judge
Louis Guirola, Jr. to decide ISSUES in DISPUTE! The Supreme Court of the United States‘ decisions
and that of the FIFTH Circuit Court of Appeals are clear on litigants‘ rights to have matters tried by
JURY and NOT by the court as Judge Guirola has attempted to do in his ROLE in the conspiracies
leveled against Newsome:
Constitutional right to trial by jury in suits at common law will be scrupulously
safeguarded by Supreme Court. Lyon v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acci. Asso., 305 US
484, 83 L Ed 303, 59 S Ct 297, reh den (1939) 306 US 667
In absence of waiver of right to trial by jury, it is VIOLATION of Seventh
Amendment for federal court to substitute itself for jury, pass upon effect of
evidence, find facts involved in case, and render judgment. Baylis v. Travellers‟ Ins.
Co., 113 US 316, 28 L Ed 989, 5 S Ct 494.
Court should not take case from jury where evidence is conflicting or different
conclusions may be drawn from undisputed facts. Woodard v. Atlantic C.L. R. , 57
F 2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1932).
Upon motion for jury trial, court should grant same in absence of compelling
reasons to contrary, even though time for demanding jury trial has expired. Albert v.
R.P. Farnsworth & Co., 176 F 2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949)
Right to jury trial in civil cases under Seventh Amendment may be waived by failure
to make timely demand for it; however, although judge is not required to allow
UNTIMELY request for jury trial, court should grant trial in absence of strong and
compelling reasons to contrary. Cox v. C. H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F 2d 138
(5th Cir. 1979)

58.

Because of the DISPUTED issues raised in Newsome‘s Complaint and her subsequent pleadings (i.e.
which are to be resolved through a jury trial), she has been deprived DUE PROCESS, equal
PROTECTION of the laws and privileges and immunities secured/guaranteed under the Constitution
of the United States and other governing statutes/laws of the United States of America:
Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 949 F.Supp. 456 (N.D.Miss.E.Div.,1996) Essential characteristic of federal system is the manner in which, in civil
common-law actions, it assigns trial functions between judge and jury
and, under the influence if not the command of Seventh Amendment, assigns
decisions of disputed questions of fact to jury. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 7.
[22] [23] As already noted by the court in this case, this court has
determined that there remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether
Page 27 of 37

11/06/13 REBUTTAL MOTION TO 102313 RULING (MMS).

11/06/13 REBUTTAL MOTION TO 102313 RULING (MMS).

Empfohlen

Empfohlen

Weitere ähnliche Inhalte

Andere mochten auch

Andere mochten auch (19)

Ähnlich wie 11/06/13 REBUTTAL MOTION TO 102313 RULING (MMS).

Ähnlich wie 11/06/13 REBUTTAL MOTION TO 102313 RULING (MMS). (20)

Kürzlich hochgeladen

Kürzlich hochgeladen (9)

11/06/13 REBUTTAL MOTION TO 102313 RULING (MMS).