Michelle King DRAFT 5 FINAL

Running Head: SHIFTING NORMS: THE SC AND COUNTERTERRORISM
Shifting Norms: The Security Council and Counterterrorism
By
Michelle L. King
In fulfillment of requirements for
HNR-499
Submitted To
The John Wesley Honors College
On
April 25, 2016
Copyright 2016
Indiana Wesleyan University

SHIFTING NORMS: THE SC AND COUNTERTERRORISM 1
Table of Contents
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………2
Introduction…………………………………………………………………… ...........3
Overview of the UN’s Development of Counterterrorism: Founding to Post 9/11...3
Introduction to the UN…………………………………………………………..3
UN Counterterrorism Development……………………………………………..4
General Assembly Action……………………………………………………….5
Security Council Action: 1989-9/11…………………………………………….6
Post-9/11 UN Counterterrorism…………………………………………………7
Methodology……………………………………………………………………………10
Security Council Resolution Case Studies……………………………………………11
Table 1: Overview of Case Study Resolutions………………………………….11
Pan-Am Bombings and Resolutions 731 and 748: Necessary but Dangerous….11
The Taliban, Afghanistan, and Resolutions 1214, 1267, and 1333: Expansion...20
9/11 and Resolutions 1368, 1373, 1377, and 1535: Solidifying UN
Counterterrorism………………………………………………………………….31
Resolution 1540: Terrorism in a Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Age……….39
Findings…………………………………………………………………………………42
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………46
References………………………………………………………………………………49

Abstract
This research paper attempts to examine the shifting norms and ideas behind the
development of UN counterterrorism by using document analysis to analyze the
resolutions and meeting minutes of the United Nations’ Security Council. The Security
Council is the ‘action branch’ of the UN whose resolutions are binding on UN member
states, thus making its resolutions and meeting minutes particularly helpful in
ascertaining the justification for and against resolutions addressing terrorism. Document
analysis identified keywords and themes throughout the resolutions and meeting minutes
that associate with overarching trends in counterterrorism’s development. The context
within which the meeting minutes and resolutions exist is important, too, because it
documents the changing nature of terrorism and how the Security Council addressed it.
Traditionally, scholars and policymakers have focused on the dichotomy between
US interests and the rest of the world. They accuse the UN Security Council of
propagating US interests and values over internationally-shared interests and values,
rooting their argument around the role of 9/11 in UN counterterrorism. In focusing on
such a dichotomy, however, one can overlook the broader trends and development in
counterterrorism such as human rights. Examining the changing norms of UN
counterterrorism throughout its development provides a more detailed and nuanced
interpretation of UN counterterrorism with implications for Security Council operations,
draft resolution framing and justification, and sovereignty.

Introduction
In the original UN Charter (1945), there is no mention of 'terrorism' or of the UN's
responsibility in fighting terrorism. Today, the UN has a growing counterterrorism
organization led by four Security Council committees: the 1267 Committee, the 1373
Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, and the 1540
Committee. These committees are capable of recommending and monitoring sanctions,
blacklisting possible terrorist suspects, and overseeing the Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) of member states. Key questions for this study include: How has terrorism
become a threat to international peace and security that necessitates a response from the
UN? How has the Security Council’s understanding of, and response to, terrorism
changed as it interacted with other norms like human rights and sovereignty? By
analyzing terrorism-related Security Council resolutions, this study demonstrates that the
Security Council has shifted from reactively responding to singular acts of violence
against specific targets to proactively addressing terrorism as a broad, complex, and
interconnected issue requiring a more holistic approach with implications for human
rights, international peace and security, transnational crime, and sovereignty. This project
will not attempt to analyze the effectiveness of those structures, but only the development
of counterterrorism measures.
Overview of the UN’s Development of Counterterrorism: Founding to Post-9/11
Introduction to the UN
It is important to briefly examine the context of counterterrorism in both the
Security Council and the General Assembly to help readers to better understand the
Security Council resolutions and the previous interpretations of UN counterterrorism.

Article 24 of the UN Charter invests the Security Council with the responsibility
of maintaining international peace and security; it is the action division of the UN. No
matter what tragedy occurs in the world, the Security Council cannot respond to a threat
unless it threatens international peace and security. Article 25 makes the Security
Council's resolutions binding on member states: member states "agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present charter" (para.
1). The General Assembly considers "general principles of co-operation" among member
states and "may make recommendations" to states in an effort to maintain the goals of the
UN Charter (U.N. Charter, art. 11, para. 1). Unlike the Security Council, the General
Assembly’s decisions are non-binding. Therefore, the General Assembly may
recommend that states continue or cease a particular action, but it lacks the power to
operationalize its recommendations. This is an important distinction because the General
Assembly addresses terrorism before the Security Council but its resolutions and
international conventions had limited effectiveness because they were hampered by poor
member state support, however, they established international norms and precedents
which the Security Council was able to draw on in operationalizing its counterterrorism
system.
UN Counterterrorism Development
Even though the UN Charter preamble declares that one of the purposes of the
UN is to "maintain international peace and security," it does not mention terrorism as a
threat to international peace and security in any context. In addition, it was not until 1972
and 1989 that the General Assembly and Security Council, respectively, issued
resolutions against terrorism (United Nations, n.d., n.p). Messmer and Yordan (2011),

Kremer and Yetiv (2008), and Luck (2004) agree that there was a long silence on
terrorism because terrorism "was viewed as a local, not global, phenomenon" (Luck,
2004, p. 98). According to the Article 24 of the UN Charter, a threat must impact
international peace and security before the Security Council can take action. Even after
the General Assembly and the Security Council addressed terrorism in 1972 and 1989,
scholars contend that an operational, international counterterrorism system did not exist
until after 9/11 (Messmer and Yordan, 2011; Kremer and Yetiv, 2008; and Foot, 2007).
General Assembly Action
On 18 December 1972, the General Assembly issued its first resolution about
terrorism, Resolution 3034. Resolution 3034 (1972) was a non-binding statement that
"recognizes the importance of international cooperation in counter terrorism...expresses
deep concern...condemns the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts...invites states"
to join international conventions and battle terrorism at state levels. Also, 3034 (1972)
established an ad hoc committee on international terrorism "consisting of thirty-five
members to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly" in order to suggest
ways states could cooperate to quickly end the problem of terrorism. However, the next
General Assembly resolution dealing with terrorism, Resolution 31/102 (15 December
1976) notes that the ad hoc committee had to discontinue work but provides no reason for
its cessation. In addition to 24 pre-9/11 resolutions, the General Assembly also developed
12 international treaties on counterterrorism measures related to "airplane hijacking,
protected persons, hostage taking, the handling of nuclear material, plastic explosives,
aviation, and maritime navigation (Kramer and Yetiv, 2008, p. 412). However, in
accordance with the UN Charter, the resolutions and treaties were not binding on the

member states. While the General Assembly did not establish an international
counterterrorism system, it did provide a foundation for the Security Council to build
upon.
Security Council Action 1989-9/11
As already stated, Messmer and Yordan (2011), Kremer and Yetiv (2008), and
Luck (2004) argue that the Security Council did not officially address terrorism until
1989 because it asserted that terrorism was a domestic, not an international problem.
Messmer and Yordan (2011) contend that the Security Council altered its opinion by
issuing resolutions in 1970, 1985, and 1989, while Kremer and Yetiv (2008) view 1989
as the turning point, and Luck (2004) believes 1985 was the "watershed year" (Luck,
2004, p. 97). The UN, however, lists Resolution 635 (1989) as the first Security Council
resolution to deal with terrorism.
Resolution 635 (1989) was the Security Council's response to the Lockerbie
bombing. Two Libyans detonated a bomb on Pan Am Flight 103 after it departed from
Heathrow airport. The plane crashed into Lockerbie, a small Scottish town, and killed
270 people (Inside Story). Resolution 635 "urges all States, and in particular the
producers of plastic or sheet explosives, to intensify research into means of making such
explosives more easily detectable, and to co-operate in this endeavour [sic]." More
importantly, it declared terrorism as an international threat to peace and security which
authorized the Security Council to develop international counterterrorism measures in
accordance with the UN Charter. Finally, Resolution 635 "established the United Nations
and the Security Council as a venue for dealing with terrorism" (Kramer and Yetiv, 2008,
p. 412).

