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"Let’s Get Physical"
Cyber Security in an IP-Enabled
            World
A simple, easy to use, online, B2B procurement
 portal for purchasing products and services to
  identify, minimise and manage the security
             threat to business data.
               www.riskfactory.com
Encryption Cracking            Data Slurping
                                                Cookies
   Script Scrapers         Script Kiddies     Spyware
Mockingbirds    Road Apples           Zombie       Spim
     M alwar        Botnets           s
                               SQL Injection     Spoofers
     e
 Google            Stealth Bombs           Port Scanning
 Hacking                           Worm
 Root Kits     Backdoors           s        Pharmin
                                War
               Crackers                     gEavesdropping
Steganography                 Driving
                Denial of Service Attacks
      X-Site                             Crawler
                     Ear Wigging
    Scripting                            s
 Phishing                              Man-in-the Middle
            Adware Data Mining
                                             Attacks
Suppression                    Screen Grabbers
               Fingerprinting
Viruses   Stripping    Smurfing       Social Engineering
Always do whatever's
next…

• Wireless

• Bluetooth

• Cloud
Our Internet Based
On… …
• 60’s concepts, requirements &
  funding

• 70’s computing environments

• 80’s operating systems,
  applications, networks, and
  programming languages

• 90’s security technology

• 2000’s operational and
  business practices
The End is Neigh


   In the next 2
     years the
     present IP
  address space
 (IPv4) will reach
   its capacity.
Birth Follows Every
Death

 It will be replaced by
     IPv6 which has
   addresses enough
(about 5x10 to the 28 th
power) for each of the
    6.8 billion human
 beings on the planet.
In Other Words...




  Every human being on the planet could have their
  own personal network the size of today’s internet.
Why?

• The Internet is preparing to leave its virtual
  world and enter our physical world.
• IPv6 provides an infrastructure for
  assigning IP addresses to physical “things”
• The networking of the virtual world to the
  physical world
• The networking of “things”
• Evolution: from a network of
  interconnected computers to a network of
  interconnected objects …
The "average" person owns somewhere between
      1000 to 5000 things – possessions.
Imagine

 • What if you could put them all on your own
   network?
 • Have a complete inventory of everything you own
   and know where it is – real-time?
 • What if you could connect this network of your
   things to other networks and interact?
 • Life on this planet would be significantly and
   profoundly changed.
 • We’d never run out of anything.
 • No more theft as we know it – we’d know exactly
   where things are at any given movement
   anywhere on the planet
Wake Up

 • It’s all ready here
 • Internet of Things (IoT)
 • Concept founded by Auto-ID Centre at in
   MIT back in 1999
 • Phase 1 underway, bottom up, level-
   specific functionality
 • Internet Protocol for Smart Objects (IPSO)
   Alliance founded 2008
IoT Characteristics


 Pervasive: present throughout

 Ubiquitous: everywhere at the same time

 Evolving: constantly changing

 Global: everywhere on this planet
Beyond Accidental




"Anytime, anywhere, by anyone and everything"
A Day in the Life…
First Things First


• Everything on the electrical grid - first

• Balance of power (grids)
  – Plant to substations
  – Substations to lines
  – Lines – transformers
  – Transformers to homes
Second Things Second


• Any “thing” with a power source to
  any “thing” with a power source
  and vice versa…

  – Refrigerator to a television
  – Toaster to smoke detector
  – Fire alarms to ovens
  – Smoke detectors to gas supplier
And Last But Not Least

• Any “person” to any “thing” or any person?

  – You   to   your house
  – You   to   your appliances
  – You   to   your car
  – You   to   your….
Communication is Key

 • Need mobile “smart” communication
   devices to connect:

   – Things to things
   – People to things

 • IP Smart Objects (IPSO)
    • RFID chip the leader
IoT Language


         Hello: My UID is
         1234567fa and my
         challenge is X4665



           Bonjour: My UID is
           af7654321 and the
           answer to your challenge
           is Ab455839
Communication
Framework

Netless: is an anamorphic structure of nodes that is capable
of holding some amounts of digital data. each node is a small,
low-power wireless digital transponder. There is no permanent
network connection. Every time any node would appear in the
vicinity of any other node - they would establish a wireless link
and swap the data that was stored internally.


