The_Development_of_Strategic_Theory_During_the_Cold_War__v2_(1)_PDF

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Matthew D. Abbott | Graduate Application Writing Sample | December 6, 2015
A SELECTED CHAPTER, WITH INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSION,
COMPARING STRATEGY DEVELOPMENTS IN NATIONS DIVIDED BY
IDEOLOGY
The Development of Strategic
Theory During the Cold War

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INTRODUCTION
“Military action is important to the nation--it is the ground of death and life, the
path of survival and destruction, so it is imperative to examine it” - Sun Tzu 1
In this modern age when the tools and mechanisms for warfare have become
industrialized; it is still man whom must wage wars, and the nations of man which must
endure its violence. With this human aspect in mind, we must acknowledge that there is
something beyond the mere statistics and raw numbers of tanks and planes and quantities of
soldiers. How these soldiers are employed and organized in the service of the nation, and how
they are deployed to combat their enemies, requires at least as much attention and scrutiny
as their quantitative or qualitative aspects.
In short, the relationship between the military and political establishments shapes the
strategies states adopt. This is because military power serves, to varying degrees, the political
objectives of that state. The depth to which the military and political apparatus are
intertwined also influence the type of strategy which will emerge. For example, the use of
violence to achieve political objectives, as in the “people’s war” strategic concept as outlined
by Mao Zedong – involves the allocation of the entire apparatus of state power towards the
offensive and defensive goals of that state. Put bluntly by Mao Zedong, “political power
1
Sun (Cleary), p. 40

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comes from the barrel of a gun”;2
and this is most true in communist states where the party
permeates the entire fabric of society, in particular the military and government
establishments. In other forms of government, especially democratic ones, the relationship is
more nuanced, with the military role increasing as the role of other state organs decreases,
the further down the hierarchical structure. However the underlying political objectives are
supposed to be the same, which requires extra care by democratic states to coordinate. Carl
von Clausewitz, a pre-eminent strategist of his age, observed that warfare and policy are a
continuum of state power, writing that “war is the mere continuation of policy by other
means”, and regarded war itself as a “political act”.3
In the most straightforward terms, “carrying the fight to the enemy and the
destruction of his armed forces and his will to fight through the strategic offensive is the
classic way wars are fought and won”.4
However, of paramount concern is the development
of means towards that end, and the particulars of the employment of forces in pursuing that
end. In The Soldier and the State, Samuel P. Huntington defines political-military relations as
“the principal institutional component of military security policy”.5
These concepts evolved during the course of the Cold War, as each nation attempted
to develop their armed forces to fit the new ideologically polarized paradigm as defined by
the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The divided nations of
the Cold War give us the unique opportunity to compare and contrast the relative merits of
different methods of military organization, eliminating largely the factors of race, language,
2
張 Chang & Halliday, p. 49
3
Von Clausewitz (Graham), p. 22
4
Summers, p. 187
5
Huntington, p. 123

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and culture within each divided state. Further underscoring the similarities of these
ideologically divided states in military terms, in some cases even relative manpower and
sophistication of arms are comparatively similar. This paradigm allows us, with hindsight, to
delve deeper into what makes effective military strategy and defense policy.
In the Cold War nations, the norm was for strategy planners were subordinate to the
policy planners. The properly functioning system of strategic leadership is supposed to
maintain a balance of power between policy makers and strategy makers, and is often
characterized in the West as between the civilian-military relationship. However, not all
military policy planners were civilians, and so this relationship can be more generally defined
as between the political structure and the military establishment, each with corresponding
roles which need to exist in a symbiotic relationship in order to produce effective strategy.
This dynamic is divided by Clausewitz into two concepts of policy and strategy, defined by
Clausewitz as preparing for war and the conduct of war proper, with each side of the
relationship representing the nation’s functional organization towards those tasks.6
This
dynamic is often the source for friction, which can arise from what Clausewitz described as
the “great chasm” between conception and execution.7
In a diametric relationship in which friction naturally arises, management and
leadership can overcome the inherent friction between the various levels of leadership and
adhere to a common functional framework in order that they can focus on strategy making,
rather than be made dysfunctional by friction. In a framework in which the balance of power
between these elements of decision making is lopsided, friction is more likely to arise.
6
Von Clausewitz (Graham) p. 50
7
Von Clausewitz (Graham), p. 45

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Cold War successes were the result of the strategy and policy makers overcoming this
inherent friction and implementing their strategic vision through a robust and flexible
framework which was responsive to the needs of the conflict, while deviations in the balance
of power in the command hierarchy complicated or blocked effective planning and
management and often rendered tactical and organizational successes irrelevant. I assert that
the functionality of the military-political relationship is the most crucial factor in the
successful implementation of strategy and military policy, as demonstrated by the various
successes and failings of the Cold War nations discussed herein.
The Cold War Divided States
Communist Bloc:
German Democratic Republic, Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
People’s Republic of China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Anti-Communist Allies:
Republic of Korea, Republic of China,
Republic of Vietnam, German Federal Republic

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General Outline of the Hierarchy in Cold War Defense Leadership:
(National Leaders) President, Congress, Parliament, Secretariat, Standing Committee, etc.
Setting National Goals and Objectives based on interpreted and analyzed information provided by sensors
(Policy Planners) Secretary of Defense, Secretaries of Service Branches, Secretary of State, Prime Minister, Politburo, etc.
Outlining guiding principles, resource allocation, budget management, establishing priorities for stated national goals, interpreting
information produced by sensors
(Strategy Developers) Military Developers of Doctrine & Theory -- Joint Chiefs, General Staff, Stavka, Commissariat, etc.
Planning campaigns, outlining conduct, building organizations, outlining regional objectives of relevance to the national goals,
analyzing information consolidated by sensors
(Operational Leadership) Organizational Leaders – Front, Army, Corps, Division, Brigade, Regiment, Battalion, political cadre
Maneuvering and task-organizing groups of units, securing area objectives, exploiting tactical breakthroughs, gathering and
consolidating information from sensors
(Tactical Leadership) Combat Leaders - Company, Platoon, Section, Squad, Team, and Individual / associated party funtionaries
Maneuvering units and engaging in direct action, task organizing individuals, securing individual objectives, making tactical
breakthroughs, informational sensors

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List of Abbreviations & Terms
AO – Area of Operations
ARVN – Lục quân Việt Nam Cộng hòa –
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South)
CCP – Chinese Communist Party
– Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng– 中國共產黨
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
Comintern – Communist International
COMUS – Commander, United States forces
COSVN – Central Office, South Vietnam
(South Vietnamese communist headquarters)
CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DMZ – De-Militarized Zone
DPRK –조선민주주의인민공화국- Chosŏn Minjujuŭi Inmin
Konghwaguk - Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (North Korea)
EDC – European Defense Community
FRG – Federal Republic of Germany (West)
FSB – Fire Support Base
GDR – German Democratic Republic (East)
GMD – Guó Mín Dǎng (lit. National People’s
Party) also “KMT/Kuomintang” 國民黨
also “Nationalist Party”
Innere Führung – Inner Leadership
JCS – Joint Chiefs of Staff
JGS – Joint General Staff (South Vietnam)
KGB - (КГБ) Komitet Gosudarstvennoy
Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)
KPA –조선인민군Chosŏn inmin'gun
Korean People’s Army (North Korean Army)
KPD – Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands –
Communist Party o Germany
KVP – Kasernierte volkspolizei - Barracked People’s
Police (communist)
LZ – Landing Zone
MACV – Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MBT – Main Battle Tank
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLF – Northern Liberation Front (Việt Cộng)
NRA – National Revolutionary Army (GMD Army)
NVA – Nationale VolksArmee – National People’s Army

