012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)

HAMILTON COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC : CASE NO.: 09CV01690
1109 Alfred Street :
Cincinnati, Ohio :
Plaintiff :
:
vs. : DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO
: COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY
Denise V. Newsome : AND DETAINER; NOTIFICATION
Post Office Box 14731 : ACCOMPANYING COUNTER-CLAIM;
Cincinnati, Ohio 45250 : COUNTER-CLAIM AND DEMAND FOR
Defendant : JURY TRIAL1

COMES NOW Defendant, named as Denise V. Newsome (“Defendant”) and presents

this, her Answer to Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer; Notification Accompanying

Counter-Claim; Counter-Claim and Demand for Jury Trial in the above referenced matter. In

support thereof, Defendant states:

DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO
COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

1. Defendant denies the allegation contained in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff’s
Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Defendant has no knowledge of Plaintiff, Stor-
All Alfred, LLC (“Stor-All” or “Plaintiff”), being the owner (not “owner and landlord”
of the “premises located at 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Hamilton County, Ohio
45214.” This appears to be a factual assertion and/or allegation by Stor-All and a
discoverable issue; however, Stor-All has presented no evidence to support its ownership
of said premises. In its craftiness in the use of the pen, Stor-All is attempting to mislead
this Court and the Defendant by intentionally and purposefully omitting the fact that it is
not Defendant’s landlord. Furthermore, Stor-All has failed to present any factual
documentation/evidence (i.e. Rental Agreement) to support its assertion that Defendant is
a tenant of it. There is no contract, lease and/or rental agreement between Stor-All and

1
Boldface, Italics and Underline added for emphasis. Legal Resource materials utilized: American
Jurisprudence Pleading and Practice Forms, Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, West’s Ohio Digest, Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure, etc.)

EXHIBIT
Page 1 of 51
104

Defendant. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the
judicial process and/or legal process.

2. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff’s
Complaint. Without waiving said denial, this again appears to be a factual assertion
accusing Defendant of being “in default of her rental agreement for failure to pay rent.”
However, Stor-All has failed to produce the rental agreement it relies upon because no
such rental agreement exist between Stor-All and the Defendant. Said allegation by Stor-
All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.

Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Defendant is in receipt of a “NOTICE TO
LEAVE THE PREMISES” mailed to her on or about January 9, 2009 and not January 9,
2008. In said document Stor-All identifies itself as “Landlord: Stor-All Alfred, LLC. .
.;” however, has failed to produce any factual documentation to assert such a claim. Stor-
All has failed as alleged “Landlord” to provide any evidence to sustain a Landlord and
Tenant relationship because no such relationship exist between Stor-All and the
Defendant; moreover, no such document to sustain such an allegation. Stor-All was not
authorized by Ohio statutes/laws to execute and/or serve such a notice identifying itself
as Defendant’s landlord. Such action by Stor-All may be implied as being done with
deceit and fraudulent intent. Furthermore, said action of Stor-All in the service of such
notice, is an abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.

Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Stor-All has presented no factual
documentation to support a contract between it and Defendant. In Paragraphs 2 and 4,
Stor-All alleges Defendant has been in default “From and after, April 1, 2008;” then,
asserts in Paragraph 4, “Defendant has, since Janury 19, 2009, unlawfully and forcibly
detained from the Plaintiff possession of the above-described premises;” however,
presents no factual documentation to support such allegations. Defendant on July 27,
2007, entered into a Rental Agreement with Crown Storage-Camp Washington for the
storage unit located at 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45214; therefore, Defendant
is in legal possession of storage “Unit 173.” See EXHIBIT “1” – Rental Agreement
attached hereto and incorporated by reference. Said Agreement being provided to the
Defendant by Stor-All upon request. There is no contractual and/or rental agreement
between Stor-All and Defendant. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its
abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

Defendant incorporates herein by reference her answers set forth in Paragraphs 1 through

4 above as if fully restated and/or set forth herein. Defendant further states in response:

Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Defendant denies that she “is indebted to

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Plaintiff for rent and late fees in the amount of $552.39.” Moreover, while Stor-All
makes such allegation and/or assertion, it has presented no evidence to sustain the debt it
alleges it is entitled to. Stor-All alleges Defendant owes the debt; however, has failed; (a)
to prove that there is such a debt – has provided no documentation to sustain such a claim
and/or that Plaintiff had agreed to such or obtained any such services warranting such
charges, (b) how it arrived at said debt; and (c) its entitlement to said debt. Said
allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process
and/or legal process.

6. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in the unnumbered Paragraph
following Paragraph 5 which begins, “WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands restitution and
recovery of said Premises” in Stor-All’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, it is
important for this Court to know that Stor-All and/or others have unlawfully and illegally
seized the Premises it seeks this Court’s intervention on. Executing and enforcing its
own self-made forcible entry and detainer action over the Defendant’s objections.
Moreover, as a matter of law, Stor-All, its agents, representatives, etc. are not entitled to
the relief sought in said Paragraph. Therefore, this Court is to deny the relief Stor-All is
seeking. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the
judicial process and/or legal process.

7. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in the unnumbered Paragraph that
is blocked bearing a title, “NOTICE UNDER THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT.” Without waiving said denial, Stor-All, its agents, representatives,
etc. are not entitled to the debt they allege is owed by the Defendant. Moreover, Stor-All,
its agents, representatives, etc. is attempting to unlawfully and illegally collect a debt to
which it knows is fraudulent and/or false. Stor-All is liable and subject to the injury/harm
rendered and/or sustained by the Defendant for any bad faith actions – as its Complaint
for Forcible Entry and Detainer filed in this lawsuit – to collect a debt to which it has full
knowledge it is not entitled to. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse
of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.

NOTIFICATION ACCOMPANYING COUNTER-CLAIM

FOR THE PURPOSES OF AVOIDING VEXATIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE LITIGATION, NEEDLESSLY

INCREASING THE COST OF LITIGATION, ETC.: Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC, is hereby

NOTIFIED that should it elect to answer the Counter-Claim, that its responsive pleading shall

comply with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 82 and/or the applicable laws governing

said matters and those responses to Defendant’s Counter-Claim:

2
For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Rule 8 General Rules of
Pleadings – Wright & Miller Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3d.

Page 3 of 51

1. State in short and plain terms Stor-All’s defenses to each claim asserted
and shall admit or deny averments upon which it relies;

2. If Stor-All is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of an averment, it shall so state and this has the effect of a
denial. However, said denials shall fairly meet the substance of the
averments denied;

3. If Stor-All intend in good faith to deny only a part or qualification of an
averment, then it shall specify so much of it as is true and material and
shall deny only the remainder; and

4. Be subject to the provisions of Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11.
Stor-All’s (which includes, its attorneys, representatives, agents, etc.)
“failure to comply with Rule 11 is subject to possible disciplinary action.”
Stor-All’s signing of pleading constitutes a certificate of the following:

a. That the attorney (or party) has conducted a
reasonable inquiry;
b. That he or she is satisfied that the paper is well
grounded in fact;
c. That the pleading has a basis in existing law or that
the attorney (or party) has a good faith argument to
amend or reverse existing law;
d. That the pleading is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as harassment, delay, or needless
increase of his opponent’s costs of litigation.
. . . If the pleading or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule,
appropriate sanctions shall be imposed by the court on motion or on its own
initiative. Sanctions may include an order to pay the other party the amount
of reasonable expenses caused by the violation, including reasonable attorney
fees.3

Stor-All is hereby further NOTIFIED that:

5. It is to familiarize and/or acquaint itself with the Rules governing
responsive pleadings. Answers such as “failure to state a claim,” “lack of
subject matter jurisdiction,” provided for purposes of misrepresentation,

3
For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Niles Federal Civil Procedure
7.530 Signing of Pleadings, Motions and Other Papers.

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delay of proceedings, obstruction of justice, etc. will be subject to the
provisions of Rule 11.4

6. If Stor-All’s answer is not sufficiently definite in nature to give reasonable
notice of the allegations in the Counter-Claim sought to be placed in issue,
the Defendant’s, Denise Newsome’s (“Defendant”), averments may be
treated as admitted (i.e. a corporate defendant’s denial of “each and every
allegation” did not give “plain notice.”).5

7. A denial of knowledge or information requires that Stor-All not only lack
first-hand knowledge of the necessary facts involved, but also that Stor-All
lack information upon which it reasonably could form a personal belief
concerning the truth of the Defendant’s allegations.6

8. Normally, Stor-All may not assert lack of knowledge or information if the
necessary facts or data involved are within Stor-All’s knowledge or easily
brought within its knowledge – (i.e. An answer denying information as to
the truth or falsity of a matter necessarily within the knowledge of the
party’s managing officers is a sham, and will be treated as an admission
of allegation of the Counter-Claim.7)

9. An averment, that Stor-All is without knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to matters that are of common knowledge or of with it
can inform itself with the slightest effort, will be treated as patently false
and the effect and purpose will be taken as such to merely delay justice.8

10. If Stor-All’s Answer to the Counter-Claim is not incompliance with the
rules and/or laws governing responsive pleadings and/or said matters, the
applicable Motion to Strike the Answer will be filed and request for the
proper relief (i.e. sanctions against Stor-All and/or its attorney [if
applicable]) will be sought.

