Impacto de la crisis financiera internacional en México y prospectos de recuperación
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Este documento resume el impacto de la crisis financiera internacional en México y las perspectivas de recuperación. Brevemente, explica que aunque México no generó la crisis ni sufrió una crisis financiera interna, la producción cayó severamente debido al impacto en el sector real y las exportaciones. Sin embargo, hay señales de una incipiente recuperación en México a medida que las condiciones financieras internacionales y el comercio mundial se estabilizan. Para lograr un crecimiento sostenible a largo plazo, se necesitan reformas
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Impacto de la crisis financiera internacional en México y prospectos de recuperación
- 1. Impacto de la crisis financiera internacional en México y prospectos de recuperación José Antonio Ardavín, OCDE Director Interino Centro de la OCDE en México para América Latina XL Jornadas Mexicanas de Biblioteconomía Acapulco, Gro| 11 de septiembre de 2009
- 2. Si bien en esta ocasión la crisis no se genero en México y no hubo una crisis financiera, la caída de la producción ha sido severa Fuente: OCDE Estudio Económico de México 2009 PIB Real y las recesiones en México
- 3. El impacto inmediato en México, a finales de 2008, no fue tanto en el ámbito financiero, aunque sí hubo una depreciación importante del tipo de cambio... Cambio en las bolsas de valores de diversos países emergentes Ago-Dic 2008 Depreciación del Tipo de Cambio de diversos países emergentes Ago-Dic 2008 Fuente: OCDE Estudio Económico de México 2009
- 4. El impacto se ha concentrado fundamentalmente en el sector real, y particularmente en las exportaciones tanto petroleras como manufactureras Crecimiento de la producción industrial Crecimiento de las exportaciones Fuente: OCDE Estudio Económico de México 2009
- 5. En las últimas semanas, las condiciones financieras internacionales han mejorado…
- 6. … y el volumen de comercio internacional se ha estabilizado
- 7. La recuperación está ya en camino en los BRICs (Brasil, Rusia, India y China)
- 8. A pesar de que la confianza del consumidor permanece debil en las principales economías de la OCDE…
- 9. … la confianza de los negocios se ha mejorado sustancialmente
- 10. En base a este panorama, la OCDE ha revisado a la alza por primera vez en un año, sus estimados de crecimiento para el tercer trimestre de 2009…
- 11. ...y para el año en su conjunto
- 12. En el caso de México… también comienza a haber signos de incipiente recuperación… Source:OECD Composite Leading Indicators Indicador Adelantado Compuesto de la OCDE
- 13. … y así lo comienzan a percibir los actores económicos Source: INEGI Indices de Confianza de los Consumidores y Productores
- 14. Sin embargo, el impacto social de la crisis tiende a tener un rezago importante… Se estima que el desempleo mundial crecerá entre 20m y 25m (8m a 10m en la OCDE), llegando a una cifra record global de 210m en 2009 Source: INEGI Índice de la Producción Industrial y Desempleo, México
- 15. … y desde luego, podría tener un efecto de mayor proporción entre los estratos de población los más vulnerables…
- 16. … afectando así la desigualdad, donde desafortunadamente México no parte de una buena base, ni entre individuos…
- 17. … ni entre regiones Evolution of regional inequality
- 18. Por lo tanto, la cuestión es ¿Puede atenderse la coyuntura de la crisis, y a la vez contribuir a la solución de problemas estructurales que han causado el limitado crecimiento económico? Source: OECD Mexico Economic Survey 2007 Source: OECD ECO
- 19. La solución tiene que ver fundamentalmente con la productividad, de ahí la necesidad de reformas estructurales OECD Employment Outlook 2008 - ISBN 9789264046337 - © OECD 2008 Fuentes del crecimiento
- 20. Algunas áreas… de oportunidad? 1. Una reforma laboral … que flexibilice la contratación por periodos de tiempo reducidos … que facilite la incorporación de jóvenes, mujeres y personas de la tercera edad … incremente el atractivo de la formalización del empleo? Indice de la rigidez de regulación del empleo en países seleccionados, 2003 OECD Employment Outlook 2008 - ISBN 9789264046337 - © OECD 2008
- 21. 2. El impulso a la infraestructura orientado estratégicamente para aumentar la capacidad de generar crecimiento económico en las diversas regiones del país… Promedio Nacional 3.74%
- 22. ...en particular en áreas como telecomunicaciones, y redes de transporte, sectores que además requieren de mayor competencia Telefonía Fija y Movil Red de Autopistas Red Ferroviaria Fuente: OCDE Estudio Económico de México 2009
- 23. 3. Una mejora regulatoria amplia Niveles de regulación de mercados de productos Impacto simulado de aplicación de mejoras regulatorias en la productividad Fuente: OCDE Estudio Económico de México 2009