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(East German Army)
NKVD - Народный комиссариат внутренних дел –
Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennikh del -
People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
OMG – Operational Maneuver Group
OSS – Office of Strategic Services
PAVN – Quân Đội Nhân Dân Việt Nam -
People’s Army of Vietnam (Communist, North)
also North Vietnamese Army
PLA – 中国人民解放军 – Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn
People’s Liberation Army
(Chinese communist forces)
POL – Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PRC – People’s Republic of China –
Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó
中華人民共和國 (Chinese communist state)
ROC –中華民國 - Zhōnghuá Mínguó - Republic of China
ROK – 대한민국 - Daehan Minguk –
Republic of Korea (South Korea)
ROK-MAG-V – Republic of Korea Military
Advisory Group, Vietnam
RVN – Republic of Vietnam - Việt Nam Cộng Hòa
SAM – Surface to Air Missile
SED – Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
(Socialist Unity Party of Germany)
SMAD – Soviet Military Administration, Germany
SOG – Studies and Observations Group
SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
(German Social-Democrat Party)
Twentieth-of-July Plot –Failed coup against Hitler
UN – United Nations
USA – United States of America
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VC – Việt Cộng (National Liberation Front)
Wiederbewaffnung – German Rearmament
WPK – 조선로동당 - Chosŏn Rodongdang –
Worker’s Party of Korea

GERMANY
Germany is the only one of the four divided nations of this examination not to
have engaged in all-out fratricidal warfare during the Cold War. After an initial period
of direct foreign control, both East and West Germany formed armies of roughly
equivalent strength, a factor in Germany’s reaching and maintaining détente. The
inter-German conflict was relegated to espionage and information warfare, diplomatic
maneuvers for worldwide recognition, arms races, military posturing, and
competitions for economic and industrial superiority.
Established on May 23rd
of 1949 in the West, the Federal Republic of Germany
had a lead on their Eastern counterpart, the German Democratic Republic, which was
formed on October 7th
of the same year. Neither government had any military forces
and remained occupied nations. The German military had practically ceased to exist
after the Second World War and the Allies had mostly de-mobilized as well. This left
Europe dangerously open to Soviet military pressure, and impotent in the face of it.
Re-armament was required in order to preserve balance.
However, the German population was war-weary. In the West, the political
leadership was influenced by the new constitution, called the German Basic Law which

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underscored the limits of military power in German politics, the fact that the Allies
and the Soviets mutually distrusted each other intensely and were in their own arms
race affected German politicians. Ultimately, both German governments reformed
their laws to allow for the raising of national armies, a process referred to as
Wiederbewaffnung by Germans.
The Allies had demobilized significant portions of their military after the close
of the Second World War, including the forces occupying Germany. For example, at
the close of the Second World War, there had been 1.6 million American soldiers in
Germany alone, but several months later there were only three armored divisions and
seven infantry divisions, approximately 125,000 troops. After the drawdown, eight of
the divisions were at half-strength. Only a single American division was combat-ready,
according to General Omar Bradley.8
In the immediate post-war period, the Allies, in addition to their own
domestic policies of military reduction, limited the arms and military funding they
provided to client states. The intention of the policy was to prevent Allied aggression,
as well as to inhibit the re-emergence of former Axis powers as military threats. In
practice, this policy may have only invited further Communist aggression. The Soviet
Union’s policies, only marginally demobilized their domestic forces, and were
altogether more aggressive internationally – favoring the arms build-up of emerging
soviet client states and their incorporation into the Soviet sphere of influence by the
forced establishment of pro-Soviet governments to counter-balance any Soviet
8
Ross, p. 11-12

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domestic reductions. The Soviet Union also used the creation communist dominated
police forces in occupied territories to consolidate communist power and provide
expedients for development of national armed forces.9
The laws of both German governments did not allow for the creation of armed
forces in the immediate post-war period. The Allied Control Council had disbanded
the German Wehrmacht, leaving no military forces behind to replace them. The
question of who would defend Germany was a controversy for the West German
administration in the post war period, and even caused some debate in the East
German administration and in the Soviet Union. The leadership of Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer and the changing international situation allowed for German rearmament
and a more stable security situation to develop, while the strong influence of the
communist party of the Soviet Union and the East German administration under
Walter Ulbricht drove the GDR to rearm as well.
The first Western plans regarding a potential war with the Soviet Union were
based on US and UK contingency plans made in the closing stages of the Second
World War, such as Operation Unthinkable. In this contingency plan, about 100,000
German Wehrmacht troops would be mobilized immediately to fight alongside the
Allies against the massive Soviet military. This course of action was considered to
have immense risk of failure.10
The American contingency plan called Operation
Totality and drafted after the Potsdam Conference, was referred to as part of President
Truman’s “giant atomic bluff” and was equally inadequate. Other early contingency
9
Waldman, p. 13
10
Walker, p. 192

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plans were drafted to maintain “significant beachheads” in continental Europe in Sicily
and Spain, with the Rhine River being the first line of defense. The planners were
forced to choose between devoting strategic air assets primarily to destroying enemy
formations as they crossed the German frontier and attempted to breach the Rhine
River line, or to striking Soviet cities.
The importance of the Rhine River in European defense plans and the need for
large contingents of troops for a conventional force deterrent brought Germany once
more into the spotlight for both the Allies and Soviets.11
Reliance on nuclear assets
alone was an exceptionally dangerous policy, despite the developments in smaller,
more tactically relevant nuclear weapons.12
It was understood by Western intelligence
sources that the Soviets were deep into the development of their own nuclear weapons.
Allied demobilization left the Soviet Union with the strategic initiative.
Nuclear forces were, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, considered the only
option for Allied planners in preventing a Soviet occupation of all Eurasia, the Middle
East, and the British home islands, but it was worried that it would be easy for
communist forces to ascertain that the West was largely bluffing. According to
defense plans drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such as Pincher, Broiler,
Bushwacker, Halfmoon, Offtackle, and Dropshot, drawn up in the post-war period,
Allied positions were completely untenable as a result of demobilization gutting the
necessary manpower and budget cuts causing a lack of parity in quality hardware. The
Allied position was further weakened by the declining power of the British Empire and
11
Ross, p. 11-49
12
Ross, p. 138

