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Experimental Android
Hacking Using Reflection
SeongJae Park, Heon Yeom,
Seoul National University
Hidden Android Features
Unsecure, Or Unmatured Features Hidden
From Developers
Need Such Features On Lots Of Researching
Rooting / System Modification
● Pros
○ Able to Use Hidden Features
○ No Limitation At All

● Cons
○ Environment Is Different With Real Market Device
How Android Hide Features
3rd Party Application Use SDK Framework
Interface
Built-in Application Uses Built-in Framework
Interface
SDK Framework Interface != Built-in
Framework Interface
Android Basic Structure
3rd Party Developer
Application

Built-in Application

SDK Framework Interface

Built-in Framework Interface

On-Device Framework

Binder

System Process

System Process

Device

System Process
Java Reflection
● Examine or Modify Behavior Of Application
○ Type Checking
○ Debugging
○ Test
Java Reflection
● Pros
○ Unlimited Freedom

● Cons
○ Performance Overhead
○ Weak Security Available
○ Unexpected Side-Effect
Android Hacking Using Reflection
Change SDK Framework Interface into OnDevice Framework Interface
3rd Party Developer
Application

Built-in Application

SDK Framework Interface

Built-in Framework Interface

Reflection

On-Device Framework
Android Hacking Using Reflection
TelephonyMaanger telephonyManager =
(TelephonyManager)getSystemService(
Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
try {
Class c = Class.forName(telephonyManager.
getClass().getName());
Method m = c.getDeclaredMethod("getITelephony");
m.setAccessible(true);
ITelephony telephony = (ITelephony)m.invoke(
telephonyManager);
telephony.endCall();
} catch (Throwable e) {}
Restriction Of Reflection Using Hack
● Performance Overhead
● May Not Success On Every Machine
○ Manufacturer’s Device Use Modified Android

● May Not Success On Latest Android

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Experimental android hacking using reflection

  • 1. Experimental Android Hacking Using Reflection SeongJae Park, Heon Yeom, Seoul National University
  • 2. Hidden Android Features Unsecure, Or Unmatured Features Hidden From Developers Need Such Features On Lots Of Researching
  • 3. Rooting / System Modification ● Pros ○ Able to Use Hidden Features ○ No Limitation At All ● Cons ○ Environment Is Different With Real Market Device
  • 4. How Android Hide Features 3rd Party Application Use SDK Framework Interface Built-in Application Uses Built-in Framework Interface SDK Framework Interface != Built-in Framework Interface
  • 5. Android Basic Structure 3rd Party Developer Application Built-in Application SDK Framework Interface Built-in Framework Interface On-Device Framework Binder System Process System Process Device System Process
  • 6. Java Reflection ● Examine or Modify Behavior Of Application ○ Type Checking ○ Debugging ○ Test
  • 7. Java Reflection ● Pros ○ Unlimited Freedom ● Cons ○ Performance Overhead ○ Weak Security Available ○ Unexpected Side-Effect
  • 8. Android Hacking Using Reflection Change SDK Framework Interface into OnDevice Framework Interface 3rd Party Developer Application Built-in Application SDK Framework Interface Built-in Framework Interface Reflection On-Device Framework
  • 9. Android Hacking Using Reflection TelephonyMaanger telephonyManager = (TelephonyManager)getSystemService( Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE); try { Class c = Class.forName(telephonyManager. getClass().getName()); Method m = c.getDeclaredMethod("getITelephony"); m.setAccessible(true); ITelephony telephony = (ITelephony)m.invoke( telephonyManager); telephony.endCall(); } catch (Throwable e) {}
  • 10. Restriction Of Reflection Using Hack ● Performance Overhead ● May Not Success On Every Machine ○ Manufacturer’s Device Use Modified Android ● May Not Success On Latest Android