1. Future of the Japan-U.S. alliance
“How Japan’s defense posture
should change for a sustainable alliance”
December 20, 2004
COL. Katsuki TAKATA
Visiting Fellow
The Henry L. Stimson Center
The views expressed herein are those solely of the author
and do not necessarily reflect those of Henry L. Stimson Center,
Japan Self Defense Force, or the Government of Japan

2. Contents
New National Defense Program Outline( NDPO)
Four scenarios for the future of Japan-U.S. alliance
and their analyses
Future shape of the Ground Self-Defense Force
resulting from scenario research.
(What it should be)
Conclusion

3. New National Defense
Program Outline( NDPO)
Security environment surrounding Japan
Regional security issues(Korean Peninsula, Taiwan strait)
The new threat and Various situation
The basic policy of Japan’s security
Basic policy
Japan’s own effort+cooperation to U.S.+cooperation to
international community(Follow the 4 principle)
The defense posture of Japan
Roles of defense capability
Effectively & appropriate respond to the new threat and various
situation
Preparations to deal with full-scale invasion
To proactively & positively engage in actives for peace & stability
of international community

4. Policy underlying
the conversion to a new SDF
Capability
Improve
Readiness
Mobility
Flexibility
Sustain at
minimum level
Function
Prepare for full-scale invasion to Japan
Education & training
Logistic capability
Capability Capability
Nuclear capability for For
Capability Capability for
Anti- Anti- Anti-new International
For Attack Air MD
Threat & Cooperation
C4I Enemies’ bases
armor submarine
operations Anti-various Activity
Mobile strike operations operations situation
Power on sea
Effectively && appropriaterespond
Effectively appropriate respond
NDPO
Proactively &positively engage New NDPO

5. Scenario for the future of
Japan-U.S. alliance
axis T
Threat perception of Japan-U.S.
Large
The 2nd scenario The 1st scenario
The Offshore The Community type
balancing type
axis P
Large
U.S. military
Small
Presence
The 3rd scenario The 4th scenario (Capability)
The Reluctant The Selective
alliance type engagement type
Small

6. Scenario for the future of
Japan-U.S. alliance
axis T
Threat perception of Japan-U.S.
Large
The 2nd scenario The 1st scenario
The Offshore The Community type
balancing type
axis P
Large
U.S. military
Small
Presence
The 3rd scenario The 4th scenario (Capability)
The Reluctant The Selective
alliance type engagement type
Small

7. Current Japan-U.S. alliance
axis T
Threat perception of Japan-U.S.
Large
Same threat is recognized
about domestic emergency and
contingency surrounding Japan
Small Large axis P
U.S. military
Current
Presence
Japan and U.S. don’t have Japan-U.S. alliance
(Capability)
same threats perception
about global activity.
Small

8. The 1st scenario
Community type
Overlapping strategic goals
Japan cooperates more closely with the U.S.
military campaigns worldwide.
Big barrier to develop this relationship
- Problems with so-called “integration with the use of
military forces” remain to be solved in the minimum.
Organization review of the JSDF
- Based on "Territorial defense model" for a Cold War type
threat should be change to “Capable base model”
Improve the power projection capability

9. The 2nd scenario
The Offshore balancing type
Global posture review of U.S.Forces
- Putting the emphasis on contingency response in the
Middle East and Central Asia
[Post-9.11]
USEUCOM
USEUCOM
USCENTCOM
USCENTCOM USPACOM
USPACOM
Arc of Instability
Arc of Instability
Uneasiness and doubt in each country will
increase
- Emphasis of defense of Japan should be shifted from
that based on Japan-US joint response to independent
defense capability

10. The 2nd scenario
The Offshore balancing type
Same threat perception is shared
- Request Japan to have a higher power projection
capability
Independent defense capability
- Revision of the force structure
- “Capability to attack enemies’ bases" and “Mobile
strike power on sea”
It will be politically challenging ,
both with Japanese public and Japan’s Asian neighbors

11. The 3rd scenario
The Reluctant alliance type
The threat perception is not shared.
Becomes a nominal alliance
Only economic interdependence remain Japan’s
independent defense capability(same as 2nd scenario)
- “It sounds appropriate to choose US force’s withdrawal from Japan
than to continue Marine Corps in Okinawa without support from
Japanese people in order to strengthen the alliance in long-range”
(Mike Mochizuki)
- “Prime Minister Hashimoto should offer to President Clinton about
redeployment of Marine Corps to south of Korea from Okinawa.”
(Jo Sakon; former Chief, Joint Staff Office)

12. The 4th scenario
The Selective engagement type
Same bed, different dreams
- U.S.(Focus on security cooperation on worldwide)
- Japan (USFJ for “Ensuring the security of Japan” )
Limited contribution to a military campaign of
the U.S. worldwide
- Vital national(JPN) interest
- Financial support etc.( In other region)
Friction between both countries
4th scenario will finally develop into the 3rd scenario