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the lack of a counterbalance in Eurasia as China was ravaged by civil war while both
Japan and Germany were still in ruins.13
More troubling, there were simply insufficient
nuclear bombs to carry out the campaign outlined in the war plans.14
The American
Joint Chiefs of Staff and their counterparts in allied nations all determined that
alternatives were needed, as soon as possible.15
This is not to say that they Allies planner were of the opinion that they needed
more firepower to accomplish their historical objectives, as there is no single weapon
more devastating than a nuclear bomb. The shortcoming that was most alarming to
them was the lack of parity or even a viable deterrent at lower levels of intensity – that
is, there was no credible Allied force between a state of peace and a state of full
nuclear combat. This would mean that the only response by the Allies to any
mobilization or offense by the Soviets would either be to fold and appease the Soviets,
or to retaliate with a nuclear counter-attack. The blockade of Berlin by Soviet forces
on June 24th
194816
and the subsequent Allied operation to relieve the city, commonly
referred to as the “Berlin Airlift”, further highlighted the necessity for West Germany
and the Allies to possess other-than nuclear responses to the aggressiveness of their
East German and Soviet counterparts.17
However, German opinions of these plans were abysmally low, for the obvious
fact that use of nuclear weapons against invading Soviet forces would involve a
13
Ross, p. 13
14
Ross, p. 29-44
15
Ross, p. 40-44
16
Burkhardt
17
Frohn

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nuclear the mass death of millions of German civilians in a nuclear holocaust.
Furthermore, defense planning theretofore lacked German participation and
represented a lack of German sovereignty which Adenauer sought to reclaim.18
The
creation of the East German “People’s Police” forces also prompted a shift in West
German political opinion, which had been strongly opposed to Wiederbewaffnung
before that time.19
It was not expected that Western Europe could be held for long without
additional forces. The Soviets, according to intelligence reports between 1945 and 1950
by the Joint Intelligence Committee, were alleged to have possessed roughly one
hundred and seventy-five divisions, with eighty-four of those divisions in Eastern
Europe. The Allied armies combined had only sixteen divisions to defend all of France,
Western Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.20
In order to remedy the unstable situation, Allied planners set about lobbying
their political leadership about the needs for a larger conventional force, where it
would come from, and how it was to be created. Also stressed was the need for Allied
demobilizations to be halted, and that a significant contribution from German forces
was needed to have any hope of deterring Soviet military adventurism.
Not existing in a vacuum, the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
understood that Communist military power, if unchecked, was an existential threat to
the regime in Bonn. Adenauer was keenly aware of the role that the military and
18
Mastny, Holtsmark, Wenger, p. 202
19
Waldman, p. 15
20
Ross, p. 40-47

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supporting industries played in terms of sovereignty, international credibility and also
in economic development. The whole of Germany’s economy and infrastructure had
been ravaged by war, and recovery was one of the administration’s most pressing
concerns. In addition to deterring the communist juggernaut, the Adenauer
administration endeavored to bring the Federal Republic of Germany into military and
political alliance with the western Allies.
For his people and the foreign press, Adenauer described the forces available to
the Soviet Union as posing an immediate, massive threat of invasion from the East.
This grim portrayal was what he described as “Zweckpessimismus”, or “strategic
pessimism …evoked in order to elicit quick political results”. His political message was
for not only local opponents to German rearmament, but also the Americans, French,
and British critics of his rearmament initiative.21
The budding of West Germany’s intelligence and strategic planning organs
began with the post-World War Two examination and accounting of Germany’s
military campaigns. Efforts to conduct these studies were organized and supported by
the US Office of Strategic Studies. The OSS recruited former German General Staff
officers, such as General Reinhard Gehlen, whom had, in the war, headed the
Abteilung Fremde Heer Ost, the General Staff’s agency dealing with Soviet and East
European armed forces. The OSS “Organization Gehlen” would become the “nucleus”
of West Germany’s future intelligence agency, the Bundesnachrichten Dienst.22
21
Large, p. 70
22
Large, p. 27

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Adenauer first developed his re-armament initiative by finding military and
intelligence advisors for his cabinet to help create national defense policies. Adenauer
appointed Count Gerhard Von Schwerin, a former Wehrmacht tank commander, as
his “National Security Advisor” on 24 May, 1950. Schwerin had been recommended to
Adenauer by the High Commissioner of the United Kingdom, Brian Robertson.
Adenauer, intent on not becoming a puppet, favored the appointment as an
alternative to the US recommendation of Gehlen23
.
Adenauer’s decisions to balance his government’s reliance between the major
allies, rather than allowing any single patron to have too much influence, helped
bolster the credibility and foster the independence of his regime. Ultimately, this
policy also allowed his government greater flexibility as the years went on and the FRG
grew. This can be compared to the Eastern GDR regime, which almost entirely
depended on the USSR alone, and thus did not have these strengths.
Adenauer described to Schwerin the “two strategic challenges” he believed the
Federal German Republic faced – East German influence and external vulnerability. In
facing these two challenges, Adenauer described the policies of the western Allies as
“totally inadequate”. Adenauer therefore wanted to create a “mobile federal police
force”, and instructed Schwerin that the creation and buildup of such an organization
was Schwerin’s top priority. The formation of such a force was to be a temporary
measure until the administration could build up political support for full rearmament
and the creation of national armed forces.
23
Large, p. 57

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Adenauer asked that Schwerin began compiling a list of former officers
Schwerin believed to be “untainted” by the former or East German regimes and might
one day form the core of a new military’s officer corps. Schwerin therefore prepared
for the Chancellor a lengthy memorandum entitled “An Outline of Practical Measures
for the Development of German Cadres within the Framework of a United European
Defense Force”, which outlined three broad options for Adenauer to consider.24
The first option: the creation of “mobile federal police” force, which according
to Schwerin “most reflected German national sensitivities”, but which required the
unlikely permission of Allied foreign ministers and the Bundestag (parliament). The
second option: transforming the Grenzhutz (Border Guard) into a centralized police
force. This internationally needed only the permission of the Allied High Commission,
but domestically also needed the unlikely acquiescence of the individual Länder
(German provinces). Schwerin also believed that the Grenzhutz personnel were “not
suited for military tasks”. The third option: involved the military coordination of
Labor Service Groups, which would not need the involvement of the Bundestag, but
were needed by the Allies for support duties and were also considered by Schwerin to
be of poor morale and “in no way suitable” for military duties.25
After forming a small staff, called the Zentrale für Heimatdienst (Center for
Domestic Affairs), Schwerin and his staff prepared a list of former Wehrmacht officers
for Adenauer, many of whom were involved in veterans organizations. Veterans’
24
Large, p. 57
25
Large, p. 58

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organizations were a significant influence on the political landscape of post-war West
Germany.
All of Schwerin’s activities were done in secrecy. At the time, anything
concerning “military planning” was technically still illegal under the Allied
disarmament regulations. Schwerin, despite the necessity for secrecy, insisted that
Adenauer keep the Bundestag informed of his efforts through Social Democrat Party
leader Kurt Schumacher and head of the Interior Ministry, Gustav Heinemann.26
Furthermore Schwerin set up another intelligence organization for the
chancellor under Jaochim Oster, the son of Twentieth-of-July conspirator Hans Oster
and former Stahlhelm leader Wilhelm Heinz. This organization gave the Chancellor
an alternative to the OSS organization under Gehlen, and also gave the FRG a method
of countering the other “strategic challenge” Adenauer had expressed concern over –
East German influence. Heinz was considered an “expert on East Germany” because of
his experiences there until he moved to the West later in the post-war period.27
Schumacher and Heinemann both objected to Adenauer’s rearmament plans,
but for different reasons. Heinemann favored reunification above Western integration
or rearmament, but the Prussian born First World War veteran Schumacher objected
because he strongly insisted that the organizational plan of producing armed forces in
the context of a Western European army was a sellout of German sovereignty.
Schumacher insisted on German reunification and creation of national armed forces.
26
Large, p. 58
27
Large, p. 59

