Presentations from CDE themed call launch event on 14 May 2013 - for full details of this call for proposals see: http://www.science.mod.uk/events/event_detail.aspx?eventid=264
16. CDE themed call programme
Precision timing Call closes 6 Jun 2013
(at 1700 hrs)
Countering insider threat attacks Call closes 27 Jun 2013
(at 1700 hrs)
Secure communications Call launch 18 Jun 2013
Innovation in drug development
processes
Call launch 25 Jun 2013
Enhancing military medical training
and support for the medic
Call launch 16 Jul 2013
UK Biological Engagement
Programme
Call launch 17 Sept 2013
Register and further details at www.science.mod.uk under âEvents and Callsâ
30. Introduction to CDE 1030
Programme overview 1050
Military context 1100
Current research 1120
Technical challenges 1140
Ethics 1230
Submitting a CDE proposal 1240
Q&A 1250
Networking lunch (book
surgery appointments)
1300
Surgery sessions 1400
Event close 1600
Agenda
33. Centre for Defence Enterprise
01235 438445
cde@dstl.gov.uk
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise
34. Introduction to CDE 1030
Programme overview 1050
Military context 1100
Current research 1120
Technical challenges 1140
Ethics 1230
Submitting a CDE proposal 1240
Q&A 1250
Networking lunch (book
surgery appointments)
1300
Surgery sessions 1400
Event close 1600
Agenda
35. Countering the Insider Threat -
CDE Themed Call
Dstl Support to Operations Overview
DSTL/PUB72551
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
36. Š Crown Copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
Dstl Support to Ops
⢠Dstl
â Science and Technology (S&T) agency of
Ministry of Defence (MOD)
â Maximise impact of S&T on UK defence
and security
⢠Support to Operations (S2O)
â MOD main effort
â Provision of appropriate deployed S&T
support
â Oversight of cross-domain S2O research
â Responsive approach to short-term
priorities
⢠Insider Threat
UNCLASSIFIED
37. Insider Threat
⢠The Insider Threat is a real threat for UK Forces operating in
Afghanistan
⢠The term âInsider Attackâ is used when a member of the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) attacks members of the
International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), of which the UK
is a part
⢠The name of these incidents recognises that ANSF as well as ISAF
are targets of these attacks
⢠The subset terms âGreen on Blueâ, âGreen on Greenâ and âGreen
on Brown (contractors)â are still used to distinguish between the
intended targets of attacks
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
38. S&T response to Insider Threat
⢠Increasing numbers of incidents through 2012
⢠Dstl Insider Threat âChallengeâ Autumn12
â What more can S&T do?
⢠Dstl Support to Ops:
â Took forward proposals from the challenge
â Created Project MORPHEUS
â Pull together S&T in this area
⢠Coordinated with wider MOD effort
â Direction from MOD customers
â Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and Ops Directorate (Afghanistan)
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
39. Project MORPHEUS
⢠Portfolio of work items
â Delivery by early 2014, largely soft science
â Causes, capability gaps
â Exploitable solutions
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
40. What do we want from you?
⢠Research proposals to help counter the Insider Threat
⢠Rapidly exploitable solutions
â Main focus is current operations
â Exploitation by January 2014
â Some interest in longer term
⢠Ensure no stone is left unturned
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
41. What will you hear today?
⢠Operational context
⢠Current research
⢠Areas of interest
⢠Assumptions and constraints
⢠How to get involved
⢠Answers to your questions
â Surgery sessions this afternoon
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
42. Introduction to CDE 1030
Programme overview 1050
Military context 1100
Current research 1120
Technical challenges 1140
Ethics 1230
Submitting a CDE proposal 1240
Q&A 1250
Networking lunch (book
surgery appointments)
1300
Surgery sessions 1400
Event close 1600
Agenda
44. Joint Warfare Directorate
Current situation
ď§ Not classified until 2008?
ď§ Peak in 2012 for UK?
ď§ It is an issue for Coalition and Afghan National Security Forces
ď§ Others are also examining this in detail
45. Joint Warfare Directorate
What has the military done?
ď§ Training
ď§ Equipment
ď§ Personnel
ď§ Information
ď§ Doctrine
ď§ Infrastructure
46. Joint Warfare Directorate
Where should the military look
next?
ď§ Afghanistan
ď§ Increase awareness of other cultures/religions?
ď§ Sharing intelligence with host nation & allies?
ď§ Ensure that the military reads and understands
doctrine/history?