4
For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Niles Federal Civil Procedure
7.100 Pleadings Allowed through 7.262 Effect of Failure to Deny.
5
For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Wright & Miller Federal
Practice and Procedure Civil 3d § 1261.
6
Practice and Procedure Civil 3d § 1262.
7
Practice and Procedure Civil 3d § 1262 and also Harvey Aluminum (Inc.) v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 749, 758 (9th Cir.
1964)..
8
For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: See Reed v. Turner, 2 F.R.D.
12; and Squire v. Levan, 32 F.Supp. 437.

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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: That Defendant’s Counter-Claim has been filed in good

faith and has been drafted to save time and costs and/or expenses. Defendant can only hope that

Stor-All will allow wisdom to prevail.

Stor-All is also NOTIFIED that unless it serves and file a written response to the

Counter-Claim within the specified time allowed, the Defendant will seek judgment of and

against it by default for the relief demanded in the Counter-Claim.

DEFENDANT’S COUNTER-CLAIM and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

COMES NOW Defendant, Denise V. Newsome – a/k/a Denise Newsome (“Defendant”)

having answered and providing defense to Plaintiff’s, Stor-All Alfred, LLC’s (“Stor-All” or

“Plaintiff”), Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer, and without waiving said defenses

thereof, files this her Counter-Claim and Demand for Jury Trial.

Defendant herein incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 7 of Defendant’s Answer to

Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer as if set forth in full herein and reiterates her non-

waiver of the denials therein stated.

Statement of Facts:

1. On or about July 27, 2007, Defendant entered into a Rental Agreement
with Crown Storage-Camp Washington (“Crown Storage”). See EXHIBIT “1” attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

2. Crown Storage at all times mentioned was the owner and/or landlord
according to the Rental Agreement (Lease No. 2543) entered into with the Defendant.

3. On July 27, 2007, Defendant was lawfully possessed of a certain storage
Unit Numbered 173 located at 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Ohio, Hamilton County,
Ohio and lawfully possessed and owned the personal property placed in and/or contained
therein.

4. Defendant rented the storage unit from Crown Storage for $29.82 per
month and the rental contract was in full force and in effect at all times mentioned.

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5. Nothing in the Rental Agreement between Crown Storage and Defendant
states how such matters involving the property being sold during the Defendant’s tenancy
should be handled. Defendant did not agree to be bound by any terms and conditions of
said Rental Agreement upon Crown Storage through a sale of its property to another.

6. Under the Rental Agreement between Crown Storage and Defendant no
problem arose regarding unpaid rent. Defendant made payments in compliance with the
terms and conditions of the Rental Agreement entered into with Crown Storage.

7. Defendant has duly performed all conditions, covenants, and promises
required to be performed by her under the Rental Agreement entered into with Crown
Storage under its terms and conditions, except for those acts which have been prevented,
delayed or excused by acts or omissions of Stor-All and Crown Storage.

8. For approximately eight (8) months under the Rental Agreement between
Crown Storage and Defendant, Crown Storage had no problems in obtaining rent
payment from Defendant.

9. In April 2008, Stor-All unlawfully entered and seized the storage unit and
property of the Defendant. Said acts are in violation of within meaning of RC § 5321.04
of the Landlord and Tenant Act.

10. Problems arose with the Defendant’s rental of her storage unit after Stor-
All’s assertion of entitlement of Defendant’s rent and unlawful seizure of her property
and denial of access to said unit and property.

11. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s constructive eviction of
Defendant from the premises, Defendant suffers from mental anguish and pain, all to
Defendants general damage to be determined by a jury.

12. Stor-All’s constructive eviction of Defendant from the premises and the
unlawful/illegal seizure of her storage unit and property were retaliatory, oppressive and
malicious within the meaning of RC §5321.03, in that it has subjected the Defendant to
cruel and unjust hardship, harassment, threats, etc. in willful and conscious disregard of
Defendant’s rights, entitling Defendant to an award of punitive damages within meaning
of RC §521.12.

13. As a further proximate result of Stor-All’s conduct as alleged in its
Complaint and in this Counter-Complaint, Defendant will incur moving expenses and
additional increase in storage cost in an amount to be determined.

14. Defendant made it verbally known and in writing she was not interested
with leasing with Stor-All. Neither was she interested in entering a Rental Agreement
with Stor-All. As evidenced in the file of Stor-All regarding the Defendant, the “STOR-

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ALL LEASE AGREEMENT” to date remains unexecuted. See EXHIBIT “2” attached
hereto and incorporated by reference.

15. In or about April 2008, Stor-All claimed that Defendant went into default.
When Defendant submitted payment for her storage unit, it was rejected by Stor-All.
Payment was submitted under the terms and agreement of the Rental Agreement between
Crown Storage and the Defendant. Defendant advised of her objections. When
Defendant advised wanting to retrieve her property, Stor-All denied her request and
demanded that she pay monies for rent and late fees and lien charges applied.

16. In or about April 2008, Stor-All forcibly seized the Defendant’s storage
unit. Defendant did not authorize and/or agree to such forcible seizure.

17. In or about April 2008, Stor-All and Stor-All’s agent(s), representative(s),
etc. unlawfully invaded the Defendant’s storage unit. Defendant did not authorize and/or
agree to such invasion.

18. In or about April 2008, Stor-All and Stor-All’s agent(s), representative(s),
etc. forcibly seized the Defendant’s storage unit and prevented, interfered, refused and
denied Defendant access to her storage unit unless she gave it money.

19. Since April 2008, Defendant’s right to her storage unit was striped away
from her without legal and/or statutory authority by Stor-All. Defendant has not been to
her storage unit for approximately ten (10) months because of the unlawful/illegal actions
of Stor-All.

20. On December 9, 2008, Stor-All’s representative, Lori Whiteside
(“Whiteside”), contacted Defendant at her place of employment by use of Defendant’s
employer’s fax machine at (513) 852-6087. See EXHIBIT “3” attached hereto and
incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

21. On December 9, 2008, Whiteside contacted Defendant at her place of
employment via facsimile at (513) 852-6087. Whiteside doing so without the
authorization of the Defendant to correspond with her through her employer’s fax number
(513) 852-6087. Whiteside using said method of correspondence to place the
Defendant’s employer and Defendant’s co-workers on notice as to the personal and
private affairs of the Defendant. Whiteside knew and/or should have known that sending
correspondence to Defendant’s employer’s fax number (513) 852-6087 would have been
received by Defendant’s employer and or Defendant’s co-workers. The action of
Whiteside was done with forethought and premeditation. The action of Whiteside was
willful, malicious and wanton and was done with reckless regard to the rights and privacy
of the Defendant.

22. On December 9, 2008, Defendant advised Whiteside of her objections in
sending her correspondence to her employer at the fax number (513) 852-6087.
Whiteside was provided with a fax number by the Defendant had she wanted to use this

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form of motion for communication; however, Whiteside with her own motives ignored
the information provided by the Defendant and sent fax to the Defendant at a number not
authorized by her. Through Defendant’s correspondence to Whiteside, she placed
Whiteside of her knowledge that sending of fax to employer’s fax number (513) 852-
6087 was ill motivated. Whiteside was advised of the emotional, mental anguish, etc.
harm/injury sustained by Defendant. See EXHIBIT “4” attached hereto and
incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

23. On December 19, 2008, Whiteside advised the Defendant that Stor-All’s
file in the matter regarding her was being submitted to Stor-All’s attorney, Dave Meranus
in Cincinnati, Ohio. Whiteside withholding the name of the law firm in which Meranus
was employed. Whiteside withholding name of law firm that Meranus was employed at
because of knowledge and/or may have been made aware that Defendant was working
with an attorney, Thomas J. Breed, who was formerly employed with Stor-All’s
counsel’s law firm prior to coming to Defendant’s employer, Wood & Lamping LLP.
See EXHIBIT “5” attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in
full herein.

24. Information as to the attorney(s) Defendant assisted could be heard when
calling and listening to her voicemail message at her place of employment, Wood &
Lamping LLP. Said information (i.e. name of law firm, attorneys she provided assistance
to) was in Defendant’s voicemail.

25. Whiteside was able to obtain the information regarding the Defendant’s
place of employment and the attorney(s) to which she assisted. Whiteside having called
the Defendant at her place of employment and in failing to reach her, proceeded to call
Defendant at home.

26. Whiteside advised Defendant she has a background in the legal field.

27. In the December 19, 2008 facsimile to Defendant, Whiteside also advised
of Stor-All’s plans scheduling an “amnesty weekend for January 9, 10, and 11, 2009.”
Said weekend would entail, “at which time we are going to have a moving truck and
driver available for any of the tenants that wish to vacate the premises at absolutely no
cost to the tenant.” See Exhibit “5.”

28. The amnesty weekend by Stor-All was done with willful and malicious
intent to deprive the Defendant of any damages to which she may be entitled. The
amnesty weekend by Stor-All was to release other tenants from such similar criminal and
civil wrongs they had subjected the Defendant to. Stor-All’s amnesty weekend was for
the benefit of masking/ shielding its liability for the illegal/unlawful acts rendered the
Defendant and perhaps others.

