The Hypercacher Raid, or Porte de Vincennes siege was a successful hostage rescue mission. It also offered large opportunity for the French Special Police to learn for future practice. Here are some of my thoughts on the CQB or Close Quarters Battle side of the raid. In all, a success. Their limited entries need work, however.

1. An Analysis of the
Hypercacher Raid
“Rye”
CQB-TEAM
https://www.facebook.com/CQBteam
http://cqb-team.com/cqbforum/
FEEL FREE TO POST THIS ANYWHERE AND EVERYWHERE. CREDITS AND COMPLAINTS GO TO RYAN AT CQB-TEAM. THANK YOU!

2. Introduction
Charlie Hebdo shootings – Two brothers raid the offices of Charlie
Hebdo, massacring the cartoonists and staff there. They then
proceeded out into the streets screaming “Allahu Akbar.” During the
getaway, they killed a lone police officer on patrol. After escaping the
scene, they took hostages in the offices of Création Tendance,
Découverte. Following a siege lasting nine hours, both the brothers
were shot dead.
Porte de Vincennes siege – During this time, Amedy Coulibaly, fellow
extremist and friend of the Charlie Hebdo attackers, took hostages at a
Jewish Hypercacher (or Supermarket).

3. The Suspect
• Amedy Coulibaly, 32. French Muslim of Malian descent.
• Main suspect in the Montrouge shooting in which municipal Police
Officer Clarissa Jean-Philippe was shot and killed.
• Close friend of Said and Cherif Kouachi, the gunmen involved in the
Charlie Hebdo shooting. Now an Islamist turned Jihadist.
• Allegedly involved with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

4. The Location
• The Hypercacher supermarket.
• A Jewish “Super” Kosher.
• Predominately Jewish district.
• Single-story supermarket.
• Parking spaces with parked vehicles.
• Multiple entrances with rolling doors.
• Multiple staff and customers within.
• Multiple aisles and tactical obstacles.

5. The Crisis
• The Porte de Vincennes siege, or the Hypercacher incident.
• Coulibaly made his way into the store with multiple weapons
including grenades.
• Four hostages killed attempting to resist Coulibaly initially.
• Fifteen more hostages held captive.
• Some hostages hid within the cold storage container of the store.
• Demanded the Kouachi brothers not be harmed.
• Closed the rolling shutters and armed himself for a police response.

6. The Initial Response
• BRI
Research and Intervention Brigade French
police special unit deployed, counter-
terrorism and K9 capable.
• RAID
Research, Assistance, Intervention,
Deterrence French national police and
counter-terrorism unit (CTU) deployed.
• Municipal Police
Local police deployed to cordon and
contain the area.
• Ambulance Service
Paramedics at scene ready to respond.
Police escorts available.

7. The Obvious Tactical Issues (Prior to Entry)
1. Rolling shutter doors.
i. These are a nightmare.
ii. They take a long time to allow access. They may need thermal, explosive or other
breaching equipment.
iii. The enemy can shoot your legs as the shutter doors open.
iv. They are often slow to open unless pulled up, again putting you in danger.
2. Aisles
i. Aisles are a pain in the butt to clear.
ii. They offer multiple exposing angles for the enemy to engage down.
iii. They are essentially Linear Danger Areas with T-intersections at the end.
3. Explosive Potential.
i. A heavily armed man with multiple weapon systems and affiliations to terrorist
groups. Expect the worst.
ii. Boobytrapped entry points is possible. As is using grenades or a suicide vest.

8. The Raid
At 17:09 Zulu, four flashbang grenades were set off in four separate locations as distraction. Multiple stacks from key sides of the building went
up to their respective positions on entry points. The automatic sliding doors first opened, followed by the rolling shutters. One team was split in
two on the front shutters. This allowed a split stack, either side of the door. Another team was posted to the side entrance on the left side of the
building. So the plan was two teams to enter two separate entry points and essentially swarm (or threat swarm) the building.
I say swarm (or flooded) the building because there were many members of the entry team in the stack. This suggests that they wanted to take a
large space in a short amount of time whilst sustaining casualties. Additionally, there were negotiators, reserve forces and hostage extraction
elements to the team increasing the size of the stack. Reserve also had additional equipment like a breaching ram. I would also expect them to
have medical capabilities.
When taking aisles, one tactic which can be used is called a Power Shift Flood. This allows aisles to be cleared with many people in a short
amount of time. If this is a little too specific, then the least we should do is adopt the view that a flood was occurring. More than likely if the side
entrance team got into position, they would clear together – or one team would act as hostage extraction.
As the shutters opened, the front team attempted entry. The first man in (hilariously named Leeroy by the general public) attempted an
immediate entry, direct-to-threat, and ended up moving to his right across line-of-fire of his team and behind the check-out counters. The team
behind poised with the shields stood at the doorjamb, engaging the threat. A coverman in the middle, behind a parked vehicle, looking into the
building, also engaged. The team to the right engaged through the automatic sliding doors glass. Multiple members of the team shot from behind
the shield-carrier on either side.
The threat then ran towards the entrance where he was shot down in a hail of gunfire, and almost a catastrophic event of crossfire for the entry
team. The entry team then entered the building and began to clear it, leaving the body for assessment by the reserve or trailing unit. The entry
team left a “corridor” or “tunnel” allowing hostages to escape whilst they entered. However, when hostages came from two separate sides, the
entry team had to negotiate around them. To say this was nearly all improvised on the spot, they did very well.

