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22 Frontiers of Microeconomics

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ,[object Object]

Hidden Actions: Principals, Agents, and Moral Hazard ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Hidden Actions: Principals, Agents, and Moral Hazard ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Hidden Actions: Principals, Agents, and Moral Hazard ,[object Object],[object Object]

Hidden Actions: Principals, Agents, and Moral Hazard ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Signaling to Convey Private Information ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Asymmetric Information and Markets ,[object Object]

Asymmetric Information and Public Policy ,[object Object]

Asymmetric Information and Public Policy ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

POLITICAL ECONOMY ,[object Object]

POLITICAL ECONOMY ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

The Condorcet Voting Paradox Third choice Second choice First choice Percent of electorate Type 3 Type 2 Type 1 Voter Type B A C A C B C B A 20 45 35

The Condorcet Voting Paradox ,[object Object],[object Object]

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem ,[object Object]

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Median Voter Theorem ,[object Object]

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS ,[object Object]

Politicians Are People Too ,[object Object],[object Object]

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Summary ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

Summary ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

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