Cities After Oil

Much of the content in this paper has been edited, expanded, and recently published as:

Rees, W.E. 2011. Getting Serious about Urban Sustainability: Eco-Footprints and the Vulnerability of Twenty-First
Century Cities. Chap 5 in: Trudi Bunting, Pierre Filion and Ryan Walker(eds). Canadian Cities in Transition: New
Directions in the Twenty-First Century, Fourth Edition. Oxford University Press.

Cities After Oil: Getting Serious about Urban Sustainability
William
Rees

Introduction: The City as Biophysical Entity

Accelerating
global
ecological
change
poses
unprecedented
challenges
to
the

integrity,
and
even
the
survival
of
modern
cities.
Regrettably,
most
cities
are
ill-‐equipped
to

deal
with
the
problem
facing
them.
One
reason
for
this
lack
of
preparation
is
that,
while

cities
are
biophysical
entities
as
well
as
socio-‐cultural
phenomena,
city-‐dwellers
have
never

T
had
to
think
of
‘the
city’
in
ecological
terms.
Even
urban
scholars
have
only
recently

AF
acknowledged
and
begun
to
study
the
human
ecological
dimensions
of
urbanization
and

cities.

With
this
slow
awakening,
the
terms
‘urban
ecosystem’
and
‘eco-‐cities’
have
become

R
familiar
to
those
interested
in
urban
sustainability.
The
rising
popularity
of
such
terms,

however,
belies
a
fundamental
error:
cities
are
not
functional
ecosystems
(Rees
2003).
To

D

be
clear:
‘the
city’
is
certainly
an
ecologically
critical
component
of
the
human
ecosystem

and
every
city
is
a
complex
system
(or,
better,
a
‘complex
of
systems’)
but
cities
as
presently

conceived
are
not
human
ecosystems.

A
functionally
complete
ecosystem
is
a
self-‐organizing,
self-‐producing,
solar-‐

powered
complex
of
mutually
dependent
autotrophic
(producer)
and
heterotrophic

(consumer)
organisms.
This
biotic
community
interacts
with
its
physical
environment
such

that
the
flow
and
dissipation
of
energy
results
in
a
defined
trophic
(feeding)
structure,
the



emergence
of
biodiversity,
and
characteristic
material
cycles
between
the
living
and
non-‐

living
components
(Odum
1971).

By
this
definition,
no
modern
city
qualifies
as
a
complete
human
ecosystem.
Some
of
the

defining
parts—for
example,
virtually
the
entire
autotrophic
(producer)
complex—are

missing
altogether
and
others
(micro-‐consumers)
are
insufficiently
abundant
for
functional

integrity.
As
significantly,
the
separation
of
people
from
‘the
land’
to
the
city
prevents
the

recycling
of
phosphorus,
nitrogen,
other
nutrients
and
organic
matter
back
into
rural

T
(agricultural
and
forest)
ecosystems.
Urbanization
has
effectively
transformed
local,

integrated,
cyclical,
ecological
production
systems
into
global,
horizontally
disintegrated,

AF
unidirectional,
throughput
systems
(Rees
1997).

On
a
crude
but
illustratively
useful
level,
an
apt
metaphor
of
the
city
might
be
a

livestock
feedlot
(Rees
2003).
Like
feedlots,
cities
are
spatial
nodes
of
intense
consumption

R
entirely
dependent
for
their
survival
on
supportive
ecosystems
increasingly
located
at

great
distance
from
the
cities
themselves.

In
ecologically
meaningful
terms,
urbanites
don’t

D

live
in
cities
at
all!
They
are
functionally
more
connected
to
the
hinterland.

The Ecological Footprints of Cities

A
complete
human
urban
ecosystem
includes
not
only
the
city
per
se
but
also
the
entire

extra-‐urban
complex
of
terrestrial
and
aquatic
ecosystems
required
to
support
the
city’s

human
population.
One
way
to
determine
just
how
much
of
‘nature’
is
thus
appropriated
by

cities
is
through
ecological
footprint
analysis
(Rees
1992,
Wackernagel
and
Rees,
1996).