29. Stor-All having knowledge that it was in violation of the statutes/laws;
however, failed to notify its tenants who elected to participate in the amnesty weekend

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scam, that they were waiving any right to seek damages of and against Stor-All if they
elected to take Stor-All up on its frivolous and ill-motive good will offer.

30. On December 19, 2008, Defendant provided Whiteside with Ohio
statutes/laws to advise her of the violations of Stor-All. To no avail. See EXHIBIT “6”
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

31. On or about December 23, 2008, Defendant advised Whiteside of
concerns that the amnesty weekend appeared to be “only in the interest of Stor-All
alone.” Defendant also advising knowledge that Stor-All was considering bringing a
Forcible Entry and Detainer action. Stor-All only deciding to bring such an action upon
being advised by Defendant that their threats (which lasted for several months) of Liens
and her property being sold/auctioned were prohibited by the statutes/laws of Ohio.
Whiteside having already confirmed that Defendant was right that they were not entitled
to the “LIEN-actions” they repeatedly harassed her with. In Defendant’s December 23,
2008, correspondence, Defendant provided Whiteside with a draft of a Complaint she is
considering filing. See EXHIBIT “7” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as
if set forth in full herein.

32. On or about December 23, 2008, Defendant advised Whiteside, “you are
not a lawyer; the courts are here to interpret and enforce the laws. I am certain that the
reason why Stor-All has not received rent is not due to any breach on my part. So let
Stor-All move forward with their lawsuit and I will counter in that it is clear where the
laws lie. The offer made was only what was in Stor-All’s best interest, so let the Court(s)
decide if it had a legal right to withhold my rent and continue to threaten me with liens –
when I proved case law to support it was not entitle to such. The delay was not due to my
part and neither was nonpayment for any contribution on my part, but all attributed to
the direct acts of Stor-All and its insistence on imposing liens on me in which it was not
entitled and neither was there a lease between me and Stor-all.” See Exhibit “7”
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.

33. On January 9, 2009, Stor-All mailed Defendant “NOTICE TO LEAVE
THE PREMISES” by January 19, 2009. Stor-All did not fax and mail said notice. It
provided notice to the Defendant via regular mail and certified mail. Defendant was at
her place of employment all day. Apparently Stor-All having knowledge as to
Defendant’s employer’s intent to terminate her employment. A causal link/connection
established. Whiteside taking a far departure from the method of communication she had
been using prior to January 9, 2009. Moreover, since introducing herself to Defendant.

34. On January 9, 2009, Defendant was terminated from her place of
employment with Wood & Lamping LLP. Being advised that her termination was due to
her position being eliminated. Said termination was without just cause.

35. Defendant’s termination was done with willful and malicious intent to aid
Stor-All. Moreover, to aid Stor-All in obtaining an undue advantage over the Defendant.
By succeeding in getting the Defendant terminated, this eliminated the potential conflict

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of interest that may arise had Defendant still been employed with Wood & Lamping and
working with Thomas J. Breed when Stor-All’s counsel filed its Complaint in this action.

36. Defendant’s termination was done to cause her financial ruin and
devastation. Stor-All thinking that with said ruin and devastation, the Defendant would
be forced to waive important rights secured to her under the Ohio Constitution, United
States Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act, and other statutes/laws governing
said matters. Stor-All believing that if the Defendant is terminated that she would be
forced to succumb to its attempts of extorting monies from her. Nevertheless, with all
its hard work – failing on December 9, 2008, to obtain Defendant’s termination – Stor-
All was ruthless, unrelenting and determined to see that Defendant was terminated from
employment with Wood & Lamping LLP. Said acts by Stor-All was done for ill gain.

37. What Stor-All did not know which proved to be very beneficial to the
Defendant:

(a) That prior to December 2008 and in December 2008, Defendant
had notified her employer of a medical procedure.
(b) That in December 2008, when Defendant again notified her
employer of the need for medical procedure, from the time of
notification Defendant was covered and/or protected under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).
(c) That on January 8, 2009, Defendant provided her written request
form to begin this process. That said leave was approved by her
attorneys, which included Thomas J. Breed’s approval.
(d) That the very NEXT day (January 9, 2009) in retaliation and in
efforts of aiding Stor-All, Wood & Lamping LLP terminated
Defendant’s employment with no just cause and in violation of the
FMLA; moreover, in efforts of assisting Stor-All in the criminal
and civil wrongs undertaken against the Defendant.
(e) That in an effort to cover up their unlawful/illegal acts, Wood &
Lamping had a representative remove Defendant’s Employee
Handbook from her desk. The taking of the Employee Handbook
was done with malicious intent to cover-up and/or mask/shield an
illegal animus. With laughter, that was not the Defendant’s only
copy. Defendant retaining a copy of her Employee Handbook at
her residence as well.
(f) That during Defendant’s employment with Wood & Lamping, she
assisted an attorney by the name of Julie R. Pugh, who specialized
in employment law. That Pugh and another attorney, Heather
Walsh, conducted an Employment Seminar in which the Defendant
attended. At said Seminar attendees were provided with a
Notebook containing Wood & Lamping LLP’s Employer’s Guide.
With laughter of which Defendant also received and retained. A

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Notebook and the Employer’s Guide available to the public. A
Guide clearly addressing violations of Wood & Lamping under the
FMLA.
(g) While Defendant knew that her termination was unlawful, the
icing on the cake came upon receipt of Stor-All’s Complaint for
Forcible Entry and Detainer; wherein said document not only
provided the name of counsel, David Meranus, but that Stor-All
had engaged the services of Schwartz Manes Ruby & Slovin, LPA
– former law firm of Thomas J. Breed. Breed being the attorney
Defendant assigned to assist at Wood & Lamping LLP. A causal
link established between Defendant’s wrongful discharge and Stor-
All’s unlawful/illegal acts against her. Moreover, an established
relationship and/or shared interest between Stor-All, their counsel
– his law firm, and Wood & Lamping.
(h) Defendant is thankful, thankful, thankful, for the additional
information obtained and/or received in that it has opened the door
for many, many, many. . . opportunities for justice and the
recovery of damages.

38. On January 17, 2009, Defendant advised Stor-All of its receipt of its
Notice of Eviction. Defendant advising that any such action by Stor-All would be met
with a Counter-Claim. In said correspondence, Defendant extended a good faith offer of
$5,500. Said offer was declined by Stor-All as evidenced in the filing of their Complaint.
In said correspondence, Defendant advised, “I believe a wise man would tell you that
$5,500 is a reasonable and/or good faith offer – considering the additional damages and
costs I may be entitled to should a lawsuit be have to be filed by me and/or on my behalf
(attorney fees, compensatory damages, etc.).” Nevertheless, Stor-All refused said offer.
Taking the path of a fool. Stor-All refusing said offer in that it was aware of its
unlawful/illegal acts.

39. On or about January 20, 2009, Stor-All brought a Forcible Entry and
Detainer action against the Defendant.

40. For the Defendant, it was a good thing Stor-All refused her January 17,
2009 offer. The doors have been swung open for exceedingly higher damages well above
that which Defendant was not aware was entitled to at the time of her January 17, 2009
offer. Yes, it was a good thing and very beneficial to the Defendant when Stor-All
declined her offer. Especially, upon learning of what was taking place behind the scene
and Stor-All appears to have been in the driver seat of such wrongs being committed
against Defendant.

41. Stor-All had actual knowledge that Defendant owed it no rent and that it
had unlawfully and illegally seized the Defendant’s unit and property without legal
authority and/or statute.

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42. Stor-All’s filing of its Forcible Entry and Detainer Complaint was not only
to collect a frivolous debt that it knew it was not entitled to from the Defendant, but to
use such Complaint for “abuse of process” purposes to unlawfully and illegally extort
monies from the Defendant to which it is not entitled.

43. Stor-All by filing its Forcible Entry and Detainer Complaint against
Defendant, intended to deceive and commit fraudulent acts upon this Court in an effort to
get this Court to engage in the furtherance of the criminal activities they have subjected
the Defendant to.

44. None of the Defendant’s property has been recovered and she has been
denied access to the storage unit and retrieval of her property unless she pays monies
Stor-All, its agents and/or representatives are attempting to extort from her.

45. Defendant has repeatedly in good faith provided Stor-All with dates that
she would like to obtain her property; however, said requests were denied unless
Defendant agreed to pay the outrageous fee and/or charges imposed by Stor-All.

46. Not only has Stor-All stooped to such criminal acts in its extortion
scheme; but in its demands to the Defendant, request that Defendant pay it the monies
without any consequences and/or liability to Stor-All. Stor-All refusing to own up to its
liability in this matter.

47. During the time and place referred to above, Stor-All unlawfully and
wrongfully seized the Defendant’s storage unit and denied her access and retrieval of her
property which may be in value of $8,000.00, and refused to allow her to retrieve her
property unless she paid the outrageous fees (late and lien) that it illegally and unlawfully
attached.