Luck (2004) describes the decade after Resolution 635 as the enforcement years
for the Security Council, where it "made its concerns about the curbing of terrorism
operational" (p. 98). The Security Council began responding to specific terrorist acts with
sanctions and/or solutions to bring terrorists to justice. For example, Resolution 748
(1992) sanctioned Libya in response to the Lockerbie bombings for failure "to
demonstrate by concrete action its renunciation of terrorism..."by freezing Libyan funds,
banning air travel over Libya, removing foreigners who advised Libyans on military
affairs, and reducing diplomatic staff in Libya (para. 6).
The most significant pre-9/11 Security Council resolution was 1267 (15 October
1999). Foot (2007), Luck (2006) and 1267 confirm that this resolution was in response to
a Taliban attack on US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The
Security Council demanded that the Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden, froze Taliban
funds, denied permission for any Taliban aircraft to land or take-off, and established a
committee to actively work with states in ensuring previous sanctions were maintained.
Foot (2007) identifies the main responsibilities of the 1267 Committee: "to target
'individuals, groups, undertakings or entities associated with Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, or
those controlled by their associates" (493). Known associations of Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban were blacklisted and monitored for terrorist activity.
Post 9/11 UN Counterterrorism
Messmer and Yordan (2011), Kremer and Yetiv (2008), and Foot (2007) agree
that 9/11 was a defining moment in international counterterrorism. Prior to 9/11, the UN
responded to specific terrorist activities after they occurred while the UN actively sought
to prevent terrorist to save lives by stopping terrorists attacks before they occur through

Security Council Resolutions 1368 (12 September 2001) and 1373 (28 September 2001).
Messmer and Yordan (2011) describe post 9/11 resolutions as "more aggressive" while
Foot (2007) considers them an "unprecedented campaign of nonmilitary, cooperative law
enforcement measures to combat global terrorist threats (846, 494). Resolutions 1368 and
1373 were the "culmination" of UN resolutions and declarations since the 1980s
(Messmer and Yordan, 2011, p. 845).
Resolution 1368 had several important aspects. First, 1368 "recognized the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence [sic] in accordance with the
Charter," while also acknowledging the UN's "readiness to take all necessary steps
to...combat all forms of terrorism" (1368). Luck (2006) contends that 1368 was the
"Council's authorization" for the use of military force against Osama bin Laden, his Al-
Qaida associates, and any state that aided them (103). In fact, this was the US's defense of
their War on Terror. Messmer and Yordan (2011) agree with Luck that the Security
Council increased the risk of states supporting terrorism by making them "the legitimate
target of military responses from victimized states" (846).
Resolution 1373 continued to operationalize a global counterterrorism system by
"impos[ing] a number of binding commitments on all member states of the United
Nations" (Kremer and Yetiv, 2008, p. 414). In addition, 1373 mandated that member
states cease financial support for terrorists, cease "any form of support, active or passive"
to terrorists, communicate with other states if they receive tips about a possible attack,
refuse to harbor terrorists and their supporters, prevent terrorist movement across borders,
and to submit "a work programme within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution"
detailing each state's plan to engage Resolution 1373 (1-3). In essence, 1373 created

"common counterterrorism laws" (Messmer and Yordan, 2011, p. 846). Also, 1373
established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) which would "facilitate the delivery
of technical assistance to states trying to carry out counter-terrorism mandates.
Furthermore, it...coordinat[ed] the counter-terrorism efforts of international, regional, and
subregional [sic] organizations" (Kremer and Yetiv, 2008, p. 414).
After Resolutions 1368 and 1373, the Security Council reinforced their
counterterrorism monitoring ability and enforcement by passing Resolution 1540, which
created the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to support the
burgeoning workload of the CTC. The 1540 Committee, named after Resolution 1540,
was the final committee that the Security Council created after 9/11 to develop their
counterterrorism system. This resolution attempted to ensure that terrorists could not
access WMDs. Member states must create security systems to protect the WMDs, they
cannot support terrorists by supplying them with weapons, or materials, tools and
expertise to create one.
Based on current literature, then, the UN developed its counterterrorism system in
response to specific terrorist acts and the intensity of the terrorist act dictated the level of
UN action. Ultimately, 9/11 proved disastrous to motivate the UN to organize an
international counterterrorism structure with four committees to oversee member states'
participation in UN resolutions. However, many scholars reduce the UN counterterrorism
system to an extension of US foreign policy because the US was the "driving force in
getting the Security Council to play a more active role..." in counterterrorism (Foot, 2007,
p. 426). Despite the overt attention on the US versus international community debate, a
document analytic approach will reveal a more nuanced and informative understanding of

counterterrorism development. The Security Council has adopted topics like international
peace and security, sovereignty, human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, and
transnational terrorism into conversations about terrorism. As terrorism has broadened,
the counterterrorism strategies have aimed more broadly and deeply in response.
Methodology
To investigate the development of UN counterterrorism, I utilized document
analysis to analyze ten Security Council resolutions and their meeting minutes that
represent the beginning of the Security Council’s counterterrorism involvement as well as
the development of the four counterterrorism organizations. Document analysis allows
for “analyses of political phenomena over time” which lends itself well to discovering
shifting norms (Johnson, Joslyn, and Reynolds, 2001, 264).
The UN Counterterrorism homepage lists the Security Council resolutions that
relate to terrorism, narrowing the potential resolutions while maintaining consistency in
defining terrorism. I grouped ten resolutions into four case studies: Resolutions 731 and
748; Resolutions 1214, 1267, and 1333, Resolutions 1368, 1373, 1377, and 1535; and
Resolution 1540. I chose the first two resolutions because they represent the beginning of
modern counterterrorism in the Security Council. The remaining case studies include the
formation of every counterterrorism committee and associated resolutions dealing with
the same topic. Using multiple resolutions permits more thorough analysis and
contextualizes the development of the various committees. Meeting minutes reveal the
Council members’ “narratives or stories that construct possibilities for political action” in
addition to state agendas, interests, and understanding of terrorism (Walling, 2015, p.
387). Meeting minutes also unveil the members’ resolution framing, which dictates the

interpretation of an attack, the resolution required, and the broader normative
development.
After selecting and narrowing down the resolutions into case studies, I used
document analysis to read the resolutions and the meeting minutes to determine what
event each resolution addressed, what the resolution did, justifications in support of the
resolutions, and pleas against the resolution. In addition to the resolutions and meeting
minutes, I investigated the history of the events surrounding the resolution to provide
context of the relationships among member states, potential conflicts of interest, and
greater knowledge of events to which the resolutions respond.
Date Meeting
Minutes
Vote
Count
Abstentions
S/RES/731 19 November 1992 3033 15-0-0
S/RES/748 31 March 1992 3063 10-0-5 China, Cape Verde, India,
Morocco, Zimbabwe
S/RES/1214 8 December 1998 3952 15-0-0
S/RES/1267 15 October 1999 4051 15-0-0
S/RES/1333 19 December 2000 4251 13-0-2 China, Malaysia
S/RES/1368 12 September 2001 4370 15-0-0
S/RES/1373 28 September 2001 4385 15-0-0
S/RES/1377 12 November 2001 4413 15-0-0
S/RES/1535 26 March 2004 4936 15-0-0
S/RES/1540 28 April 2004 4956 15-0-0
Table 1: Overview of Case Study Resolutions
Security Council Resolution Case Studies
Pan-Am Bombings and Resolutions 731 and 748: Necessary but Dangerous
One of the first events the United Nations Security Council responded to as an act
of international terrorism was the Pan-Am Bombings in 1988 when it passed resolutions
731 and 748 in 1992. The Pan-Am Bombings, the resolutions, and the meeting minutes
provide excellent examples of the Security Council’s initial case-by-case responses to

terrorist attacks which had already occurred. In addition, the Pan-Am Bombing
resolutions reveal that a country’s ‘yes’ vote for a draft resolution does not equate to
unequivocal agreement to the reasoning behind the draft. That is, there may be alternative
explanations for a ‘yes’ vote instead of simply to go along with the leading powers in the
Security Council.
On December 21, 1988 a cassette tape carrying Semtex exploded in the baggage
compartment of Pan American Airways (Pan Am) flight 103, a Boeing 747, killing all
270 people on board. Pan Am flight 103 was carrying passengers from London to New
York City, but it exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. The plane’s wreckage covered
approximately 850 square miles of land, destroyed 21 homes, and killed 11 additional
people on the ground. A majority of the 270 passengers were American. Two Libyan
intelligence agents, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi and Lamin Khalifa Fhimah,
were the primary suspects and were suspected to be hiding in Libya.
The Pan-Am bombings were assumed to be one part of the US-Libyan clashes
during the 1980s which started after Muammar Gaddafi assumed power in Libya. Before
the Pan-Am bombings, Libya had attacked US aircraft in the Gulf of Sidra to which the
US responded with economic sanctions and passport bans. In retaliation for the sanctions,
Libyans bombed a Berlin nightclub in 1986, killing two American servicemen. Several
months later, the US initiated Operation El Dorado Canyon, an air attack on Tripoli,
Libya resulting in approximately 60 dead Libyans and two dead US Air Force captains.
Several years later, hundreds of Americans were killed in the Pan-Am bombings
suspected to be orchestrated by Libyan intelligence agents (Al Jazeera, Timeline, 2008).

