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HP Application Security
Center
       ViViT – Madison, WI (Dec. 4, 2009)



1   12 March 2009
Your Security Will Fail
        … you just don’t know it yet.



                                                                               Rafal M. Los
                                                                               Sr. Security Solutions Specialist




        © 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
22 MarchThe information contained herein is subject to change without notice
1        2009
Today’s Agenda
•Quick Scan of Headliners
    −Incidents & data theft
•5 Reasons Security Is Failing
    −Security not user-friendly
    −Decentralized data storage
    −Consumerization
    −Passing the buck (aka – liability)
    −Consumer apathy
•How You Will Succeed
    −Magic pixie dust
3   12 March 2009
4   12 March 2009
5   12 March 2009
Quick Scan of Recent Headlines
    India vs. Pakistan in “cyber-war”
•
    − India hacked Pakistan’s websites, Pakistan
      retaliates(A1)
    US Pentagon web sites “penetrated” by Chinese
•
    − “No sites are safe” say the Chinese hackers(A2)
•   Corporate sites hacked
    − Hackers attacking corporate sites(A3-A5)
    Hacking your way into Harvard (A6)
•
    Santa’s Gmail account hacked!
•
    − Is no one safe? Not even Santa!? (A7)
6    12 March 2009
Security Fails Because…




7   12 March 2009
Security Fails Because…
•   Security is not user-friendly
    − Secure is not second nature
         • Seat belts, dead-bolt locks, locking your car
    − Secure is possible, but requires a PhD
         • Configuring your computer to be “secure”
         • Using minimal browser-capabilities (NoScript?)
    − Security measures are complex
         • Tokens, digital certificates, “widgets” and “gadgets”
         • Anti-virus, Anti-Malware, SPAM, trojans, ClickJacking
    − Usability is arch enemy of security
         • Why?

8    12 March 2009
Security Fails Because…
•   Data storage is de-centralized
    − How many devices carry “data”
         • iPod, USB Memory stick, cell phone
         • Many, many other devices store information
    − Castle theory is impossible
         • No “centralized” data store to build defenses around
    − Data in all formats
         • Spreadsheets, databases, txt
           files, PSTs, PDFs, PPTs, DOCs, et al
    − No one knows where data lives
         • Is *your* corporate data centralized?
         • Can anyone identify data/types/locations for all data?
9    12 March 2009
Security Fails Because…
•    Consumerization drives non-securable
     technologies
     − Vendors build for “wow factor”
          • Cool sells
          • Secure does not
     − Viral marketing works
          • iPhone, iPod vs. Windows Mobile, Zune
     − Corporations cannot deal with all the gadgets
          • Gadgets don’t include enterprise features
          • No way to secure this stuff!
     − It just shows up one day
          • New devices show up on the corp. network every day
10    12 March 2009
Security Fails Because…
•    Businesses pass the [risk] buck
     − “Not my problem” mentality
          • Contracts write liability down the chain
          • Customers responsible for own security
     − Contracts are brutal
          • Corporations pass liability to vendors
     − Corporations don’t understand impact
          • Liability is one thing, public opinion… another
          • Customers don’t care for liability write-offs
     − The pen is mightier (so is the blog)
          • Bloggers, digital media exposes breaches

11    12 March 2009
Security Fails Because…
     End-users still don’t get it
•
     − End-users still apathetic about security
          • Who cares if my computer is hacked?
          • What would hackers want with my information?
     − Wait until your identity is stolen…
          • Costs are huge in dollars and time
     − End-users think corporations protect them
          • … but companies don’t do enough
          • … but no one can protect you from yourself
     − Apathy to outrage
          • “Why didn’t someone tell me”… when it’s too late

12    12 March 2009
Security Has No End-Game
•    Live to fight another day
     − Mitigate immediate risks
     − Secure what you can
     − Educate and empower end-users
     − Make it simple stupid
•    People, Process, Tools are the foundation
     − People: educate, empower, assist
     − Process: easier to do the right thing, not the wrong
     − Tools: don’t replace people, make them efficient


13    12 March 2009
You Can Succeed




14   12 March 2009
You Can Succeed
                                              People: Providing guidance on secure application
                                              development
                                                •Educate and empower
                                                •HP ASC Security Team can help!




Process: Security cannot be an afterthought
                                                      Tools: Coverage for the entire SDLC.
 •Repeatable processes
                                                              • WebInspect
 •Secure coding practices
                                                              • QAInspect
 •Web Security Policies and Standards
                                                              • DevInspect
                                                              • AMP platform
 15   12 March 2009
Are You Ready? Take the First Step.