48. During the period of the unlawful seizure of the Defendant’s storage unit
and property, Stor-All subjected the Defendant to repeated threats of placing a lien on her
property and repeatedly serving her with documents entitled, “NOTICE OF INTENT TO
ENFORCE LIEN ON STORED PROPERTY PURSUANT TO RC §5322.01, ET. SEQ.”
See EXHIBIT “8” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full
herein.

49. Upon receipt of Stor-All’s “NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENFORCE LIEN
ON STORED PROPERTY PURSUANT TO RC §5322.01, ET. SEQ.,” Defendant
responded in a timely manner as to her objections. Defendant being entitled to rights
guaranteed/secured to her under the Ohio Constitution, United States Constitution, Ohio
Landlord & Tenant Act, and any/all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters.

50. In early and/or mid 2008, Stor-All was timely, properly and adequately
placed on notice as to the statutes/laws it was in violation of in the handling of
Defendant’s storage unit and property. To no avail. Stor-All made a willful, conscious
and knowing decision to continue to conduct business in such an illegal/unlawful manner.

Page 13 of 51

51. Stor-All elected to unlawfully seize and take the Defendant’s storage unit
and property hostage. Stor-All making it clear Defendant would not be receiving her
property unless she paid the monies it demanded from her.

52. While Defendant repeatedly requested and demanded that Stor-All provide
her with legal conclusions to support its actions, to date, as with Stor-All’s Complaint
filed in this action, it has not been able to provide the Defendant with the information
requested. Nevertheless, as with Stor-All’s Complaint, it continues to demand monies
from the Defendant to which it is not entitled. Stor-All being requested as early as May
13, 2008 to provide said information. See EXHIBIT “9” – electronic copy9 attached
hereto and incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

53. Defendant acted in good faith, and, before the institution of the proceeding
of Stor-All’s Complaint, Defendant stated all facts and circumstances connected with this
matter to support her defense in this lawsuit. Stor-All was provided with facts, evidence
and/or statutes/laws governing said matters which supported Defendant’s defense to the
monies it was asserting was owed it. Moreover, with case laws/statutes supporting a
defense to the relief she sought. A jury trial on this matter will sustain that there is
sufficient information in the possession of Stor-All to support the filing of its Complaint
against Defendant is an abuse of process, is not sound in law and filed in furtherance of
the criminal and civil wrongs already rendered against Defendant.

54. Defendant, as lessee in the Rental Agreement entered into between Crown
Storage and her, entered into said Agreement of the storage unit in good faith. Upon the
execution of said Agreement, Defendant entered into possession of the premises under
the terms of the Agreement and pursuant to the Agreement, remained in good standing as
a tenant of said premises at all times until Stor-All took over and began claiming right
and/or entitlement to Defendant’s rent and the outrageous fees and liens charges leveled
against her. Moreover, Stor-All’s unlawful/illegal denying Defendant access and
depriving her of her property in storage unit.

55. During the period when Defendant was entitled to the peaceable
possession of the premises as a tenant under the Lease entered between she and Crown
Storage, Stor-All unlawfully/illegally seized the Defendant’s property and denied her
access and/or retrieval of said property unless she paid the monies it attempted to extort
from her. Stor-All doing so intending to injure Defendant in her good name and
reputation, and in order to cause the Defendant great loss and damages, falsely, willfully,
maliciously and without probable cause whatever, unlawfully took possession of
Defendant’s storage unit and property over the Defendant’s objections, and caused the
lock Defendant placed on her storage unit to secure her property to be removed and may
have replaced it with a lock of its own to deprive the Defendant access to the demised
premises and her property.

9
Defendant reserving the right to supplement this Exhibit upon retrieving executed copy if requested.

Page 14 of 51

56. Stor-All knew that Defendant had no binding Rental Agreement with it;
moreover, that Defendant’s Rental Agreement was with Crown Storage. However,
through its unlawful seizure of the Defendant’s storage unit and property, it attempted to
unlawfully/illegally extort monies from the Defendant in exchange for her receipt of her
property. Stor-All’s sole purpose for filing its Forcible Entry and Detainer action is in
furtherance of its unlawful and illegal practices of said extortion practices; moreover, to
deprive Defendant access to her storage unit and her property. Thus, the filing of Stor-
All’s Forcible Entry and Detainer Complaint is an abuse of process in that its lawsuit is
being used for a purpose other than that for which it was lawfully intended to be used for.

57. Stor-All devised an elaborate scam to unlawfully/illegally obtain the
property of persons renting space at the 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45214. Said
scam involving the taking of person’s property through a lawful process; however,
through illegal means (i.e. by way of extorting money, etc. from persons through fear of
losing their property). Stor-All using such methods for financial gain from the monies
earned at auctioning off property. For instance, Defendant believes that an auction would
have yielded Stor-All a profit – her rent being approximately $29.82 and had Stor-All
sold it at auction, stood to earn a great deal more (perhaps hundreds and/or thousand of
dollars more).

58. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s unlawful and illegal seizure
and taking of Defendant’s storage unit and its removal of Defendant’s lock and may have
replaced it with one of its own, Defendant was deprived of her rights as a tenant and of
her personal property contained on the premises under the Rental Agreement between she
and Crown Storage.

59. To date, Defendant has not recovered her property and is not certain if her
property is still there in that she has been denied access to it for almost a year. An
inability to recover because Stor-All has repeatedly attempted to extort monies from the
Defendant in exchange and/or has attempted to get the Defendant to waive rights secured
to her under the statutes/laws which would entitle her to relief for such unlawful/illegal
practices.

60. Stor-All’s acts were willful, malicious and wanton in hopes that Defendant
would weary and eventually abandon her property. To Stor-All’s disappointment,
Defendant is literate, college educated and capable of researching the laws.

61. The record in Stor-All’s possession will support the good faith efforts by
the Defendant to support her response and the efforts made to resolve this matter and
retrieve her property. However, Stor-All refused all such good faith efforts by Defendant
in that it refused to accept its liability from the illegal/unlawful wrongs rendered the
Defendant.

62. There is no Landlord and Tenant relationship between Stor-All and
Defendant. Stor-All just asserted such title of Landlord over the Defendant’s objections.

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Moreover, with knowledge that Defendant did not wish to enter into a Rental Agreement
with it. Action by Stor-All was for purpose of abuse of process.

63. Stor-All since asserting such relationship (Landlord and Tenant), has
retaliated and deprived the Defendant of quiet enjoyment of premises as a direct result of
Defendant’s refusal to enter a Rental Agreement and to deprive her of property.

64. Stor-All’s actions were intentional. Stor-All’s conduct and behavior being
done to deprive the Defendant beneficial enjoyment of premises and the retrieval of her
property in that Defendant does not wish to enter a Rental Agreement with Stor-All.

65. Stor-All has intentionally filed its Forcible Entry and Detainer action
knowing it is not entitled to the relief it seeks. Stor-All using a lawful purpose with
unlawful/illegal intent; moreover, for abuse of process.

66. Since Stor-All’s filing of its Complaint, Plaintiff was able to obtain the
additional information and ill motive of Stor-All and its unrelenting efforts to destroy her
life.

67. Defendant has given Stor-All reasonable time to return her property and in
good faith has attempted to reach a financial settlement to compensate her for the
injury/harm sustained. To no avail. Stor-All merely wants the Defendant to let it go
without consequences for the criminal and/or illegal/unlawful wrongs rendered her.

68. Defendant believe that prior to bringing this counter-claim, she has in
good faith attempted to mitigate damages; however, Stor-All again, simply wanted
Defendant to agree to monies to which it was not entitled and/or leave without holding it
accountable for the damages (injury/harm) Defendant sustained as a direct and proximate
result of its unlawful/illegal actions.

COUNT ONE
ABUSE OF PROCESS
(OF AND AGAINST STOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC – WHICH INCLUDES STORE-ALL ALFRED, LLC,
ITS AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, ATTORNEY, ETC.)

Defendant herein incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 68 of her Counter-Claim and

Paragraphs 1 through 7 of Defendant’s Answer to Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer as

if set forth herein with said protection as that argued therein.

Page 16 of 51

Defendant seeks relief as a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s abuse of process in

the filing of its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer. In support thereof, Defendant

alleges:

69. Stor-All in the filing of its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer has
filed said action for purposes of abuse of process. Stor-All’s bringing of its forcible entry
and detainer action in a manner not proper in the regular conduct of such proceedings
with ill and/or ulterior motives – i.e. to obtain an undue advantage over the Defendant,
obtain storage unit and monies from the Defendant to which it was not entitled, subject
the Defendant to injury/harm, etc.. Neither was Stor-All entitled, as a matter of law to
bring said forcible entry and detainer action against the Defendant.

45 Ohio Jur.3d § 66 – Distinctions:
While the gist of the action for malicious
prosecution is that the prosecution has been carried on
maliciously and without probable cause, the essence of the
action for abuse of process is the use of process in a
manner not proper in the regular conduct of the
proceeding, with an ulterior motive.