Resolution 731 (1992) was the first of two resolutions passed by the Security
Council addressing the Pan-Am bombing. The resolution was authored and presented to
the Security Council by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at the 3033rd
Security Council meeting where the voting members passed it unanimously, 15-0. The
voting members included Austria, Belgium, Cape Verde, China, Ecuador, France,
Hungary, India, Japan, Morocco, Russia, the US, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
Resolution 731 expresses deep concern about “the results of investigations, which
implicate officials of the Libyan Government…[and] strongly deplores the fact that the
Libyan Government has not yet responded effectively to the above requests to cooperate
fully in establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts [Pan-Am bombings]”
(S/RES/731). It also “urges” Libya to “provide a full and effective response” to requests
for cooperation by officials from the US and UK (S/RES/731). In addition, all States are
to hold Libya accountable to fulfill the Security Council’s request to cooperate. The
resolution does not threaten the use of sanctions or any other punishments. In fact, most
readers may consider it inert and pointless.
However, the speeches reflect deeper and more divisive issues, including the role
of the Security Council in addressing terrorism, principles of international law related to
the trying of terrorist suspects, and suggestions of norms shifting established behavior. To
contrast the pro-resolution sentiments of the resolution’s authors, the Council invited
Libya, Canada, Iraq, Congo, Italy, Mauritania, Sudan, and Yemen to address the Council
about the proposed draft. Libya, the League of Arab States, Sudan, Iraq, and Yemen
appealed to the Council to vote ‘no’ to the draft resolution, citing irregularities and
inaccuracies in the investigation process and misinformation in the draft resolution. Libya

contended that four years after the US and UK started their investigation, they have not
produced evidence to support their accusations, however, their accusation is “final,
unequivocal judgements [sic] on which there is to be no further discussion: the two
Libyan nationals were declared guilty when the indictments were issued…the accused are
now to be considered guilty until proven innocent” (S/PV.3033, 1992). In addition, Libya
countered accusations that it had not offered cooperation towards the investigations.
Libya noted that it had made steps to support the investigation, including offering to send
representatives to visit the US and UK to examine evidence, but the countries refused “to
hand over the files of the investigation or submit the evidence in their possession”
(S/PV.3033).
Overarching the debate is Libya, Morocco, and Iran’s claim that Libya’s case is a
“principle of international law” and should be addressed by a legal body, namely the
International Court of Justice, not the Security Council (S/PV.3033). Legally, according
to Iran, Libya “does not have to extradite or surrender the alleged offenders to any other
State that may also have jurisdiction to try them, provided that Libya, as a Contracting
State, undertakes to make the offence mentioned in article 1 cf. the Convention [1971
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation] punishable by severe penalties” (S/PV.3033).
Sudan and Morocco accused the Security Council of being “a forum for the
imposition of the will and interests of the strong on the weak” and for singling out Arab
states (S/PV.3033). To avoid becoming a tool of the strong, they recommended leaving
the matter with a justice body in a manner “consistent with both the letter and the spirit of
international law and affords a greater degree of independent inquiry” (S/PV.3033).

When the voting members responded to the guest speakers, most supported the
draft resolution as a means to “signal [their] strong condemnation of international
terrorism and [their] willingness to join [their] voice[s] to those of others that want this
abominable practice of violence eliminated” in addition to a necessary demonstration of
cooperation (S/PV.3033). The US and the UK responded to the first speakers’
accusations of Western dominance by assuring the Council that the sponsors of the draft
want the “accused [to] be tried promptly in accordance with the tenets of international
law,” and in spite of Libya trying to obscure the matter with its “diversionary tactics,” has
responded “in a careful and prudent manner to a unique situation (S/PV.3033).” The UK
further clarified Libya’s “diversionary tactics” as making inappropriate references to the
Montreal Convention (S/PV.3033). The Montreal Convention does not apply to Libya’s
situation because it is not “a dispute between two or more Contracting Parties concerning
the interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention1
” but rather the Council is
concerned with Libya’s refusal to “respond effectively” to the accusations. In addition,
the UK contended that the suggestion of a trial before an international tribunal is not
practical because neither the ICJ nor any other international tribunal has such jurisdiction
(S/PV.3033).
Although there was general solidarity among the voting members, Cape Verde,
China, Zimbabwe, and India argued that the recent vote could not establish “precedent”
for future SC votes for several reasons (S/PV.3033). First, the authors of the draft
resolution sought to enlist the entire Security Council’s support using only their own
1
The Montreal Convention (1971) defines and criminalizes various activities which would damage an
aircraft and endanger the lives of those on board.

evidence which India argued is not necessarily within the means provided by
international law. China confirmed India’s argument by acknowledging the “constructive
observations about the unilateral nature of [SC] investigations” (S/PV.3033). Second,
Cape Verde asserted that its ‘yes’ vote should not be interpreted as desire to change the
precedent of state sovereignty in extradition matters. Citing its own constitution as an
example, Cape Verde contended that extradition is an “expression of a principle
[sovereignty] dear to all countries that should be preserved” (S/PV.3033).
Overall, it appears that S/RES/731 was widely accepted by the Security Council’s
voting members, although it is questionable whether a similar resolution would have been
introduced to the Council without the US, UK, and France’s authorship as other countries
believed that the resolution could potentially establish a precedent allowing countries to
lead their own investigations and use that information to base future resolutions on. Thus,
in spite of general agreement that violence against humanity was unacceptable and a
realization that it was the international community’s responsibility to devise a solution to
stop it, many countries cautioned the Council members to not rely on unilateral
investigations.
Several months later, the Security Council passed S/RES/748 (1992) as a follow-
up to Resolution 731 with the assumption that a new resolution with threats of
punishment and sanctions would impact Libya’s decision to cooperate. Demanding that
Libya should cease assistance to terrorist groups, Resolution 748 allows other member
states to 1) deny permission to Libyan aircraft or aircraft going to or coming from Libya,
unless it is approved; 2) cease providing technical advice, assistance, or any other forms
of training to Libya (military, especially); 3) withhold assistance in the sale or transfer of

arms, ammo, and any other weapons to Libya; 4) cease advising on military situations. In
addition, Resolution 748 generally challenges states to “refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting, or participating in terrorist acts in another State…” (S/RES/748).
Compared to its precedent, Resolution 731, Resolution 748 offers specific ways for
member States to discipline Libya for not following the requests presented in Resolution
731.
The same voting members were present for Resolution 748, but the vote count
changed from unanimously in favor to ten ‘yes’ votes and five abstentions. Like meeting
3033, the meeting surrounding the vote of Resolution748 featured guest participants
Libya, Mauritania, Uganda, and Iraq. Libya, obviously, disagreed with the resolution
because it would be adopted before a “neutral and objective jurisdiction” had ruled on the
matter to determine the guilt or innocence of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (S/PV. 3063).
Libya continued to seek an international legal intervention because, it argued, the US had
established precedent with seven earlier cases to use the ICJ instead of Security Council
action. Libya also questioned the validity of a follow-up resolution because the first
resolution, 731, was passed with the votes of the US and UK who should not have voted.
Rooting their argument in Article 52, paragraph 3 of the UN Charter, Libya contended
that the UK and UK should not have voted on an issue invoking Chapter VII if they were
parties in the dispute. These errors make Resolution 748 “fraud…insult…flagrant act of
forgery” (S/PV.3063).
Iraq and Mauritania supported Libya’s position, arguing that the Security Council
should not allow “certain hegemonistic members to dictate its [the Security Council’s]
positions,” seemingly referencing the US and the UK. Iraq used Israel as an example of

Western bias by noting that Israel had ignored Security Council resolutions in the past,
but the Security Council did not issue follow-up resolutions (S/PV. 3063). Mauritania
questioned that all judicial options for addressing the situation had been exhausted and
then condemned the use of sanctions, noting that they “would be inappropriate, and that
all efforts must be continued to promote the use of peaceful means for the solution of all
disputes and conflicts” (S/PV. 3063). In addition, both Mauritania and Iraq challenged
the Council to “assess fairly and justly the seriousness of the implications of these
enforcement measures for the fraternal Libyan people” (S/PV. 3063).
Five Security Council members abstained from voting: Zimbabwe, India, China,
Cape Verde, and Morocco. Their common grievance against Resolution 748 was that the
method of sanctions was inappropriate to the task which was “to serve an unambiguous
notice on all those engaged in acts of terrorism, directly or through material, political or
moral assistance to terrorists, of the determination of the international community to
combat terrorism” (S/PV. 3063). They reflected on the report of Secretary General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali which noted positive improvement in Libya’s cooperation and
that such cooperation should be taken into consideration before voting on Resolution 748.
China added that sanctions will “complicate the issue further, aggravate regional tension
and have serious economic consequences” for countries in the region (S/PV. 3063). Even
though China did not agree with 748, she did not exercise her right as a permanent
member to veto the resolution. With a veto, the resolution would not have passed.
The US, UK, and France defended their sponsorship and support of Resolution
748 by contending that Libya’s involvement in the “wanton destruction of two civilian
airliners” breached international justice, justifying Chapter VII intervention (S/PV. 3063).