9. Power Shift Flood
As an example:
• Multiple angles.
• Easier to clear barricades.
• Clears large areas quickly.
• Clears horizontal aisles quickly.
• Allows for split targets.
• Gets multiple weapons on threat.
• Creates safe space in centre.

10. The Raid (Video – Front and Side Angles)

11. The Raid (Video – Diagonal Angle)

12. Micro-Timeline of the Raid
• 5 seconds for entry team to move from starting position to the front entry point.
• 10 seconds until the stack is in position.
• 22 seconds before the roller shutters and automatic doors are opened. That is a gap of 12 seconds which is a potentially
fatal time period in which the hostage taker could kill hostages.
• 26 seconds before initial entry by Leeroy. A gap of 4 seconds with no under-door intelligence.
• 27 seconds before the first shots ring out. A gap of 1 second before the suspect engages.
• 42 seconds before the suspect runs at police. This could have been suicide by cop at this stage. It takes a number of shots
before the suspect goes down. This is wound ballistics hell.
• 46 seconds before the threat is downed. This is a gap of nearly 20 seconds. In limited entry terms this is way beyond time
for “lingering in the fatal funnel.” Staying static for so long is an individuals decision.
• 50 seconds before the final shot goes into the suspect. A gap of 4 seconds to confirm dead.
• 54 seconds before making entry as a team. This is 28 seconds since Leeroy entered. Nearly 10 seconds since the suspect
was downed – a suspect potentially laden with explosives. A suicide vest would have killed many.
• 1 minute 1 seconds before first hostages freed. No visible hostage processing or holding area.
• 1 minutes 30 seconds before next set of hostages freed by the hostage extraction team.
For a macro-timeline, go here: http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/1.636178.

13. The Confusion
• There was initial confusion as to whether to immediately enter or duck
under the rolling shutter to enter.
• There was confusion from the pointman when initial shots were fired and
contact was met, causing him to react unpredictably.
• Further confusion was met when the team decided to stay at the
doorjamb. This forced those behind the pointmen to react, move to
contact and engage.
• Confusion is normal, even when expecting to face a threat.
• The body alarm response (fight or flight) leads to a rush of emotional and
physiological deployment towards the situation. Behaviours then adjust.
• Training around this confusion can iron out issues. Behavioural compliance
is key. However, latent and active issues will always be present.

14. The Obvious Tactical Issues (During the Raid)
1. Immediate Entry Danger.
i. The threat of potential explosives or suicide belt meant that progressing
into the building had great potential of triggering a reaction or tripwire.
ii. Keeping a threat at distance and engaging the threat at earliest
convenience should be priority. Entering was not behaviour-compliant.
2. Poor Standard of Limited Entry.
i. The tactic choice was good. The team was capable. The execution was
below average. The operation was still a success but flaws were apparent.
ii. Cementing yourself rather than moving in and out is a better technique.
iii. If the threat had moved out-of-sight, one would then have to enter.
However, there was time to move inside – this was possible, even if
dangerous. Further, lingering in the fatal funnel is dangerous. Dilemma.

15. The Aftermath
• Not a single Police Officer died. Injuries occurred.
• Not a single hostage died prior to entry.
• Suspect killed. Splatted!
• Tactics tested.
• Lessons learnt.
• Public and media support.
• Political support.
Success? ✓ Overall fantastic.
However, improvements still have to be made. No operation is perfect.

16. Public and Media Reaction
• There was a HUGE online reaction to these events which unfolded on
near real-time television.
• The media thought the operation as a success, as did many “Military
Advisors” brought in to debate the topic. In fact, the media were
more concerned with the motives of the terrorists than the response
to the event.
• The public, as always, were quite split – dualistic. Some said the entry
was great. However, most online reactions were negative. Mainly
pertaining to not entering quick enough or in the pattern “they were
taught.”
• F&%K THE HATERS. It was a successful mission.