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The domestic and international situation vis-à-vis West Germany’s patrons made this
impossible – at first.
Initially favoring the “reunification first” advocates like Minister of the Interior
Gustav Heineman and prominent German theologian Martin Niemöller, West German
political leaders in the West began to shift towards favoring German Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer’s initiative for German re-armament, especially after the resignation
of Heinemann. The opposition in the SPD largely dissipated after the German panic
caused by the Korean War, of China, and the exploding of the first Soviet atomic
device in the face of the unprepared Allies 28
.
The European Defense Community concept of an integrated European military
was put to rest in August 1954 when it was rejected by the French National Assembly,
on the grounds that it undermined French national sovereignty29
. This was not
necessarily a setback for the Germans. The efforts to join the EDC had laid the
groundwork for German leaders in the pursuit of eventual creation of a West German
military system.
In order to provide temporary security until winning the Federal Republic the
rights to rebuild the armed forces, Adenauer employed the stop-gap measure of
arming and equipping a national police force, this time with Bundestag support and
without the framework Schumacher loathed of integration into a European military.
28
Waldman, p. 22
29
Waldman, p. 17

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The creation of the national police forces also helped to establish credibility for West
Germany as a responsible and defensible nation.
A different alliance organization was created to provide for the defense of
continental Europe and provide an organizational framework for that task using
existing national militaries with a coalition command structure. This new
organization, called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, was
established on April 4th
, 1949.
By treaty obligation, each member nation was bound to the every other in a
mutual defense pact. Weapons and equipment would be standardized throughout the
organization, to ease in logistics. A NATO military command hierarchy would be
established, and member nations would semi-integrate their forces under that
command structure. Noticeably absent from the founding member, however, was
Germany. The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, stated in 1949 that the
objective of the alliance was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the
Germans down”30
. However, a defense of the continent would not be possible without
German manpower and resources. Other prominent military leaders, including
American General Matthew Ridgeway and even such cautious leaders as General
Omar Bradley, advocated for West Germany’s re-armament31
. Adenauer seized on this
opportunity to join NATO and press for greater sovereignty and defense rights32
.
30
Large, p. 36
31
Large, p. 37
32
Large, p. 49

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In order to provide temporary security until winning the Federal Republic the
rights to rebuild the armed forces, Adenauer employed the stop-gap measure of
arming and equipping a national police force, this time with Bundestag support and
without the framework Schumacher loathed of integration into a European military.
The Adenauer administration used a modified version of Schwerin’s plan to use border
police, establishing the Bundesgrenzschutz (Federal Border Police) in 1951 under the
Ministry of the Interior. The deployment of these forces in 1953 also helped to
establish credibility for West Germany as a responsible and defensible nation.
The Bundesgrenzschutz was equipped with various light hardware, such as
armored cars, anti-tank guns, helicopters, trucks, jeeps, carbines, and pistols.
Intended to respond to small scale incursions and threats, the Federal Border Police
was intended to assert the sovereignty of the Federal German Republic. A coast guard,
called the Bundesgrenzschutz-See, was founded on January 7th, 1951. This force of
approximately 550 members of the Bundesgrenzschutz was placed under the control of
the Koordinierungsverbund Küstenwache (Coast Watch).
The Soviet nuclear detonation, the fall of China to the communists, and
particularly the invasion of South Korea by North Korea profoundly affected the
national psyche of the German people33
, particularly West Germans, fearful now of
becoming a “second Korea” in the face of the increasing Soviet threat34
. Many West
Germans, including prominent figures like Schwerin, became convinced that the Third
World War was imminent, and their efforts at rearmament escalated dramatically. No
33
Large, p. 65
34
Large, p. 62

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longer was an armed Federal Police Force adequate – German newspapers and
periodicals called for full rearmament, the Müncher Merkur insisted that in light of the
Korean War, it was imperative to form a “new Wehrmacht”.35
At Adenaur’s request, former Wehrmacht officers met quietly at the
Eifelkloster Himmerod in early October 1950 and the “Himmeroder Memorandum”
would become the blueprint for Germany’s contribution to the defense of Western
Europe and the creation of a new kind of military. Adenauer then appointed Theodor
Blank as the “Commissioner for Questions with Regard to the Strengthening of Allied
Troops” and established the secretive “Blank Office” which became the forerunner of
the German Ministry of Defense.36
The shocking series of communist aggressions did not affect Germany alone –
the other Allies became more supportive of German rearmament as well37
. The
problem still existed with Germany’s international agreements, but this was resolved
at the London and Paris Conferences, with the Americans urging the urging the
initially reluctant French diplomats to acquiesce38
. At the conferences, the Treaty of
Brussels (an expansion of the Dunkirk Treaty) was modified to include the Federal
Republic of Germany, and the newly allied nations would form the Western European
Union (WEU).
35
Large, p. 66
36
Macgregor, p. 3
37
Large, p. 130
38
Large, p. 132

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 14
PAGE 14
West Germany joined NATO on May 9th
, 1955.39
In line with her new treaty
obligations, the FRG would be allowed to amend the Basic Law and re-arm, but the
three Western Allies retained occupation powers in Berlin and western Germany as a
whole under status-of-forces agreements. Furthermore, the WEU would determine
the size of the armed forces allowed by each of its members. Germany’s effort to join
NATO and the WEU by the Adenauer administration was intended to be seen as an
effort to cooperate with the western Allies and to calm foreign critics of German
rearmament. Domestic critics would be calmed when the nature of the new military
was characterized.
Adenauer had first to negotiate the opposition to rearmament in the Bundestag,
wary of granting the chancellery further powers.40
The Bundestag would not fully
acquiesce to Adenaur’s perceived intentions to monopolize power over military affairs,
and so compromised with his administration after much inter-party debate and
controversy41
.
After the German Bundestag had ratified the First Amendment to the Basic
Law on February 26, 1954, establishing Germany’s right to military sovereignty, Amt
Blank publicly laid out concrete plans for the formation of a new German military and
Ministry of Defense. The Bundestag, as the legislative body in a democratic system,
would retain the fundamental war powers under the Basic Law for the Federal
Republic of Germany, as well as retaining the fundamental war powers, while the
39
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany
40
Searle, p. 37
41
Stahl, p. 40-63