Sanctions were an appropriate response because they were a “multilateral, non-violent
and peaceful response to violent and brutal acts” in addition to being limited to three
areas, “aviation, arms and Libyan Government overseas offices and officials,” thus
limiting the sanctions’ impact on ordinary civilians (S/PV. 3063). In addition, the
sanctions would not take effect until April 15, giving Libya several weeks to acquiesce to
the request for cooperation. Other countries like Venezuela and Ecuador voted ‘yes’ in
order to send a message to the world that the Security Council was “in favour of
eliminating terrorism, and, in particular, has urged the Government of Libya to provide a
complete and effective response to the requests submitted to it” (S/PV. 3063). Venezuela
and Ecuador appealed for Libya’s cooperation so the sanctions would not have to be
implemented.
Despite the apparent overwhelming support for both Resolutions 731 and 748
(15-0 and 10-0-5, respectively), the meeting minutes reveal a deeper and more polarizing
debate. Non-member countries like Libya, Mauritania, and Iran expressed frustration
with the apparent hegemonic dominance of the US, UK, and France in submitting draft
resolutions that relied solely on their own investigations without submitting to an
international judicial body. They raised questions about the legality of the US, UK, and
France voting on the resolutions in relation to Article 52, paragraph 3. Voting members
also expressed doubts about using the Security Council over an international justice body
like the ICJ. In fact, members who voted ‘yes’ worried that passing these resolutions
would establish a dangerous precedent of one or two countries initiating a draft resolution
based on their own investigations. Other members who abstained from voting on 748
expressed doubts as to the impact of the sanctions on the general population of Libya.

However, in spite of the concerns of all members, except the US, UK, and France, most
countries voted in favor of the resolutions in order to show the world that the Security
Council was prepared to stand against international terrorism. This case study
demonstrates Security Council’s early treatment of terrorism: react to terrorism after it
happened and address only one actor of terrorism, the perpetrator. The primary areas of
dispute among the member states focus on the role of an international judicial institution
compared to the Security Council in certain situations, the procedure of conducting
investigations upon which states will base draft resolutions, and how to bring the Pan-Am
terrorists to justice. The next case studies will investigate whether there is a shift in
behavior and motives of the Security Council towards terrorism.
The Taliban, Afghanistan, and Resolutions 1214, 1267, and 1333
The next case study examines the Security Council’s response to the growing
Taliban terrorist activity in Afghanistan only six years after the Pan-Am bombing
resolutions. Afghanistan had proven historically unstable even before these resolutions
were issued with different rival armed groups seeking power (Al Jazeera, 2009, n.p.).
When the Soviets began ruling in 1979, they established a puppet government to restore
some semblance of order. The new Afghan government was led by the leftist People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan’s Babrak Karmal (United Nations Afghanistan, n.d.,
n.p.). Other ethnic and more hard-line groups were unhappy with communist rule for
different reasons, however, they were able to unite under their mutual dissatisfaction of
the Soviet Union. The US, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia supported these
Mujahideen (anti-communist Muslim Afghan fighters) for the next several years in an
attempt to disrupt Soviet rule. For example, the CIA developed several training camps for

the Mujahidenn to learn bomb-making, sabotage, and guerilla warfare tactics which
serviced approximately 12,500 Afghans (Al Jazeera, 2009, n.p.).
When the Soviet Union fell in 1989, the Mujahideen forces removed the Soviet-
back government from power which was now led by Mohammad Najibullah. From 1989-
1994, Afghanistan became home to massive civil unrest as the once united Mujahideen
splintered back into their rivalrous groups seeking control of the government. In the midst
of the chaos, Mullah Mohammed Omar trained the Taliban, translated students, and was
able to claim power (Council, n.d., n.p.). They also became a de-facto political party.
The Taliban’s rule was fraught with violence and chaos. The UN specifically
addressed the role of the Taliban as terrorists after the September 1998 murders of Iranian
diplomats and a journalist in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. Mazar-e-Sharif was the
stronghold of the Northern Alliance, an opposition group challenging the Taliban’s
governance in Afghanistan. Iran supported the Northern Alliance and, in retaliation,
Taliban members murdered 11 Iranian diplomats and an Iranian journalist during a
Taliban attack on Mazar-e-Sharif.
S/RES/1214 (1998) was the first of several Security Council resolutions
addressing the Taliban and the Afghan conflict. The voting members at meeting 3952
included Brazil, China, Costa Rica, France, Gabon, Gambia, Japan, Kenya, Portugal,
Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, the UK, and the US and they passed Resolution 1214
unanimously with no abstentions. Resolution 1214 accuses the Taliban of escalating the
chaos and suffering in Afghanistan while also condemning the Taliban murder of the
Iranian diplomats and journalist. Resolution 1214 specifically targets the Taliban as the

source of conflict, not the state of Afghanistan itself. In fact, the resolution “reaffirms
commitment to sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of
Afghanistan, and respect for its cultural and historical heritage” (S/RES1214). To protect
the sovereignty of Afghanistan, the resolution calls for the cessation of “outside
interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan including the involvement of foreign
military personnel and the supply of arms and ammunition to all parties to the conflict”
(S/RES1214). Finally, Resolution 1214 also calls for the parties in the conflict to uphold
international humanitarian law, namely the Geneva Conventions, while also ending
discrimination against girls and women. Thus, Resolution 1214 identifies the Taliban as
the perpetrator of terrorism, not the state of Afghanistan, and calls for outside sources to
stop providing arms to the parties of conflict. This condemnation of international
terrorism is then couched within the broader issue of human rights.
Before allowing voting members to speak, the Security Council welcomed Iran
and Pakistan to present their opinion on Resolution 1214. Iran acknowledged that it “is
committed to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of
Afghanistan” and does not want to interfere with Afghanistan’s sovereignty, but the
Taliban have yet to provide a promised investigation report thus necessitating a Security
Council resolution (S/PV.3952). Pakistan, a supporter of the Taliban, countered Iran and
the international community by contending that Afghanistan had contributed to
promoting justice by returning the dead bodies of the Iranian diplomats, expressing regret
over the attack, establishing a mission of investigation, and repatriating all Iranian
prisoners. Pakistan believed that the international community would achieve better results
in fighting terrorism and violence in Afghanistan if it would acknowledge the Taliban as

the “de jure and de facto heads” and work with them instead of against them
(S/PV.3952). The draft resolution was not sufficient because it ignored the violence
committed against the Taliban, ignored the prisoner exchange, ignored the fact that the
Taliban have allowed the UN to station personnel in Afghanistan, and that there is peace
in 90 percent of the country. Instead of fighting the Taliban rule, Pakistan contended that
the international community should assist Afghanistan because its economy was wrecked
by the Soviet Union.
Voting members did not agree with Pakistan. There were several common themes
in voting members’ support of Resolution 1214. First, all voting members separated the
Taliban and the state of Afghanistan and so that the resolution was a condemnation of
terrorists, not a violation of state sovereignty. Russia noted that the “Taliban has ignored
the international community and tried to take over the entire country” (S/PV.3952). The
Taliban are terrorists responsible for “repeated undermining of [peace]
negotiations…unwillingness to cooperate with the representatives of other political
forces…killing of foreign diplomats, journalists…mass persecutions…executions for
national and religious reasons…” in addition to violations of human rights (S/PV.3952).
As terrorism rooted itself in Afghanistan, the US and UK argued that the Taliban have
used Afghanistan to “export [the “plague”] of international terrorism and illegal drugs”
around the world (S/PV.3952).
Second, all members justified their support of Resolution 1214 by acknowledging
the “further deterioration in the human rights situation in Afghanistan” thanks to the
Taliban’s brutal regime (S/PV.3952). Russia, China, Slovenia, the UK, and Sweden
considered the recent terrorist attacks at Mazar-e-Sharif a reflection of the broader human

rights violations occurring within the Taliban’s control. Sweden demanded that all
violations of human rights cease and that international norms and laws associated with
combating terrorism be adhered to rather than ignored.
Third, the Security Council members echoed China’s sentiment when it
acknowledged that UN-led, multi-state involvement was “the only way to resolve the
Afghan conflict” and that Resolution 1214 represented international cooperation in
combating the Taliban (S/PV.3952). Slovenia reiterated that “broad-based, multi-ethnic
and representative” governments must be involved to stabilize Afghanistan (S/PV.3952).
China also cautioned that it is important to engage and consult local Afghan factions in
the best way to oust the Taliban and restore Afghanistan’s stability. Because of the
international commitment to ending conflict and terrorism, members reiterated that they
were prepared to continue passing resolutions and sanctions until the situation was
resolved.
In confirming the importance of the international community’s responsibility in
combating terrorism in Afghanistan, Costa Rica, the UK, and Kenya also chastised “some
countries which profess[ed] to support peace in Afghanistan [but] continued to prolong
the war by supplying the factions with arms and funding” (S/PV.3952). Kenya contended
that was “hypocritical” to say you are pro-peace while providing weapons that continue
the conflict and widen the spread of international terrorism (S/PV.3952).
The next resolution to consider the question of the Taliban and international
terrorism was S/RES/1267 (1999) after which the Security Council’s 1267 Committee is
named. On 15 October 1999, a new Security Council reinforced previous resolutions
against Taliban terrorism with multiple sanctions and established the Resolution 1267

