Lessons learned from Ushahidi deployments 2008 to 2011

1. Lessons Learned –
March 2011
Author: Sarah George
Ushahidi 1100 North Glebe Rd. 22201 http://ushahidi.com

2. Ushahidi Inc.
Framing the Discussion
At the International Conference on Crisis Mapping (ICCM) last September Sabina Carlson, an Ushahidi Haiti
volunteer and liaison with Haitian diaspora, explained “People don’t speak in terms of data sets. They say
‘I’m Hungry’.” Her point is that the need for translation does not only refer to language but also applies to the
need to translate information into action. In the following discussion of crowdsourcing, it’s important to keep
this fundamental challenge in mind.
Crowdsourcing is a general concept – and various Ushahidi implementations apply the approach in critically
different ways. While crowdsourcing broadly implies information generated by many for the benefit many,
there are three distinct audiences or stakeholders for any individual campaign:
• Deployers (whether a group of citizen volunteers, an individual organization, or a multi-agency
partnership)
• Users (generating and/or actively using the content)
• Viewers (passive consumers of the shared information, similar to viewers of broadcast media)
While each audience is unique, they may also overlap. Many of the best crowdsourcing campaigns anticipate
the needs of all three audiences while others target a specific audience. Identifying stakeholders in advance
is important to the success of a campaign and will influence decisions during implementation. In addition, it is
important to consider a few key strategic distinctions:
• Local vs remote (virtual) deployment
• Permissive vs hostile environment
• Short term vs ongoing campaign
• Situational awareness vs direct / tactical response
• Direct reports and/or curation of (social & mainstream) media reports
• Trusted and/or anonymous public reporters
Again, recognizing these distinctions in advance will help determine what methodology to adopt during
implementation and will help establish clear and attainable goals.
Finally, when considering lessons learned it is also helpful to distinguish between different types of
deployments such as:
• Crisis Response
• Election observation
• Social / environmental advocacy campaigns
• Media / journalism
Lessons Learned, March 2011 2

3. Ushahidi Inc.
Different types of deployments will incorporate different implementation strategies and target different
audiences.
Challenges
Quantity of information
Too much information can be problematic, especially in campaigns that tap into the flood of social
media (ie via Twitter or Facebook). Information overload is a serious concern.
Underreporting can lead to a dearth of reports in campaigns that rely on direct reporting from the
public. Barriers can include: lack of incentive, lack of awareness, lack of literacy, fear of intimidation or
reprisal, socio-cultural constraints such as reticence to share information / self-censorship, cost of
SMS if mobile is primary reporting mechanism, technical hurdles, the habit of public to passively
consume rather then produce information, etc
Quality of information
Reports from public may not be relevant or detailed enough to be actionable.
Insufficient training of trusted reporters in the field can yield poor data.
Need to structure data for easy adoption and to mitigate rather than exacerbate information overload.
Need for information management (incident tracking) and data analysis.
Human capacity
Insufficient and/or inconsistent staff and/or volunteers to moderate (approve, geo-locate, verify).
Incoming reports can cause a critical delay as well as uneven quality of categorization / geo-location.
Lack of local language proficiency.
Lack of response capability.
Sustainability of large pools of volunteers needed to crowdsource translation, geo-location, report
moderation in large scale deployments.
Technical capacity
Lessons Learned, March 2011 3

4. Ushahidi Inc.
Localization, customization and troubleshooting of software platform.
Low internet bandwidth on the ground.
When visualizing data, underlying map may lack detail.
Situational issues
Difficulty of navigating a field crowded with multiple agencies / responders (ie, Haiti and LABB).
Lack of reliable electricity / internet.
Cooperation of telecommunication companies if using mobile reporting.
Financial issues
While technology and raw data may be free, cost of hosting site, SMS, publicity, personnel, etc can be
prohibitive for small organizations / volunteer groups.
Security
Privacy protection is critical in repressive environments and in vulnerable populations such as children.
Lessons Learned, March 2011 4