We
formally
define
the
ecological
footprint
(EF)
of
a
specified
population
as:



The
area
of
land
and
water
ecosystems
required,
on
a
continuous
basis,
to
produce
the

resources
that
the
population
consumes
and
to
assimilate
the
wastes
that
the

population
produces,
wherever
on
Earth
the
relevant
land/water
is
located
(2006).i,
ii

Figure
1
shows
the
equivalence-‐adjustediii
per
capita
EFs
and
domestic
biocapacities
for
a

selection
of
countries
from
among
the
wealthiest
to
among
the
poorest
based
on
2005
data

from
World
Wildlife
Fund
(WWF
2008).
Note
the
vastly
greater
demand
by
wealthy,
mainly

urban
consumers,
compared
to
that
of
mainly
rural
peasants.
The
citizens
of
wasteful
high-‐

T
income
countries
like
the
US
and
Canada
have
average
EFs
of
6
to
almost
10
hectares,
EFs

up
to
20
times
larger
than
the
EFs
of
the
citizens
of
the
world’s
poorest
countries
like

AF
Bangaldesh.
European
countries
and
Japan
typically
have
per
capita
EFs
in
the
4
to
6

hectare
range.
China
is
fairly
representative
of
the
emerging
economies
which
show

growing
EFs
of
1.5
to
3
hectares
per
capita.
Because
urban
industrial
society
is
very
much
a

R
product
of
abundant
cheap
fossil
fuel,
half
or
more
of
the
EF
of
rich
countries
and
45%
of

humanity’s
global
EF,
is
attributable
to
the
carbon
footprint
(area
of
required
carbon-‐sink

D

ecosystems)
generated
by
the
burning
of
fossil
fuels.
But
it
is
crucial
to
note
that,
even
the

biofuels
utilized
in
a
post-‐carbon
world
do
not
guarantee
its
cities
smaller
energy
eco-‐

footprints
since
the
eco-‐footprints
of
biofules
are
larger
than
the
fossil
fuels
they
allegedly

displace.iv
Indeed,
although
we
are
familiar
with
the
environmental
degradation
associated

with
the
consumption
of
fossil
fuels,
in
another
sense
our
consumption
of
fossil
fuels
has

obscured
or
deferred
our
degradation
of
other
natural
resources.

In
this
sense,
EF
has
the
advantage
of
putting
sustainability
measures
in
a
realistic

perspective,
by
providing
a
wider
view
of
the
demands
any
city
as
currently
conceived
puts



on
the
hinterland.
Most
countries’
per
capita
eco-‐footprints
exceed
their
per
capita

domestic
biocapacities.
These
countries
are
at
least
partially
dependent
on
trade
and

exploitation
of
the
global
commons
to
maintain
their
current
lifestyles.
The
Netherlands,

for
example,
uses
almost
four
times
as
much
productive
land/water
outside
its
borders
as

is
found
within
the
country.
Japan
uses
eight
times
its
domestic
supply.
Such
countries
are

in
a
state
of
‘overshoot’
and
are
running
unsustainable
ecological
deficits
with
the
rest
of

the
world.

T

A
smaller
number
of
countries
(e.g.,
Canada,
Argentina)
have
an
apparent
surplus
of

biocapacity
and
could
theoretically
live
on
their
domestic
‘natural
incomes.’
The
surpluses

AF
of
such
nations,
however,
are
only
‘apparent’
because
the
extra
biocapacity
is
generally

being
traded
away
to
cover
the
ecological
deficits
of
other
countries.

Ominously,
the
world
as
a
whole
is
in
overshoot
with
a
growing
ecological
deficit

R
(Figure
1).
Human
demand
already
exceeds
the
earth’s
regenerative
capacity
by
at
least

30%.
We
are
living,
in
part,
by
depleting
dissipating
stocks
of
potentially
renewable
natural

D

capital
(fish,
forests,
soils,
etc.)
that
have
accumulated
in
ecosystems.

[INSERT
FIGURE
1]

The
Global
Reach
of
Cities

Cities,
of
course,
are
virtually
all
ecological
deficit.
Urban
populations
are
almost

totally
dependent
on
rural
people,
ecosystems
and
life-‐support
processes,
all
of
which
are

increasingly
scattered
over
the
planet.



