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Advanced Persistent Threats

                           K. K. Mookhey
                     Principal Consultant
       Network Intelligence India Pvt. Ltd.
Speaker Introduction
    Founder & Principal Consultant
        Network Intelligence
        Institute of Information Security
    Certified as CISA, CISSP and CISM
    Speaker at Blackhat 2004, Interop 2005, IT Underground
     2005, OWASP Asia 2008,2009
    Co-author of book on Metasploit Framework (Syngress),
     Linux Security & Controls (ISACA)
    Author of numerous articles on SecurityFocus, IT Audit, IS
     Controls (ISACA)
    Over a decade of experience in pen-tests, application security
     assessments, forensics, compliance, etc.
Agenda
   Ground-level Realities

   Compliance & Regulations

   Case Study of Privileged Identity Challenges

   Solutions
       Policy
       Process
       Technology
Background
Further background…
               ―Fraud worries Indian outsourcing firms... Industry executives
               and officials at Nasscom, … say they are worried that exposés
               of recent incidents of fraud are damaging India's reputation as
                               a high-skilled, low-cost location…‖



         ―Laterals attrition worrying IT biggies... some companies are now battling
           attrition as high as 40% among their project managers, threatening to
                                disrupt ongoing engagements. ―


         ―Infosys wrestles with India IT worker turnover…the Indian outsourcing
            firm is wrestling with a 25 percent spike in employee attrition—the
                            highest mark since 2004, analysts say.‖


         ―In India, the average annual attrition rate in the business process outsourcing
                     (BPO) sector hit a high of close to 50% a few years ago.‖
What are Privileged Accounts?
Acct Type        Scope                    Used by              Used for

Elevated         • Personal Accounts                           • Privileged operations
                   elevated permissions   • IT staff
Personal Accts                                                 • Access to sensitive
                    – JSmith_admin
(SUPM)              – SUDO
                                                                 information



Shared
                Highly Powerful •• Emergency
                         • IT staff
                 • Administrator
                         • System Admins
                 • UNIX root                Fire-call
                         • Network Admins
 Difficult to Control,DBAs
Privileged
Accounts
                         • Manage & Monitor
                 • Cisco Enable
                 • Oracle SYS
                                          • Disaster recovery
                                          • Privileged operations
                         • Help Desk, etc
(SAPM)
           Usage is Not ••‘Personalized’sensitive
                 • Local Administrators
                           Developers
                 • ERP admin
                           Legacy Apps
                                          • Access to
                                            information

        Pose Devastating Risk if Misused
                                          • Applications
                 • Hard-Coded, and        • Scripts
Application                                                    • Online database access
                   Embedded Application   • Windows Services
Accounts                                                       • Batch processing
                   IDs                    • Scheduled Tasks
(AIM)                                                          • App-2-App communication
                 • Service Accounts       • Batch jobs, etc
                                          • Developers
The Insider Threat…

     No. 1 security concern of large companies is…
          THE INSIDER THREAT (IDC Analyst Group)

   86% of the insiders held technical positions (CERT)

   90% of them were granted system administrators or
    privileged system access when hired (CERT)

   64% used remote access (CERT)

   50% of those people were no longer supposed
    to have this privileged access
    (Source: Carnegie Mellon, DOD)

   92% of all the insiders attacked following a negative
    work-related event like termination, dispute, etc. (CERT)
Crucial question…



  Quis custodiet ipsos custodies

                    =

   Who will guard the guards?
How sys admins really operate!
And how passwords get compromised!

                    Ground Level Realities
SQL Server to Enterprise 0wned!
   Entry Point – 172.16.1.36
       Vulnerability -> SQL Server
           Default username and password
           Username: sa
           Password: password



   Use xp_cmdshell to
   ‗net user kkm kkm /add‘
   ‗net localgroup administrators kkm /add‘
Hash Dump
   Administrator:500:A8367713FF9D45CE45F37A6:::
   Guest:501:NO PASSWORD*********************:NO
    PASSWORD*********************:::
   GP2010STGLocal:1012:3ED3C0B9BB7B5091BC4186920:
    AC4FFE38A7582D2A46E36865B:::
Privilege Escalation on the Network
   Using the Administrator account logon to other machines
       Login to the domain server was not possible
       Check for Impersonating Users
The Scope of the Problem...