5. Ushahidi Inc.
Lessons Learned
Crowdsourcing platform must be easy to deploy, intuitive, simple to localize / customize
Strong correlation between successful campaigns and technical capacity.
Crowdmap has reduced dependence on technical proficiency
Important to consider need for additional functionality and/or appropriate technology
When soliciting reports via SMS, procure a shortcode if possible
Use phone number recognition to auto-post reports from trusted sources
Start early
Complete technical work prior to trainings and conduct testing prior to public deployment.
Establish protocols / clear workflows in advance. Haiti pointed to need and Libya demonstrates.
Also, need clear security protocols in repressive environments and when working with vulnerable
populations.
Invest in training of field reporters and site moderators / administrators to improve quality of data
Integrate into emergency preparedness strategy, ie too late to educate an impacted population during
crisis (Orciano 2010 civil protection exercise, BushFire Connect, OCHA Colombia earthquake
simulation)
Anticipate how a campaign will evolve, ie in Crisis from Response to Recovery to Rebuilding; in
elections from campaign / voter registration to Election Day to results announcement to post-election
Get the word out
Several deployments point to the importance of advance publicity / outreach via media coverage,
advertising, workshops & demonstrations.
Recognize that media may be reluctant to cover a campaign until after data is published and supports
a “story”, ie Stock Stopouts campaign received significant press coverage by adopting a publicity
strategy that included a post-implementation press conference to announce results.
Encourage media to use data as a source for their own reporting
Lessons Learned, March 2011 5

6. Ushahidi Inc.
Uchaguzi and Plan International both suggest that real life demonstrations can to improve local “take
up.” Similar outreach efforts could be used with beneficiary populations and humanitarian orgs /
responders.
Consider the use of SMS Blasts. However, consider capacity issues. For example the Mission 4636
project decided not to send an SMS blast out of concern that systems were not in place to handle the
potential influx of information.
Radio can be an effective means for raising awareness and educating the public
Make Friends
Perception of independence (or lack of) may influence the public’s willingness to report.
Consider how to develop mutual trust.
Clearly define roles and responsibilities
In crisis response, “plug-in” to existing humanitarian response network. UN OCHA invitation to create
Libya Crisis Map suggests potential for “buy-in”
Partner with local NGOs who can create a feedback loops by both generating and applying data
Partner with local media (BBC Tubestrike, ABC Queensland Flood, Washington Post Snowmaggedon)
Local Matters
Utilize linguistic and geographic knowledge of local (and diasporan) population
Encourage capacity for local citizen response (Russian Wildfire HelpMap, Holoda.info HelpMap, New
Zealand earthquake)
Local populations can provide “eye-witness” accounts
Provide a channel for local population to articulate needs
Information Please
In addition to information aggregation and visualization, the need for data management tools
Provide “value added” information analysis
Lessons Learned, March 2011 6

7. Ushahidi Inc.
Ask the right questions, ie PakReport asked public to report “What they See” rather than “What they
Need”
Humanitarian organizations and responders need structured information
Consider using trusted reporters in addition to crowd
Sufficient human capacity to process, manage and analyze data
Anonymous reporting is crucial in repressive environments / in vulnerable populations
Consider “low-tech” solutions such as paper and voice reporting
Conduct rigorous quality assurance
Motivation
Incentivize public participation by closing the feedback loop. London Tubestrike deployers noted that a
simple “Thank You!” in response to a public report would encourage subsequent reporting
Make sure that information returned to public is meaningful, useful and timely.
Utilize volunteer crisis mapping community to make social media actionable, ie crowdsourcing report
moderation, translation, geolocation, approval and verification in addition to reporting.
Universities for Ushahidi and the Standby Volunteer Task Force are confronting the need for a
sustainable, replicable, reliable and predictable pool of volunteers in large scale / ongoing deployments
Crowdsourcing is effective in exposing gaps in official response / monitoring.
Crowdsourced data can be used to evaluate veracity of official data (StopStockouts, Cuidemos el
Voto)
Crowdsourcing campaigns can serve as repository of eyewitness accounts / testimony (LABB)
Crowdsourcing can be used for long-term monitoring of environmental / health affects
Citizen reporting works when and where traditional media coverage cannot – ie inherent bias ofofficial
sources or inability to effectively cover thru traditional reporting, ie London Tubestrike
US Marines used UHP to identify “centers of gravity”
Lessons Learned, March 2011 7

8. Ushahidi Inc.
NYC Medics were able to identify a hospital with capacity to utilize the resources they could mobilize
Geolocation services used in SAR operations
Be open to unexpected outcomes / application of data ie correlation between spatial distribution of
structural damage and report clustering in Ushahidi Haiti + direct communication between Mission
4636 volunteers and people on the ground may have had impact thru direct intervention
Lessons Learned, March 2011 8