17. Opinions
Opinions are like arseholes…
The problem is the public often have a bias view of Close Quarters Battle.
The view is often that a team must enter immediately, with flashbangs, and
quickly, getting through the fatal funnel or the entry team will fail. This is
incorrect.
The mission was essentially completed from the door. Successfully.
Different methodologies, different situations require different tactics.
Fighting from and through the door is a legitimate tactic.
This is known as a limited entry or fighting from the door.

19. Oh So Many Opinions
• Often promoted by conventional Military or those trained in a
particular way of entry, i.e. immediately entering a room.
• Hardly any expert advice or opinion, for example from counter-
terrorism unit members.
• No one acknowledges the success of the situation. People tend to
orientate towards the negative aspects of it.
• People who said it was good were often shouted down.
• Trolls everywhere. Theatrics.
• In other words, ignore these idiots!

20. Entry Discussion
• There are two primary methods used by the team:
• Limited entry; and,
• Direct-to-threat.
• This included using ballistic shields on pointmen as a contributing tactic..
• The team engage from the door, limiting themselves from progressing (limited entry)
until the threat is downed (direct-to-threat).
• They then proceed into the building searching for threats as per standard.
• There is one primary method used by the initial pointman to enter, aptly
named Leeroy:
• Immediate entry. In specific terms, a cross.
• At first it looked like he was conducting an immediate threat drill or going direct-to-
threat but then he moved to the right, crossing over. Behavioural compliance went
out there window! In fact, it shot off into space…

21. Limited Entry Issues
There were a few observed issues with the limited entry portrayed, although it was successful:
1. Moving in and out of cover, constantly.
i. In a limited entry, one man holds the near side of the door and another man holds the far side of the door. They act as pillars
– they cement themselves as a foundation. They are now able to engage from either side. People can move or engage
through the middle or these “pillars”, and can decide to move if they need to enter. This is a trained process.
ii. Moving in and out of cover neglects this. The “pillars” stay still, if people want to shoot they move around them. Other issues
within this include earning the shot and safety. It is unsafe to be unpredictable.
2. Crossfire on getting rushed.
i. The suspect rushing the team came into the middle of them, creating a potential crossfire situation. As with the coverman
behind the vehicle potentially shooting the entry team.
3. Lingering in the fatal funnel.
i. It took almost a minute from moving towards the building to entering. It took more than 30 seconds from the shutters going
up until the team entered. Limited entries should allow you to engage and down the threat (or stay until downed), engage
and follow-up the threat (to enter), or engage and back away to conduct another tactic. Remember: lingering equals risk.
ii. There were good reasons for lingering, however. For one, they knew where the threat was. They did not have to enter to
identify him. And secondly, they were in an active engagement. Unfortunately, it became a prolonged engagement but they
still retained control over the situation.
4. Other issues will not be discussed here. This is supposed to be a short presentation!

22. Shooting Issues
1. Obstructions:
I. Be prepared to break or shoot through glass. I.e. with a glass breaker, hoolie or other mechanical device.
II. Be prepared to navigate shopping trolleys and move them out the way or use something to move them.
2. Shield:
I. If you are shield – you can be static or mobile. Pick one. The team will negotiate around you or signal you if they need you to
move. If you are going to move, signal the team. Have an SOP around this.
II. Always “New York Reload” as shieldman. Have multiple pistols at the ready instead of attempting to reload.
III. Always shoot-around the shield guy. Earn the shot. In some cases use him to move, in some cases the man with the shield
acts as the lower guy in a high/low situation. You may control him. Safety issues are not range-isms in this context.
IV. Do not jump in and out from behind the shield guy. This is a friendly fire risk. Using shields to cover friends and hostages,
especially those who were wounded, was a good tactic to see. All shieldmen had at least one coverman present.
3. Long Guns and Wound Ballistics:
I. Try to get a long gun in the firefight. This includes a sniper team if present.
II. All teams should understand wound ballistics to a basic degree. Pistols are well-known for being underperformers at
incapacitating someone within a vital few seconds.
III. People can still move, run and shoot while wounded. Some people take six plus gunshot wounds to drop to the floor. Shot
placement is key to success, as is many rounds on target.

23. “Leeroy”
• The pointman who entered first in an immediate entry has been deemed “Leeroy
Jenkins” by the public. This is in response to the popular “Leeroy Jenkins” video posted
online where one member of a team in a videogame charges head first, getting the team
hurt.
• Commander of RAID, Jean-Michel Fauvergue suggests that, “[Leeroy] then slipped [into
the Kosher] with a shield to protect the hostages that were in the back of the store.” It
seems more Leeroy took his opportunity to enter and then was met with resistance.
• He moved first, keeping to his sector. Ducking under an obstacle is safe but if you will
note – the helmet is very close to the roller door. Shots ring out, leading Leeroy to
fumble in panic. This is the body alarm response. His weapon then goes down, eye-line
not level to threat.
• He goes towards the right for cover or concealment behind the checkout counter. During
this he almost instantly crouches, adopting a smaller target behind the shield. This may
be due to the body alarm response, where humans often want to adopt a smaller
position or fetal position. This may be due to realizing that members of his team are
shooting near him or are behind him.