In
some
respects,
this
relationship
is
a
two-‐way,
mutualistic
one—rural
people

benefit
from
urban
markets,
the
products
of
urban
factories,
urban-‐based
services,

technology
transfers
from
urban
areas,
etc.
However,
while
rural
populations
have

survived
historically
without
cities
the
ecological
dependence
of
urbanites
on
‘the

hinterland’
is
absolute.
Understanding
the
nature
of
rural-‐urban
interdependence
is

essential
to
understanding
the
total
human
ecosystem
and
to
urban
sustainability.
There

can
be
no
urban
sustainability
without
rural
sustainability.

T
So,
just
how
great
is
a
typical
modern
city’s
biophysical
debt
to
the
global
countryside?

Despite
unavoidable
methodological
and
data-‐quality
differences,
urban
eco-‐footprint

AF
studies
invariably
show
that
the
EFs
of
typical
modern
high-‐income
cities
exceed
their

geographic
or
political
areas
by
two
to
three
orders
of
magnitude.
For
example:

• Based
on
locally-‐adjusted
per
capita
EF
estimates
(FCM
2005),
the
people
of

R
Toronto
and
Vancouver,
Canada,
‘occupy’
land
areas
outside
their
municipal

boundaries
that
are
292
and
390
times
larger
(respectively)
than
the
cities

D

themselves.
Even
the
lower-‐density
metropolitan
areas
of
these
cities
have
EFs
57

times
bigger
than
the
respective
urban
regions.

• Assuming
that
the
average
citizen
of
New
York’s
more
densely
populated
five

boroughs
is
similar
to
the
national
average
of
9.4
gha,
the
city’s
8.2
million
people

(2.7%
of
US
population
in
2006)
have
a
total
eco-‐footprint
of
77,080,000
gha.
This
is

963
times
larger
than
the
city’s
geographic
area
of
80,000
ha
and
equivalent
to
10%

of
the
area
of
the
US.



• With
a
population
of
33
million
and
a
per
capita
EF
of
about
4.9
global
ha,
greater

Tokyo’s
total
eco-‐footprint
is
161,700,000
gha.
However,
the
entire
domestic

biocapacity
of
Japan
is
only
about
76,860,000
gha.
In
short,
Tokyo,
with
only
26%
of

the
Japan’s
population,
lives
on
an
area
of
productive
ecosystems
2.1
times
larger

than
the
nation’s
entire
terrestrial
biocapacity.v

• Under
varying
management
assumptions
to
cope
with
regional
waste
management

issues,
Folke
et
al.
(1997)
estimated
that
the
29
largest
cities
of
the
Baltic
region

T
require
for
resources
and
certain
categories
of
waste
assimilation,
an
area
of
forest,

agricultural,
marine,
and
wetland
ecosystems
565-‐1130
times
larger
than
the
area

AF
of
the
cities
themselves.

• An
analysis
of
“ecosystem
appropriation
by
Hong
Kong”
shows
that
this
city
of

almost
seven
million
people
has
a
total
eco-‐footprint
of
332,150
to
478,300
km2
(the

R
range
reflects
two
estimates
of
carbon
sink
land
requirements).
Hong
Kong’s
eco-‐

footprint
is
at
least
303
times
the
total
land
area
of
the
Hong
Special
Administrative

D

Region
(1097
km2)
and
3020
times
the
built-‐up
area
of
the
city
(110
km2)
(Warren-‐

Rhodes,
K.
and
A.
Koenig
2001).

These
data
show
clearly
that,
in
material
terms,
‘sustainable
city’
is
an
oxymoron
(Rees

1997).
Modern
cities
are
entropic
black
holes
sweeping
up
the
productivity
of
a
vastly

larger
and
increasingly
global
resource
hinterland
and
spewing
an
equivalent
quantity
of

waste
back
into
it.
They
are
compact
nodes
of
consumption
living
quasi-‐parasitically
on
the

productivity
and
assimilative
capacity
of
a
vastly
larger
‘undeveloped’
area,
portions
of

which
may
be
thousands
of
kilometres
from
the
built-‐up
area
at
the
centre.



