34. Come on, Ehud! What’s the real reason leftists favor the Expulsion Plan?
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Hinweis der Redaktion
mms://msmedia.a7.org/arutz7/heb-perm/alimut-shotrim.wmv A gang of policemen cruelly beating a road-blocking protestor last Wednesday night was caught on an Arutz-7 video camera. On Wednesday night, June 29, Arutz-7's Russian-language site's director Tuvia Lerner set out for the Gush Dan-Tel Aviv area, with the aim of covering the scheduled anti-disengagement road-blocking protests set for that night. At one point, he was standing at the main thoroughfare in Ramat Gan, Jabotinsky Blvd., when he saw what he later described as a "cruel, shocking and pre-meditated attack by policemen." Lerner said that despite attempts by the police to hide it by standing tightly around, he managed to film it on an amateur digital camera. Lerner's video testimony can be seen here. Arutz-7 spoke both with the demonstrator (see below) and Lerner. Lerner's story: "I heard someone call out, 'Photographer!' When I turned around, I saw a demonstrator lying on the road, with three Yasamnikim [special unit policemen used for missions that require extra force - ed.] sitting on him, bending his arms, and putting handcuffs on him. There is no doubt that a man in this position is totally neutralized and cannot endanger anyone. I should note that I had passed that part of the road a few times before that and there was no violence at all by demonstrators. "I saw the policemen surrounding this demonstrator. It seemed very strange to me. I pointed my camera towards them and towards what they were doing to him. The policeman who was wearing an ID tag with the name Eliran Avraham tried to prevent me from taking the pictures. He pushed me and kept on turning my camera away and threatened to arrest me. His behavior just intensified my suspicions. "Through the screen of my camera I saw the officer, wearing a name tag with the name Eran Naim, go behind the demonstrator, go on top of him, and stick his full hand towards his face. He stuck his fingers into the man's nostrils and pulled upwards and backwards in a fast and professional way, and tore his whole face, including a blow at his eyes . "I realized that I had incriminating material in my camera. I saw how nervous/angry the policeman Eliran Avraham was, in his fear that I might have managed to catch the act on my camera despite the wall of policemen blocking it, and he continued to threaten to arrest me. That's why I did not photograph the officer Eran Naim when he walked aside to wipe off his hands that were filled with the blood of the demonstrator. I didn't want to take a chance on losing the material that I already had. "The policemen immediately picked up the wounded demonstrator and arrested him, while he was dripping blood. His head, nose and eyes were almost totally covered with blood. "Afterwards, I disappeared from the scene so that the policemen would think that I had already given in the material to my editors, and then I came back to take more pictures. "There were many other press photographers on the scene. No one else filmed this very hard scene. But what worries me more than anything is that I gave the material to the three main television channels - Channel 1 (Israel Broadcasting Authority), Channel Two and Channel Ten - and none of them showed real interest in receiving it. This, despite the fact that I had already done all the 'dirty work' and found the demonstrator, who has still not yet recovered. He is suffering from pain and psychological anguish. "Despite the fact that both he and I agreed to be interviewed, some of the reporters told me, off the record, that it was a waste of effort because their editors would not approve it. "This showed me that the watchdogs of democracy had turned into etrog-preservers." The reference to etrogim applies to a recent remark by leading television commentator Amnon Abramovitch, who said that the media in Israel must protect Ariel Sharon "like an etrog" - the citron used and carefully sheltered by observant Jews on the Sukkot holiday - presumably, so that he not suffer a political downfall before he succeeds in carrying out the expulsion plan. Lerner reported that he later spoke with the victimized demonstrator. The latter said that after he was brought to the police station, he was taken into a room while in handcuffs, and there he was beaten by three policemen - one of whom was Eliran Avraham. A Gush Dan Police spokesman contacted by Arutz-7 said, "We have received the material you sent, and you will receive a response." The demonstator, named Akiva, told Arutz-7 what happened from his point of view. His story (paraphrased): "I was on the scene of the road-blocking, and I heard the police near me say they wanted to arrest me. Suddenly, four or five Yassamnikim surrounded and grabbed me - each one with his own job: One choked me, one bent my arms, one poked his fingers very strongly into my nose up and down - on two different occasions - and it felt as if he