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 15
PAGE 15
chancellery would be permitted to form a defense cabinet and set about organizing
the armed forces. The Bundestag would also define, through policy, what type of
soldiers the executive would be permitted to recruit and train, passing the “Law on the
Personnel Screening Board for the Armed Forces” on July 23rd
, 1955.42
The Bundeswehr was formed on November 12th
, 1955; the day way chosen in
commemoration of Prussian military theoretician and reformer General Gerhard von
Scharnhorst’s two-hundredth birthday. One-hundred and one initial volunteers were
presented their appointments to the new armed forces. The formation of national
armed forces, and their relationship with the state and German society, represented a
re-establishment of German sovereignty and national identity.43
The new civilian oversight concept was called Innere Führung, which roughly
translates as “Inner Leadership”. Drafted by military theoretician and General Wolf
Stefan Traugott Graf von Baudissin, whom had served on the General Staff of
esteemed Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the new system of civilian oversight and
education instilled in Bundeswehr soldiers the core ethical concepts for the new
military’s culture.44
Innere Führung defined Bundeswehr soldiers as Staatsbürger in
Uniform, or “citizen-soldiers”. The embodiment of state power and identity, they were
the protectors of the new government’s democratic ideals.45
42
Searle, p. 188
43
Huntington, p. 123
44
Macgregor, p. 4
45
FM ZDv10/1

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 16
PAGE 16
The days of the Wehrmacht’s passivity and complicity in the face of gross
violations of political power and manipulation of legal authority were left to the
dustbin of history. The new Bundeswehr recognized its own position as a political
element within the legal system. German soldiers were subject to the German Basic
Law, as any other citizen;46
they were to place the law above all else – their orders
were to be made justifiable, and their responsibility was to view orders critically under
the law rather than to follow blindly.
German experience with the Nuremburg trials profoundly influenced the
notions of military intellectuals regarding the obligations, traditions, and
responsibilities of soldiers and officers, and the stress on the respect of human dignity
and rights by the new Bundeswehr are representative of the changed attitudes.
Dehumanization and oaths of absolute obedience to authority were no longer
conceivable – instead, Bundeswher recruits were inducted with pledges to uphold
democracy and follow the principles of guaranteeing the rule of law and respecting
human rights. Bundeswehr troops were to be seen first as citizens of the Federal
Republic, and there was to be no more “parade ground brutality” in the ranks.47
Innere Führung was not a merely a quaint system of political indoctrination for
Bundeswehr personnel to be taught their rights and responsibilities in the Federal
Republic; Innere Führung created a system of accountability and information feedback,
allowing the government to measure the degree to which policy had permeated the
military organization, but without the need for a partisan, party based apparatus.
46
German Ministry of Defense
47
Searle, p. 128

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 17
PAGE 17
Thusly, the West German model was on a whole a much more responsive, integrated
force than the East German force.
The Bundestag’s creation of the political pre-requisites for re-armament and
the effective use of legal policy to create a system with a balanced military-policy
relationship not only helped to characterize the FRG as an exemplary democratic state,
it ensured the stability and functionality of the FRG defense establishment. The FRG
benefited from this development and would be the most stable government of all the
Cold War divided states. As a result, the FRG could, when combined with the
economic power it developed, be considered as a sovereign state equal to the other
allied powers.
The Bundeswehr was to be composed of both drafted and volunteer recruits,
and the FRG government would have full sovereign control. However, the new
constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, in the Bündnisfall clause, prohibits
any military actions, except in the case of defending an attack against Germany or its
allies. German citizens were also permitted to refuse service in the Bundeswehr if they
plead conscientious objector status – they would, however, still be subject to the draft
in the capacity of civil service instead.
Early in the formation of the Bundeswehr, military officers, such as former
Wehrmacht General Ramkce, stated bluntly that they “cannot be expected to supply
cannon-fodder”.48
Generals like Ramke, with the support of the Adenaur
administration, lobbied for West Germany to be treated as an equal party to any
48
Large, p. 50

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 18
PAGE 18
military alliance with the Western Allies, espousing the view that no German soldier
or officer should help the Western Allies by advising or rendering service as “cannon-
fodder” without the demanded equitable relationship49
.
Championing this sentiment, Adenauer went further to press for the right for
the Federal Republic of Germany to build up mechanized forces, including the latest
armor and air power. The Adenauer administration knew that additional security
measures in Central Europe were needed, and intended to press the Western powers
to consider why they should burden themselves by expanding their forces to protect
Germany when the Germans were willing to participate as partners50
. The “atomic
cannon fodder” issue was largely resolved when the FRG was allowed to rebuild the
arms industry, as the German military would be able to participate in a manner that
made them valuable contributors to the defensive enterprise and gave them
maneuverability and technology with which to confront the Soviet conventional and
nuclear threats.51
In this way, The Federal Republic of Germany established for itself in the
subsequent years of the Cold War as an integral part of the NATO Alliance and
checked the military and political maneuvers of the German Democratic Republic and
the Soviet Union. The Bundeswehr would remain an adaptive, flexible, and modern
force throughout the Cold War and, fully integrated into NATO, would serve as an
effective deterrent for their antagonistic East German neighbors.
49
Searle, p. 164
50
Large, p. 52
51
Searle, p. 35

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 19
PAGE 19
On the other side of the Inner German border, the Soviet Military
Administration in Germany (SMAD) at first set about exploiting occupied Germany
for the enrichment of the Soviet Union. The development of the GDR was hampered
by the huge war indemnity it was forced to pay the Soviet Union, compared to the
investment and aid the United States poured into the FRG under the Marshal plan.
The Soviets also extracted huge portions of East Germany’s manufacturing and
industrial resources, which further slowed its recovery – the USSR is estimated to have
stripped away about 14 billion dollars in assets, comparable to the Marshal Plan,
except in reverse.52
Despite this seemingly short-sighted economic policy, the SMAD
set up a fledgling security apparatus using ex-patriate pro-Russian German
communists, but most of the security functions were performed by the Soviet NKVD53
.
The small German communist party, the KPD, was forcefully merged with the
local Social-democrat (SPD) party elements. The KPD leaders retaining all leadership
functions. The new “united” party was dubbed the “Socialist Unity Party” (SED), and
was quickly organized to more closely function and resemble the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union.54
Shortly after occupation, the Soviet Union had East German heavy
industries nationalized – particularly the arms industries – and directed the SED to set
up a planned economy with quotas determined by the SED, and demands on specific
areas industrial production determined by the CPSU.
52
Terry, Marer, Stent, p. 156
53
Walker p. 65
54

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 20
PAGE 20
Intending to secure their new holdings and begin the process of creating a loyal
satellite state, SMAG also created the Border Police and armed it with armored
personnel carriers, anti-tank weapons, and small-arms. Once the Border was secured,
the Soviets and the now SED controlled GDR government, set about further
consolidating power. To ensure the stability and security of the SED dominated
government in East Germany, a paramilitary police force was formed in October 1948,
called the Bereitschaftspolizei (Alert Police). This force consisted of forty armed units
with between one hundred and two-hundred and fifty men each, housed in barracks
and trained as paramilitary troops. The units of the Alert Police were subordinated to
the authority of the East German Lander (provincial authorities). Each Lander had its
own party apparatus. Many of the officers and men of the Alert Police were recruited
from former Wehrmacht POWs still held in the USSR.55
In November 1948 the SMAD turned over control of the paramilitary forces to
the East German Interior Administration, which also took control over the Border
Troops, combining the two into the umbrella organization called the Hauptabteilung
Grenzpolizei und Bereitschaften (HA GP/B) which translates to “Border Police and
Readiness Department”. After several name changes and reorganizations to ensure
political reliability and to incorporate new units and organizations into a larger whole,
it finally evolved into the Kasernierte Volkspolizei (KVP) on June 1, 195256
. This force
also included a separate naval and air arm.57
55
Lapp, p. 141-158
56
Diedrich, Wenzke, p. 72
57
Lapp, p. 141-158