The
Vulnerability
of
Modern
Cities

“Today’s
city
is
the
most
vulnerable
social
structure
ever
conceived
by
man.”

-‐-‐Oppenheimer
1969

The
functional
dependence
of
cities
on
global
stability
has
implications
for
the

security
of
urban
populations
in
an
era
of
incipient
energy
scarcity,
increasingly
erratic

climate
and
other
forms
of
global
change.
Consider
the
example
of
Tokyo,
the
capital
of

T
Japan
and
the
world’s
largest
metropolitan
region.
Because
Tokyo
alone
consumes
twice

the
nation’s
ecological
output,
Japan
would
have
difficulty
supporting
the
population
of
its

AF
capital
city
alone
without
massive
adjustments
to
its
prevailing
material
lifestyles
if
the

country
were
required
to
subsist
on
its
domestic
biocapacity.

The
critical
point,
here,
is
that
enormous
cities
have
evolved
not
because
greater

R
size
confers
great
advantage
but
simply
because
they
could.
To
date,
globalization
and
trade

have
ensured
the
availability
of
the
enormous
quantities
and
uninterrupted
flows
of
energy

D

and
other
material
resources
required
to
grow
the
modern
metropolis.
But
this
raises
a

critical
question:
just
how
secure
is
any
megacity
of
millions,
or
even
a
relative
‘town’
of

100,000,
if
resource
scarcity,
shifting
climate
or
geo-‐political
unrest
threaten
to
cut
it
off

from
vital
sources
of
supply?

There
are
several
interrelated
reasons
to
believe
this
is
not
an
idle
question.
For

example:

1.
Reliable
food
supplies
should
be
of
increasing
concern
to
urbanizing
populations.

Global
food
production
is
levelling
off.
Yet,
just
to
keep
pace
with
UN
medium



population
growth
projections,
agricultural
output
will
have
to
increase
over
50%

by
2050
and
improving
the
diets
of
malnourished
people
would
push
this
toward

100%.
Achieving
increases
of
this
magnitude
will
be
increasingly
difficult.
By
1990,

562
million
hectares
(38%)
of
the
world’s
roughly
1.5
billion
hectares
of
cropland

had
become
significantly
eroded
or
otherwise
degraded;
300
million
hectares

(21%)
of
cultivated
land—enough
to
feed
almost
all
of
Europe—has
been
lost
to

production
(FAO
2000,
SDIS,
2004).

Depending
on
the
climate
and
agricultural

T
practices,
we
are
still
destroying
topsoil
16
to
300
times
as
fast
as
it
is
regenerated.

So
far,
the
impact
has
been
masked
because
we
have
managed
to
substitute
fossil

AF
fuel
for
depleted
soils
and
landscape
degradation—but
that
may
be
about
to

change.

2. Modern
cities
are
the
product
of
abundant
cheap
fossil
fuel.
Fossil
fuels,
especially
oil,

R
currently
supply
about
85%
of
humanity’s
total
energy
demand
and
are
essential
for

electricity
generation,
transportation,
and
space
and
water
heating
in
much
of
the

D

world.
They
are
also
a
major
factor
in
the
green
revolution.
Mechanization,
diesel-‐

powered
irrigation,
the
capacity
to
double-‐crop,
and
agro-‐chemicals
(fertilizers
and

pesticides)
made
from
oil
and
natural
gas
account
for
79-‐96%
of
the
increased

yields
of
wheat,
rice
and
maize
production
since
1967
(Conforti
&
Giampietro1997,

Cassman
1999).
For
all
these
reasons,
some
analysts
argue
that
the
imminent

peaking
of
global
petroleum
production
(i.e.,
extraction)
represents
a
singular
event

in
modern
history
and
poses
a
greater
challenge
to
geopolitical
stability
and
urban



security
than
any
other
factor
(Duncan
and
Youngquist
1999,
Campbell
1999,

Laherrere
2003).