―Most organizations have more privileged accounts than personal accounts‖
    (Sally Hudson, IDC)
   Typical use case - mid-size company IT profile:
       ~10,000 employees
       8,000+ desktops/laptops
       200 Windows servers
       10 Windows domains
       500 Unix/Linux servers
       20 WebSphere/Weblogic/Jboss/Tomcat servers
       100 Oracle/DB2/Sqlserver databases
       50 Cisco/Juniper/Nortel routers and switches
       20 firewalls
       1,000 application accounts
       150 Emergency and break-glass accounts
What happened at RSA?
Spear Phishing
Compliance & Regulations
Compliance and Regulation
Current Audit Questions around Privileged Accounts:

    ―Can you prove that you are protecting access to key accounts?‖

    ―Who is acting as System Administrator for this activity?‖

    ―Can you prove that Rahul Mehta‘s access to the netAdmin ID was properly
     approved?‖

    ―Can you show me what Rahul Mehta did within his session as root last week?‖

    ―Are you changing the Exchange Admin password inline with company policy?‖

    ―Have you removed hard-coded passwords from your applications?‖


             PCI, SOX, Basel II & HIPAA are all
           diving deeper into Privileged Accounts
Telecom Regulations
   DOT circular (31st May 2011) states in 5.6 A (vi) c.
    that
   The Licensee shall keep a record of all the operation and
    maintenance command logs for a period of 12 months,
    which should include the actual command given, who gave
    the command, when was it given and from where. For
    next 24 months the same information shall be
    stored/retained in a non-online mode.
Corporate Liability
   ‗43A.Where a body corporate, possessing, dealing or
    handling any sensitive personal data or information in a
    computer resource which it owns, controls or operates, is
    negligent in implementing and maintaining
    reasonable security practices and procedures and
    thereby causes wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any
    person, such body corporate shall be liable to pay
    damages, not exceeding five crore rupees, by way
    of compensation to the person so affected.
RBI Guidelines on Technology Risks
   April 29, 2011, the Reserve Bank of India released the
    ―Guidelines on Information security, Electronic Banking,
    Technology risk management and cyber frauds‖.

   Close supervision of personnel with elevated
    system privileges
   Personnel with elevated system access privileges should
    be closely supervised
App2App Communication



•   App2App interaction requires an authentication process
     – Calling application needs to send credentials to target application
•   Common use cases
     – Applications and Scripts connecting to databases
     – 3rd Party Products accessing network resources
     – Job Scheduling
     – Application Server Connection Pools
     – Distributed Computing Centers
     – Application Encryption Key Management
     – ATM, Kiosks, etc.
Solutions!

Or why SIEM’s are not the answer
Decipher this!

      OS_USERNAME
      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      USERNAME
      ------------------------------
      USERHOST
      --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      TIMESTAMP RETURNCODE
      ------------------- ----------------
      MRMESSINMike Messina
      DUMMYWORKGROUPMRMESSIN
      11/08/2007 09:07:54 1017
On-Demand Privileges Manager:Tightening Unix Security
  Control superuser access for in-depth unix security
  Manage the commands Unix admins can run with granular access control
  Enforce ‗least privilege‘ - elevate to ‗root‘ only when necessary
  Monitor individual superuser activity with text recording
  Unified audit of superuser activity and password access




         When     Who      What         Where
Privileged ‗Session‘ Example ‘Session’ Example
                       Privileged



    Company      : Telco with over 100M subscribers
    Regulation   : Multiple
    Driver       : Compliance, control & monitor access to production
                     environment, reduce operational costs
    Scope        : Integrated Privileged ID and Session Management implementation
                     on 15,000 machines, tens of thousands of accounts.
    Benefits     :
                     Minimized security risks
                         • Detailed audit logging & recording – 26,000 PSM recorded
                            sessions within first 60 days
                     Met compliance goals
                     Reduced TCO
                         • Avoid performance impact of end-point logging agents – savings
                            of around 4% of total CPU power!
                     Operational efficiency
                         • Integrated solution with central management & unified
                            reporting & policies
                         • Improved IT work efficiency with privileged single-sign-on
Summary: Privileged Identity & Session Management

A comprehensive platform for isolating and preemptively
protecting your datacenter – whether on premise or in the
cloud
  Discover all privileged accounts across datacenter
  Manage and secure every credential
  Enforce policies for usage
  Record and monitor privileged activities
  React and comply
  Integrate with IDAM
Before we get to the technology…
Controls Framework
Policies
   Privileged ID Management Policy & Procedures
       Privileged ID allocation – process of the approval mechanism
        for it
       Privileged ID periodic review – procedure for this
       Monitoring of privileged ID activities – mechanisms, and
        procedures for logging and monitoring privileged IDs
       Revocation of a privileged ID – what happens when an
        Administrator leaves the organization?
       How are vendor-supplied user IDs managed
       Managing shared/generic privileged IDs
Take Aways
   Privileged IDs represent the highest risk for data leakage
    in the organization
   Such IDs are numerous due to the large number of
    systems and devices in any network
   Managing the access of these IDs and monitoring their
    activities is of crucial importance!
   Technology solutions such as Privileged Identity
    Management make this task easier
   But these need to be combined with the right policy
    framework and comprehensive procedures
Thank you!