Counterterrorism committee to solidify the UN’s role in fighting terrorism. No longer
was the Security Council addressing terrorism reactively as a state-by-state, single-issue
but proactively as an international scourge.
The new Security Council consisted of Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, Slovenia, the UK, and
the US. 1267 was submitted as a draft resolution by Canada, Netherlands, Russia,
Slovenia, the UK, Ireland, and the US. It was passed unanimously with no abstentions.
Resolution 1267 reiterated the Security Council’s “strong commitment to the
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan, and its
respect for Afghanistan’s cultural and historical heritage,” but condemned the Taliban’s
capture and murder of Iran’s Consulate General, other diplomats, and a journalist in
Mazar-e-Sharif in addition to the deplorable fact that the Taliban provided safe haven for
Usama bin Laden after his US embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania2
(S/RES/1267).
Because of the Taliban’s refusal to cooperate with previous resolutions, the Security
Council acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to demand that the Taliban 1) comply
with previous resolutions and cease contributions to international terrorism; 2) turn over
Usama bin Laden “without further delay to appropriate authorities;” 3) enforce sanctions
if demands are not met (S/RES/1267). Without the Taliban’s compliance, the Security
Council would implement several sanctions, including denying permission to any aircraft
2
On 7 August 1998, Usama bin Laden and his associates bombed US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar
es Salaam, Tanzania. The Taliban harbored bin Laden in Afghanistan afterwards and refused US requests
to turn bin Laden over to stand trial.

to land or take off from Taliban-controlled territory and freezing financial resources of
the Taliban.
After listing the sanctions against the Taliban, Resolution 1267 introduced a
“Committee of the Security Council…to undertake the following tasks and to report on
its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations” (S/RES/1267). The
committee would be responsible for following up on the aforementioned sanctions to
ensure states are complying, consider any information brought to its attention about
terrorist activity by member states, report to the Security Council about the committee’s
recommendations on the proper procedure for addressing future acts of terrorism, and
consider states’ request for exemption from sanctions.
S/RES/1333 (2000) reinforced Resolutions 1214 and 1267 in condemning the
Taliban for terrorist activity while increasing the amount of sanctions against the Taliban
if they did not comply with the Security Council’s requests. India, Kyrgyzstan, Russia,
Tajikistan, and the US drafted 1333. The 4251st
meeting members passed Resolution
1333 with 13 ‘yes’ votes and 2 abstentions. The members included Argentina,
Bangladesh, Canada, China, France, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Netherlands,
Tunisia, Ukraine, UK, and the USA. China and Malaysia abstained.
Resolution 1333 is one of the strictest and most comprehensive resolutions
against the Taliban. It condemned the Taliban for not complying with previous
resolutions’ requests, including the cessation of terrorist harboring (specifically Usama
bin Laden), terrorist training camp sponsorship, and the planning of terrorist operations.
Reinforcing the Security Council’s “commitment to sovereignty, independent territorial
integrity, and national unity of Afghanistan,” the Security Council refused to view the

Taliban as legitimate leaders. Members connected terrorism with narcotics trafficking,
human rights, and international humanitarian and development aid, Resolution 1333
acknowledged that combating violence required a “comprehensive, integrated approach”
(S/RES/1333). In working toward such an approach, the Security Council attempted to
use targeted sanctions with “adequate and effective exemptions to avoid adverse
humanitarian consequences on the people…and…not impede, thwart or delay the work of
international humanitarian assistance organizations or governmental relief agencies
providing humanitarian assistance” (S/RES/1333).
After reiterating previous requests on cessation of violence, the Security Council
instructed member States to ensure that they stopped the flow of all arms to Afghanistan,
withdraw their diplomatic staff, close all offices of Ariana Afghan Airlines,3
halt illegal
drug activities, and ensure that acetic anhydride4
was not sold to anyone loyal to the
Taliban, whether in Afghanistan or not.
Resolution 1333 then instructed the newly formed 1267 committee to investigate
and report on the potential methods for enforcing the arms embargo and closing Taliban
training camps. In addition, the 1267 committee would be responsible for monitoring the
humanitarian implications of the sanctions. All member states needed to report on their
progress to the committee and, in return, the committee could provide resources and
information to assist states in better fulfilling the sanctions against the Taliban. The
3
Ariana Afghan Airlines was the largest airline and national carrier for Afghanistan.
4
Acetic anhydride is used in the synthesis of heroin, which contributed to the Taliban’s booming drug
business

Taliban had one month from the passage of the resolution to comply. If they did, the
sanctions would not take effect.
Afghanistan, India, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan requested permission to speak on
the resolution. Afghanistan offered the most interesting view on the resolution. It tried to
shift the blame of Taliban’s growing terrorist network onto Taliban supporters,
specifically Pakistan. Because Pakistan is “intimately” connected with the propagation of
terrorism via their “indoctrinating” madrassahs and alliance with bin Laden and the
Taliban, the Security Council cannot adequately address the broader situation without
considering drafting a resolution chastising Pakistan (S/PV.4251). Accordingly,
Afghanistan requested that the Security Council establish a commission of inquiry to
investigate Pakistan’s role in terrorism.
Voting members China and Malaysia abstained from voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the
resolution. China and Malaysia both cited humanitarian concerns as the primary reason
for their abstention, but they also voiced “procedural and substantive” concerns
(S/PV.4251). They believed that the proposed sanctions would contribute to the declining
humanitarian situation in Afghanistan and exacerbate the harm caused by the drought and
violence on Afghan civilians. If sanctions like those suggested by Resolution 1333 were
enacted, Malaysia and China warn that the Taliban will “expel the humanitarian
personnel” already in Afghanistan thereby harming innocent Afghanis (S/PV.4251). To
peacefully end the conflict, reduce terrorism, and improve the humanitarian situation in
Afghanistan, China argues that a more realistic route would be to achieve a ceasefire
rather than removing the Taliban from power.

In addition to humanitarian concerns, Malaysia argued that the sanctions were
based on biased analysis, thus making the sanctions subjective. An “objective sanctions
impact assessment” was necessary to validate the consequences and necessity of
proposed sanctions (S/PV.4251). Waiting for an objective sanctions impact assessment
would give time for Francesc Vendrell, the Secretary General’s Special Representative on
Afghanistan, time to “exhaust his [peace] efforts which are at the initial stage… [and to]
be supportive, not dismissive about the peace process” (S/PV.4251). Finally, Malaysia
contended that the arms embargo “compromises the essential neutrality of the Council
[and] without that necessary neutrality the Council will undermine its own role and
credibility” (S/PV.4251). This is a similar argument that Malaysia made several years
earlier when it argued against Security Council resolutions against Libya.
Members who voted ‘yes’ to Resolution 1333 generally did so for several reasons.
First, the Taliban had propagated an “ongoing policy of violating humanitarian law,
flagrant violations of human rights, maltreatment of the civil population, violence and
continuing discrimination against girls and women” (S/PV.4251). Both the Taliban’s
terrorism and its overall governance had created a humanitarian crisis and it was the
Security Council’s responsibility to pressure the Taliban into stopping its terrorization.
Second, the US argued that the Taliban had continually “flout[ed] the will of the
international community and support and shelter terrorists without repercussions” The
sanctions, according to Canada, send a “strong anti-terrorism message…[and] are also a
clear signal that the Council is serious about its demands and that the Taliban must
comply with its international obligations” (S/PV.4251). To ensure that the Taliban are
punished and not innocent Afghanis, the sanctions are supposed to be “carefully targeted”