3. Other
analysts
see
climate
change
as
the
greatest
threat
to
modern
urban

civilization,
arguing
that
it
could
bring
the
planet
to
the
edge
of
anarchy
(e.g.,

Schwartz
and
Randall
2003,
CSIS
2007).
In
The
Age
of
Consequences,
Washington’s

Center
for
Strategic
and
International
Studies
(CSIS)
suggests
that
human-‐induced

climate
change
driven
by
burning
fossil
fuels
could
end
peaceful
global
integration

T
as
various
nations
contract
inwardly
to
conserve
what
they
need—or
expand

outwardly
to
take
what
they
need—for
survival.
In
the
event
of
“severe
climate

AF
change,”
corresponding
to
an
average
increase
in
global
temperature
of
2.6°C
by

2040
(now
deemed
to
be
increasingly
likely),
major
nonlinear
changes
in

biophysical
systems
will
give
rise
to
major
nonlinear
socio-‐political
events.
Shifting

R
climate
will
force
internal
and
cross-‐border
migrations
as
people
leave
areas
where

food
and
water
are
scarce.
Hundreds
of
millions
of
people
will
also
be
forced
to
flee

D

rising
seas
and
areas
devastated
by
increasingly
frequent
droughts,
floods,
and

severe
storms.
Dramatic
increases
in
migration
combined
with
food,
energy
and

water
shortages
will
impose
great
pressure
on
the
internal
cohesion
of
nations.
War

is
likely
and
nuclear
war
is
possible
(CSIS
2007).

Even
moderate
climate
change
could
undermine
resource
flows
to
dependent
urban

areas.
For
example,
shifting
weather
patterns
will
certainly
disrupt
historic
water

availability
and
distribution
and
could
reduce
agricultural
output
in
remaining



globally
significant
bread-‐baskets,
such
as
the
North
American
Great
Plains,

increasing
the
likelihood
of
food-‐shortages
in
distant
dependent
urban
regions

(Kissinger
and
Rees
2009).

No
city
will
be
unaffected
by
global
change.
The
good
news
is
that
determined
action
to

address
climate
change
could
help
avoid
the
peak
oil
problem
and
vice
versa.
For
example,

if
the
world
were
to
take
the
action
necessary
to
reduce
CO2
emissions
by
several
percent

per
year,
the
drop
in
demand
for
oil
would
keep
pace
with
or
exceed
the
anticipated

T
decline
in
extraction
rate.
AF
Toward the ‘One Planet’ City

Ours
is
a
world
already
in
overshoot
yet
both
population
and
per
capita

consumption
continue
to
increase
and
material
expectations
continue
to
rise
all
over
the

R

world.
This
is
a
fundamentally
unsustainable
situation—to
raise
just
the
present
world

population
sustainably
to
North
American
material
standards
would
require
the

D

biocapacity
of
four
additional
Earth-‐like
planets
(Rees
2006).
The
really
inconvenient
truth

is
that,
to
achieve
sustainability
global
energy
and
material
throughput
must
decrease,
not

grow.

Techno-‐industrial
society
is
a
self-‐proclaimed
science-‐based
society
and
to
act

consistently
with
our
best
science
may
well
require
a
planned
economic
contraction.
To

avoid
severe
climate
change
the
world
will
have
to
decarbonize
by
at
least
80%
by
mid

century.
To
achieve
one
planet
living,
North
Americans
should
be
planning
now
to
reduce

their
ecological
footprints
by
almost
80%
from
the
current
level
of
9.2
gha
to
2.1
gha
per



capita.
(The
latter
represents
our
equitable
share
of
global
biocapacity.)
This,
in
turn,
will

require
dramatic
changes
in
prevailing
economic
beliefs,
values,
and
particularly
in

consumer
behaviour.
For
sustainability,
the
rich
may
have
to
learn
to
consume
less
in
order

to
create
the
ecological
space
necessary
for
needed
growth
in
the
developing
world
(Rees

2008).
(Fortunately,
‘managing
without
growth’
is
technologically
and
economically

possible
and
might
well
improve
quality
of
life
[see
Victor
2008]).