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 21
PAGE 21
Following the unrest from 17th June 1953, when many East German citizens
rioted, staged protests, and conducted strikes, nearly 25,000 KVP members were
viewed as "politically unreliable", with some joining the revolt or either refusing or
ignoring SED directives. Afterword, anyone with family in West Germany, whom had
served in the Wehrmacht, had been a POW of any Allied power besides the Soviet
Union, or had been in the Nazi Party, were purged from the force so as to make it
more politically reliable and loyal to the SED controlled government.58
On May 14th
, 1955, a treaty of “friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid” was
signed between the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, and Albania; commonly referred to in the West the “Warsaw Pact” after the
Polish city in which it was signed. Article Five of the Pact placed all of the military
forces of the signatories under a “joint command for their armed forces” which was at
the time to be chaired by Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan S. Konev, and Article Seven,
which forbade signatories from entering into any other alliance. Though trampling
the concept of sovereignty, this provided a very formidable force, each nation being
guaranteed to have the entire might of the Soviet military behind it59
. The
introduction of the treaty stated in no uncertain terms the treaty’s raison d'être. The
treaty introduction stated “Western Germany, which is being remilitarized, and her
inclusion in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the danger of a new war and
creates a threat to the national security of peace-loving states.”60
58
Giese, des Gruyter, p. 35
59
Hansell
60
US Department of State Publication 9446, p. 445-448

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 22
PAGE 22
To give the East Germans bigger teeth, the Soviets assisted the East German
efforts to build a new military by providing resources and limited economic support.
The East German People's Chamber passed a bill on January 18th 1956 merging the
Kasernierte Volkspolizei, Sea Police, and Air Police into a new organization; the
Nationale Volksarmee - East Germany's new armed forces.61
The new military would be placed under another new addition to East
Germany's establishment - the Ministry of National Defense, and would have ground,
naval, and air branches. To ensure total security and appease critics in the Ministry of
the Interior, a new Alert Police unit was created, similar in nature to the Soviet NKVD
called the Volkspolizei-Bereitschaft, subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. These
Alert Police units would be armed in paramilitary fashion, equipped with wheeled
light armor vehicles, mortars, rifles, and anti-riot gear as well as some anti-tank and
combat engineer capabilities.62
All of these new forces were to be fully controlled by
the SED, which staffed political personnel at each level of command.
The SED indoctrination of the East German military was characterized by
strong anti-fascist and anti-imperialist rhetoric, but called deeply on traditional
Prussian military characteristics and virtues.63
Ironically, the need for immediate
expertise and manpower necessitated that the new NVA would recruit large numbers
of former Wehrmacht veterans. Indeed, the majority of NVA staff officers were former
Wehrmacht officers well into the 1960’s.
61
Burant, p. 421-428
62
Lapp, p. 141-158
63
Large, p. 146

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 23
PAGE 23
The Nationale Volkarmee was regarded by both the Soviet Union and NATO as
not only a credible military force by weight of weapons systems or number of troops,
but a highly professional and well equipped force. The Nationale Volkarmee was
second only to the Soviet Union in terms of equipment priority and quality and the
East German Nationale Volksarmee began its existence as a structurally and
doctrinally modern force from its inception.
The East Germans, being a Warsaw Pact member, adopted Soviet battle
doctrine and fit into the Soviet strategic scheme. Soviet Deep Battle, as developed by
Vladimir Triandafillov, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Alexander Andreyevich Svechin,
Georgii Isserson, and Mikhail Frunze in the 1920’s and 1930’s64
, was designed to
account for the Soviet Union’s strengths and weaknesses, such as her vast manpower
and lack of technological sophistication, as well as the vastness of the Soviet Union’s
depth and breadth, which allowed for maneuver65
.
In the Soviet Deep Battle doctrine, the exploitation forces would follow up
tactical breakthroughs in the enemy’s front to exploit a breakthrough made by a
frontline tactical unit within a Front, made up of motorized infantry units, integrated
with armored units and heavily supported by artillery and close air support. This
breakthrough was not merely to exploit the flanks after a breakthrough, but to
penetrate the enemy strategic depth as much as possible so as to disrupt the enemy’s
ability to conduct war.
64
Harrison, p. 204
65
Cody and Krause, p. 229.

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 24
PAGE 24
Almost immediately after their formation, the East Germans began planning
for an operation to capture West Berlin in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
These plans were updated often to keep pace with force-structure changes, and
technological developments, new plans were drafted well into the 1980’s. Troops and
supplies were pre-positioned, and rehearsals were conducted several times throughout
the history of the East German military establishment. Many documents containing
details of the extensive war plans were destroyed after reunification by the Stasi, but
some were preserved. Some documents outlined an outlandish assault of West Berlin
through the underground sewer systems.66
It was estimated that West Berlin would
only take three days to capture and pacify completely, divided into two sectors.67
The plans to conquer West Berlin also demonstrate how integrated the East
German and Soviet systems were with their respective party-dominated internal
security apparatuses. The East German Ministry of State Security compiled “extensive
files on West German citizens, which would have been of special interest during
selection procedures.”68
Immediately after capturing the city, the Stasi was to begin
consolidating power. According to a report signed by the District Leader of the Berlin
Area of the Ministry of State Security, Lieutenant-General Wolfgang Schwanitz, the
Stasi would detain members of the intelligence communities, leaders of anti-
communist organizations, senior police officials, leading politicians, senior civil
servants, and persons suspected of having knowledge of business, scientific, or
66
Schönbohm, p. 117
67
Dr. Wenzel, Peifer, p. 9
68
Stiller, p. 158

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 25
PAGE 25
technical secrets. Journalists known to have anti-leftist leanings would also be arrested.
Detainees were to be brought to internment camps69
. Similar plans were drawn up for
the potential occupation forces of Western Europe in the event of war.
In the 1960’s, East Germany’s development and maturation changed it from a
liability of the USSR and into a vital ally in Central Europe70
. In these years, East
Germany had reached a sort of equilibrium vis-à-vis West Germany as a result of
Soviet efforts to promote military détente with the Western Europeans. This allowed
the GDR to focus primarily on economic growth, which was the prime factor in
maintaining the GDR’s credibility and internal stability.71
After the détente years in the 1960s, the GDR increased military expenditures.
The GDR defense budget rose 73.5 percent between 1969 and 1977. Defense
expenditure increases between 1970 and 1975 were particularly sharp. Most of these
increases were non-personnel, indicating that the East German military was making
progress in mechanization and equipment modernization.72
These modernizations are evidenced in the large number of imported Soviet
tanks, such as T-62 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and later the new T-72 MBTs, artillery
and self-propelled guns, Mi-24 Hind gunships, MiG-23 fighter aircraft, and heavy
folding bridge laying vehicles and engineering equipment. At the same time the order
of battle and troop levels did not substantially grow until 1979, in order to keep costs
69
Dr. Wenzel, Peifer, p. 12
70
Brown, p. ix
71
Cline, Miller, Kanet, p. 48
72
MacGregor, p. 63