was trying to push my nose into my skull. It hurt terribly. And another one poked my eyes very strongly. They handcuffed me and dragged me to the truck, and then to the police station. I asked for medical assistance, they said OK, but didn't give me. After about two hours, they wanted to give me water to wash off the blood, but I said I didn't want them to wash it off until a doctor sees me. "A few of us [arrestees] were there together, and we were talking, and the policemen said to be quiet. I said that they can't take away our right to speak. One guy looked at me as if he was about to kill me and said, 'Is that so?' or something like that. He then took me into a side room where there was a bunch of policemen and they all started beating me up. Punches to the head, kicks, everything, while at the same time, one of them was trying to put handcuffs on me. When they finished, they sat me on a chair, with my hands handcuffed behind me, and one guy started slapping and punching me in my face and head with all his strength. I of course couldn't defend myself. It was just like one long terrible painful hurt; I couldn't feel each individual punch... "I don't know why, but I still didn't shut up; when he finished, I said, 'I'll see you in Machash [the Complaints Against Policemen Department]. He looked at me again and started beating me up again - and then a third time. He even gored me with his head against my head one time." Later, Akiva related, "I refused to identify myself, or be photographed, as is my right, and they put me in a room for a couple of minutes with one of the Yassamnikim from before - maybe to scare me or something. He said two things that I think are very important. First he said, 'You guys work on the issue of justice - but sometimes it's not such a good idea; sometimes you have be smart, not right.' And then he said, 'What you got today is nothing compared to what often goes on here.'" ... They finally photographed me, and then, at 1 AM, just let me go, just like that." Akiva said he plans to file a complaint with the police department, as well as a civil suit.
Senior Police Commander On Film - Calls to Beat Disengagement Opponents Without Mercy 09:07 Jul 22, '05 / 15 Tammuz 5765 (IsraelNN.com) Channel 10 TV on Friday night will air its video footage depicting Negev police commander Brigadier-General Miso Shacham. Speaking to the area border police commander, Shacham is recorded instructing his forces to beat anyone who breaks away from the Kfar Maimon group, seeking to enter Gush Katif. He called for the indiscriminate use of the water cannon, giving him authority to do so without hesitation or approval, as well as telling him to use batons and "hit them hard, blows to the lower extremities to teach them a lesson". The documented footage includes a fair share of vulgarities and explicit instructions to inflict pain on those persons apprehended trying to enter Gush Katif. Learning of the footage and the Channel 10 program, Shacham explained his statements were made in a closed conversation with a senior officer following a number of days without sleep, expressing remorse for his harsh words. Israel Police officials have requested the tape from Channel 10 to review the conversation as well as the context in which the remarks were made.
On July 11, 2005, Seymour D. Reich, President of the Israel Policy Forum, an American organization, provided a unique glimpse into the thinking of those who are leading this country. In a letter to the editor published in the New York Times , Reich, a former chairman of the Presidents' Conference, informed us that Ehud Olmert , Israel's vice prime minister, spoke before an audience in New York in June and announced: "We are tired of fighting, we are tired of being courageous, we are tired of winning, we are tired of defeating our enemies." What is probably most remarkable about Olmert's words is that they went unreported at the time, and not that they represent one of the most abject and defeatist formulations of statecraft in the history of diplomacy. Even Neville Chamberlain at Munich in 1938 was a bit more optimistic while serving up Czechoslovakia's Sudentenland. On July 11, 2005, Seymour D. Reich, President of the Israel Policy Forum, an American organization, provided a unique glimpse into the thinking of those who are leading this country. In a letter to the editor published in the New York Times , Reich, a former chairman of the Presidents' Conference, informed us that Ehud Olmert , Israel's vice prime minister, spoke before an audience in New York in June and announced: "We are tired of fighting, we are tired of being courageous, we are tired of winning, we are tired of defeating our enemies." What is probably most remarkable about Olmert's words is that they went unreported at the time, and not that they represent one of the most abject and defeatist formulations of statecraft in the history of diplomacy. Even Neville Chamberlain at Munich in 1938 was a bit more optimistic while serving up Czechoslovakia's Sudentenland.
