Strong performers and successful reformers in PISA 2012 - Policy lessons for Norway
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What do 15-year-old Norwegians know… …and what can they do with what they know?
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Strong performers and successful reformers in PISA 2012 - Policy lessons for Norway
- 1. Strong performers and successful reformers in PISA 2012 Policy lessons for Norway OECD EMPLOYER BRAND Playbook Andreas Schleicher Oslo, 8 January 2014 1
- 2. A changing world – foundation skills Average 16-24 year-olds Average 55-65 year-olds Skills in the older generation UK US US Norway Norway Germany Germany France France Finland Spain 240 Finland Spain Korea 245 250 255 260 Korea 265 270 275 Test score literacy 280 285 290 295 300
- 3. 4 PISA in brief • Over half a million students… – representing 28 million 15-year-olds in 65 countries/economies … took an internationally agreed 2-hour test… – Goes beyond testing whether students can reproduce what they were taught… … to assess students’ capacity to extrapolate from what they know and creatively apply their knowledge in novel situations – Mathematics, reading, science, problem-solving, financial literacy … and responded to questions on… – their personal background, their schools and their engagement with learning and school • Parents, principals and system leaders provided data on… – school policies, practices, resources and institutional factors that help explain performance differences .
- 4. 5 What do 15-year-old Norwegians know… …and what can they do with what they know?
- 5. High mathematics performance Mean score … Shanghai-China performs above this line (613) 580 Singapore 570 560 Chinese Taipei Korea 550 540 Macao-China Japan Liechtenstein Switzerland 530 520 510 500 490 480 470 Hong Kong-China Poland Belgium Germany Austria Slovenia New Zealand Denmark France Czech Republic Latvia Luxembourg Portugal Spain Slovak Republic United States Hungary Netherlands Estonia Finland Canada Viet Nam Australia Ireland United Kingdom Iceland Norway Italy Russian Fed. Lithuania Sweden Croatia Israel 460 450 Greece Serbia Turkey Romania 440 430 420 410 Chile … 12 countries perform below this line Bulgaria U.A.E. Kazakhstan Thailand Malaysia Mexico Low mathematics performance Average performance of 15-year-olds in Mathematics Fig I.2.13
- 6. High mathematics performance Singapore Chinese Taipei Hong Kong-China Average performance of 15-year-olds in mathematics Korea Macao-China Japan Liechtenstein Switzerland Strong socio-economic impact on student performance Poland Belgium Germany Austria Slovenia New Zealand Denmark France Czech Republic Latvia Luxembourg Portugal Spain Slovak Republic United States Hungary Netherlands Estonia Finland Canada Viet Nam Australia Ireland United Kingdom Iceland Norway Italy Russian Fed. Lithuania Sweden Croatia Israel Greece Serbia Turkey Romania Chile Bulgaria U.A.E. Kazakhstan Thailand Malaysia Mexico Low mathematics performance Socially equitable distribution of learning opportunities
- 7. 2012 Shanghai-China Singapore Singapore Chinese Taipei Chinese Taipei Hong Kong-China Hong Kong-China Korea Macao-China Japan Switzerland Switzerland Liechtenstein Korea Japan Liechtenstein Estonia Macao-China Netherlands Netherlands Estonia Poland Poland Canada Canada Belgium Belgium Finland FinlandViet Nam Viet Nam Germany Germany Strong socio-economic Socially equitable Austria Denmark Austria DenmarkAustralia Australia New ZealandNew Zealand impact on student Slovenia Ireland Ireland Slovenia distribution of learning Iceland Iceland Czech Rep. Czech Rep. performance 22France 18 opportunities France UK 26 24 20 1816 16 14UK14 12 12 10 10 0 24 22 20 8 8 6 6 44 22 0 Latvia Latvia Luxembourg Norway Luxembourg Norway Portugal Portugal Italy Italy Russian Fed. Russian Fed. US US Spain Lithuania Spain Lithuania Sweden Sweden Slovak Rep. Slovak Rep.Hungary Hungary Croatia Croatia Israel Israel Bulgaria Chile Greece Greece Serbia Serbia Turkey Turkey Romania Romania Bulgaria United Arab Emirates United Arab Emirates Kazakhstan Thailand Chile Malaysia Malaysia Mexico Kazakhstan Thailand Mexico
- 8. Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel socio-economic Strong Italy impact on student Japan performance Korea Luxembourg Mexico Slovak Rep. Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK US 2012 Korea Japan Switzerland Netherlands Poland Belgium Germany Estonia Canada Finland Socially equitable Austria Australia New Zealand Denmark Ireland Slovenia distribution of learning Iceland Czech Rep. opportunities France UK Luxembourg Norway Portugal Italy US Spain Sweden Hungary Israel Greece Turkey Chile Mexico
- 9. Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Slovak Rep. Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK US Korea Japan Switzerland Netherlands Poland Belgium Germany Estonia Canada Finland Austria Australia New Zealand Denmark Ireland Slovenia Iceland Czech Rep. France UK Luxembourg Norway Portugal Italy US Spain Sweden Hungary Israel Greece Turkey Chile Mexico
- 10. Composition of instructional costs US$ Contribution of estimated class size Contribution of instruction time Contribution of teaching time Contribution of teachers' salary 4 000 3 000 2 000 1 000 0 -1 000 -2 000 Estonia Slovak Republic Chile Hungary Turkey Poland Czech Republic Israel Slovenia Iceland Finland Korea England Italy United States Canada France Ireland Netherlands Australia Norway Austria Germany Spain Portugal Belgium (Fl.) -3 000
