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Trilateral Forum Tokyo
Japan-US-European Dialogue
Asia-Pacific Regional Architecture and Trilateral Cooperation
ORGANIZED BY:
The German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Tokyo Foundation
SUPPORTED BY:
Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership and the
Delegation of the European Union to Japan
Tokyo, Japan 8-9 June 2013
SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE:
MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES
FOR THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION
Rommel C. Banlaoi
Chairman of the Board and Executive Director
Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR)
Head, Center for Intelligence and National Security Studies (CINSS)
Delivered at the Japan-US-European Dialogue organized by the German Marshall Fund of the United
States and the Tokyo Foundation held at the Europa House, Tokyo, Japan on 9 June 2013
It is my great honor to present my humble thoughts on the Senkaku Islands
dispute and its implications for the maritime security in the Asia Pacific.
I share the predicaments of the Japanese people on the Senkaku Islands
dispute in the East China Sea because the Philippines is also engulfed in a
bitter territorial dispute with China over the Spratly Islands in the South
China Sea.
Currently, China has recently established a full operational sea control of the
Scarborough Shoal in the aftermath of the tense Philippines-China standoff
in April 2012. The Scarborough Shoal, which the Philippines calls Panatag
Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc Shoal, is located 123 nautical miles from west of
Subic Bay. The shoal, which became the target range of American military
forces during the cold war while in Subic Naval base, is apparently within
the Philippines’ 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
guaranteed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).
But China argues that the Scarborough Shoal belongs to China by virtue of
historic rights and effective jurisdiction. China calls it the Huangyan Island

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located 472 nautical miles away from Hainan province but within its nine-
dash line claim in the South China Sea.
By sending its Marine Surveillance Vessels (CMS) Number 84 and Number
75 in April 2012 with a fleet of at least 12 fishing boats from Hainan, China
was able to establish its foothold in the area.
The Philippines no longer deploys its Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ships
in the Scarborough Shoal to avoid unintentional violent conflicts with
China. Filipino fishermen are also discouraged to fish there as a preventive
measure.
With a very limited military and law enforcement capabilities to protect its
claims, the Philippine government submitted in January 2013 its maritime
claims before the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
Judge Shunji Yania, the ITLOS President, announced on 24 April 2013 that
he already completed the panel to hear the Philippine submission. But
China vehemently rejected the submission and bitterly ignored the case that
the Philippines filed before ITLOS.
Meanwhile, China has increased its para-military presence in the South
China Sea. While China convinces us to believe that it wants a peaceful
external security environment, its deployment of para-military forces in the
East China Sea and the South China Sea is heightening security anxieties not
only among claimants and littoral states but also with other countries in the
world relying on the freedom of navigation in one of the world’s busiest sea-
lanes.
China’s latest worrisome activities are in the 2nd
Thomas Shoal, just around
50 nautical miles away from the Mischief Reef that China occupied from the
Philippines in 1995. The Mischief Reef is currently fortified with a solid
three-storey building armed with gun emplacements, radars, windmill, solar
panels, basketball court and an extended solid platform suitable for a
helipad. The Mischief Reef can serve as an effective stop over, refuelling,
and rest station of Chinese warships and civilian maritime vessels cruising
towards the East China Sea, South China Sea, the Yellow Sea and beyond.
Like the Senkaku Islands dispute, my fear in the South China Sea is the huge
potential of a military conflict against the backdrop of China’s increasing
“reactive assertiveness” to pursue its excessive maritime territorial claims.
Though all parties involved in maritime territorial disputes want to avoid any
military confrontation with each other, recent developments in the Senkaku
Islands, Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands have increased the potential for
escalation of conflicts in this highly contested maritime domain.

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In the Paracel Islands, Vietnam accused China for attacking a Vietnamese
fishing boat on 20 May 2013. In Senkaku Islands, Japan Coast Guard
revealed that three China Marine Surveillance vessels (Haijian 15, 50 and
66) entered the water in the East China Sea on 13 May 2013. Chinese State
Oceans Administration even ordered Japan ships sailing around Senkaku
Islands to leave the area.
In the Spratlys, China deployed three of its CMS vessels accompanied by 10
fishing boats in the 2nd
Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal) on 10 May 2013 and
asked the Philippine government to remove its grounded ship in the area.
In fact, China wants the Philippines to vacate all its occupied land features
in the Spratlys.
These are just some of the recent incidents in disputed waters that
increasingly create the risk of violent clashes that are inimical to the
maritime security of the entire Asia Pacific region. Avoiding violent
incidents at sea is therefore essential to maintain peace and stability in this
very dynamic region.
However, overlapping fishing activities and increasing maritime patrols of
parties around the waters of the Senkaku Islands and the Spratly Islands can
raise the possibility of accidental maritime clash that can lead to violent
incidents. An unintentional accidental clash can lead to unintended armed
skirmishes that all parties do not want to occur.
The recent tension between the Philippines and Taiwan over the killing on 9
May 2013 of a Taiwanese fisherman on the contested water demonstrates
the risk of a potential violent conflict that can happen in the maritime
domain. Involvement of the public in the incident due to Asia’s rising
maritime nationalism can complicate the situation. Inciting popular
nationalism in maritime territorial disputes can be counter-productive in
finding peaceful resolutions.
How to avoid violent accident at sea, particularly in the contested area,
should loom large in our strategic thinking, policy-making, and tactical
operation. A violent accident in the disputed waters of the East China Sea
and the South China Sea can be the tipping point of unintended armed
clashes that can severely threaten maritime security, peace, stability and
prosperity of the Asia Pacific region.
Thank you very much for your attention.