The Planned Ethnic Cleansing and It’s Consequences – by Arieh Stav Thus, by means of elimination, there is only one plausible explanation, which MK Zvi Hendel pithily characterized: "The depth of the evacuation equals the depth of the investigation". Below is the account, which Hendel, who was then Deputy Education Minister, claims to have received from one of the participants. "The Depth of the Evacuation Equals the Depth of the Investigation" In late 2003, distressing information reached Dov Weisglas, esq., Sharon's attorney and chief of staff: The contents of the revised indictment against Dudi Appel in the Greek Island matter. The revised indictment stated that Gilad Sharon had received an astronomical salary for relatively marginal consultancy services in the mega-deal in which the contractor sought to purchase the Greek Island of Petrocolus for the purpose of building one of the largest vacation sites! in the world there. In paying that salary to Gilad Sharon, Appel apparently sought to obtain assistance from the Prime Minister himself in consummating the deal. Weisglas was distraught. He understood perfectly the connotation of "bribery" the legal term for the deal described above. He shared his concerns with the "farm forum", the Prime Minister's support group, which would regularly meet on the farm: His sons, Omri and Gilad, Weisglas, public relations consultant Eyal Arad and others. Weisglas was determined: "If the indictment includes the section about bribery, we are in a lot of trouble. We must take a drastic step to stop this course of action". The question was what is that "significant step", which would be able to stop the indictment snowball. "Look, Arik", Weisglas said, "You have no choice. There are many precedents in the world when a leader of a nation undertakes a significant national enterprise, investigations against him are closed. That is your chance". For a moment, a proposal was raised to go to war, however that was immediately rejected. It was clear that the Left would not forgive Sharon, with his problematic past in that area, for going to war. "We need a political initiative", Weisglas said. Then Eyal Arad said: "Arik, go for a total evacuation of the Gaza Strip. The Right will support you on that issue because they have already become accustomed to the idea. Everyone hates Gaza and no one will oppose an action of that sort. It will extract you from the legal muddle. It is the easiest step to market to the public. Come on, go for it". Sharon disagreed. "Have you gone mad?" he asked those present, "The settlement there is a strategic asset. I truly believe that. It was but a few months ago that I explained that to Mizna". The discussion ended with no decision. Time passed, the apparent bribery story gained momentum in the media . The "farm forum" sought a different step, which would! be dramatic enough to dissuade the Attorney General from pursuing his plan to indict, but found none. Three weeks later, the "farm forum" reconvened. This time it was the turn of Gilad, Sharon's "right-wing" son who was considered to be the smart one in the family, to be the primary speaker. "Father", he said to him, "We have no choice. Nothing else can save us. We must go for an evacuation of the Gaza Strip". This time, the father agreed with his son. Shortly thereafter, on February 2, 2004, Sharon announced his "disengagement plan". It goes without saying that his action was successful. From that date on, the Greek Island matter disappeared from the public agenda and Sharon became a media darling and a cultural hero of the extreme Left. As there is no other plausible explanation for the phenomenon of a man who in one fell swoop tramples everything in which he believed, which is, not coincidentally, the essence of Zionism there is no avoiding the conclusion that Sharon sold out the Land of Israel for personal gain. Quisling and Petain would be blushing in shame.
Disengagement Plan Formulated to Escape Sharon Corruption Probe 19:53 Jun 16, '05 / 9 Sivan 5765 Two veteran journalists, based on talks with persons very close to the Prime Minister, say that the Disengagement Plan was hatched up simply to avoid Sharon's indictment in the Greek Island scandal. Journalists Raviv Drucker of Channel Ten TV and Ofer Shelach of Yediot Acharonot newspaper appeared on Nissim Mishal's Channel Two television program last night and summarized the results of their research. The main findings: The evacuation plan was born because Sharon was sure that then-State Prosecutor Edna Arbel would indict him. The decisions on the disengagement plan were made by marginalizing the army people, and without the participation of the ministers and the Cabinet. Sharon proposed to one of the army's top generals that he be a "plant" and report to him on the goings-on in the General Staff. Click here to view the 7-minute Channel Two TV segment - in Hebrew (or right click and select "Save Target As..." to download) Drucker and Shelach said that Sharon's fear of State Prosecutor Arbel was a determining factor in making this plan. "If not for the interrogations, this historic decision would not have been made," they said. "This can be seen by the timetable of events in February 2004" - the appointment of Gen. Eiland to begin working on the plan, the appointment of Meni Mazuz as Attorney General, a summons to Sharon for police interrogation, the rumors that Arbel was about to indict him, and finally the meeting of the Farm Forum [Sharon, his sons and one or two others very close to the Prime Minister]. This Farm Forum "did not state it outright," Drucker said, "but it was in the air that something had to be done, that there had to be some major diplomatic process that would swallow up everything and would change