                Questions?
kkmookhey@niiconsulting.com

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Advanced persistent threats

  • 1. Advanced Persistent Threats K. K. Mookhey Principal Consultant Network Intelligence India Pvt. Ltd.
  • 2. Speaker Introduction  Founder & Principal Consultant  Network Intelligence  Institute of Information Security  Certified as CISA, CISSP and CISM  Speaker at Blackhat 2004, Interop 2005, IT Underground 2005, OWASP Asia 2008,2009  Co-author of book on Metasploit Framework (Syngress), Linux Security & Controls (ISACA)  Author of numerous articles on SecurityFocus, IT Audit, IS Controls (ISACA)  Over a decade of experience in pen-tests, application security assessments, forensics, compliance, etc.
  • 3. Agenda  Ground-level Realities  Compliance & Regulations  Case Study of Privileged Identity Challenges  Solutions  Policy  Process  Technology
  • 5. Further background… ―Fraud worries Indian outsourcing firms... Industry executives and officials at Nasscom, … say they are worried that exposés of recent incidents of fraud are damaging India's reputation as a high-skilled, low-cost location…‖ ―Laterals attrition worrying IT biggies... some companies are now battling attrition as high as 40% among their project managers, threatening to disrupt ongoing engagements. ― ―Infosys wrestles with India IT worker turnover…the Indian outsourcing firm is wrestling with a 25 percent spike in employee attrition—the highest mark since 2004, analysts say.‖ ―In India, the average annual attrition rate in the business process outsourcing (BPO) sector hit a high of close to 50% a few years ago.‖
  • 6. What are Privileged Accounts? Acct Type Scope Used by Used for Elevated • Personal Accounts • Privileged operations elevated permissions • IT staff Personal Accts • Access to sensitive – JSmith_admin (SUPM) – SUDO information Shared Highly Powerful •• Emergency • IT staff • Administrator • System Admins • UNIX root Fire-call • Network Admins Difficult to Control,DBAs Privileged Accounts • Manage & Monitor • Cisco Enable • Oracle SYS • Disaster recovery • Privileged operations • Help Desk, etc (SAPM) Usage is Not ••‘Personalized’sensitive • Local Administrators Developers • ERP admin Legacy Apps • Access to information Pose Devastating Risk if Misused • Applications • Hard-Coded, and • Scripts Application • Online database access Embedded Application • Windows Services Accounts • Batch processing IDs • Scheduled Tasks (AIM) • App-2-App communication • Service Accounts • Batch jobs, etc • Developers
  • 7. The Insider Threat… No. 1 security concern of large companies is… THE INSIDER THREAT (IDC Analyst Group)  86% of the insiders held technical positions (CERT)  90% of them were granted system administrators or privileged system access when hired (CERT)  64% used remote access (CERT)  50% of those people were no longer supposed to have this privileged access (Source: Carnegie Mellon, DOD)  92% of all the insiders attacked following a negative work-related event like termination, dispute, etc. (CERT)
  • 8. Crucial question… Quis custodiet ipsos custodies = Who will guard the guards?
  • 9. How sys admins really operate! And how passwords get compromised! Ground Level Realities
  • 10. SQL Server to Enterprise 0wned!  Entry Point – 172.16.1.36  Vulnerability -> SQL Server  Default username and password  Username: sa  Password: password  Use xp_cmdshell to  ‗net user kkm kkm /add‘  ‗net localgroup administrators kkm /add‘
  • 11. Hash Dump  Administrator:500:A8367713FF9D45CE45F37A6:::  Guest:501:NO PASSWORD*********************:NO PASSWORD*********************:::  GP2010STGLocal:1012:3ED3C0B9BB7B5091BC4186920: AC4FFE38A7582D2A46E36865B:::
  • 12. Privilege Escalation on the Network  Using the Administrator account logon to other machines  Login to the domain server was not possible  Check for Impersonating Users
  • 13. The Scope of the Problem... ―Most organizations have more privileged accounts than personal accounts‖ (Sally Hudson, IDC)  Typical use case - mid-size company IT profile:  ~10,000 employees  8,000+ desktops/laptops  200 Windows servers  10 Windows domains  500 Unix/Linux servers  20 WebSphere/Weblogic/Jboss/Tomcat servers  100 Oracle/DB2/Sqlserver databases  50 Cisco/Juniper/Nortel routers and switches  20 firewalls  1,000 application accounts  150 Emergency and break-glass accounts
  • 17. Compliance and Regulation Current Audit Questions around Privileged Accounts:  ―Can you prove that you are protecting access to key accounts?‖  ―Who is acting as System Administrator for this activity?‖  ―Can you prove that Rahul Mehta‘s access to the netAdmin ID was properly approved?‖  ―Can you show me what Rahul Mehta did within his session as root last week?‖  ―Are you changing the Exchange Admin password inline with company policy?‖  ―Have you removed hard-coded passwords from your applications?‖ PCI, SOX, Basel II & HIPAA are all diving deeper into Privileged Accounts
