Usable security
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Talk written in partnership with Guy Podjarny When a user opens Facebook, he wants to post a picture. When she logs into her bank, she wants to see her balance. For our users, security is not front of mind. If it gets in their way – they’re likely to look for a shortcut or skip it entirely. And yet, we consistently push security decisions to users, ranging from passwords to security warnings, usually resulting in an experience that’s neither usable nor secure. This talk shares examples that aspire to solve the problem, best practices, and discusses how to provide a secure experience that doesn’t alienate users.
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Usable security
- 1. USABLE SECURITY RACHEL SIMPSON (@RILAN) & GUY PODJARNY (@GUYPOD)
- 4. 0 0 0 3 4 1 HIT COUNTER
- 9. FOR DIGITAL SECURITY, THE STAKES HAVE NEVER BEEN HIGHER.
- 11. ARE USERS REALLY THE WEAKEST LINK?
- 14. USABLE SECURITY WHAT’S ON THE AGENDA? ▸ Why do people do what they do? ▸ Passwords ▸ HTTPS errors ▸ SSL Interstitials ▸ Phishing ▸ Takeways
- 15. ARE USERS REALLY THE WEAKEST LINK?
- 17. USABLE SECURITY HUMAN FACTORS ▸ Memory
- 18. USABLE SECURITY HUMAN FACTORS ▸ Memory ▸ Attention
- 19. USABLE SECURITY HUMAN FACTORS ▸ Memory ▸ Attention ▸ Cognitive load
- 20. USABLE SECURITY HUMAN FACTORS ▸ Memory ▸ Attention ▸ Cognitive load ▸ Previous context
- 21. PASSWORDS
- 27. 130 ACCOUNTS PER AMERICAN USER BLOG.DASHLANE.COM
- 30. MEMORY IS A LIMITED RESOURCE
- 31. WE USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS XKCD WWW.XKCD.COM/936
- 32. P@$$w0rd
- 33. FROM SPLASH DATA’S WORST PASSWORDS OF 2015 ATTACKERS ENUMERATE USERNAMES WITH COMMON PASSWORDS ▸ 123456 ▸ password ▸ 12345 ▸ 12345678 ▸ qwerty ▸ 123456789 ▸ 1234 ▸ baseball ▸ dragon ▸ football
- 35. WHAT CAN WE DO?
- 38. Photo by Mateusz Adamowski
- 40. BE MORE FLEXIBLE TAKEAWAY #1
- 41. (BUT NOT TOO FLEXIBLE) TAKEAWAY #1
- 47. ATTENTION IS FOCUSED ON THE TASK AT HAND
- 50. BE TIMELY & MEANINGFUL TAKEAWAY #2
- 51. INTERSTITIALS
- 53. 63% CONTINUED THROUGH THE WARNING EXPERIMENTING AT SCALE WITH GOOGLE CHROME’S SSL WARNING
- 57. 38% CONTINUED THROUGH THE WARNING EXPERIMENTING AT SCALE WITH GOOGLE CHROME’S SSL WARNING
- 58. MAKING DECISIONS HAS A COST
- 59. OFFER AN OPINION TAKEAWAY #3
- 60. PHISHING
- 61. HELENONLINE
- 62. HELENONLINE
- 63. THERE’S NO PATCH FOR HUMAN STUPIDITY Trolls GENERAL INTERNET WISDOM
- 64. 23% AVERAGE OPEN RATE THREATSIM STATE OF THE PHISH STUDY
- 65. 11% AVERAGE CLICK THROUGH RATE THREATSIM STATE OF THE PHISH STUDY
- 66. YOU DON’T KNOW WHAT YOU DON’T KNOW.
- 67. USERS DO NOT GENERALLY PERCEIVE THE ABSENCE OF A WARNING SIGN. Chrome Security Team MARKING HTTP AS NON-SECURE
- 69. HOW BAD IS PHISHING REALLY?
- 73. OUR LAST PHISHING EXAMPLE GUY GETS PHISHED
- 74. WHAT CAN WE DO?
- 78. BE MORE FLEXIBLE BE TIMELY & MEANINGFUL OFFER AN OPINION USABLE SECURITY
- 79. BE MORE FLEXIBLE BE TIMELY & MEANINGFUL USABLE SECURITY
- 80. BE MORE FLEXIBLE BE TIMELY & MEANINGFUL OFFER AN OPINION USABLE SECURITY
- 81. WE’RE HIRING! RACHEL SIMPSON @RILAN GUY PODJARNY @GUYPOD
- 82. USABLE SECURITY RESOURCES ▸ Transforming the ‘weakest link’ – a human/computer interaction approach to usable and effective security (M A Sasse, S Brushoff, D Weirich) ▸ Learning from “Shadow Security” (Iacovos Kirlappos, Simon Parkin, M. Angela Sasse) ▸ Users are not the enemy (Anne Adams, Martina Angela Sasse) ▸ Experimenting at scale with Google Chrome’s SSL Warning (Adrienne Porter Felt, Hazim Almuhimedi, Sunny Consolvo) ▸ Improving SSL Warnings: Comprehension & Adherence (Adrienne Porter Felt, Alex Ainslie, Robert W. Reeder, Sunny Consolvo, Somas Thyagaraja, Alan Bettes, Helen Harris, Jeff Grimes) ▸ The Emperor’s New Security Indicators (Stuart E. Schechter, Rachna Dhamija, Andy Ozment, Ian Fischer)