45 Ohio Jur.3d § 215 – Distinguished from malicious
prosecution:
Under Ohio law, the tort of abuse of process differs
from the tort of malicious criminal prosecution in that the
gist of the tort of abuse of process is not commencing an
action or causing process to issue without justification, but
misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an
end other than that which it was designed to accomplish;
the purpose for which the process is used, once it is issued,
is the only thing of importance. (Bickley v. FMC
Technologies, Inc., 282 F.Supp.2d 631 (N.D. Ohio 2003).

70. To support the prima facie requirement for abuse of process Defendant
must show: (a) a legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with
probable cause; (b) the proceeding was perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior
purpose for which it was not designed; and (c) direct damage has resulted from the
wrongful use of process. Therefore, in support of said allegation that Stor-All’s
Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer is an abuse of process, Defendant states:

(a) The filing of Stor-All’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and
Detainer initiated a legal proceeding in proper form and, through
said acts, with its assertion for probable cause; (b) the filing of

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Stor-All’s Complaint has perverted these proceeding and the
judicial process for purposes of attempting to accomplish an
ulterior purpose – such as (i) extorting monies from the Defendant,
(ii) cover-up/shield the unlawful/illegal eviction it initiated about
April 2008, (iii) obstruct the administration of justice, deprive
Defendant equal protection of the laws and due process of laws,
(iv) financially devastating the Defendant for purposes of obtaining
an undue advantage over her – Stor-All working on and/or seeing
that Defendant was terminated from her place of employment in
hopes that it would destitute the Defendant and force her to waive
protected rights secured/guaranteed under the Ohio Constitution,
U.S. Constitution, Landlord and Tenant Act, and other applicable
statutes/laws governing said matters; and (c) as a direct a direct
and proximate result of the unlawful/illegal as well as criminal and
civil wrongs Stor-All leveled against the Defendant, she has
sustained direct damage from the wrongful use of process – i.e.
Stor-All’s filing of Complaint was in furtherance of their criminal
and civil wrongs already initiated against the Defendant. Stor All
having already taken the laws into its hands and evicting the
Defendant without legal authority and/or court order. Stor-All’s
filing of Complaint was merely a continuance of it pattern-of-
practice in abuse of process and when it failed up under its
repeated “Notice of Intent to Enforce Lien. . . ,” it sought ways and
means to see that Defendant was terminated from her place of
employment until it accomplished such efforts on January 9, 2009,
then it moved forward on January 20, 2009, and in continuance
with abuse of process, filed its Complaint for Forcible Entry and
Detainer.

45 Ohio Jur.3d § 214 – Generally; Nature and elements
of cause of action:
Under Ohio law, the elements of a claim of abuse of
process are that (1) a legal proceeding has been set in motion in
proper form and with probable cause; (2) the proceeding has been
perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it
was not designed; and (3) direct damage has resulted from the
wrongful use of process (Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, Ohio,
412 F.3d 669, 2005 FED App. 0273P (6th Cir. 2005); Bickley v.
FMC Technologies, Inc., 282 F.Supp. 631 (N.D. Ohio 2003);
Greenwood v. Delphi Automotive Systems, Inc., 257 F.Supp.2d
1047 (S.D. Ohio 2003), aff’d, 103 Fed. Appx. 609 (6th Cir.
2004))…

71. In determining what relief, if any, the Defendant is entitled to for the Stor-
All’s abuse of process, the Court may: (a) consider loss of earnings, (b) physical

Page 18 of 51

suffering, (c) mental suffering, (d) embarrassment, (e) humiliation, (f) loss of property or
freedom, etc..

45 Ohio Jur.3d § 218 – Damages:
A prevailing plaintiff in an action for abuse of process is
entitled to recover the amount of money which will reasonably
compensate him for the actual damages he has sustained as a
proximate result of the abuse of process in determining
compensatory damages, the court may consider the plaintiff’s loss
of earnings, medical and other expenses, physical suffering,
mental suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of
personal property or freedom. The plaintiff may recover only those
damages which naturally resulted from defendant’s acts, and the
court cannot consider remote, indefinite or speculative injuries or
damages.
Actual malice is necessary for a recovery of punitive
damages in an abuse of process case. Where defendant’s abuse of
the legal process involved a conscious disregard for the rights and
safety of the plaintiff, as where the defendant was aware that his
acts had a great probability of causing substantial harm to the
plaintiff, an award of punitive damages is appropriate. (Donohoe v.
Burd, 722 F.Supp. 1507 (S.D. Ohio 1989), judgment aff’d, 923
F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1991).

72. Stor-All having knowledge of the injury that would be rendered and/or
had been rendered Defendant, resorted to a commonly used practice used by it in
depriving citizens, such as Defendant, of equal protection of the laws and due process of
laws, in unlawfully/illegally seizing Defendants storage unit without legal authority.

73. The legal process for obtaining premises through a forcible entry and
detainer action was abused by Stor-All. Stor-All evaded process and unlawfully evicted
the Defendant and seized her property without just cause and without legal authority.

74. The perverted use by Stor-All of the legal process was done to deprive
Defendant rights secured and/or guaranteed under the Ohio Constitution, U.S.
Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act and any/all applicable statutes/laws
governing said matters.

75. Stor-All committed an illegal and wrongful act in commencing an eviction
of the Defendant by seizing her storage unit and taking her property without legal
justification and/or probable cause.

76. Stor-All resorted to abuse of process to coerce and obtain collateral
advantage to force the Defendant to surrender her storage unit and/or abandon said
storage unit, by abusing process, taking the laws into its own hands, unlawfully seizing

Page 19 of 51

Defendants storage unit and taking her property for the means of extorting monies from
her.

77. Acting with express authorization by Stor-All, its employees, agents
and/or representatives willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and illegally entered the
Defendant’s storage unit in order to evict her without legal process and/or statutory right.

78. Access to the Defendant’s storage unit was obtained by force without legal
process and/or statutory right.

79. The malicious and wrongful acts of Stor-All caused Defendant damages,
inconvenience and discomfort, mental suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, distress,
loss of employment and more to Plaintiff’s loss and damage in the sum to be determined.

80. Under Ohio law, the laws are clear on how matters involving rental of
commercial property is to be handled.

81. Stor-All placed the cart-before-the-horse when it took the laws into its
own hands and unlawfully/illegally evicted the Defendant from her storage unit. Now in
a desperate effort to cover up such unlawful/illegal and criminal acts, it filed its January
20, 2009 Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer failing to advise the Court of the
legal wrongs that it had rendered the Defendant. If Stor-All believed that it had a right to
the Defendant’s storage unit (when it did not), it should have brought a forcible entry and
detainer action BEFORE the unlawful/illegal eviction it performed under its self-imposed
laws.

82. Defendant was never indebted to Stor-All and neither has Stor-All
presented any evidence to sustain such claim to monies alleged to be owed.

83. Stor-All’s failure to comply with statutes/laws governing said matter
subjected the Defendant to an illegal/unlawful eviction and the seizure of her property.

84. At any given time prior to Stor-All’s filing of the instant lawsuit, it could
have settled this matter; however, elected to move forward with ill motive.

85. On January 20, 2009, Stor-All maliciously sued out and caused Summons
in Action in Forcible Entry, Detainer, and Money to be issued against Defendant, falsely
and maliciously in connection to its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer in the
Hamilton County Municipal Court – Hamilton County, Ohio alleging failure to pay rent.

86. Stor-All had actual knowledge that the Defendant owed it no monies
alleged prior to bringing this instant lawsuit. Nevertheless, is abusing the judicial process
for ill motive.

87. None of Defendant’s property that was unlawfully/illegal seized by Stor-
All has been returned to the Defendant.

Page 20 of 51

88. In perpetrating the above acts, Stor-All acted malicious and wrongfully
and with the intent, design, and purpose to injure Defendant.

89. Stor-All’s filing of this instant lawsuit and seeking out the Summons to be
issued in this matter and causing said Summons to be executed, was willful, malicious
and wanton.

90. Stor-All through its representative(s) contacted Defendant’s employer via
facsimile and/or other means known to it regarding dispute between it and Defendant.
Stor-All doing so with ill intent/motive.

91. By filing this instant lawsuit and due to acts prior to filing by Stor-All,
Defendant has incurred and continues to incur legal expenses. Said expenses and
services which is expected to exceed $15,000. Moreover, Defendant may be required to
retain an attorney in the representation of this matter.

92. Ohio Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act and other statutes/laws
governing such matters are clear that Stor-All’s handling of Defendant has created an
infringement upon her protected rights.

93. A reasonable mind may conclude that there were other means available to
Stor-All prior to its unlawful/illegal eviction of Defendant from her storage unit and the
seizure of her property. If Stor-All believed that it had a legal right (although it did not)
to bring a forcible entry and detainer, it should have brought such action when at the time
it claims rent was not paid – in April 2008 or shortly thereafter. Instead it elected to
unlawful/illegally forcibly enter and seize the Defendant’s storage unit and property
rather than use the legal process to resolve this matter. A reasonable mind may conclude
that the unlawful/illegal method used by Stor-All in the taking of the Defendant’s storage
unit and property is one commonly used by it to deprive citizens, such as Defendant, of
protected rights.