24. Leeroy Example

25. Keep at a Distance or Close In?
• This is a dilemma.
• Dilemmas require real-time, on-the-ground decision-making.
• There is almost never a “right” answer. Some answers are potentially better than others but that
is an issue for after the event and training.
• Do you stay in limited entry position and engage the threat at distance? This is good if he has a
suicide vest. If he comes forward do you pull away? Another good question to pose in this event.
How long do you stay there? You do not want to “linger” for too long as he could move out-of-
sight and kill hostages. In other words, to Leeroy or not to Leeroy… that is the question.
• Do you close in? Do you follow Leeroy and engage with the threat? Certainly there was time and
space to do so, however dangerous. Putting more people into the room against threat would
open up more engagement angles and triangulate fire. The shields could have moved up, covering
the approach for the rest of the team. Shopping trolleys prevented this for the other team.
• Do not judge someone who makes a mistake. Identify the mistake and look to make better
decisions in the future. Leeroy is a good example of that… no judgments towards the individual
involved. He held his own and did what most will never do.

26. Safety Concerns (During Entry)
Some range safety theories(range-isms) go out the window with a limited entry. This is
beyond the range. New safety concerns become apparent:
1. On Line Rule
2. 45/90 Degree Rule
3. 2 Meter Rule
4. Body Contact Rule
5. Approach Angle
6. Muzzle Before Meat
7. Earn The Shot
8. Limit Exposure
9. Mutual Support/Wingman
10. Area or Call to Predictably Move, Change or Exit Position
INFORMATION FROM HIGH THREAT SYSTEMS LLC AT WWW.HIGHTHREATSYSTEMS.COM!

27. Potential for Friendly Fire
As seen in these snippets from the previous videos, there was a great
potential for friendly fire. This may or may not have lead to injuries.
Blue-on-blue must be avoided at all costs. Rules of Engagement (ROE)
and Orders for Opening Fire (OFOF) are very strict within the Hostage
Rescue (HR) or Special Recovery Operation (SRO) context. However…
Many safety rules were neglected that could have potentially prevented
friendly fire. It comes down to three matters:
• Training;
• Knowledge; and,
• Experience.
By recognizing that the safety issues are apparent, there is room for
improving. Train on limited entries. Gain knowledge about them and
their associated safety concerns. Put it in the face of reality.
TCCC kicks in. CUF. Kill threat. Get them to cover or allow self-extraction.

28. Future Recommendations
Tactical Teams are recommended to:
• Improve and work on limited entries and fighting from the door
techniques to prevent the jumpy behaviour and safety concerns seen.
• Have Standard Operating Procedures for immediate entries. If one
man enters, should the rest of the team?
• Develop work around shields, including movement around shield to
engage and decision making in regards to equipment. New York
Reload is strongly recommended.
• Keep honing behavioural responses while entering in lieu of threats.
• Learn from other teams with a similar set up!

29. Conclusion
The French Special Police did a fantastic job. There were no civilian casualties
during the raid, no Special Police died. They have come a long way in regards
to Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.
Training still has to be refined. Limited penetration techniques have to be
closely trained upon as errors cropped up during the raid that could be life-
threatening to the operator, including weapon safety and proper
manipulation. These errors were seen as basic, which could indicate lack of
training in regards to this particular entry type.
Good job!
FEEL FREE TO POST THIS ANYWHERE AND EVERYWHERE. CREDITS AND COMPLAINTS GO TO RYAN AT CQB-TEAM. THANK YOU!

30. References
• Small Wars Journal, Urban Siege in Paris: A Spectrum of Armed Assault. Here:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/20955.
• Haaretz, Paris Shooting Updates French PM Acknowledges 'Failings' in Preventing Attack. Here:
http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/1.636178.
• Leparisien, Le patron du Raid et des GIPN: Coulibaly ne souhaitait pas négocier. Here:
http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/le-patron-du-raid-et-des-gipn-coulibaly-ne-souhaitait-pas-
negocier-13-01-2015-
4442355.php#xtref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reddit.com%2Fr%2FMilitary%2Fcomments%2F2sb
1wg%2Fhead_of_the_raid_explains_the_unperfect_assault%2F.
• Reddit, Head of RAID explains unperfect assault. Here:
https://www.reddit.com/r/Military/comments/2sb1wg/head_of_the_raid_explains_the_unper
fect_assault/.
• Wikipedia, Porte de Vincennes siege. Here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porte_de_Vincennes_siege.
• The New Yorker, The End of the Sieges in France. Here: http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-
davidson/end-sieges-france.