in order to “limit as much as possible their impact on the civilian population of
Afghanistan” (S/PV.4251).
For example, the draft resolution attempted to balance the humanitarian issue and
the flight ban by “provid[ing] an exception for flights organized by humanitarian
organizations that are duly registered (S/PV.4251).” Although the authors’ attempt at
targeted resolutions satisfied most of the ‘yes’ members, the Netherlands did voice
concerns about the “humanitarian impact of additional sanctions” but did concede that the
humanitarian impact would be determined by the Taliban’s response (S/PV.4251). The
US reassured members that sanctions are not the cause of the suffering and misery of
Afghanis, but the “draconian polices of the [Taliban’s] leadership” (S/PV.4251).
Third, the Security Council members expressed approval of the time-based
features of the sanctions including the sanctions’ “limited time period” which required
renewal after three-years and “the one-month period provided for drawing up the list of
humanitarian agencies and organizations authorized to organize flights” thereby giving
the Taliban time to accept 1333’s terms (S/PV.4251). Russia specifically addressed China
and Malaysia’s concerns about the Taliban’s threat of removing humanitarian personnel
from Afghanistan if 1333 was passed and the potential hindrance 1333 posed to the peace
process. Russia likened the Taliban’s threat to black mail and contended that “if the
Security Council takes such threats into account, we will become the direct victims of
blackmail [and be seen as] one that acquiesces to blackmail [instead of] the organ
responsible for the maintenance of peace and security” (S/PV.4251). In reference to the
peace process, the Taliban had consistently “gone back on the[ir] obligation” to resume

negotiations multiple times, thus it is necessary to force their hand with sanctions
(S/PV.4251).
9/11 and Resolutions 1368, 1373, 1377, and 1535: Solidifying UN Counterterrorism
Scholars consider the Security Council resolutions following 9/11 to be a massive
escalation in UN counterterrorism, but they mainly consider how the “unprecedented
campaign of non-military, cooperative law enforcement measures to combat global
terrorist threats” served the US’s interests, not how the shifting norms altered how the
Security Council addressed counterterrorism (Foot, 2007, 846-894). It is important to
examine the 9/11 resolutions within the context of the previous resolutions so one can
witness the overall shift the Security Council’s counterterrorism over the previous twenty
years. Even before 9/11, the Security Council was developing stricter and more defined
consequences for terrorism while expanding the Chapter VII’s interpretation of the
Security Council’s role in counterterrorism. Thus, one could also argue that fundamental
shifts in ideology and norms had already solidified the UN’s role in counterterrorism
before 9/11 and 9/11 just accelerated the final shift.
9/11 was the product of several years of planning by bin Laden and his al-Qaeda
network as a step towards “the wiping out of America and the infidel West” (Wright,
2006, 372). Also known as the “planes operation,” the original plan was to use four
planes to attack the World Trade Centers, the Pentagon, and the Capitol (National 2015).
Bin Laden chose these targets for their symbolic value (the World Trade Center) and
political value (Pentagon and Capitol) with the understanding “that America – as a
political entity – could actually be destroyed” if he targeted the center of government,
leaving anarchy and chaos behind (Wright, 2006, 308).

Nineteen hijackers spent several years training in Afghanistan, Yemen, and the
US for 9/11. Training included English lessons, flying school, and learning how to
commandeer a plane. The lead hijackers and pilots, Hani Hanjour, Mohammed Atta,
Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah, began arriving in 2000 but it took over a year to
move the remaining fifteen muscle hijackers into the US without raising red flags. A
variety of miscommunication and ignorance within US intelligence agencies kept the
various offices from connecting the seemingly separate and unconnected terrorist
movement (9/11, 277).
On 9/11, only three of the four scheduled plane attacks succeeded. At 8:46 am,
Mohammed Atta flew American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower between floors
93-99. 102 minutes later, at 10:28 am, it collapsed. The second attack occurred at 9:03
am. Hijackers crashed United Airlines Flight 175 into the South Tower between floors
75-85. In 56 minutes, the South Tower collapsed. The third plane crashed into the
western part of the Pentagon at 9:37 am while the fourth attack was unsuccessful.
Passengers on Flight 93 heard about the attacks in New York and on the Pentagon before
Al Qaeda hijacked the flight. They were able to regain control of the cabin but the
hijackers crashed the plane in rural Pennsylvania before the passengers gained control of
the cockpit. Thus, the attack on the Capitol failed but Al Qaeda’s attacks still inflicted
tremendous damage with approximately 3,000 deaths, most of which occurred in New
York City.
On 9/11, the Security Council members included Bangladesh, China, Colombia,
France, Ireland, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritius, Norway, the Russian Federation, Singapore,
Tunisia, Ukraine, the UK, and the US. They passed S/RES/1368 unanimously, 15-0, with

no abstentions. It is unknown who drafted the resolution as the minutes only say that the
draft was prepared in the course of prior consultations.
Resolution 1368 is a one-page resolution condemning the 9/11 terrorist attacks in
the US, calling “on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks,” petitioning “the
international community to redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts”
via international cooperation and implementation of previous anti-terrorist conventions
and resolutions, and offering “its deepest sympathy and condolences” to the victims,
families, and the US as a whole (S/RES/1368). The interesting line in the resolution notes
that the Security Council recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence in accordance with the Charter. (S/RES/1368). None of the previous
counterterrorism resolutions made that concession. Victims had to wait for the
perpetrators to turn themselves in or for the international community to provide necessary
assistance. Now, it appears that the Security Council approved retaliatory action outside
of the context of the UN. Shortly after 9/11, the US sought UN approval to fight a War on
Terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, so that may be what Resolution 1368 is approving.
Security Council members expressed sorrow and solidarity with the US in their
justification speeches, but there was one point that appeared in almost every speech: “a
terrorist attack on one country is an attack on humanity as a whole” (S/PV.4370, 2001).
“The values and freedoms shared by all were attacked” in addition to the US and it is the
responsibility of all member states to “work together” in fighting a “global issue
(S/PV.4370, 2001).” Mauritius and China, two countries who had abstained from certain
resolutions targeting terrorism even condemned the attacks as a “threat to international

peace and security” and “an open challenge to the international community as a whole
(S/PV.4370, 2001).”
While Resolution 1368 reinforced terrorism as a threat to international peace and
security, it did not enact any sanctions or form a committee. Those actions came later in
resolutions S/RES/1373 (28 Sep 2001) and S/RES/1377 (12 Nov 2001). The Security
Council unanimously passed Resolution 1373 with no abstentions. It reiterated that
international terrorism was a threat to international peace and security, allowing the
Security Council to act under Chapter VII to mandate states to “criminalize funding and
willful provision or collection of funds…by their nationals or in their territories with the
intention that the funds should be used…in order to carry out terrorist acts,” freeze the
funds and other economic assets of those who “attempt…participate in…or facilitate
terrorist acts,” refrain from state-sponsored, enabled, or supported terrorism, assist other
states in their fight against terrorism, deny safe haven to terrorists, “prevent the
movement of terrorists or terrorists groups by effective border control,” exchange
information to better coordinate counterterrorism strategies, and maintain international
standards on human rights (S/RES/1373).
The Security Council also instructed states to “become parties…and fully
implement” previous provisions, resolutions, and conventions against terrorism
(S/RES/1373). In addition, the Security Council recognized the close connection between
international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering,
illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other
potentially deadly materials” and called for greater levels of cooperation to combat the
tangential crimes that contribute to terrorism.

Unfortunately, the meeting minutes in which members provide their justification
in voting for or against a resolution simply note that “the text…was prepared in the
course of the Council’s prior consultations [and that] the Council is ready to proceed to
the vote on the draft resolution before it” (S/PV.4385).
S/RES/1377 is a “broad resolution at targeting terrorists and those who harbor, aid
or support them” and also created the 1373 Committee which monitored the resolution’s
implementation (S/PV.4413, 2001). The Security Council members are the same as the
previous two resolutions: Bangladesh, China, Colombia, France, Ireland, Mali, Mauritius,
Norway, Russian Federation, Singapore, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the
US. They passed the resolution unanimously 15-0 with no abstentions.
Resolution 1377 reiterated that international terrorism is “one of the most serious
threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century” and was a
challenge to all States and all of humanity must work together to find a solution to it
(S/PV.4413). It created the Resolution 1373 Committee to monitor the sanctions already
passed in Resolution 1373. The committee’s responsibilities included exploring ways that
the Security Council could assist States in implementing sanctions, fostering
international, regional, and sub regional cooperation, promoting “best-practice” policies
especially in legal areas, and determining available programs that can monitor existing
technical, financial, regulatory, legislative, and other sanctions (S/PV.4413).
Secretary-General Kofi Atta Annan expounded on the ramifications of the 1373
Committee to the Security Council before the members voted on it. He contended that the
resolution required Member State cooperation and they needed assistance from the 1373
Committee in a wide range of areas “from suppressing the financing of terrorism to