94. The abuse of process by Stor-All was done with malice, forethought,
harassment, retaliation, and improper motive to all this Court to grant punitive damages.

95. Stor-All with knowledge of the way its employees, agents and
representatives were conducting business on its behalf, did nothing to deter, prevent
and/or correct such legal wrongs rendered the Defendant. Instead, Stor-All made a
willful and conscious decision to unlawfully/illegally evict the Defendant and seize her
storage unit and property.

96. As a direct and proximate result Stor-All’s acts, Defendant was injured,
deprived entitlement to storage unit and property, deprived rights secured under the Ohio
Constitution, U.S. Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act, and any/all applicable
laws governing said matters.

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97. In perpetrating the above acts, Stor-All acted maliciously and wrongfully
and with the intent, design, and purpose to injure Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant
requests exemplary damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages against Stor-All
in the sum to be determined by a jury.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff request judgment of and against Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC for:

98. Compensatory damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of
$250,000.

99. Actual damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) to be determined.

100. Consequential damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of
$225,000.

101. Future damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of
$225,000.

102. Punitive damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of
$750,000.

103. Enter the applicable injunctions and restraining orders requiring Plaintiff,
Stor-All Alfred, LLC, their agents, employees, attorneys, representatives and all persons
acting in concert with them to cease their unconstitutional and unlawful practices.

104. Reasonable fees and/or attorney fees.

105. Costs of suit; and

106. Such other further relief as the Court deem just and proper.

COUNT TWO
WRONGFUL EVICTION




Page 22 of 51

Defendant brings this Counter-Claim for the wrongful eviction action of Stor-All. In

Stor-All’s filing of Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer it has asserted itself as a Landlord

and, thus, has voluntarily surrendered itself to be liable to the damages and relief Defendant

seeks through her Counter-Claim. Stor-All’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer is done

for purposes of wrongful eviction action. Even if Stor-All would now want to abandon its

“Landlord” title to avoid liability, such acts would also fail in that such relinquishing of title

would then allow the Defendant to bring an action against it for “malicious prosecution.”

Therefore, Defendant alleges:

107. On January 20, 2009, Stor-All filed Complaint for Forcible Entry and
Detainer against the Defendant.

108. There is no Rental Agreement between Stor-All and the Defendant. An
unexecuted Stor-All Lease Agreement between Stor-All and Defendant supports said
averment. Therefore, under Ohio law, Stor-All has no right to entry and/or the relief
sought in their Forcible Entry and Detainer action.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 73 – Generally:
The estate of a landlord during the existence of an
outstanding leasehold is a mere reversion, though, in the case of a
tenancy under a lease, the lessor has an ever-present interest – a
constant right to participate in the benefits of possession.
However, in the absence of an agreement or statute to the
contrary, the landlord has no right of entry during the lease term.

109. As a matter of Ohio law, Defendant was wrongfully evicted about April
2008, or shortly thereafter, in that Stor-All: (a) subjected her to disturbance in the use of
her storage unit; (b) deprived Defendant of the enjoyment of her storage unit apparently
as a third party either acting under its own authority or that of Crown Storage-Camp
Washington, Defendant’s landlord and/or in which a Rental Agreement was entered; (c)
denied the Defendant access unless she paid the charges/fees alleged; (d) had the
Defendant’s lock removed from the storage unit in taking possession of it.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 161 – Generally:
The term “eviction” is one with peculiar reference to a
tenant, being the disturbance of his possession, or his expulsion,
depriving him of the enjoyment of the premises demised, or any

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portion of them by the landlord, the act of third persons acting
under the authority of the landlord, or by act of someone having a
paramount title.

110. Stor-All’s Forcible Entry and Detainer action has been brought against the
Defendant although it is fully aware that it has already made an unlawful entry in an
unreasonable manner of Defendant’s storage unit. Moreover, Stor-All has repeatedly
served the Defendant with “NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENFORCE LIEN ON STORED
PROPERTY PURSUANT TO RC § 5322.01 ET.SEQ.” with knowledge and/or should
have known that such action was not permissible under the laws of the State of Ohio.
Stor-All placing the cart-before-the-horse and being unsuccessful in such threats has now
brought its Forcible Entry and Detainer action in furtherance of such threats, harassment
and other unlawful/illegal means of which Defendant has had to endure in Stor-All’s
efforts of obtaining her property. Therefore, this action is necessary to obtain injunctive
relief as well as additional relief to which the laws of the state of Ohio entitle the
Defendant to.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 130 – Wrongful entry or wrongful refusal of
access under 1974 Landlord and Tenant Act:
If a landlord under a rental agreement enters upon the
demised premises in violation of the statutory provision governing
the right of entry (R.C. 5321.04(A)(8), makes lawful entry in an
unreasonable manner, or makes repeated demands for entry
otherwise lawful, which have the effect of harassing the tenant,
the tenant may recover actual damages resulting from the entry or
demands, obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the
conduct, and obtain a judgment for reasonable attorney fees, or
terminate the rental agreement. (R.C. 5321.04(B). As to award of
attorney’s fees under R.C. ch. 5321 and/or § 135).

111. Defendant has been subjected to acts of actual eviction by Stor-All in that
she has been excluded from her storage unit and Stor-All has repeatedly denied her access
unless she paid monies it was attempting to extort from her. Defendant has also been
subjected to acts of constructive eviction by Stor-All in that: (a) it has repeatedly
interfered and/or obstructed Defendant’s access to her storage unit, removed the
Defendant’s lock she had on her storage unit and may have replaced it with one of their
own, (b) it has substantially deprived the Defendant of the beneficial use of her storage
unit and the Defendant has not returned; and (c) the Defendant has involuntarily
relinquished possession of her storage unit – i.e. Stor-All unlawfully/illegally seizing
storage unit and taking it as its own, (d) Stor-All’s acts were meritless, done in malice
and bad faith; moreover, so severe that it not only interfered with Defendant’s peaceful
enjoyment of the storage unit, but went as far as bringing such unlawful/illegal practices
to the Defendant’s place of employment which resulted in the Defendant being
terminated.

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65 Ohio Jur.3d § 162 – Elements and requisites; actual or
constructive eviction:
An eviction, in the strict sense of the term, is to enter upon
lands and expel the tenant (Forbus v. Collier, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep.
331, 2 W.L.B. 122, 1877 WL 7471 (Ohio Dist. Ct. 1877).
However, the result is also an eviction if the tenant loses the
enjoyment of any part of the leased premises by some act of the
landlord, of a permanent character, done with the intention of
depriving him or her of the enjoyment (Id.)
An eviction may be actual or constructive (McAlpine v.
Woodruff, 11 Ohio St. 120, 1860 WL 31 (1860); Wetzel V.
Richcreek, 53 Ohio St. 62, 40 N.E. 1004 (1895)). Actual eviction
involves expulsion or exclusion from the demised premises
(Liberal Sav. & Loan Co. v. Frankel Realty Co., 137 Ohio St. 489,
19 Ohio Op. 170, 30 N.E.2d 1012 (1940); Foote Theatre, Inc. v.
Dixie Roller Rink, Inc., 14 Ohio App. 3d 456, 471 N.E. 2d 866 (3d
Dist. Hardin County 1984)). In order to establish constructive
eviction, there must be proof of active interference by the landlord
or someone authorized by the landlord which compelled the tenant
to leave (Eckhart v. Robert E. Lee Motel, 2 Ohio App. 3d 80, 440
N.E.2d 824 (10th Dist. Franklin County 1981)). Constructive
eviction occurs when the landlord has substantially deprived the
tenant of beneficial use of the premises, and the tenant vacates
(Wood v. Rathfelder, 128 F. Supp.2d 1079 (N.D. Ohio 2000). So
long as the tenant remains in possession, he or she cannot maintain
that there has been a constructive eviction. Thus, for constructive
eviction to occur when there is merely interference with the
tenant’s possession and enjoyment, the tenant must relinquish
possession of premises (Doll v. Rapp, 74 Ohio Misc.2d 140, 660
N.E.2d 542 (Mun. Ct. 1995)). . . . Constructive eviction also
occurs when the landlord’s actions are meritless, done in malice or
bad faith, and so severe as to interfere with the tenant’s peaceful
enjoyment of the premises. (Wood v. Rathfelder, 128 F.Supp.2d
1079 (N.D. Ohio 2000)). Thus, a constructive eviction has also
been defined as a failure or interference on the part of the landlord
with the intended enjoyment of the leased premises, which is of a
substantial nature, and so injurious as to deprive the tenant of the
beneficial enjoyment of the leased premises. (Nye v. Schuler, 110
Ohio App. 443, 13 Ohio Op.2d 208, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 165
N.E.2d 16 (4th Dist. Ross County 1959)).

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 173 – Pleading and proof; Trial:
i Illustration: A charge to the jury that a
constructive eviction is such a failure or interference on the part of
the landlord with the intended enjoyment of the leased premises as

Page 25 of 51

to be of a substantial nature, and so injurious to the tenant as to
deprive him or her of the beneficial enjoyment of the leased
premises, is a clear and concise definition of a constructive
eviction, and in the absence of a request for a more complete
definition, is sufficient. (Nye v. Schuler, 110 Ohio App. 443, 13
Ohio Op.2d 208, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 165 N.E.2d 16 (4th Dist.
Ross County 1959)).