Keywords: permission-less, parasitic network, off-line data-
sharing, city-net, WAN, othernet, decentralized, node-network,
sneakernet, sensor-network, grassroots-network, wireless.
Looks Like
Soylent Green is People!

Newly developed ‘RFID
Powder’, as invisible as a
speck of dust: 0.05 mm x
0.05 x 0.005mm

Chips are packed with 128
bits of static memory,
enough to store a unique
38-digit ID number, 2.45
GHz, 1mW

Can be embed directly into
pieces of paper

Current favored application:
anti-counterfeiting
Already There

• Retail stores using RFID for
  stock control
• Vehicles paying by RFID on
  motorways
• Cows, Dogs, Cats, Sheep
  implanted with RFID chips
• Consumer products from
  cars and mobiles to
  children’s tennis shoes now
  equipped with GPS RFID
  chips
Security Requirements

Can our current C.I.A. definition fit the IoT?

Pervasive: present throughout?

Ubiquitous: everywhere simultaneously?

Emerging: constantly evolving?

Global: everywhere on this planet?
Application Challenges
IP Challenges

Packet spoofing
Network traffic analysis
Device analysis
Device spoofing
Encryption
Key distribution
Privacy protection
Identity protection
Identity and identifier
management
IPSO Challenges

•   Devices are not reachable
     – Most of the time a device is not
       connected
•   Devices can be lost and stolen
     – Makes security difficult when the
       device
       is not connected
•   Devices are not crypto-engines
     – Strong security difficult without
       processing power
•   Devices have finite life
     – Credentials need to be tied to lifetime
•   Devices are transportable
     – Will cross borders
•   Devices need to be recognised by many
    readers
Privacy Challenges

• What things you own
• Where you bought them
• The price you paid for
  them
• Where they are located
• What you use them for
• How often you use them
• What they connect to
• Who they connect to
Fraud Challenges


 • "Thing" Theft

 • Counterfeit

 • Piracy
Professional Challenges

• See the bigger picture - now
• Anticipate the potential problems
• Security professionals are always
  “catching up” to technology
• Step up. Consider the implications of
  the
  next world of networked things
• Prepare for it – now
• Lead - Don’t follow.
26 Dover Street
        London
    United Kingdom
        W1S 4LY
  +44 (0)20 3586 1025
+44 (0)20 7763 7101(fax)

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Risk Factory: Let's Get Physical