Regrettably,
there
is
scant
evidence
that
any
such
cultural
shift
is
underway.
Despite

T
repeated
warnings
that
staying
our
present
course
spells
catastrophe
for
billions
of
people

(USC
1992,
MEA
2005),
the
modern
world
remains
mired
in
a
swamp
of
cognitive

AF
dissonance
and
collective
denial
(Rees
2009a).
To
date,
most
mainstream
responses
to
our

ecological
conundrum
do
not
address
the
fundamental
problem
but
instead
seem
designed

to
reproduce
the
status
quo
by
other
means.
Such
‘innovations’
as
hybrid
cars,
green

R
buildings,
smart
growth,
the
new
urbanism,
green
consumerism
etc.,
assume
that
we
can

achieve
sustainability
through
technological
innovation
and
greater
material
and
economic

D

efficiency.
This
is
a
conceptual
error—historically
efficiency
has
actually
increased

consumption
by,
for
example,
raising
incomes
and
lowering
prices.
With
more
money

chasing
cheaper
goods
and
services,
throughput
rises.
In
effect,
improved
efficiency
simply

makes
industrial
growth-‐bound
society
more
efficiently
unsustainable.

The
urban
sustainability
multiplier

While
some
have
interpreted
the
consumptive
and
polluting
powers
of
cities
as
an

anti-‐urban
argument,
it
is
nothing
of
the
sort.
All
else
being
equal,
cities
actually
offer



several
advantages
over
more
dispersed
settlement
patterns
in
the
quest
for
sustainability.

The
very
factors
that
make
wealthy
cities
weigh
so
heavily
on
the
ecosphere—the

concentration
of
people
and
the
localized
intensity
of
energy/material
consumption
and

waste
generation—give
cities
considerable
economic
and
technical
leverage
to
address

global
change
by
shrinking
their
eco-‐footprints
(see
Newman
&
Jennings
2008).

To
enable
society
to
take
full
advantage
of
this
leverage,
state/provincial
and

municipal
governments
must
create
the
land-‐use
legislation
and
zoning
by-‐laws
that
urban

T
planners
need
to
eliminate
sprawl
and
consolidate
and
densify
existing
built-‐up
areas.

Compact
cities—particularly
car-‐free
compact
cities—are
vastly
less
energy-‐
and
material-‐
AF
intensive
than
today’s
sprawling
suburban
cities.
The
economies
of
scale
and

agglomeration
economies
associated
with
high-‐density
settlements
confer
a
substantial

‘urban
sustainability
multiplier’
on
cities.

For
example:

R
• reduced per capita demand for occupied land;

• more ways to reduce (mostly fossil) energy consumption, particularly by motor vehicles,
D

by promoting walking, cycling, and public transit;

• more opportunities for co-housing, car-sharing and other cooperative relationships that

lower capital requirements (consumption) per household and individual;

• lower biophysical and economic costs per capita of providing piped treated water, sewer

systems, waste collection, and most other forms of infrastructure and public amenities;

• greater possibilities for electricity co-generation, district heating/cooling and the use of

waste process heat from industry or power plants, to reduce the per capita use of fossil

fuel for water and space-heating;



• the potential to implement the principles of low throughput ‘industrial ecology’ (i.e., the

ideal of closed-circuit industrial parks in which the waste energy or materials of some

firms are essential feed-stocks for others).

• a greater range of options for material recycling, re-use, re-manufacturing, and a

concentration of the specialized skills and enterprises needed to make these things

happen;

• more ‘social contagion,’ facilitating the spread of such more nearly sustainable life-style

choices (e.g., ‘voluntary simplicity’);

T
As
noted,
however,
efficiency
gains
alone
will
not
achieve
‘one-‐planet
living’.
Sustainability

AF
and
security
demand
that
cities
everywhere
become
less
consumption-‐driven
and
more

materially
self-‐reliant.
Indeed,
cities
may
be
forced
down
this
unfamiliar
path
either
with

the
rising
cost
of
oil-‐based
transportation
or
the
needed
rapid
phase-‐out
of
fossil
fuels.

R
Urban
designers
must
begin
now
to
rethink
cities
so
they
function
as
complete
ecosystems.

This
is
the
ultimate
form
of
bio-‐mimicry.