  • 18. Telecom Regulations  DOT circular (31st May 2011) states in 5.6 A (vi) c. that  The Licensee shall keep a record of all the operation and maintenance command logs for a period of 12 months, which should include the actual command given, who gave the command, when was it given and from where. For next 24 months the same information shall be stored/retained in a non-online mode.
  • 19. Corporate Liability  ‗43A.Where a body corporate, possessing, dealing or handling any sensitive personal data or information in a computer resource which it owns, controls or operates, is negligent in implementing and maintaining reasonable security practices and procedures and thereby causes wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any person, such body corporate shall be liable to pay damages, not exceeding five crore rupees, by way of compensation to the person so affected.
  • 20. RBI Guidelines on Technology Risks  April 29, 2011, the Reserve Bank of India released the ―Guidelines on Information security, Electronic Banking, Technology risk management and cyber frauds‖.  Close supervision of personnel with elevated system privileges  Personnel with elevated system access privileges should be closely supervised
  • 21. App2App Communication • App2App interaction requires an authentication process – Calling application needs to send credentials to target application • Common use cases – Applications and Scripts connecting to databases – 3rd Party Products accessing network resources – Job Scheduling – Application Server Connection Pools – Distributed Computing Centers – Application Encryption Key Management – ATM, Kiosks, etc.
  • 22. Solutions! Or why SIEM’s are not the answer
  • 23. Decipher this! OS_USERNAME -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- USERNAME ------------------------------ USERHOST -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TIMESTAMP RETURNCODE ------------------- ---------------- MRMESSINMike Messina DUMMYWORKGROUPMRMESSIN 11/08/2007 09:07:54 1017
  • 24. On-Demand Privileges Manager:Tightening Unix Security Control superuser access for in-depth unix security Manage the commands Unix admins can run with granular access control Enforce ‗least privilege‘ - elevate to ‗root‘ only when necessary Monitor individual superuser activity with text recording Unified audit of superuser activity and password access When Who What Where
  • 25. Privileged ‗Session‘ Example ‘Session’ Example Privileged  Company : Telco with over 100M subscribers  Regulation : Multiple  Driver : Compliance, control & monitor access to production environment, reduce operational costs  Scope : Integrated Privileged ID and Session Management implementation on 15,000 machines, tens of thousands of accounts.  Benefits :  Minimized security risks • Detailed audit logging & recording – 26,000 PSM recorded sessions within first 60 days  Met compliance goals  Reduced TCO • Avoid performance impact of end-point logging agents – savings of around 4% of total CPU power!  Operational efficiency • Integrated solution with central management & unified reporting & policies • Improved IT work efficiency with privileged single-sign-on
  • 26. Summary: Privileged Identity & Session Management A comprehensive platform for isolating and preemptively protecting your datacenter – whether on premise or in the cloud Discover all privileged accounts across datacenter Manage and secure every credential Enforce policies for usage Record and monitor privileged activities React and comply Integrate with IDAM
  • 27. Before we get to the technology…
  • 29. Policies  Privileged ID Management Policy & Procedures  Privileged ID allocation – process of the approval mechanism for it  Privileged ID periodic review – procedure for this  Monitoring of privileged ID activities – mechanisms, and procedures for logging and monitoring privileged IDs  Revocation of a privileged ID – what happens when an Administrator leaves the organization?  How are vendor-supplied user IDs managed  Managing shared/generic privileged IDs
  • 30. Take Aways  Privileged IDs represent the highest risk for data leakage in the organization  Such IDs are numerous due to the large number of systems and devices in any network  Managing the access of these IDs and monitoring their activities is of crucial importance!  Technology solutions such as Privileged Identity Management make this task easier  But these need to be combined with the right policy framework and comprehensive procedures
  • 31. Thank you! Questions? kkmookhey@niiconsulting.com