13. Summary of scenario research
axis T Large
The 2nd scenario The 1st scenario
○ Same threat perception is shared ●Overlapping the strategic goals
○ Independent defense capability ○Big barrier to developing
○ Difficulty getting people's support ○Improve the power
projection capability
axis P
Small Large
The 3rd scenario The 4th scenario
○ Same bed,different dreams
○ The threat perception is not shared. ○ Japan’s military contribution to
○ Becomes nominal alliance U.S. military campaigns worldwide
○ Independent defense capability will be limited
○ Worst scenario ○4th scenario will finally develop
into the 3rd scenario
Small

14. Future of Japan’s defense policy
Changes of Japanese defense strategy
The Basic Concept of Japan’s Defense Policy
Positive use defense power globally (Active
Deterrence)
Further promotion of Japan-U.S. strategic
dialogue
“What Japan should do”
“ What Japan are able to do”

15. Image of “Active Deterrence”
Active Deterrence by action
Deterrence Deterrence by existence
Deterrence by
existence + action
deterrence by
existence =Exclusively defense-oriented Policy

16. Roles & Mission of Japan-U.S.
HRO, Peacetime Engagement
Remote Areas
Remote Areas
ＡＣＳＡ Info-
: Japan’s Role & mission
: Sharing, RAS for
: U.S.’s Role & mission MNF Offensive OPS HRO
: Japan’s challenge Deterrence （Security Nation-
Red letter : Restricted by legislation Options OPS, Use of Building
Force, RAS for ＤＤＲ、
Military MNF Cease
Japan’’s Proximity Japan’’s Territories
CMIC）
Japan s Proximity Japan s Territories
NEO,
Presence International HRO Info- RAS Fire
PSI,
(Balance), SLOC Defense Exchanges Sharing, SAR ACSA Security
Counter- protection Combat
Terrorism Operations
Deterrence area SLOC
SLOC Protection、ACSA Options protection Nuclear SLOC Protection、ACSA
Deterrence,
Counter Counter Counter-
Terrorism、 Terrorism Invasion, Offensive Reconstructio
Deterrence LIC, OPS Domestic
Territorial S&R n
Options MD Security
Protection etc. NEO etc. Assistance
Info-Sharing
SLOC Protection, ACSA
Info-Sharing, Protection of USFJ, SLOC protection Protection
CONUS
ＰＳＩ、Multilateral Ex/Tng OPS for USFJ, Nuc-Strikes
Rapid National
LIC Reconstruction
Deployment Building
Counter-Terrorism, Disaster MD
Nuc Deterrence
Relief, Forward Presence MD
Peacetime Prevention Deterrence Response Reconstruction

17. Future shape of
the Ground Self-Defense Force
(“What it should be”)
New organization
Establishment of international duty
force
Establishment of an experimental
force that can link to the network of
the U.S.
Establishment of "A light and strong"
force

18. Future shape of
the Ground Self-Defense Force
(“What it should be”)
New organization
Establishment of international duty
force
Establishment of an experimental
force that can link to the network of
the U.S.
Establishment of "A light and strong"
force

19. Future shape of
the Ground Self-Defense Force
(“What it should be”)
New organization
Establishment of international duty
force
Establishment of an experimental
force that can link to the network of
the U.S.
Establishment of "A light and strong"
force

20. "A light and strong" Force
IT soldier Improve mobility
Coordinate
integrate operation
Net work for B
Maintenance the center of
gravity of defense posture
Net work for R

21. Future shape of
the Ground Self-Defense Force
(“What it should be”)
Improvement of Japan-U.S. interoperability
Eliminate uncertainty
The bilateral joint training should be more actively executed.
Conducting multinational training in order to maintain peace and
stability in Asia Pacific region.
Cooperation between ministries, local
governments and NGOs, etc. in peacetime
Establish a liaison branch to each ministry
Information exchange and coordination with NGOs in Japan and
overseas for international activity

22. Future shape of
the Ground Self-Defense Force
(“What it should be”)
Improvement of Japan-U.S. interoperability
Eliminate uncertainty
The bilateral joint training should be more actively executed.
Conducting multinational training in order to maintain peace and
stability in Asia Pacific region.
Cooperation between ministries, local
governments and NGOs, etc. in peacetime
Establish a liaison branch to facilitate interagency coordination
Information exchange and coordination with NGOs in Japan and
overseas for international activity

23. Conclusions
Japan-U.S. alliance should move toward the 1st
scenario, and must avoid the 3rd scenario.
Easing the interpretation of the Constitution over
the right to collective self-defense
Promotion of the strategic dialogue
"Territorial defense" the only main task any longer
Pay attention to 4th scenario
Logistical support to the U.S. military and coalition
forces
Continue humanitarian and the reconstruction
support after conflicts
Japan must clearly communicate its “Roles and
Missions” to the United States, and have to share a
common understanding.

24. “Final Goal Keeper of Defense”
Questions & Comments ?