- 24. 4. Mayor profundización del mercado financiero Crédito domestico como porcentaje del PIB y en relación al PIB per capita Capitalización de la Bolsa de Valores Fuente: OCDE Estudio Económico de México 2009
- 25. Impacto de la crisis financiera internacional en México y prospectos de recuperación José Antonio Ardavín, OCDE Director Interino Centro de la OCDE en México para América Latina www.oecd.org/centrodemexico
Notas del editor
- Mexico was somewhat better prepared in 2008 than in the past to face external shocks . Sound macroeconomic policies had reduced inflation, domestic and foreign debt, and increased policy credibility. The low current account deficits implied lower foreign financing needs, and the build-up of foreign reserves provided cushion for turmoil. The financial sector is relatively sound and small with limited exposure to foreign assets or liabilities, and credit growth was contained by positive real interest rates, conservative lending policies and attractive investment opportunities in less risky government paper. Strict prudential regulations limited banks’ exposure to currency risk and risky products. Highest risks are with consumer credit, which had the most rapid growth. Main financial vulnerabilities stemmed from dependence on portfolio capital and reliance on direct foreign credit by enterprises . Foreign equity holdings have risen from 8 to 15% of GDP and foreigners have financed a steady one tenth of GDP of domestic bonds between 2001-08. The inflows into domestic bond markets had intensified during 2008 with the rise in the interest rate differential with the US and an appreciating peso. Mexican enterprises have relied on foreign banks abroad for close to half of their credit needs, which increases their vulnerability to currency risks and changes in lending conditions abroad. Therefore, the turmoil first hit Mexican capital markets as risk-aversion among foreign investors intensified in September 2008. The peso became under pressure as foreign portfolio investors pulled out from Mexico and other emerging economies (EM). The pressure on the currency was intensified by demand for dollars by large domestic enterprises to cover their long hedges on peso appreciation. Interventions by the central bank and the announcement of a swap facility with the US Fed and potential for a credit line with the IMF helped stabilize the markets which however remain volatile. The stock exchange also fell, and foreign bond spreads shot up as perceptions of risk changed. The search for short-term liquidity disrupted interbank and domestic bond markets causing a large spike in spreads, which were only stabilized after interventions by the government at the long end of the market.
- Mexico was somewhat better prepared in 2008 than in the past to face external shocks . Sound macroeconomic policies had reduced inflation, domestic and foreign debt, and increased policy credibility. The low current account deficits implied lower foreign financing needs, and the build-up of foreign reserves provided cushion for turmoil. The financial sector is relatively sound and small with limited exposure to foreign assets or liabilities, and credit growth was contained by positive real interest rates, conservative lending policies and attractive investment opportunities in less risky government paper. Strict prudential regulations limited banks’ exposure to currency risk and risky products. Highest risks are with consumer credit, which had the most rapid growth. Main financial vulnerabilities stemmed from dependence on portfolio capital and reliance on direct foreign credit by enterprises . Foreign equity holdings have risen from 8 to 15% of GDP and foreigners have financed a steady one tenth of GDP of domestic bonds between 2001-08. The inflows into domestic bond markets had intensified during 2008 with the rise in the interest rate differential with the US and an appreciating peso. Mexican enterprises have relied on foreign banks abroad for close to half of their credit needs, which increases their vulnerability to currency risks and changes in lending conditions abroad. Therefore, the turmoil first hit Mexican capital markets as risk-aversion among foreign investors intensified in September 2008. The peso became under pressure as foreign portfolio investors pulled out from Mexico and other emerging economies (EM). The pressure on the currency was intensified by demand for dollars by large domestic enterprises to cover their long hedges on peso appreciation. Interventions by the central bank and the announcement of a swap facility with the US Fed and potential for a credit line with the IMF helped stabilize the markets which however remain volatile. The stock exchange also fell, and foreign bond spreads shot up as perceptions of risk changed. The search for short-term liquidity disrupted interbank and domestic bond markets causing a large spike in spreads, which were only stabilized after interventions by the government at the long end of the market.