- 11. Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Slovak Rep. Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK US Korea Japan Switzerland Netherlands Poland Belgium Germany Estonia Canada Finland Austria Australia New Zealand Denmark Ireland Slovenia Iceland Czech Rep. France UK Luxembourg Norway Portugal Italy US Spain Sweden Hungary Israel Greece Turkey Chile Mexico
- 12. Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Slovak Rep. Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK US Shanghai 2003 - 2012 Singapore Singapore Korea Japan Switzerland Netherlands Poland Belgium Germany Estonia Canada Finland Austria Australia New Zealand Denmark Ireland Slovenia Iceland Czech Rep. France UK Luxembourg Norway Portugal Italy US Spain Sweden Hungary Israel Greece Turkey Chile Mexico
- 13. 14 The dream of social mobility In some countries it is close to a reality
- 14. 2 Shanghai-China Hong Kong-China Macao-China Viet Nam Singapore Korea Chinese Taipei Japan Liechtenstein Switzerland Estonia Netherlands Poland Canada Finland Belgium Portugal Germany Turkey OECD average Italy Spain Latvia Ireland Australia Thailand Austria Luxembourg Czech Republic Slovenia United Kingdom Lithuania France Norway Iceland New Zealand Russian Fed. United States Croatia Denmark Sweden Hungary Slovak Republic Mexico Serbia Greece Israel Tunisia Romania Malaysia Indonesia Bulgaria Kazakhstan Uruguay Brazil Costa Rica Chile Colombia Montenegro U.A.E. Argentina Jordan Peru Qatar 15 Percentage of resilient students More than 10 % resilient Between 5%-10% of resilient students Fig II.2.4 20 18 16 14 12 % 10 8 6 4 Less than 5% 0
- 15. 16 It is not just about poor kids in poor neighbourhoods… …but about many kids in many neighbourhoods
- 16. 40 30 Shanghai-China Singapore Chinese Taipei Hong Kong-China Korea Liechtenstein Macao-China Japan Switzerland Belgium Netherlands Germany Poland Canada Finland New Zealand Australia Estonia Austria Slovenia Viet Nam France Czech Republic OECD average United Kingdom Luxembourg Iceland Slovak Republic Ireland Portugal Denmark Italy Norway Israel Hungary United States Lithuania Sweden Spain Latvia Russian Federation Croatia Turkey Serbia Bulgaria Greece United Arab Emirates Romania Thailand Qatar Chile Uruguay Malaysia Montenegro Kazakhstan Albania Tunisia Brazil Mexico Peru Costa Rica Jordan Colombia Indonesia Argentina 17 Percentage of top performers in mathematics Tab I.2.1a % 60 50 Across OECD, 13% of students are top performers (Level 5 or 6). They can develop and work with models for complex situations, and work strategically with advanced thinking and reasoning skills In Norway the percentage declined since 2003 20 10 0
- 17. Excellence matters 18 % • Evolution of employment in occupational groups defined by 20 problem-solving skills 25 medium-low level of problem-solving 15 10 5 0 Low level of problem-solving -5 -10 -15 -20 Medium-high level of problem-solving
- 18. High impact on outcomes 19 19 Quick wins Lessons from high performers Must haves Catching up with the top-performers Low feasibility High feasibility Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes
- 19. High impact on outcomes 20 20 Quick wins Must haves Lessons from high performers Commitment to universal achievement Capacity at point of delivery Resources where they yield most Gateways, instructional systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes
- 20. High impact on outcomes 21 21 Lessons from high performers Quick Must to education and the belief that wins A commitmenthaves Commitment to universal therefore competencies can be learned andachievementall children can achieve at high levels Capacity Resources at Ambitious universal standards and personalization as point of delivery the approach to heterogeneitywhere they yield most in the student body Clear articulation who is responsible for ensuring Gateways, instructional student success and to whom systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes
- 21. 23 Motivation to learn mathematics Fig III.3.9 Percentage of students who reported "agree" or "strongly agree" with the following statements: Norway Shanghai-China OECD average I am interested in the things I learn in mathematics I do mathematics because I enjoy it I look forward to my mathematics lessons I enjoy reading about mathematics 0 B UK 10 20 30 40 % 50 60 70
- 22. 24 Perceived self-responsibility for failure in mathematics Fig III.3.6 Percentage of students who reported "agree" or "strongly agree" with the following statements: Norway Shanghai-China OECD average Sometimes I am just unlucky The teacher did not get students interested in the material Sometimes the course material is too hard This week I made bad guesses on the quiz My teacher did not explain the concepts well this week I’m not very good at solving mathematics problems 0 B US 20 40 % 60 80
- 23. 25 The parent factor Students whose parents have high educational expectations for them tend to report more perseverance, greater intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics, and more confidence in their own ability to solve mathematics problems than students of similar background and academic performance, whose parents hold less ambitious expectations for them.