providing early warning, cooperating in criminal investigations and exchanging
information on possible terrorist acts” (S/PV.4413). The committee’s reports will “play
an indispensable role in identifying and cataloguing existing policies and
instruments…[and] provide the benchmark for the international community as it assesses
its ability to combat international terrorism” (S/PV.4413). The Committee will be chaired
by the UK.
Kofi Annan also warned the Council that international terrorism was not an
isolated phenomenon, but is “an immensely complicated phenomenon with multiple
objectives and causes, a multitude of weapons and agents and virtually limitless
manifestations” (S/PV.4413). Annan’s argument for a multi-faceted approach to
terrorism was echoed by several of the members including China, Russia, the US, and
Mali.
The primary justifications for member states’ support of Resolution 1377 include
terrorism’s threat to the world, an understanding that all countries are responsible to fight
terrorism, and a desire to protect human rights. First, China and Mauritius note that
terrorism is a major threat to international peace and security while China continues that
terrorism “has also inflicted severe damage on the world economy [thus making
terrorism] a common enemy to humanity” (S/PV.4413, 2001). In addition, Colombia
noted that terrorism increased the spread and use of illicit drugs because their lucrative
operation financed terrorism. Singapore considered the fight against terrorism “a fight
against the forces of violence, intolerance and fanaticism. It is a fight for civilization, and
it is a fight that we must win” (S/PV.4413).

Second, many Security Council members justified the establishment of the 1373
Committee because, they not only agreed that terrorism an international threat, but they
also understood that states have a responsibility to fight terrorism -- “if states do not fight
terrorism, then international terrorism can fester through our own complacency if we fail
to tackle vigorously its capacity to act” (S/PV.4413). Colombia stated that “the struggle
against international terrorism is the responsibility of all countries, without exception”
(S/PV.4413). How states interpret responsibility are varied. France interpreted
responsibility to include supporting the US’s “armed response against Osama bin Laden
and the Al Qaeda network and against the Taliban system that supports them” because of
the right of self-defense (S/PV.4413). China and Russia contended that “military means
alone are not enough to resolve the problem” but states must also address the multi-
faceted causes of terrorism (S/PV.4413). Either way, states can no longer hide behind any
“political, religious, or ideological” reasons to justify ignoring international terrorism
(S/PV.4413).
Third, multiple states justified Resolution 1377 because it was necessary to
protect human rights. Terrorists hold “in contempt everything that the UN
embodies…terrorists have no respect for the human rights of innocent
people…promoting diversity and pluralism…creeds or religions…views and convictions
of others” and Resolution 1377 “offers a blueprint for action” (S/RES/1377, 2001,
Ireland). Mauritius echoed that terrorism is the “senseless and indiscriminate taking of
innocent lives” while Norway and Mali confirmed that “we are fighting terrorism [to
uphold] the very values, rights and freedoms that the terrorists so despise” (S/RES/1377).

Thus, the Security Council is responsible for upholding the human rights of individuals
and must actively work to stop terrorism.
In March 2004, the Security Council unanimously reaffirmed the importance of
the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee and revitalized the CTC by adding the Counter-
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) to assist the CTC (S/RES/1535).
The CTED was “established as a special political mission, under the policy guidance of
the Plenary5
…to enhance the Committee’s ability to monitor the implementation of
resolution 1373” (S/RES/1535). The CTED was responsible for ensuring “comprehensive
follow-up of all CTC’s decisions, monitoring their execution and evaluating their results;
supporting and advising the Plenary and Chair6
in their functions…facilitate[ing] the
provision of assistance programmes to States in order to further the implementation of
UNSCR 1373” (S/2004/124). Like 1373, the meeting minutes only note that “the
text…was prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations [and that] the
Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it” (S/PV.4936,
2004).
The 9/11 Security Council resolutions offer a more nuanced and complex vision
of the Security Council’s motivations for continuing to develop its counterterrorism
structures. While these resolutions were still in response to a specific attack on the US,
the other members recognized and justified their support for the resolutions in terms of
the broader impact of terrorism on the rest of the world. Human rights, responsibility, and
5
The Plenary is a sub-part of the Counter-Terrorism Committee established by S/RES/1373 composed of
the Security Council member States.
6
The Chair is the head of the CTC.

cooperation were frequent themes throughout the speeches of the various Security
Council members.
Resolution 1540: Terrorism in a Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Age
Resolution 1540 is couched within the broader narrative of the Iraq War and
Western accusations that Iraq possessed a WMD arsenal. Since the Gulf War, the US and
Iraq had debated the presence of WMDs in Iraq and the resulting status quo left Iraq “free
to attempt to reconstitute its assorted weapons of mass destruction programs” (Richelson,
2004, n.p.). After 9/11, President Bush accused Iraq of working with al-Qaeda during the
planning of 9/11 and invaded Iraq in March 2003 on the premise that Iraq had a secret
WMD program which could prove dangerous to the world, despite the Security Council’s
refusal to pass a resolution authorizing multilateral military intervention.
Shortly after the US and Britain’s invasion of Iraq in March, President Bush
challenged the Security Council on September 23, 2003 to pass a resolution which would
reduce the proliferation of weapons that have the potential “to bring sudden disaster and
suffering on a scale we can scarcely imagine” (Bush, 2003, n.p.). He presented several
steps that he envisioned would help increase security including securing WMDs at their
sources, improving capacities to “interdict lethal materials in transit,” and to “criminalize
the proliferation of weapons” (Bush, 2003, n.p.). Shortly after Bush’s speech, France, the
Philippines, Romania, Russia, Northern Ireland, Britain, and the US submitted a draft
resolution addressing the non-proliferation of WMDs, however, the resolution had to be
amended three times before achieving unanimous support from the Security Council
member states which included Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chile, China, France,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Romania, Russia, Spain, the UK, and the US.

Resolution 1540 affirmed “that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and
security” and that the Security Council is “gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism
and the risk that non-State actors…may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery” (S/RES/1540). In addition,
1540 mandates that states “refrain from providing any form of support” to terrorists and
non-State actors in acquiring WMDs, adopt previous, relevant international conventions
and laws referencing the non-proliferation of WMDs, and create border controls to limit
the ability of parties to transport WMDs across borders (S/RES/1540). To oversee the
implementation of 1540, the Security Council established the 1540 Committee.
The 1540 Committee would be composed of Security Council members who
must report within six months on the status of the UN’s member states’ implementation
of 1540. In addition, the 1540 Committee would provide technical assistance to any state
that lacks the resources or capacity to strengthen border controls, secure its WMD
materials, or implement any other provisions of 1540.
There were several justifications for approving the 1540 including the resolution’s
revised nature, general agreement of WMDs’ “clear and present threat to global peace
and security,” and 1540’s restricted targeting (S/PV.4956, 2004). First, Pakistan, Algeria,
and Germany voted for 1540 only after significant revisions were made in the initial
draft. While the three states support nuclear non-proliferation among non-State actors,
they were concerned that the “long process of restricted consultations among the five
permanent members” created a resolution that would not only target non-State actors, but
smaller nuclear states like Pakistan (S/PV.4956). Although not all of the Algeria,

Pakistan, and Germany’s concerns were addressed, the final draft resolution represented
clearer and more acceptable solutions. Even though Pakistan, Algeria, and Germany’s
vote would not have hindered the passage of a draft resolution that favored larger states
like the US, UK, and Russia, the draft resolution’s authors went back and edited the
resolution until it received unanimous support. There was even an “open debate” about
1540’s contents in the Security Council on April 22, 2004 which allowed “wide,
constructive participation” by all member states (S/PV.4956) Romania confirmed that
1540 is the result “of extensive and useful exchanges in the interactions both within the
Security Council membership and among the general membership of the Organization”
(S/PV.4956).
Second, every member state affirmed that the WMDs harbored a dangerous threat
to international peace and security. Because there was a “vacuum” of and “serious gap”
in international laws regarding the production, distribution, and harboring of WMDs, the
Security Council had a responsibility to establish international norms and standards in
place of international law (S/PV.4956, 2004). The US stated that nuclear non-
proliferation required “the broadest possible cooperation” and the Security Council could
contribute to such cooperation by mandating member states to follow binding resolutions
to meet “legal and technical” requirements that would reduce the ability of non-State
actors to attain WMDs (S/PV.4956).
Third, Russia, Pakistan, and China expressed satisfaction that 1540 “is targeted
specifically at [the threat of WMDs in the hands of non-State actors]” that it will not
“supercede existing non-proliferation mechanisms…nor does it impede scientific and
technical cooperation for peaceful purposes…but [1540] establishes an operational