- Mex 0.4, 1.8 for 2009, 2010 US -0.9, 1.6 Euro area -0.6, 1.2 OECD -0.4, 1.5 The largest vulnerabilities are in the real sector from dependence on the US economy and on oil revenues, which are already being felt in slower demand. The sharp decline in US growth is affecting activity in Mexico. Although data incorporating the October turmoil is still scarce recent indicators for exports and manufacturing point to a sharp slowdown. The drop in oil- and non-oil exports gradually propagated to domestic demand and a rise in unemployment, and is likely to soon hit the service sector that held relatively well so far. The strong increase in public investment or net lending since spring 2008, the main components of the fiscal stimulus, have still to be felt in activity. Most forecasters are revising sharply down their projections for 2009 (0 or negative). Risks are on the downside, both from oil prices and external demand. Inflation has remained persistently high despite lower activity as energy and food related prices continue to rise with lags, which has kept policy interest rates unchanged. Demand is also being affected by slower credit growth as credit conditions have tightened at home and abroad and more if asset quality worsens . The rise in spreads and risk aversion by foreign lenders are reducing their willingness to provide credit to Mexico. This affects mostly the enterprises sector, which is the main user of foreign loans. Domestic credit supply is being reduced by adjustments by foreign banks’ (80% of Mexican assets) global portfolios to cut leverage and exposure to riskier markets in an environment of shrinking balance sheets. Mexican banks may also be affected by worsening asset quality over time as the economic downturn progresses. Although financial indicators are sound, they tend to be backward looking and can change rapidly as the economy worsens. High net interest margins and high operating costs provide some cushion for absorbing losses.
- Mex 0.4, 1.8 for 2009, 2010 US -0.9, 1.6 Euro area -0.6, 1.2 OECD -0.4, 1.5 The largest vulnerabilities are in the real sector from dependence on the US economy and on oil revenues, which are already being felt in slower demand. The sharp decline in US growth is affecting activity in Mexico. Although data incorporating the October turmoil is still scarce recent indicators for exports and manufacturing point to a sharp slowdown. The drop in oil- and non-oil exports gradually propagated to domestic demand and a rise in unemployment, and is likely to soon hit the service sector that held relatively well so far. The strong increase in public investment or net lending since spring 2008, the main components of the fiscal stimulus, have still to be felt in activity. Most forecasters are revising sharply down their projections for 2009 (0 or negative). Risks are on the downside, both from oil prices and external demand. Inflation has remained persistently high despite lower activity as energy and food related prices continue to rise with lags, which has kept policy interest rates unchanged. Demand is also being affected by slower credit growth as credit conditions have tightened at home and abroad and more if asset quality worsens . The rise in spreads and risk aversion by foreign lenders are reducing their willingness to provide credit to Mexico. This affects mostly the enterprises sector, which is the main user of foreign loans. Domestic credit supply is being reduced by adjustments by foreign banks’ (80% of Mexican assets) global portfolios to cut leverage and exposure to riskier markets in an environment of shrinking balance sheets. Mexican banks may also be affected by worsening asset quality over time as the economic downturn progresses. Although financial indicators are sound, they tend to be backward looking and can change rapidly as the economy worsens. High net interest margins and high operating costs provide some cushion for absorbing losses.
- We're heading for a loss of between 8m and 10m jobs in the OECD area... and 20m to 25m in the world as a whole between now and 2010." The International Labour Organisation said that it expects the global unemployment toll to rise by 20m to a record high of 210m by late 2009.
- Labour market policy can and should play an important role in supporting the unemployed; through income support schemes and active programmes to help the unemployed search for a new job and improve their skills if needed. Additional measures may also be needed in some countries to help the most disadvantaged but these have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A basic principle is that these additional measures should be timely and temporary and especially well targeted to the most needy individuals and households.
- Labour market policy can and should play an important role in supporting the unemployed; through income support schemes and active programmes to help the unemployed search for a new job and improve their skills if needed. Additional measures may also be needed in some countries to help the most disadvantaged but these have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A basic principle is that these additional measures should be timely and temporary and especially well targeted to the most needy individuals and households.
- Por ejemplo el tema de crecer al 7%, que es una meta grabada en el subconsciente de todo Mexicano Se nos olvida que ese 7% es el resultante del crecimiento de nuestras regiones. Y que si alguna vez como en el 2000 lo alcanzamos fue porque regiones como Aguascalientes, Queretaro y Baja California crecieron al 12% Sin embargo tambien vemos que algunos estados han tenido un crecimiento promedio durante la ultima decada bastante por debajo de la media nacional. En este sentido es un reto y una oportunidad el desarrollo regional en Mèxico puesto que generalmente los estados más rezagados son los que pueden dar tasas de crecimiento màs altas y solo asì podremos generar tasas superiores al 7%.
- Por ejemplo el tema de crecer al 7%, que es una meta grabada en el subconsciente de todo Mexicano Se nos olvida que ese 7% es el resultante del crecimiento de nuestras regiones. Y que si alguna vez como en el 2000 lo alcanzamos fue porque regiones como Aguascalientes, Queretaro y Baja California crecieron al 12% Sin embargo tambien vemos que algunos estados han tenido un crecimiento promedio durante la ultima decada bastante por debajo de la media nacional. En este sentido es un reto y una oportunidad el desarrollo regional en Mèxico puesto que generalmente los estados más rezagados son los que pueden dar tasas de crecimiento màs altas y solo asì podremos generar tasas superiores al 7%.