In an action for damages for breach of covenants in a lease,
a defense that the lessor’s agent evicted the lessee raises an issue of
fact as the agency, which must be passed on by a jury unless a
jury is waived (Shepfer v. Hannenkrat, 48 Ohio App. 35, 1 Ohio
Op. 19, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 561, 192 N.E. 274 (5th Dist. Tuscarawas
County 1933)).

112. On January 9, 2009, and on the same date that Defendant was terminated
from her place of employment, Stor-All served her with “NOTICE TO LEAVE THE
PREMISES” asserting that the Defendant rented from it. Requesting the Defendant to
leave the premises with knowledge it has not allowed her on the premises and/or entry
into her storage unit since about April 2008. Had Defendant complied with said notice
and vacated, she would have lost her rights to bring this Counter-Claim, in that her
vacating would have been taken as voluntary. At the time of Stor-All’s filing of its
Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer as well as its claim to ownership of the
property, the Defendant was rightfully in possession of her storage unit and entitled to
remain. In the interest of justice and in compliance with Ohio law, Defendant: (a) should
await legal proceedings threatened against her – in which she has; and (b) rather than
comply with Stor-All’s notice to leave the premises (which it has denied her access for
almost a year), bring an action such as her Counter-Claim for alleged damages that
perhaps never would have resulted. In fact, Stor-All was so determined to ruin the
Defendant; it went as far as engaging and/or providing information for review by her
former employer for purposes of obtaining an undue advantage over the Defendant in the
handling of this matter. A causal link between Stor-All’s acts and Defendant’s wrongful
termination is established.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 164 – Notice to vacate; bringing possessory
action:
A notice by the landlord that the tenancy is being
terminated, combined with a demand by him or her for possession
of the premises, and voluntary compliance therewith by the tenant
without protest, is not an eviction for which damages may be
recovered. (Greenberg v. Murphy, 16 Ohio C.D. 359, 1904 WL
1147 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1904)). [Practice Guide: If the tenant is
rightfully in possession and entitled to remain, the tenant should
await legal proceedings that are threatened, and make defense
thereto, rather than comply with the demand, and then bring an

Page 26 of 51

action for alleged damages that perhaps never would have resulted.
(Greenberg)]
Where a tenant, upon request or notice to vacate,
voluntarily abandons the premises without protest, no action for
damages against the landlord, based on fraud or misrepresentations
as to the reasons for such request can be maintained under rights
recognized by the common law, or any statute of Ohio. (Ferguson
v. Buddenberg, 87 Ohio App. 326, 42 Ohio Op. 488, 57 Ohio L.
Abs. 473, 94 N.E.2d 568 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1950)).

113. Stor-All through the filing of its Complaint for Forcible Entry and
Detainer is attempting force the Defendant to give up her storage unit. The actions of
Stor-All are in violation of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and statutory provisions
governing rights given to the Defendant under the Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act. As a
direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s actions, Defendant has sustained damages and/or
injury/harm to which she is entitled to compensatory damages to the extent that she is
being forced to leave as well as having to pay more for a comparable space elsewhere.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 131 – Generally; liquated damages:
General contract principles govern damages recoverable in
an action for the breach of a lease, including claims for breach of a
covenant of quiet enjoyment, breach of a warranty of habitability,
and breach of a landlord’s statutory duties. (Allen v. Lee, 43 Ohio
App. 3d 31, 538 N.E.2d 1073 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1987)).
A party injured by a breach of a contract is entitled to his or her
expectation interest, which is the injured party’s interest in having
the benefit of the bargain by being put in as good a position as that
party would have been in had the contract been performed. (Ohio
Jur. 3d, Damages § 18; see F. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried
Chicken Corp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 154, 1 Ohio Op. 3d 90, 351 N.E.2d
121 (1976)) [Observation: Under Ohio law, any ambiguities in
commercial lease language setting forth damages recoverable upon
default must be strictly construed against drafter of lease10 (New
Market Acquisitions, Ltd. v. Powerhouse Gym, 212 F.Supp. 2d 763
(S.D. Ohio 2002)).]
As to the damages recoverable for a breach by the lessor,
the general rule is that a lessee who is forced by the lessor’s breach
to give up the lease incurs compensable damages to the extent that

10
§ 89 Construction Against Party Preparing Lease: The general rule that ambiguities in a written
instrument must be construed against the person who prepared it (Bevy’s Dry Cleaners & Shirt Laundry, Inc. v.
Streble, 2 Ohio St.2d 250, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 507, 208 N.E.2d 528 (1965); Crickets of Ohio, Inc. v. Hines Invests,
L.L.C., 2006-Ohio-2901, 2006 WL 1575212 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. Fairfield County 2006); Shaker Bldg. Co. v.
Federal Lime & Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 57 Ohio Op. 2d 486, 277 N.E.2d 584 (Mun. Ct. 1971), rev’d on
other grounds, 1972 WL 20379)(Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1972)) and favorably to the person who
had no voice in the selection of the language (Madden v. American News Co., 11 Ohio Misc. 119, 40 Ohio Op.2d
355, 229 N.E.2d 119 (C.P. 1967)) applies to the interpretation of the leases.

Page 27 of 51

the lessee has to pay more for comparable space over the term of
the original lease, plus any special damages (Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord
and Tenant §§ 97, 98. As to measure of damages for breach of
covenant of title of quiet enjoyment, see § 184).

114. Stor-All’s Forcible Entry and Detainer action has been brought for
purposes of extorting monies from the Defendant and to have her unlawfully/illegally
evicted.

115. Stor-All having no authority under Ohio statutes/laws to bring this action
against the Defendant.

116. Prior to Stor-All’s filing of Forcible Entry and Detainer action, it knew
and/or should have known that it was not entitled to bring this lawsuit against the
Defendant.

117. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s acts, the Defendant has
sustained damages and/or injury/harm to which she seeks relief thereof through the filing
of this instant Counter-Claim. Said relief as allowed under Ohio law:

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 174 – Measure and elements of damages:
In many jurisdictions, the view is taken that in a tort action
for wrongful eviction by a landlord or by persons for whose act the
landlord is responsible, the tenant may recover as general damages
the actual or rental value of the unexpired lease term less the rent
reserved (Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 668). There is
authority in Ohio supporting this view (Grunau v. Faflik, 50 Ohio
L. Abs. 142, 77 N.E.2d 719 (Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County
1947)(damage for eviction by or under authority of landlord is
reasonable value of leasehold) and also the view that a lessor is
liable to the lessee (or a sublessor is liable to the sublessor) for all
damages sustained by reason of a wrongful eviction for which he
or she is responsible. (Hoffstetter v. Harris, 23 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
579, 1921 WL 1344 (C.P. 1921)).
In actions based on the wrongful eviction of a tenant,
damages for special losses, such as . . . expenses in defending an
ejectment action, have been recovered. . . .exemplary damages are
not recoverable in an action for breach of contract unless the
conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive
damages are recoverable (Ohio Jur.3d, Damages § 128). . . .
[Illustration: A landlord’s constructive eviction of the tenants. . .
in changing the locks of the tenants’ door one day after posting a
three-day eviction notice . . .entitled the tenants to punitive
damages (Proctor v. Frame, 90 Ohio Mis. 2d 11, 695 N.E.2d 357
(Mun. Ct. 1998)).

Page 28 of 51

A tenant who is constructively evicted . . . is entitled, as far
as it is possible to do so, to a monetary award in order to be placed
in the position that the tenant would have been in had constructive
eviction not occurred, keeping in mind the purpose for which the
premises were leased. Thus, where there is a constructive eviction
of the tenant, the tenant may be awarded judgment on the
landlord’s counterclaims which are based on unpaid rent for the
balance of the lease agreement (Weingarden v. Eagle Ridge
Condominiums, 71 Ohio Misc.2d 7, 653 N.E.2d 759 (Mun. Ct.
1995)).

118. Defendant seeks any and all relief afforded to her under the laws of the
State of Ohio and/or applicable statutes/laws governing such matters relating to the
wrongful eviction she sustained. While Stor-All brought Complaint for Forcible Entry
and Detainer on January 20, 2009, it had already taken the laws into its own hands by
unlawfully/illegally evicting the Defendant under its own self-made laws. Since April
2008 to present, the Defendant has not been allowed to return to her storage unit.
Moreover, in order to retrieve her property she was required to pay the monies Stor-All
was attempting to extort from her. The acts of Stor-All were retaliatory, fraudulent,
oppressive, willful, malicious and wanton entitling the Defendant to punitive damages.
Moreover, the extremes of such acts are evidenced in Stor-All’s obsessive acts in
destroying the Defendant’s life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The evidence supports
that aggravation and outrage, spite and malice, fraudulent and evil intent, as well as a
conscious and deliberate disregard for the interests and rights of the Defendant.