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 26
PAGE 26
from rising too far. The small rise in personnel in 1979 was largely from a few
equipment-related additions of personnel to the East German navy, and the addition
of East Germany’s first, and only, airborne unit – a parachute infantry battalion. It
must be noted that most of these modernizations and reforms were immediately
following the “Prague Spring” uprising in Czechoslovakia, which the SED may have
considered as a possibility in their own state if East Germans were provoked or if the
GDR lost credibility. Military readiness operations, doctrinal development, and “party
work” were also conducted by the Soviet and East German command to train and
regiment East German troops, which were featured prominently among the
participating Warsaw Pact forces.73
For example, the Comrades-in-Arms 70 exercise in the vicinity of Magdeburg in
October of 1970, with about 100,000 participating Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops,
Soviet and East German troops operated jointly under the nominal command of the
GDR Defense Minister. This demonstrates the trust which the Soviet Union placed in
the East Germans. Though there were communications issues in Comrades-in-Arms
70, these were gradually worked out during Shield 72, Visla-Elbe, and Sheild 76. These
large-scale cooperative military exercises also demonstrate the seriousness with which
the Soviets and East Germans approached their alliance and the challenges of military
cooperation and political integration. The reforms and training efforts also allowed
the Soviets and Warsaw Pact countries to further develop their concepts for offensive
military action and make improvements in mobilization, logistics and personnel
73
MacGregor, p. 64

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 27
PAGE 27
management, political indoctrination, and performance oriented training in simulated
combat conditions.74
The political work to be done was outlined in a secret meeting of Warsaw Pact
Leaders in Prague in 1973. At the meeting, the General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, stated in
no uncertain terms that the Soviet objective was world détente. However, he also
stipulated that the communist powers reserved the right to fight a “just war” of
“national liberation”75
. This policy was largely abandoned at the end of the 1970’s,
with increasingly aggressive military posturing becoming once again the norm in the
1980’s.
Consistent “political work” by the Soviet Union to ensure the reliability of
Warsaw Pact formations, and the examples set by Pact reliability in suppressing local
movements and revolts in Pact states, demonstrates that in a combat situation East
German, Polish, and Czech troops would likely have followed deployment orders. The
party apparatuses served to integrate the military command structures, but they also
totally dominated their decision making apparatuses. The CPSU to SED liaison was an
integral part of the Nationale Volksarmee relationship with the Soviet Union and
other communist nations. Relationships with the rest of the Warsaw Pact were largely
through SED relations with the local communist parties of those other communist
74
MacGregor, p. 64-65
75

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 28
PAGE 28
bloc countries, and usually with CPSU oversight. The CPSU had a closer relationship
with the SED than any other party76
In the case of the Poles and Czechs only a part of their national militaries were
trained and equipped to operate with Soviet forces in combat operations. The
Warsaw Pact differentiated the readiness and effectiveness of its combat formations
between three different tiers, known as Category I, II, & III.77
East European Category
I units were those held at a high state of readiness, equipped with more modern
equipment, trained to a higher standard, and considered more “politically reliable”.
This being stated, it is important to note that even Category I units of the Warsaw
Pact were in general technologically a generation behind tier-one Soviet Forces
deployed to the German Inner-Border area.78
Many of the Category I formations were
East German units.79
As the East Germans reformed their military, they did so in the style of Soviet
Forces, to maximize interoperability under the Warsaw Pact and the strategy imposed
on it by the Soviet Union. The Soviet reorganization of forces was intended to prepare
the Soviet military for the new perceived threat of Western forces and also largely as a
result of noted deficiencies in the organizational structure of forces during the
previous conflict against Nazi Germany80
. It was assembled to fit within the Soviet
force structure, with the largest maneuver formation being the Front in wartime, and
76
77
Simon, p. 360
78
Cordesman, p. 35
79
Cordesman, p. 36
80
Simpkin , p. 179

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 29
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administered as Groups of Forces within the Military District in peace-time. Each
Military District was under the authority of the CPSU. Each Front was roughly
equivalent to a Western Army Group,81
and was composed of three to five Combined
Arms Armies and one or two Tank Armies82
, and supported by the Soviet Operational
Maneuver Group.83
The Operational Maneuver Group was a development in the 1950’s of the
military structure for maneuver warfare more suitable for the strategic concept of
Soviet Deep Battle than the previous force structure. Implemented fully by the early
1980’s84
, the OMG replaced the previous structural scheme, organized around the
Cavalry Mechanized Group, which had performed deep operations against German
forces in the Second World War, but was believed by the Soviet Stavka to have had
several shortcomings the OMG was intended to replace85
. The OMG relied primarily
on the speed and shock of land forces for success, and were to be used as rapidly
deployable units for the exploitation of breakthroughs in the enemy front under the
Soviet Deep Battle doctrine. The OMGs could be followed-up by whole tank-armies,
but was not itself a tank army – there were several notable differences between the
two organizational units.86
Unlike Tank Armies, OMG’s had integrated Close Air
81
FM 100-2-3, United States Department of the Army, p. 161-163
82
83
CIA DLB 4351-7177 ref. # 22385 SOV 83-10034, p. 2
84
CIA DLB 4351-7177 ref. # 22385 SOV 83-10034, p. 1
85
Simpkin, p. 139-152
86
Simpkin, p.139-186

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 30
PAGE 30
support and support units87
, and were usually composed of three tank divisions and
two mechanized infantry divisions.88
Despite Soviet refinements over the years, US military and CIA analysis
estimated that the OMGs were vulnerable to ambush and destruction by support fires
from artillery or air support because of their dense packing of vehicles and personnel
along a narrow axis of advance, and increased vulnerability to NATO air power
because the air defenses included in an OMG did not include long-range SAMs89
.
Furthermore, it was believed that such a defeat of an OMG would allow NATO forces
an opportunity to counterattack through the gap in Warsaw Pact lines and collapse
the entire Front.
At first glance, the Warsaw Pact’s mobilization and reinforcement capabilities
appear to suffer less from some of the inter-national difficulties that NATO had to
deal with. In wartime the Soviet military would have assumed direct operational
control over Warsaw Pact units and mobilization would require a single order from
the Soviet Marshal chairing the joint Warsaw Pact command. However, the margin of
superiority in numbers of combat units was not overwhelming compared to NATO
forces. Several transportation, mobilization, and readiness issues would have
complicated Warsaw Pact reinforcement operations90
as a result of the Soviet policy
favoring the formation of combat units over service, sustainment, and support units,
which resulted in less logistical capacity.
87
CIA DLB 4351-7177 ref. # 22385 SOV 83-10034, p. 3
88
CIA DLB 4351-7177 ref. # 22385 SOV 83-10034, p. iii
89
CIA DLB 4351-7177 ref. # 22385 SOV 83-10034, p. 3
90
Simon, p. 360