the public agenda [away from the corruption headlines against Sharon] - and they came up with this plan." In answer to a question, Shelach said, "The people who are closest to Sharon told us absolutely that if it wasn't for those police interrogations, this decision [to quit Gaza] would not have been made. This can be seen by the timetable of events..." Drucker and Shelach further found that top Sharon-aide Dov Weisglass (pictured) led the way in preparing the disengagement plan, particularly in a private meeting with Condoleeza Rice in December 2003, and that those in the army and government who could have helped improve the plan for Israel were left out of the decision-making loop. "[National Security Advisor] Giora Eiland was in the midst of preparing a plan as to how Israel could get some benefit from its withdrawal," they said, "when suddenly he was presented with this new [unilateral] plan - and even now he objects to the plan [as it now stands]." Narrator Nissim Mishal noted that the image of Prime Minister Sharon as depicted in the new book, entitled Boomerang, does not jibe with the common perception of him as strong and determined. "Instead," he said, "your book portrays him as one who is scared of police interrogations and led along by the Farm Forum and [top Sharon-aide] Duby Weisglass." Raviv Drucker responded, "We too were surprised by what we found. One government minister told us, 'This is the weakest Prime Minister I have seen, and I have seen many Prime Ministers.' The point is that Sharon is very strong at enforcing his decisions, but is weak at making decisions; he has no spine of his own today, and the best example of this is Duby Weisglass and the disengagement plan... "Sharon wanted only to survive politically. Weisglass led the whole plan. In October 2003, before the plan had started, Weisglass asked staffers in the Prime Minister's Bureau for data on Gaza because he said he felt we had to withdraw from Gaza. Sharon did not yet agree then - but he would come around later. At that time, Weisglass also started spreading hints to other people that if Sharon didn't agree to this plan, he would end up leaving the political arena as an 'insignificant old man.' Weisglass also started pressuring [Defense Minister Sha'ul] Mofaz at this time. But more than anything - Weisglass felt that he had the right key to persuade Sharon." Drucker's colleague Ofer Shelach continued: "When Sharon arrived in office, he didn't know what to do; he was great in tactics, but had no strategy - not on the personal level, and not on the diplomatic-international level. He just doesn't know what to do. Don't forget: after two years in office, he finds himself - the great terror-fighter Arik Sharon - with the highest amount of terror victims ever. And Weisglass - together with the Farm Forum, but mainly Weisglass - takes advantage of this to lead Sharon [by the nose]... "In December '03, after Sharon's Herzliya speech introducing the disengagement concept but when this plan was still very vague - in fact, Sharon was still asking the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff what they thought about taking down just one or two communities - Weisglass goes to Washington all by himself - without his Military Secretary Moshe Kaplinsky or National Security Advisor Giora Eiland, who usually accompany him - and speaks to then-U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice privately. Very senior army officials told us that this was the trip in which Weisglass made the following offer: In the first stage, we would quit Gaza, in the second stage there would be a deep withdrawal from Judea and Samaria, and in the third stage we'd even be willing to talk about the '67 lines. "The important thing to note is that from that moment, there is no contact with those elements who were supposed to help Sharon decide about the plan, figure out what Israel would get in return, and help Israel get the best deal it could. And from that moment, the plan essentially rolls along on its own." Shelach and Drucker revealed that Sharon sought out a top IDF general to be a mole in the IDF General Staff. The authors refused to divulge the name of the general whom Sharon asked to be his "plant." They said, "The general himself told us that Sharon asked him to agree to report back to him on the goings-on in the General Staff... All along, Sharon was unhappy with the army, and always tried to form direct channels of communication [in this way]..." They said that many top officers, such as former Chief of Staff Mofaz, Intelligence Chief Ze'evi-Farkash, and others, were originally very much against the disengagement plan. "Several months before Sharon's adoption of the Disengagement Plan, there was a deliberation amidst the top brass of the IDF in the presence of the Chief of Staff. Many options were presented. One of the options was unilateral disengagement from Gaza. There was unanimous agreement regarding the idea: absolutely no. Mofaz said at the beginning, 'Whoever supports a unilateral retreat, apparently wasn't here for the last two and a half years,' and Farkash said it would be a catastrophe, and the head of IDF Research said it would be the worst thing... but after several months, when they saw that Sharon was so strongly in favor, they amazingly all fell in line and backed it..." "We have a very biting claim," Drucker concluded. "In the past four and a half years, there were many opportunities to end or change the course of the intifada, but because of the way decisions were made, these chances were missed, and the bottom line - it's terrible to say - is that there were many people who were killed [by terrorists during the Oslo War] in vain."
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