framework for international cooperation (S/PV.4956). China voted in favor of 1540 as it
did not threaten “the legitimate rights of all countries, especially developing countries, to
utilize and share dual-use science and technology and their products for peaceful
purposes” (S/PV.4956). Thus, 1540 did not address broader nuclear non-proliferation
among nuclear states and that permitted extensive support from states like Russia,
Pakistan, and China.
Findings
The above analysis demonstrates a decided shift in the Security Council’s
approach to terrorism and counterterrorism from reacting to singular acts of violence
against specific targets to proactively addressing terrorism as a broad, complex, and
interconnected issue. This shift has implications for issues like human rights,
international peace and security, transnational crime, and sovereignty.
First, the analysis shows both the nature of terrorism and the Security Council’s
response evolved over the case studies. The Pan Am case study represented one of the
first post-Cold War resolutions directly addressing terrorism. The event was a single
attack on a specific target while the Security Council responded directly to the alleged
perpetrator and did not attempt to create an overarching counterterrorism framework. The
US, UK, and France authored and muscled the resolutions through the Security Council
which was evident to all members and acknowledged by several in the meeting minutes.
Some of the members contended that the Security Council was a “forum for the
imposition of the will and interests of the strong on the weak” while others voted ‘yes’ to
the condemn terrorism but not for establishing a precedent of Western dominance in
counterterrorism decisions (S/PV.3033, 1992). Thus, the Western nations framed the

resolution as a punitive response to Libyan terrorism while non-Western nations voiced
concerns about Western dominance and framed their support as a condemnation of
terrorism in general.
The next case study surrounding the Taliban’s terrorism in Afghanistan took a
decided shift in both the nature of terrorism and counterterrorism. No longer was
terrorism only single, isolated attacks but terrorism was broader and more sweeping.
Afghanistan was continually living in a state of terror while the Taliban targeted both
Afghans and the international community. The Taliban’s attack on Iranian diplomats and
journalists provided the impetus for S/RES/1214, 1267, and 1333, but the Security
Council began to recognize that terrorism was couched within a web of variables
including arms supply, human rights, drugs, development, humanitarian aid, and
democracy. The scourge of terrorism reached internationally and threatened the peace of
security of the world. Over the next three resolutions, the member states framed their
justification for the resolutions by referencing their international responsibility to a
“comprehensive integrated approach” supported by “broad-based, multi-ethnic and
representative” governments pursuing an end to major threats to international peace and
security (S/RES/1333; S/PV.3952, 2000). China and Malaysia both abstained from voting
on S/RES/1333, which reinforced sanctions against the Taliban, citing humanitarian
concerns and a belief that pursuing a ceasefire over additional sanctions would be more
appropriate. Russia supported the additional sanctions in order to resist the Taliban’s
blackmail.
This case study does reference a specific situation, but it is embedded in more
pervasive, indiscriminate, and chronic terrorism. In response, the Security Council

became more proactive by creating the 1267 Committee to begin dismantling terrorism
sources, thus countering Foot’s claim that an operational, international counterterrorism
system did not exist until after 9/11 (2007).
In response to 9/11, the Security Council created the 1373 Committee, the CTED,
and approved military action against terrorism if it was in self-defense. The 1373
Committee addressed solutions on how to reduce transnational crime, illicit drug
transport, money-laundering, illegal arms trafficking, WMDs in addition to various
technical, financial, regulatory, and legislative assistance measures for states with limited
capacities to enforce the resolutions’ demands. This accelerated the proactive, wide-
spread counterterrorism strategy instigated by the 1267 Committee. The Security Council
reinforced its commitment to preventing terrorism by expanding the role of the Security
Council with the addition of the CTED in March 2004.
While shifting norms in terrorism and counterterrorism are evident before the
9/11 resolutions, 9/11 accelerated formative changes in how the Security Council
constructed its counterterrorism structure. Why 9/11? Why not the Pan Am bombings?
Why not the Taliban’s execution of Iranian diplomats? Perhaps it was the size of the
attack which intensified efforts to create a UN counterterrorism strategy.
9/11 was the largest terrorist attack in the history of post-Cold War terrorism.
Approximately 3,000 people were killed, thousands more were injured, two of the tallest
buildings in the world disappeared, and it all happened in several hours or less. Other
notable terrorist attacks like the Pan-Am bombings had death tolls of several hundred
with only a few houses and a plane destroyed. A majority of terrorist attacks had fewer
than 100 deaths and destroyed small places like a gas station, restaurant, café, movie

theater, street corner, etc. If a well-developed, powerful, and well-protected country like
the US could not prevent an attack of the magnitude of 9/11, then similar attacks could
happen elsewhere. Such fear would provide the impetus to quickly foster greater
international cooperation.
S/RES/1540 (2004) created the last counterterrorism committee during the US’s
War on Terrorism. This resolution demonstrates the developing levels of communication
among member states as they passed 1540 only after substantial edits and adjustments
were made, incorporating the demands of smaller countries like Pakistan, Algeria, and
Germany. An open council meeting was held to discuss the draft resolution, an event not
mentioned in any other resolution in these case studies. The original draft attempted to
limit the power of smaller nuclear states like Pakistan, but the final draft remained
targeted on the non-proliferation of non-state actors.
Second, despite the various shifts in the Security Council’s counterterrorism
approach, one value remained constant: sovereignty. Beginning with the resolutions in
the Taliban case study and continuing through S/RES/1540 on WMDs, states refused to
pass any resolution which denied or violated the sovereignty of any nation. In the Taliban
case study, multiple member states and the resolutions affirmed Afghanistan’s
sovereignty and independence while directing the sanctions at the Taliban. The Security
Council refused to acknowledge the Taliban as the de facto head of Afghanistan because
then member states would have to reconcile their sanctions with a potential violation of
state sovereignty. As long as the Taliban remained non-state actors, Afghanistan’s
sovereignty remained unaffected.

In 1540, member states had to revise the original draft resolution several times
and subject the draft to an open Council meeting. Multiple states were concerned that the
original draft tried to subject small-states’ WMD programs to the same sanctions and
regulations as non-state actors which they considered in violation with their state
sovereignty. Russia and China expressed approval the final resolution did not inhibit
states’ production of uranium for peaceful purposes.
Conclusion and Implications
By elevating the conversation about UN counterterrorism above the standard US
versus the international community debate, one can see that both the nature of terrorism
and the manner in which the Security Council addresses terrorism have shifted since the
Pan Am resolutions. In 1992, the Pan Am resolutions reacted to a terrorist attack by
punishing the perpetrator and then waiting until the next attack to administer more
sanctions against terrorists. Between 1992 and 2004, the Security Council expanded its
definition of terrorism, adopted more nuanced and diverse explanations of terrorism,
solidified its responsibility to protect international peace and security, and sought more
proactive engagement with terrorism. These shifting norms reveal a more nuanced
counterterrorism structure than many scholars and policymakers acknowledge because of
the dominating debate over US versus the international community. This study should
provide encouragement that an international body can work together to create multi-
faceted solutions to issues like terrorism.
There are several implications of the Security Council’s counterterrorism
organization. First, by acknowledging counterterrorism’s interconnectivity with other
variables like human rights, transnational crime, etc., the Security Council can use

counterterrorist organizations to more easily implement human rights, transnational
crime, WMDs, and development protocols. Now the Security Council indirectly assists in
border control, military training, financial security, development aid, and human rights
investigations via counterterrorism in addition to their more direct interventions. Plus,
counterterrorism committees possess agenda-setting power in more areas than terrorism
and counterterrorism as the Security Council rely on their reports as part of it resolution
drafting process.
Second, the Security Council’s counterterrorism norms have cemented “widely
shared international moral values” like human rights and the necessity of international
cooperation in fighting transnational crime thus delegitimizing overtly self-interested
arguments by member states (Walling, 2015, 318). Member states must carefully frame
draft resolutions, sanctions, and their justifications or concerns about resolutions to
represent international interest and uphold moral values.
Third, sovereignty still maintains its supreme importance as an international
norm. If member states believe that a draft resolution infringes on the sovereignty of a
state, then they will not pass the resolution or require extensive revisions. In the Taliban
case study, member states avoided infringing upon Afghanistan’s sovereignty arguing
that the lack of a legitimate government had removed Afghanistan’s sovereignty. The
lack of sovereignty justified the Security Council’s action against Afghanistan. During
the debate surrounding Resolution 1540, many states believed the first draft infringed on
state sovereignty and refused to pass it without substantial revisions. Thus, draft
resolutions must uphold international, multilateral values while protecting state
sovereignty.

Future study should include a document analysis of General Assembly resolutions
and their role in UN counterterrorism. Current literature focuses mainly on the Security
Council's role in the development of counterterrorism structures while ignoring the norms
established by the General Assembly and later adopted by the Security Council. In
addition, studying recent Security Council engagement with terrorism can reveal any
shifts in Council counterterrorism actions and justification post-Resolution 1540.

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