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PAGE 31
In 1961, the Soviet Union carried out Exercise Buria, which combined field and
command post drills in order to develop Warsaw Pact doctrine under a new Warsaw
Pact military organizational structure - the Unified Armed Forces. Exercise Buria was
the first large-scale joint field maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact. The results of the Buria
exercise resulted in a new Soviet war plan based on the doctrine of all-out nuclear war
with full commitment of armed forces in the event of war. The Soviet General Staff,
Soviet Defense Minister, East German Defense Minister, and military leadership of the
Warsaw Pact concurred that all of continental Europe must be brought under control
as quickly as possible, optimally within 10-15 days – and would necessitate the massive
use of nuclear weapons.91
The most comprehensive of the plans for war with NATO was dubbed Seven
Days to the River Rhine. Using the Soviet Deep Battle doctrine in conjunction with
their nuclear weaponry, The Soviet Union intended to use Soviet and Warsaw Pact
troops in an all-out assault on NATO forces, with coordinated tactical nuclear strikes
along the entire length of the Inner German border and several key military
installations and cities. East Germany would square-off against Dutch and Danish
troops in the North German Plain, providing a reconnaissance in force and screening
element for more powerful Soviet follow-on forces, as well as to serve in the vanguard
for less politically reliable Polish forces committed to the Northern sector.
Soviet and other Polish forces would assault across the centre and Southern
flanks of the Iron Curtain. Forces from the Hungarian People’s Army would storm
91
Mastny, Holtsmark, Wenger, p. 47

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into Northern Italy and Austria shortly after the Soviet assault annihilated Vienna and
Vicenza with 500-kiloton nuclear warheads. Recently declassified documents
pertaining to the war plan describe how Czechoslovakian mechanized forces were to
drive a spearhead through the blast zones along the inner-German border
immediately after detonation, despite the radioactive fallout, and strike deep targets
inside West Germany before they would succumb to radiation caused ailments.
Organizationally, the Nationale Volksarmee and Warsaw Pact armies
paralleled the armed forces of the Western Allies in their major functions, but less
flexibly. Despite the aggressive nature and intentions of East German forces, they
were never able to achieve the prerequisites necessary to justify an invasion. This
allowed the competition for recognition and legitimacy to be played out through
geopolitical maneuverings worldwide, and for the military competition to be
determined by the arms race, since neither side had the organizational or strategic
initiative. Ultimately the East Germans could not keep up with the competition for
international recognition92
, nor could they match the economic or technologic
successes of the Western Allies. The recognizing the military stalemate and the
futility of further antagonism enabled diplomatic relations which eventually resulted
in the peaceful re-unification of Germany.
The East German and Soviet system, while somewhat successfully relying on
the party to provide a functional framework for control within the Warsaw Pact
military forces, could not rely on the party establishment to fulfill that role in
92
Holloway, Sharp, p. 148

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 33
PAGE 33
government. The party was inherently unresponsive to the people and inconsiderate
of the economic and social needs of the people – military included. The credibility of
the state was tied too closely to the credibility of the SED, and when the party’s
credibility faltered, many began to question the purpose of the armed forces and the
party-state itself.93
This credibility failure ultimately undermined the system which
the military relied on until the military could no longer function – it no longer had the
support of a functioning state. The East German government was wholly unprepared
for the collapse of the Soviet Union and had no plans that did not involve the support
of the Soviet Union
The Nationale Volksarmee and the GDR government were dominated by the
existence of the party organs at every level of command – this gave the force cohesion
and centralization, but left it at the whims of a party establishment which was not
necessarily representative of the needs and conditions of Germans living in the East,
and was considered to be out of touch with reality because of the SED and Soviet focus
on puritanical communist ideology. This would result in paralysis when the party was
rejected en-masse by East German civilians at the end of the Cold War.
In 1990, after massive civil movements, East Germany left the Warsaw Pact and
reunited with West Germany, ceasing to exist as the Federal Republic expanded to
include former GDR citizens and territories. The reunified Germany maintained
membership in NATO. The rise of non-communist governments in other eastern bloc
nations, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, throughout 1990 and 1991 marked an
93
Schönbohm, p. 103

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 34
PAGE 34
effective end of the power of the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact remained intact
until 1991, when in March of that year, the military alliance component of the pact was
dissolved - in July 1991, the last meeting of the political consultative body took place.94
With the writing on the wall, the Soviet Union itself collapsed shortly thereafter, and
the Cold War, at least in the Europe, was over.
CONCLUSION
Through these lenses of conflict in the Cold War era, it has been demonstrated
how Policy and Strategy, as represented by the military-political relationship, affect
the overall performance of the state in conflict. These Cold War lenses allow us to
perceive the existence of a military-political framework that exists outside the Cold
War paradigm.
Maintaining static defenses and defense policies is insufficient, as warfare is
dynamic by nature. Policies must be implemented and constantly updated to reflect
reality, such as when West Germany had to adapt to the vacuum of power in the post-
war period. Successful adaptation is dependent on a unified command framework
with clearly defined roles and responsibilities, without undue overlap which could
94
History.com

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 35
PAGE 35
foster power struggles or factionalism to interfere with the operation of the command
structure.
Strategy must be designed relying on the conditions at hand. This information
is gained through the experiences of the tactical and operational leaders, and passed
up the chain of command so that the strategy can be refined, constantly. The
information must include, besides the details of terrain and other factors of military
significance, a study of the enemy. This information will allow the higher levels of
leadership to form a clear definition of how the war will be prosecuted. However,
equally important to the strategy is the study of the self, which will give clarity to the
priorities of the war, both short and long term, and allow the strategist the
opportunity to create plans that fit the resources available and set realistic
benchmarks for measuring progress. This is only accomplished by effective political
establishments. The military strategist relies on tactical and operational assets for the
information regarding conditions in the place of conflict, the state of the enemy, and
the condition of the military itself; but the condition of the state, its economy, and its
supporting assets can only be provided to the strategist by the political establishment.
The relationship between policy makers and strategy makers is made difficult
in a typical democratic country, because top military officials, in charge of strategy, are
subordinated to civilian leaders, which can be a source of friction. This friction can be
overcome in a healthy democracy through debate and in an environment where the

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 36
PAGE 36
military is integrated and supported by the state. In most of the communist countries
of the Cold War, the defense policy planners were often staffed by military officials;
however, the role of the party and the subordination of the state and the military in
decision making sometimes complicated the relationship between policy and strategy
makers – having such unchecked power left the party-dominated system prone to
systemic error and a lack of critical self-analysis, as well as a stifling of creative
thought and debate which resulted in paralysis.
Summing up, we can see that modern policy and strategy making is as much a
process as it is a plan, and is shaped by the hierarchy which created it as much as it
shapes the hierarchy it serves. We can therefore assume that the though the
hypothetical framework exists independently of ideological or cultural criterion, the
evidence demonstrates that these frameworks are subject to ideological and cultural
influence. These influences alternatively may interfere with or reinforce that
theoretical framework - the crucial factor being the relationship between military and
polity; between strategy and policy.

M . A b b o t t – P a g e | 37
PAGE 37
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