Middle East Missiles Presentation

March 2014March 2014
Rocket and Missiles in The Middle EastRocket and Missiles in The Middle East
Rubincon Ltd.
Defense Technology ConsultingDefense Technology Consulting
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Rockets and Missiles in The Middle East – Global Implications
Presentation to the 15h
RUSI Missile Defense Conference, March 2014
• Rockets and missiles in Syria’s Civil War (contd.)
• Syrian rocket shipment to Gaza
• Iran’s missiles programs march on.
• Strategic Implications.
All information herein come from open sources. Copyright Rubincon Ltd

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Syria’s Civil War
Source: The Economist August 2013

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Syrian Army Applies Massive Firepower to Destroy Insurgent Held Urban Areas
Yabrood, March 2014

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Contested Neighborhood in Homs: Before
Eros sat, June 2013 courtesy of Israel Aerospace Industries

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Contested Neighborhood in Homs: After
Eros sat, June 2013 courtesy of Israel Aerospace Industries

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Syrian Air Force Combat Aircraft Lost to Insurgents Air Defense

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(late 2012) Syrian Army Response: Ground Launched
Weapons
Scud
FROG 7
SS - 21
Tishrin
(Fatah 110)

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Kafer Harmeh June 2013 Aleppo February 2013
Effects of SCUD Warheads

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Early Sightings of “Barrel Rockets” and Their Launchers (Late 2012)

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“Barrel Rocket” Reconstruction

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Syria’s Family of “Barrel Rockets”
(VOLCANO)Apparently dubbed “Burkan”
107mm 122mm(?) 302mm
• Short Ranges (0.5 – 2.5 Km)
• Heavy warheads (up to 1+ ton)
• Low cost alternatives to combat aircraft and ballistic missiles.
• All types seen in Syrian regime service

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“Barrel Rockets” in Hizbullah’s Service?

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Possible Inspiration: US M130 Experimental Minefield Clearing Rocket System
Fuel/Air Warhead, 1970’s
Courtesy Tal Inbar, Fisher Institute

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Use of CW in the Syria Civil War
• Early reports: March 2013, Aleppo and Damascus districts.
• The low number of casualties did not attract global attention.
• Possible motive: Compelling civilians to flee thus exposing the active insurgents
• The Assad regime denied responsibility and invited UN fact finding teams.

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The CW Attack on Insurgent Held Suburbs of Damascus, August 21 st
2013
Approximately 1500 Fatalities

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Identification of the CW Rockets of August 21st
by the UN Inspection Team
Muadamieh: Russian origin 140 mm
artillery rockets
Range Capability: 3.5 – 9.5 Km
Zamalka and Ein Tarma: “330 mm” rockets
Estimated range capability about 2 Km

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Syrian Army Operation “Rif Damashk”
March – August 2013
Zamalka/Ein TarmaMuadamiah

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Human Rights Watch Map of CW Rocket impacts in Damascus, August 21 st
2013

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2 Km
Jawbar Industrial Zone
Mezzeh Airfield
3.5
Km
Human Rights Watch Map of CW Rocket impacts in Damascus, August 21 st
2013

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“Whodoneit?”
• The short range of the chemical rockets did not preclude their use by the Assad regime
forces
to launch the August 21st
2013 Damascus chemical attack.
• The allegation of an “Intelligence failure” is therefore groundless.
• The Assad regime had the motive, the weapons and the opportunity to do it.
• The alternative theory – that the insurgents gassed their own forces in the midst of a
raging
Syrian Army offensive, instead of gassing the oncoming Syrian Army troops – stretches
credibility to the limit.
• The real enigma is why neither the US nor the EU demanded a UN mandated board of
inquiry
to indict the responsible persons and bring them to justice.

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Syria and Iran Join Forces to Destabilize the Israeli – Palestinian Confrontation
The Saga of The Heavy Rocket Shipment
The rocket shipment trail
Klose C in Eilat Unloaded 302 mm rockets

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Iran’s ballistic missiles
and space launchers

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Space Launchers
Safir
Simorgh
Ballistic Missiles
Sejjil
Ghader F
Shahab 3
Shahab 2
Qiam

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A Slowdown in Iran’s Missile and Space Programs?
• No announced test of either liquid or solid propellant long range ballistic missile from
February
2011 till February 2014 – a 3 years hiatus.
• No “Great Prophet” exercise – usually featuring numerous ballistic missile launches- since
July
2012, more than a year and a half ago.
• No announced space launches since February 2012, two years ago.
• Some analysts attribute this lull to the sanctions that presumably starved the programs from
materials, components and money.
• However, there is ample evidence to the contrary.

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May 2012 Launch Attempt
Courtesy Janes Defense Weekly

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October 2013 Launch Attempt

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February 2013 Launch Attempt

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2008 20132012201120102009
F S
F
SS F FF
Iran Space Launch Record

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May 2013: Shahab 3 Launcher Production Line Unveiled

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Ballistic Missile Launcher Mimicking Civilian Semitrailer

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650
ft
450
ft
August 2013: Another Giant Missile Launch Complex Unveiled

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Iran’s Newly Discovered Giant Missile Launch Complex
Shahrud
Semnan

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February 2014: Iran Tests a Cluster Warhead Version of Shahab 3 Missile

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March 2014: Iran’s Missile Storage Facilities Unveiled
24 Quiam in Narrow Tunnel44 Quiam in Hangar
15 Kadr F in Wide Tunnel

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Quiam 1 – A Finless Derivation of Shahab 2
Only one single flight test disclosed to date

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Kadr F – Extended Range Derivation of Shahab 3

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Conspicuous in its Absence: Sejjil Two Stage Solid Propellant Missile

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Are Iran’s Missile and Space Programs Going Covert?
• The Shahab program goes on; this is evident form the busy production line of its
launchers
and the large storage facilities.
• The full scale production of Quiam 1 hints of more flight tests than the single disclosed
test.
• The construction of a second large flight test facility indicates and accelerated flight test
program.
• The Space program may be actually speeding up.
• The perceived “lull” is not due to sanction induced shortages, but to a combination of
technical difficulties and policy decisions:
 The Sejil solid propellant IRBM may still be recovering from a snag -
or is being deemphasized to allay European concerns.
 The unsuccessful space launches remain unannouced.
 Ballistic missile tests are concealed.
 A new policy of opacity and toning down of rhetoric as part of a wider
diplomatic effort to ease the sanctions.

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Strategic Implications
• Syria: Lowly Rockets threatened to leverage a civil war into a global crisis.
• Iran: Contrary to the optimism of some observers, there is no let down in the rapid
buildup
of rocket and missile threats from Iran. If anything, it is accelerating.
• A nuclear deal with Iran will not mitigate its prospective missile threat and will not
change
the rationale for the European Territorial Defense program (EPAA)
• Unless EPAA is conceded by Russia, there is a prospect that it would compel it to deploy
missiles against Europe and perhaps to walk out of the INF treaty.
• Thus, Iran’s missile program are not just Middle East
destabilizers: They have the potential to become
global destabilizers.
• Yet missile are not included in the present negotiations
with the Iran. It might be useful to correct this situation.

Middle East Missiles Presentation

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