D

The
least
vulnerable
and
most
resilient
urban
eco-‐system
might
be
a
new
form
of

regional
eco-‐city
state
(or
bioregion)
in
which
a
densely
built-‐up
core
is
surrounded
by

essential
supportive
ecosystems
(Rees
2009b).vi
The
central
idea
is
to
consolidate
as
much

as
possible
of
the
city’s
productive
hinterland
in
close
proximity
to
its
consumptive
urban

core.
In
effect,
this
would
internalize
the
currently
widely
scattered
external
eco-‐footprints

of
our
cities
into
more
compact
and
manageable
city-‐centred
regions
that
could
function
as

complete
human
ecosystems.
Such
a
transformed
homeplace,
“rather
than
being
merely
the

site
of
consumption,
[would],
through
its
very
design,
produce
some
of
its
own
food
and



energy,
as
well
as
become
the
locus
of
work
for
its
residents”
(Van
der
Ryn
&
Calthorpe

1986).
Eco-‐city
states
would
be
less
of
a
burden
on,
and
more
of
a
contributor
to,
the
life-‐

support
functions
of
the
ecosphere
than
contemporary
cities.

Significantly,
too,
the
bioregional
city
would
reconnect
urban
populations
both

physically
and
psychologically
to
‘the
land.’
Because
inhabitants
would
be
more
directly

dependent
on
local
ecosystems,
they
would
have
a
powerful
incentive—currently
absent—

to
manage
their
land
and
water
resources
sustainably
in
the
face
of
global
change.
(Ideally,

T
political
control
over
the
productive
land
and
resource
base
of
the
consolidated
region

would
pass
to
the
eco-‐city
state
governments.)
Less
reliant
on
imports,
their
populations

AF
would
be
partially
insulated
from
climate
vagaries,
resource
shortages,
and
distant
violent

conflicts.

Most
importantly,
if
the
world
were
organized
into
a
system
of
bioregions
that
managed
to

R
become
sustainable
(no
net
loss
of
natural
capital
on
a
per
capita
basis)
the
aggregate
effect

would
be
global
sustainability—which
is,
after
all,
the
purpose
of
the
exercise.

D

i

For
full
details
of
the
method,
including
inclusions,
e xceptions
and
l imitations,
s ee
Rees
(2003,
2006)
W WF

(2008)
and
various
links
at
http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/

ii

EFA
o bviously
does
n ot
c apture
the
e ntire
human
impact
on
Earth,
o nly
those
dimensions
for
which
the

ecosphere
has
regenerative
capacity.
For
example,
various
wastes
such
as
ozone
depleting
chemicals
or
the

toxic
chemical
residues
accumulating
in
our
food
chain
cannot
be
converted
into
a
corresponding

ecosystem
area.

iii

To
enable
fair
comparisons
a mong
countries,
the
data
in
Figure
1
are
presented
in
terms
o f
‘ global
hectares’

(gha),
i.e.,
the
eco-‐footprints
and
biocapacities
of
each
country
are
represented
in
terms
of
an
equivalent

area
of
global
average
productivity.

iv
This
does
not
necessarily
mean
that
a
post-‐carbon
world
will
have
a
s maller
energy
e co-‐footprint.
For

example,
biofuels
have
an
even
larger
eco-‐footprint
than
the
fossil
fuels
they
allegedly
d isplace.

v

The
area
o f
Japan
is
only
a bout
37,770,000
ha
but
Japan’s
terrestrial
e cosystems
are
considerably
more

productive
than
the
world
average.
This
increases
the
country’s
biocapacity
to
almost
77,000,000
gha.

vivi

For
a
history
and
philosophy
o f
the
bioregional
movement,
see
Carr
(2005).


Rees, W.E. 2011. Getting Serious about Urban Sustainability: Eco-Footprints and the Vulnerability of
Twenty-First Century Cities. Chap 5 in: Trudi Bunting, Pierre Filion and Ryan Walker(eds). Canadian Cities
in Transition: New Directions in the Twenty-First Century, Fourth Edition. Oxford University Press.
Cities After Oil: Getting Serious about Urban Sustainability
William
Rees

Figure

T
AF
R
D

Figure
1.
Per
Capita
Biocapacities
and
Ecological
Footprints
of
Selected
Countries

Compared
to
the
World
Averages.
Source:
2005
data
extracted
from
WWF
2008



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