49 Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 538 – Generally,
Measure of damages:
Where a tenant is wrongfully evicted by the landlord or by
persons for whose acts the landlord is responsible, the tenant may
maintain an action in tort against the landlord and may recover as
general damage the actual or rental value of the unexpired term
less the rent reserved. In addition, the tenant may recover all
losses actually sustained, or which the tenant will necessarily
sustain, under the circumstances, as a result of the unlawful
eviction. Such losses may include the cost of moving, actual
expenses, reasonably incurred, and lost profits.

49 Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 544 – Punitive damage:
The damages recoverable for wrongful eviction, actual or
constructive, may include punitive damages. The mere
commission of the tort of wrongful eviction, however, is
insufficient. There must be circumstances of aggravation or
outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive or
such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others
that the landlord’s conduct may be call willful or wanton.

Page 29 of 51

A commercial landlord acted with malice toward a tenant,
and thus an award of punitive damages was warranted on unlawful
eviction and conversion claims, where the landlord suddenly
locked the tenant out of the rented premises, wrongfully retained
the tenant’s business equipment, . . . and expressed personal
animosity toward the tenant. . . It has also been stated that punitive
damages may be awarded to tenants when a landlord’s conduct is
morally culpable or actuated by evil and reprehensible motives
(Maula v. Milford Management Corp., 559 F.Supp. 1000 (1983)),
or is malicious and wanton (Stewart v. Johnson, 209 W. Va. 476,
549 S.E.2d 670 (2001)). In addition, a lessee who does not move,
and is not evicted, because of a lessor’s retaliatory act may
nevertheless recover a statutory punitive damages award of the
lessor’s retaliatory act of fraud, oppression, or malice.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff request judgment of and against Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC for:

119. Compensatory damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of
$75,000.

120. Actual damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) to be determined.

121. Consequential damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of
$20,000.

122. Future damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $50,000.

123. Punitive damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of
$250,000.

124. Enter the applicable injunctions and restraining orders requiring Plaintiff,
Stor-All Alfred, LLC, their agents, employees, attorneys, representatives and all persons
acting in concert with them to cease their unconstitutional and unlawful practices.

125. Reasonable fees and/or attorney fees.

126. Costs of suit; and

127. Such other further relief as the Court deem just and proper.

Page 30 of 51

COUNT THREE
LOSS OF ENJOYMENT/DISTURBANCE




Defendant seeks relief for the loss of enjoyment and disturbance to as a direct and

proximate result of Stor-All’s unlawful/illegal actions. In support thereof, Defendant alleges:

128. Stor-All had no right to enter remove the lock Defendant had placed on
her storage unit. Defendant did not authorize said removal. Stor-All had no right to enter
the Defendant’s storage unit. Defendant did not authorize said entry. Even if
Defendant’s tenancy was at will (when it was not), Stor-All had no legal and/or statutory
authority to enter the Defendant’s storage unit; moreover, seize said unit and deny her
access to it. Neither did Stor-All have a judgment from a court authorizing its actions
taken against the Defendant. Stor-All bypassed the laws and took matters into it own
hands and evicted the Defendant about April 2008.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 137 – Landlord’s right of entry:
In light of the fact that the interest that a lessor normally
retains in the leased premises is merely that of a reversion, a lessor
generally has no right to enter the demised premises during the
term of the lease (State of Cincinnati Tin & Japan Co., 66 Ohio St.
182, 64 N.E. 68 (1902); Nigh v. Keifer, 3 Ohio C.D. 1, 1890 WL
343 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1890); Kilfoyl v. Hull, 4 Ohio Dec. Rep. 552, 2
Cleve. Law Rep. 369, 1879 WL 6355 (Ohio C.P. 1879)). Even
under a tenancy at will, the landlord has no right to enter without
the tenant’s permission; he or she must resort to a legal remedy to
enforce a right to possession. (Coward v. Fleming, 89 Ohio App.
485, 46 Ohio Op. 289, 102 N.E.2d 850 (1st Dist. Hamilton County
1951)).
Notwithstanding the general rule that a lessor has no right
to enter the demised premises during the term of the lease, a lessor
may enter the premises without incurring liability as a trespasser
where:. . . there has been a breach of condition, the entry is
limited to common areas, the lessor is acting under an express
right of entry provided for in the lease (Helvich v. George A.
Rutherford Co., 96 Ohio App. 367, 54 Ohio Op. 365, 114 N.E.2d

Page 31 of 51

514 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1953)), the lessor is acting under
a right of entry provided by statute.

129. The July 27, 2007, Rental Agreement was entered into between Crown
Storage-Camp Washington (“Crown Storage”) and Defendant. Stor-All claims it is now
owner of the property at which Defendant has a storage unit. Even if said property was
sold and Stor-All purchased it, said purchase did not pass possession and control under
the Rental Agreement to it. Accordingly, Stor-All by having no right to enter the leased
premises has no power to authorize someone else to enter on its behalf. While Stor-All
claims ownership of said property, it provided no evidence to support such claim.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 138 – Landlord’s right of entry – Entry of
others on landlord’s behalf:
In conjunction with the passing of possession and control
of the premises under a lease agreement to the lessee, the lessor
parts with the power and right to admit people to the premises or
to exclude them. Accordingly, a landlord who has no right to enter
the leased premises has no power to authorize someone else to
enter on his or her behalf. (Richmond Glass and Aluminum Corp.
v. Wynn, 1991 WL 172902 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. Columbiana
County 1991)).

130. In entering the Rental Agreement with Crown Storage, the “covenant of
quiet enjoyment” is implied and protected Defendant’s right to peaceful and undisturbed
enjoyment of her storage unit. Under said covenant, Defendant was entitled to believe
that Crown Storage would do no act (or allow anyone else – i.e. such as Stor-All) which
interrupts the free and peaceable enjoyment of her storage unit and/or premises during the
terms of said Agreement, and indemnified the Defendant from against such
unlawful/illegal acts as committed against her by Stor-All.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 176 – Covenants respecting enjoyment of
premises by lessee:
A covenant of quiet enjoyment is implied into every lease
contract for realty (Hamilton Brownfields Redevelopment, LLC v.
Duro Tire & Wheel, 156 Ohio App.3d 525, 2004-Ohio-1365, 806
N.E.2d 1039 (12th Dist. Butler County 2004); Dworkin v. Paley, 93
Ohio App.3d 383, 638 N.E.2d 636 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County
1994)) and protects the tenant’s right to peaceful and undisturbed
enjoyment of the leasehold. (Dworkin).
A covenant of quiet enjoyment, insofar as leases are
concerned, has been defined as an undertaking on the part of the
grantor to do no act which interrupts the free and peaceable
enjoyment of the premises demised during the continuance of the
term, and to indemnify the lessee against all acts committed by
virtue of paramount title (Barker v. Blanchard, 5 Ohio N.P. 398, 7

Page 32 of 51

Ohio Dec. 537, 1898 WL 1464 (C.P. 1898)). Quiet enjoyment has
also been defined to mean a right to enjoy unimpaired (so far as a
landlord who is owner to the leased property can insure) the
physical status of the property at the time of the execution of the
lease, and for the duration of the lease. (Weiss-Pollak Co. v.
Gibson Art Co., 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 354, 1929 WL 2385 (C.P.
1929))

131. The covenant of quiet enjoyment afford to the Defendant under the Rental
Agreement with Crown Storage was interfered with when Stor-All took the laws into its
own hands and obstructed and/or interfered with, as well as took away from the
Defendant the entire access and use of her storage unit. Stor-All in committing such acts
ousted and/or evicted the Defendant and has not allowed her to enter her storage unit
unless she agreed to pay the monies they were attempting to extort from her and/or
agreed to the unlawful/illegal terms presented by Stor-All to get her to waive her rights.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 178 – Acts of landlord:
The covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached when the
landlord obstructs, interferes with, or takes away from the tenant a
substantial degree of beneficial use of the leasehold. (Hamilton).
Thus, the following acts may constitute a breach of the covenant
for quiet enjoyment: interference by the landlord with the lessee’s
possession by ousting the lessee from possession (Weiss-Pollak).

132. As a matter of law and in the interest of justice, Defendant is entitled to
compensatory damages, punitive damages and/or any and all applicable damages
permissible by law.

65 Ohio Jur.3d § 184 – Measure and elements of damages:
In the case of a breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment by
an eviction, the majority rule is that the measure of damages is the
difference between the actual value of the unexpired term and the
agreed rent, with actual value of the unexpired term and the agreed
rent, with the actual value generally being measured by the rental
value (Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 621)(Howard v. Simon,
18 Ohio App.3d 14, 480 N.E.2d 99 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County
1984); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Russo, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 307, 1933
WL 2293 (Ct. App.2d Dist. Clark County 1933)).
A tenant is entitled to damages for the period during which
the landlord breaches the covenant of quiet enjoyment (Hamilton).
The evidence supported the award of punitive damages to
the tenants. . . The landlord had resorted to self-help in resolving
the lease dispute against the advice of counsel, for the malicious
purpose of compelling the tenants to terminate the lease or to
obtain a more favorable rental agreement. (Stern Enterprises v.
Plaza Theaters I & II, Inc., 105 Ohio App. 3d 601, 664 N.E.2d 981

Page 33 of 51

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