16   12 March 2009
“The Journey of a
 thousand miles must
 begin with a single step”
                                                    -- Chinese proverb



Rafal “Raf” M. Los
Sr. Security Solutions Consultant      -         HP Application Security Center
Direct - (404) 606-6056                -         email: Rafal@hp.com
http://www.communities.hp.com/securitysoftware/blogs/rafal/
Appendix
          References
A.
     1.      http://www.arsalanonline.com/2008/11/indian-website-hacked-pakistani-hackers-response-to-ogra-website-
             hacking/
     2.      http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/03/07/china.hackers/index.html
     3.      http://www.engadgethd.com/tag/Tweeter/
     4.      http://www.pcworld.com/printable/article/id,148007/printable.html
     5.      http://cyberinsecure.com/businessweek-online-content-hit-by-sql-injection/
     6.      http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-8459030_ITM
     7.      http://preachsecurity.blogspot.com/2008/12/santas-gmail-hacked-is-nothing-sacred.html




18    12 March 2009

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Failed - Why Security Fails And What To Do v08.1204a

  • 1. HP Application Security Center ViViT – Madison, WI (Dec. 4, 2009) 1 12 March 2009
  • 2. Your Security Will Fail … you just don’t know it yet. Rafal M. Los Sr. Security Solutions Specialist © 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. 22 MarchThe information contained herein is subject to change without notice 1 2009
  • 3. Today’s Agenda •Quick Scan of Headliners −Incidents & data theft •5 Reasons Security Is Failing −Security not user-friendly −Decentralized data storage −Consumerization −Passing the buck (aka – liability) −Consumer apathy •How You Will Succeed −Magic pixie dust 3 12 March 2009
  • 4. 4 12 March 2009
  • 5. 5 12 March 2009
  • 6. Quick Scan of Recent Headlines India vs. Pakistan in “cyber-war” • − India hacked Pakistan’s websites, Pakistan retaliates(A1) US Pentagon web sites “penetrated” by Chinese • − “No sites are safe” say the Chinese hackers(A2) • Corporate sites hacked − Hackers attacking corporate sites(A3-A5) Hacking your way into Harvard (A6) • Santa’s Gmail account hacked! • − Is no one safe? Not even Santa!? (A7) 6 12 March 2009
  • 8. Security Fails Because… • Security is not user-friendly − Secure is not second nature • Seat belts, dead-bolt locks, locking your car − Secure is possible, but requires a PhD • Configuring your computer to be “secure” • Using minimal browser-capabilities (NoScript?) − Security measures are complex • Tokens, digital certificates, “widgets” and “gadgets” • Anti-virus, Anti-Malware, SPAM, trojans, ClickJacking − Usability is arch enemy of security • Why? 8 12 March 2009
  • 9. Security Fails Because… • Data storage is de-centralized − How many devices carry “data” • iPod, USB Memory stick, cell phone • Many, many other devices store information − Castle theory is impossible • No “centralized” data store to build defenses around − Data in all formats • Spreadsheets, databases, txt files, PSTs, PDFs, PPTs, DOCs, et al − No one knows where data lives • Is *your* corporate data centralized? • Can anyone identify data/types/locations for all data? 9 12 March 2009
  • 10. Security Fails Because… • Consumerization drives non-securable technologies − Vendors build for “wow factor” • Cool sells • Secure does not − Viral marketing works • iPhone, iPod vs. Windows Mobile, Zune − Corporations cannot deal with all the gadgets • Gadgets don’t include enterprise features • No way to secure this stuff! − It just shows up one day • New devices show up on the corp. network every day 10 12 March 2009
  • 11. Security Fails Because… • Businesses pass the [risk] buck − “Not my problem” mentality • Contracts write liability down the chain • Customers responsible for own security − Contracts are brutal • Corporations pass liability to vendors − Corporations don’t understand impact • Liability is one thing, public opinion… another • Customers don’t care for liability write-offs − The pen is mightier (so is the blog) • Bloggers, digital media exposes breaches 11 12 March 2009
  • 12. Security Fails Because… End-users still don’t get it • − End-users still apathetic about security • Who cares if my computer is hacked? • What would hackers want with my information? − Wait until your identity is stolen… • Costs are huge in dollars and time − End-users think corporations protect them • … but companies don’t do enough • … but no one can protect you from yourself − Apathy to outrage • “Why didn’t someone tell me”… when it’s too late 12 12 March 2009
  • 13. Security Has No End-Game • Live to fight another day − Mitigate immediate risks − Secure what you can − Educate and empower end-users − Make it simple stupid • People, Process, Tools are the foundation − People: educate, empower, assist − Process: easier to do the right thing, not the wrong − Tools: don’t replace people, make them efficient 13 12 March 2009
  • 14. You Can Succeed 14 12 March 2009
  • 15. You Can Succeed People: Providing guidance on secure application development •Educate and empower •HP ASC Security Team can help! Process: Security cannot be an afterthought Tools: Coverage for the entire SDLC. •Repeatable processes • WebInspect •Secure coding practices • QAInspect •Web Security Policies and Standards • DevInspect • AMP platform 15 12 March 2009
  • 16. Are You Ready? Take the First Step. 16 12 March 2009
  • 17. “The Journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step” -- Chinese proverb Rafal “Raf” M. Los Sr. Security Solutions Consultant - HP Application Security Center Direct - (404) 606-6056 - email: Rafal@hp.com http://www.communities.hp.com/securitysoftware/blogs/rafal/
  • 18. Appendix References A. 1. http://www.arsalanonline.com/2008/11/indian-website-hacked-pakistani-hackers-response-to-ogra-website- hacking/ 2. http://www.cnn.com/2008/TECH/03/07/china.hackers/index.html 3. http://www.engadgethd.com/tag/Tweeter/ 4. http://www.pcworld.com/printable/article/id,148007/printable.html 5. http://cyberinsecure.com/businessweek-online-content-hit-by-sql-injection/ 6. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-8459030_ITM 7. http://preachsecurity.blogspot.com/2008/12/santas-gmail-hacked-is-nothing-sacred.html 18 12 March 2009