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1
Dan Hubbard & Andree Toonk
Blackhat 2015
BGP Stream
2
BGP Overview
BGP Attack Examples
Announcing BGPStream
BGPStream dataviz client example
Other cool stuff
Things we may or may not present….
3
4
•  Network of Networks, it’s a Graph!
•  Each organizations on the Internet is
called an Autonomous system.
•  Each node represents an Autonomous
system (AS).
•  AS is identified by a number.
•  OpenDNS is 36692, Google is 15169.
•  Each AS has one or more Prefixes.
•  36692 has 56 (ipv4 and IPv6) network
prefixes.
•  BGP is the glue that makes this work!
Result is a topology map of the Internet
Internet 101 & BGP
5
andree@rtr1.syd> show route protocol bgp www.facebook.com
inet.0: 528878 destinations, 1095067 routes (528873 active, 3 holddown, 12 hidden)
+ = Active Route, - = Last Active, * = Both
179.60.193.0/24
*[BGP/170] 2w6d 21:16:18, MED 0, localpref 100
AS path: 32934 I
> to 202.167.228.39 via ge-1/1/9.0
[BGP/170] 1w6d 02:04:04, localpref 100
AS path: 4637 1221 32934 I
> to 210.176.38.1 via xe-0/0/0.0
[BGP/170] 4d 21:09:54, MED 0, localpref 100
AS path: 2914 38561 1221 32934 I
> to 202.68.65.149 via xe-2/0/0.0
Example BGP troubleshooting How	
  do	
  I	
  route	
  
to	
  Facebook?	
  
6
Recent High Profile BGP Incident Examples
BGP	
  hijack	
  used	
  for	
  spamming	
  
BGP	
  hijack	
  used	
  for	
  financial	
  gain	
  (bitcoin	
  hijack)	
  
BGP	
  hijack	
  by	
  Hacking	
  team	
  
Large	
  scale	
  mulC	
  day	
  outages	
  in	
  Syria	
  and	
  Egypt	
  
BGP	
  hijack	
  by	
  Turkey	
  to	
  censor	
  popular	
  DNS	
  resolvers	
  
Many	
  more	
  accidental	
  BGP	
  hijacks	
  
7
8
9
High level Architecture	
  	
  
	
  
BGP	
  Stream	
  analyzer	
  
BGP	
  data	
  
Classifier Notification
Expected	
  
Support	
  for:	
  
IPv4	
  &	
  IPv6	
  
16	
  &	
  32bit	
  AS	
  numbers	
  
Expected	
  state:	
  
•  Prefix	
  /	
  Origin	
  AS	
  
•  AS	
  relaCons	
  
•  Historical	
  info	
  
•  GEO	
  info	
  
•  Whois	
  info	
  
•  Etc.	
  
Observed BGP data from
hundreds of BGP peers
globally
10
BGP Stream Classifier	
  
	
  
BGP	
  data	
  
•  Expected Origin AS vs. Detected origin AS
•  Existing Business relationship?
•  Does Detected	
  	
  AS	
  announce other Expected	
  	
  AS	
  prefixes in BGP
•  Is there an existing peering relationship
•  Did Detected	
  	
  AS	
  recently announce Expected	
  	
  AS	
  prefixes
•  Exclude well relations and ASNs (i.e. DoD Asns, special Anycast prefixes).
•  Whois information
•  Valid RPLS route object in RIR / IRR databases?
•  Allocation data
•  Name collision in name, description, emails
•  Geo Info
•  Do Expected	
  	
  and Detected	
  operate in same country
•  For US, same state
•  Detected by number of BGPmon peers
11
BGPStream Data Visualization Client
12
13
$blackhat there is more..
RUN
BGPDNS
14
Requests
Per Day
80B Countries
160+
Daily Active
Users
65M Enterprise
Customers
10K
Our Perspective
Diverse Set of Data &
Global Internet Visibility
15
16
Malaysia Airlines DNS Hijack
January 25, 2015
17
MALICIOUS
ASN/IP
IDENTIFIED
Owned	
  by	
  Lizard	
  Squad	
  
who	
  hacked	
  PS3	
  and	
  Xbox	
  
Networks	
  in	
  	
  
December	
  2014	
  
18
19
POPVOTE.HK
750 Million DNS
requests 1 hour
20
21
22
The Future….
More Tuning and Training
Integrate DNSStream into BGPStream portal
Build a community of BGP and DNS watchers
23
@bgpstream
@dnsstream