- 24. Parents’ high expectations can nurture students’ enjoyment in learning mathematics 26 Fig III.6.11 Change in the index of intrinsic motivation to learn mathematics that is associated with parents expecting the child to complete a university degree 0.50 0.45 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Germany Mexico Macao-China Croatia Hungary Portugal Chile Hong Kong-China Italy Korea 0.00 Belgium (Flemish) Mean index change 0.40
- 25. Parents’ high expectations can foster perseverance in their child 27 Fig III.6.11 Change in the index of perseverance that is associated with parents expecting the child to complete a university degree 0.35 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Macao-China Korea Croatia Germany Hong Kong-China Chile Hungary Mexico Belgium (Flemish) Italy 0.00 Portugal Mean index change 0.30
- 26. High impact on outcomes 28 28 Quick wins Must haves Lessons from high performers Commitment to universal achievement Clear ambitious goals that are shared across the Capacity system and aligned with high stakes gateways and Resources at point of delivery where instructional systemsthey yield most Coherence Low feasibility Well established delivery chain through which Gateways, instructional curricular goals translate into instructional systems, systems instructional practices and student learning (intended, implemented andlearning system A achieved) High level of metacognitive content of instruction High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes
- 27. 29 High impact on outcomes 29 Capacity at Lessons from high performers the point of delivery Quick wins Must haves Attracting, developing and retaining high quality Commitment a universal achievement teachers and school leaders andto work organisation in which they can use their potential Capacity Instructional leadership and human resource Resources at point of delivery management in schools where they yield most Keeping teaching an attractive profession Gateways, instructional System-wide career development … systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes
- 28. High impact on outcomes 30 30 Lessons from high performers Quick wins Must haves Incentives, accountability, knowledge management Commitment to universal achievement Aligned incentive structures For students Capacity Resources How gateways at point of delivery affect the strength, direction, clarity and nature of the incentives operating on students at each stage of their education where they yield most Degree to which students have incentives to take tough courses and study hard Gateways, Opportunity costs for staying in school and performing well instructional For teachers Coherenceinnovations in pedagogy and/or organisation Make A learning system Low feasibility Improve their own performance and the performance of their colleagues Pursue professional development opportunities that lead to stronger pedagogical practices systems High feasibility Incentive structures and A balance between vertical and lateral accountability accountability Effective instruments to manage and share knowledge and spread innovation – communication within the system and with stakeholders around it Money pits Low hanging A capable centre with authority and legitimacy to act fruits Low impact on outcomes
- 29. Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with less autonomy in systems with standardised math policies Fig IV.1.16 School autonomy for curriculum and assessment x system's extent of implementing a standardised math policy (e.g. curriculum and instructional materials) Score points 485 480 475 470 465 460 Standardised math policy 455 No standardised math policy Less school autonomy More school autonomy
- 30. Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with less autonomy in systems with more accountability arrangements Fig IV.1.16 School autonomy for curriculum and assessment x system's level of posting achievement data publicly Score points 478 476 474 472 470 468 466 School data public 464 School data not public Less school autonomy More school autonomy
- 31. 36 Quality assurance and school improvement Fig IV.4.14 Percentage of students in schools whose principal reported that their schools have the following for quality assurance and improvement: Norway Singapore OECD average Implementation of a standardised policy for mathematics Regular consultation with one or more experts over a period of at least six months with the aim of improving… Teacher mentoring Written feedback from students (e.g. regarding lessons, teachers or resources) External evaluation Internal evaluation/self-evaluation Systematic recording of data, including teacher and student attendance and graduation rates, test results… Written specification of student-performance standards Written specification of the school's curriculum and educational goals 0 20 40 % 60 80 100
- 32. High impact on outcomes 37 37 Quick wins Lessons from high performers Must haves Commitment to universal achievement Investing resources where they can make most of Capacity a difference Resources Alignment of resources with key challenges (e.g. at point of delivery where they teachers attracting the most talentedyield mostto the most challenging classrooms) Gateways, instructional Effective spending choices that prioritise high quality systems teachers over smaller classes Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes
- 33. High impact on outcomes 39 39 Quick wins Must haves Lessons from high performers Commitment to universal achievement Capacity at point of delivery Resources where they yield most Coherence of policies and practices Alignment of policies across all aspects of the system Coherence Coherence of policies over sustained periods of time LowConsistency of implementation feasibility Fidelity of implementation (without excessive control) Money pits Gateways, instructional systems A learning system High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes
- 34. High impact on outcomes 40 40 Quick wins Must haves Lessons from high performers Commitment to universal achievement Capacity at point of delivery Resources where they yield most Gateways, instructional systems Coherence A learning system Low feasibility High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes
- 35. What it all means 41 41 Lessons from high performers Average education systems High performers Student inclusion Some students learn at high levels All students need to learn at high levels Curriculum, instruction and assessment Routine cognitive skills, rote learning Learning to learn, complex ways of thinking, ways of working Teacher quality Few years more than secondary High-level professional knowledge workers Work organisation ‘Tayloristic’, hierarchical Flat, collegial Accountability Primarily to authorities Primarily to peers and stakeholders
- 36. Likelihood of positive social and economic outcomes among highly literate adults (scoring at Level 4/5 compared with those scoring at Level 1 or below) Odds ratio Average Norway 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 Good to Being Employed High levels of excellent health trust Participation in High levels of volunteer political efficacy activities High wages
- 37. Find out more about PISA at www.pisa.oecd.org • All national and international publications • The complete micro-level database Thank you ! Email: Andreas.Schleicher@OECD.org Twitter: SchleicherEDU and remember: Without data, you are just another person with an opinion
Editor's Notes
- Young Koreans, for example, are outperformed only by their Japanese counterparts, while Korea’s 55 to 64 year-olds are among the three lowest-performing groups of this age across all participating countries. Every decade, Korea has been the equivalent of two years in quality, wihtout raising quantity.The results from Finland tell a similar story. But progress has been uneven. Young Brits and Americans are entering a much more demanding job market with similar literacy and numeracy skills as their compatriots who are retiring. The talent pool in these countries could shrink significantly over the next decades unless urgent action is taken both to improve schooling and to provide adults with better opportunities to develop and maintain their skills
- (9) Does this matter? Yes, it does. When you look at the evolution of employment by those problem-solving skills, you can see that there has been a significant decline in employment by people with basic problem-solving skills. There has been little change in employment among the low-skilled. But there has been significant growth in employment among great problem-solvers. What you see here is the hollowing out of labour-markets. Those who have great skills are fine, and will be better and better off. The people most at risk are not the poorly-skilled but white-collar workers with so-so-problem-solving skills, because their skills can increasingly be digitised, automated or outsourced. Those at the low end of the spectrum keep their jobs but are seeing declining wages. That's because you cannot digitise your bus driver or outsource your hairdresser to India.
- (Fig. II.4.5)
- (Fig. II.4.5)
- I want to conclude with what we have learned about successful reform trajectories In the past when you only needed a small slice of well-educated people it was efficient for governments to invest a large sum in a small elite to lead the country. But the social and economic cost of low educational performance has risen substantially and all young people now need to leave school with strong foundation skills.When you could still assume that what you learn in school will last for a lifetime, teaching content and routine cognitive skills was at the centre of education. Today, where you can access content on Google, where routine cognitive skills are being digitised or outsourced, and where jobs are changing rapidly, the focus is on enabling people to become lifelong learners, to manage complex ways of thinking and complex ways of working that computers cannot take over easily.In the past, teachers had sometimes only a few years more education than the students they taught. When teacher quality is so low, governments tend to tell their teachers exactly what to do and exactly how they want it done and they tend to use Tayloristic methods of administrative control and accountability to get the results they want. Today the challenge is to make teaching a profession of high-level knowledge workers. But such people will not work in schools organised as Tayloristic workplaces using administrative forms of accountability and bureaucratic command and control systems to direct their work. To attract the people they need, successful education systems have transformed the form of work organisation in their schools to a professional form of work organisation in which professional norms of control complement bureaucratic and administrative forms of control.
- You see that highly skilled adults are twice as likely to report good health, or to be employed, than poorly skilled. You also see they are more likely to trust others or to participate in volunteering activities. They are also seeing themselves as actors rather than as objects of political process, and they are getting much higher wages. To look at it the other way round, poor skills severely limit people’s access to better-paying and more-rewarding jobs. It seems we also can’t develop fair and inclusive policies and engage with all citizens if a lack of proficiency in basic skills prevents them from fully participating in society. And in some countries, the link between better skills and better lives is even stronger, look at the data for the UK, for example, a country that is very good at extracting value form its human talent.