  • 1. "Let’s Get Physical" Cyber Security in an IP-Enabled World
  • 2. A simple, easy to use, online, B2B procurement portal for purchasing products and services to identify, minimise and manage the security threat to business data. www.riskfactory.com
  • 3. Encryption Cracking Data Slurping Cookies Script Scrapers Script Kiddies Spyware Mockingbirds Road Apples Zombie Spim M alwar Botnets s SQL Injection Spoofers e Google Stealth Bombs Port Scanning Hacking Worm Root Kits Backdoors s Pharmin War Crackers gEavesdropping Steganography Driving Denial of Service Attacks X-Site Crawler Ear Wigging Scripting s Phishing Man-in-the Middle Adware Data Mining Attacks Suppression Screen Grabbers Fingerprinting Viruses Stripping Smurfing Social Engineering
  • 4. Always do whatever's next… • Wireless • Bluetooth • Cloud
  • 5. Our Internet Based On… … • 60’s concepts, requirements & funding • 70’s computing environments • 80’s operating systems, applications, networks, and programming languages • 90’s security technology • 2000’s operational and business practices
  • 6. The End is Neigh In the next 2 years the present IP address space (IPv4) will reach its capacity.
  • 7. Birth Follows Every Death It will be replaced by IPv6 which has addresses enough (about 5x10 to the 28 th power) for each of the 6.8 billion human beings on the planet.
  • 8. In Other Words... Every human being on the planet could have their own personal network the size of today’s internet.
  • 9. Why? • The Internet is preparing to leave its virtual world and enter our physical world. • IPv6 provides an infrastructure for assigning IP addresses to physical “things” • The networking of the virtual world to the physical world • The networking of “things” • Evolution: from a network of interconnected computers to a network of interconnected objects …
  • 10. The "average" person owns somewhere between 1000 to 5000 things – possessions.
  • 11. Imagine • What if you could put them all on your own network? • Have a complete inventory of everything you own and know where it is – real-time? • What if you could connect this network of your things to other networks and interact? • Life on this planet would be significantly and profoundly changed. • We’d never run out of anything. • No more theft as we know it – we’d know exactly where things are at any given movement anywhere on the planet
  • 12. Wake Up • It’s all ready here • Internet of Things (IoT) • Concept founded by Auto-ID Centre at in MIT back in 1999 • Phase 1 underway, bottom up, level- specific functionality • Internet Protocol for Smart Objects (IPSO) Alliance founded 2008
  • 13. IoT Characteristics Pervasive: present throughout Ubiquitous: everywhere at the same time Evolving: constantly changing Global: everywhere on this planet
  • 14. Beyond Accidental "Anytime, anywhere, by anyone and everything"
  • 15. A Day in the Life…
  • 16. First Things First • Everything on the electrical grid - first • Balance of power (grids) – Plant to substations – Substations to lines – Lines – transformers – Transformers to homes
  • 17. Second Things Second • Any “thing” with a power source to any “thing” with a power source and vice versa… – Refrigerator to a television – Toaster to smoke detector – Fire alarms to ovens – Smoke detectors to gas supplier
  • 18. And Last But Not Least • Any “person” to any “thing” or any person? – You to your house – You to your appliances – You to your car – You to your….
  • 19. Communication is Key • Need mobile “smart” communication devices to connect: – Things to things – People to things • IP Smart Objects (IPSO) • RFID chip the leader
  • 20. IoT Language Hello: My UID is 1234567fa and my challenge is X4665 Bonjour: My UID is af7654321 and the answer to your challenge is Ab455839
  • 22. Framework Netless: is an anamorphic structure of nodes that is capable of holding some amounts of digital data. each node is a small, low-power wireless digital transponder. There is no permanent network connection. Every time any node would appear in the vicinity of any other node - they would establish a wireless link and swap the data that was stored internally. Keywords: permission-less, parasitic network, off-line data- sharing, city-net, WAN, othernet, decentralized, node-network, sneakernet, sensor-network, grassroots-network, wireless.
  • 24. Soylent Green is People! Newly developed ‘RFID Powder’, as invisible as a speck of dust: 0.05 mm x 0.05 x 0.005mm Chips are packed with 128 bits of static memory, enough to store a unique 38-digit ID number, 2.45 GHz, 1mW Can be embed directly into pieces of paper Current favored application: anti-counterfeiting
  • 25. Already There • Retail stores using RFID for stock control • Vehicles paying by RFID on motorways • Cows, Dogs, Cats, Sheep implanted with RFID chips • Consumer products from cars and mobiles to children’s tennis shoes now equipped with GPS RFID chips
  • 26. Security Requirements Can our current C.I.A. definition fit the IoT? Pervasive: present throughout? Ubiquitous: everywhere simultaneously? Emerging: constantly evolving? Global: everywhere on this planet?
  • 28. IP Challenges Packet spoofing Network traffic analysis Device analysis Device spoofing Encryption Key distribution Privacy protection Identity protection Identity and identifier management
  • 29. IPSO Challenges • Devices are not reachable – Most of the time a device is not connected • Devices can be lost and stolen – Makes security difficult when the device is not connected • Devices are not crypto-engines – Strong security difficult without processing power • Devices have finite life – Credentials need to be tied to lifetime • Devices are transportable – Will cross borders • Devices need to be recognised by many readers
  • 30. Privacy Challenges • What things you own • Where you bought them • The price you paid for them • Where they are located • What you use them for • How often you use them • What they connect to • Who they connect to
  • 31.
  • 32. Fraud Challenges • "Thing" Theft • Counterfeit • Piracy
  • 33. Professional Challenges • See the bigger picture - now • Anticipate the potential problems • Security professionals are always “catching up” to technology • Step up. Consider the implications of the next world of networked things • Prepare for it – now • Lead - Don’t follow.
  • 34. 26 Dover Street London United Kingdom W1S 4LY +44 (0)20 3586 1025 +44 (0)20 7763 7101(fax)

Hinweis der Redaktion

  1. Give out cards
  2. Give out cards
  3. Oldest crime on record – not prostitution First recorded case of identity theft Bible: Genesis XXX