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Blackhat USA 2015: BGP Stream Presentation

  • 1. 1 Dan Hubbard & Andree Toonk Blackhat 2015 BGP Stream
  • 2. 2 BGP Overview BGP Attack Examples Announcing BGPStream BGPStream dataviz client example Other cool stuff Things we may or may not present….
  • 3. 3
  • 4. 4 •  Network of Networks, it’s a Graph! •  Each organizations on the Internet is called an Autonomous system. •  Each node represents an Autonomous system (AS). •  AS is identified by a number. •  OpenDNS is 36692, Google is 15169. •  Each AS has one or more Prefixes. •  36692 has 56 (ipv4 and IPv6) network prefixes. •  BGP is the glue that makes this work! Result is a topology map of the Internet Internet 101 & BGP
  • 5. 5 andree@rtr1.syd> show route protocol bgp www.facebook.com inet.0: 528878 destinations, 1095067 routes (528873 active, 3 holddown, 12 hidden) + = Active Route, - = Last Active, * = Both 179.60.193.0/24 *[BGP/170] 2w6d 21:16:18, MED 0, localpref 100 AS path: 32934 I > to 202.167.228.39 via ge-1/1/9.0 [BGP/170] 1w6d 02:04:04, localpref 100 AS path: 4637 1221 32934 I > to 210.176.38.1 via xe-0/0/0.0 [BGP/170] 4d 21:09:54, MED 0, localpref 100 AS path: 2914 38561 1221 32934 I > to 202.68.65.149 via xe-2/0/0.0 Example BGP troubleshooting How  do  I  route   to  Facebook?  
  • 6. 6 Recent High Profile BGP Incident Examples BGP  hijack  used  for  spamming   BGP  hijack  used  for  financial  gain  (bitcoin  hijack)   BGP  hijack  by  Hacking  team   Large  scale  mulC  day  outages  in  Syria  and  Egypt   BGP  hijack  by  Turkey  to  censor  popular  DNS  resolvers   Many  more  accidental  BGP  hijacks  
  • 7. 7
  • 8. 8
  • 9. 9 High level Architecture       BGP  Stream  analyzer   BGP  data   Classifier Notification Expected   Support  for:   IPv4  &  IPv6   16  &  32bit  AS  numbers   Expected  state:   •  Prefix  /  Origin  AS   •  AS  relaCons   •  Historical  info   •  GEO  info   •  Whois  info   •  Etc.   Observed BGP data from hundreds of BGP peers globally
  • 10. 10 BGP Stream Classifier     BGP  data   •  Expected Origin AS vs. Detected origin AS •  Existing Business relationship? •  Does Detected    AS  announce other Expected    AS  prefixes in BGP •  Is there an existing peering relationship •  Did Detected    AS  recently announce Expected    AS  prefixes •  Exclude well relations and ASNs (i.e. DoD Asns, special Anycast prefixes). •  Whois information •  Valid RPLS route object in RIR / IRR databases? •  Allocation data •  Name collision in name, description, emails •  Geo Info •  Do Expected    and Detected  operate in same country •  For US, same state •  Detected by number of BGPmon peers
  • 12. 12
  • 13. 13 $blackhat there is more.. RUN BGPDNS
  • 14. 14 Requests Per Day 80B Countries 160+ Daily Active Users 65M Enterprise Customers 10K Our Perspective Diverse Set of Data & Global Internet Visibility
  • 15. 15
  • 16. 16 Malaysia Airlines DNS Hijack January 25, 2015
  • 17. 17 MALICIOUS ASN/IP IDENTIFIED Owned  by  Lizard  Squad   who  hacked  PS3  and  Xbox   Networks  in     December  2014  
  • 18. 18
  • 20. 20
  • 21. 21
  • 22. 22 The Future…. More Tuning and Training Integrate DNSStream into BGPStream portal Build a community of BGP and DNS watchers