47. Introduction to CDE 1030
Programme overview 1050
Military context 1100
Current research 1120
Technical challenges 1140
Ethics 1230
Submitting a CDE proposal 1240
Q&A 1250
Networking lunch (book
surgery appointments)
1300
Surgery sessions 1400
Event close 1600
Agenda
49. Overview of Current Work
UNCLASSIFIED
⢠The Insider Attacks are likely to be underpinned by a number of
different factors
⢠This is reflected by the multifaceted programme
⢠A number of work strands have been undertaken over the last 6
months:
â Operational Analysis
â Selection of Mentors
â Cultural Training
â Training Review
â Information Dissemination Review
â Intent Detection System Evaluation
â Protected Living Spaces
Š Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
50. Operational Analysis
⢠Objectives:
â To collate all available data into a classified database and conduct analysis
on Insider Threat attacks to identify any common factors and trends over
time
⢠Previous operations
⢠Analogous attacks
â To conduct interviews with members of the Afghan National Security Forces
to better understand their concerns / motivations / drivers
⢠Benefits:
â A greater understanding of the threat will mean that appropriate mitigation
measures can be implemented
â Work strands within the programme are evidence based
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
51. Selection of Mentors
⢠Objectives:
â To provide guidance on the knowledge, skills and experience required in
order to operate successfully in the mentor role. Mentors and mentoring
teams are there to provide training and support to both develop knowledge
and improve the skills required to enhance their performance during military
and policing operations
⢠Benefits:
â Ensure that the most appropriate individuals deploy
in the mentor role
⢠Eg Those who can build productive relationships and
be culturally sensitive
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
52. Cultural Training
⢠Objectives:
â To provide guidance on how to improve the pre-deployment cultural training
received by all troops
⢠To improve the methods of delivery
⢠To ensure that the âso whatâ is included
⢠Benefits:
â Ensure that troops are culturally sensitive and will not cause offence
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
53. Training Review
⢠Objectives:
â To identify and review current training cross government that will be relevant
for dealing with the Insider Threat on current and future operations
⢠Behavioural analysis/ anomaly detection
⢠De-escalation training
⢠Cultural training
⢠Benefits:
â Identify relevant training material and methods which could be incorporated
into a specific Insider Threat training course if required
â Provide recommendations for how âsoft skillsâ training could be incorporated
into basic training
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
54. Information Dissemination
⢠Objectives:
â To review existing Insider Threat newsletters/ doctrine notes
⢠To propose revised content
⢠To provide options for effective future communication of latest Insider Threat
findings
⢠Benefits:
â Improved dissemination of information to target audience
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
55. Intent Detection Systems
⢠Objectives:
â To consider whether Intent Detection Systems could have utility for the
Insider Threat
⢠Assess whether systems could detect the intent to commit an insider attack
⢠Evaluate the practicalities of using Intent Detection Systems on current operations
⢠Benefits:
â A better understanding of the capability
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
56. Protected Living Spaces
⢠Objectives:
â To provide advice on materials/technologies that are available to protect
living accommodation in Afghanistan
⢠Benefits:
â Improved understanding of the options available to mitigate against the
vulnerabilities within living accommodation
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
57. Summary
⢠These work strands give a flavour of the types of activities currently
being undertaken in this area
⢠Programme already established and benefits are being realised
⢠What else could you do?
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
58. Introduction to CDE 1030
Programme overview 1050
Military context 1100
Current research 1120
Technical challenges 1140
Ethics 1230
Submitting a CDE proposal 1240
Q&A 1250
Networking lunch (book
surgery appointments)
1300
Surgery sessions 1400
Event close 1600
Agenda
60. Scope
⢠Open to new approaches and solutions
⢠Current and possible future operations
⢠Not limited to current situation and assumptions
⢠Push boundaries, however unusual or radical
⢠Thinking differently
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
61. Scope
⢠Continue partnering with host nationâs forces and
population
⢠Human dimension:
â Insider Threat: Underlying causes? Influence over others? Opportunity?
Ability? Timing? Location? Outcome?
â UK forces: Awareness? Response? Training? Influence?
⢠Technology:
â Detect intent? Share situational awareness? Building layout to minimise
effects? Weapon suppressors?
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
62. Whatâs required
⢠Research proposals for new solutions and technology to help mitigate
the Insider Threat
⢠New ways of countering attacks
⢠Re-use old ideas from a related world
⢠Social and behavioural sciences
â Training, tools, planning aids
⢠Proof-of-concept technology
⢠âDoing things differentlyâ
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
63. Whatâs not required
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
⢠Long-term social and behavioural science studies
⢠Incremental improvements
⢠Ideas with no realistic probability of exploitation
64. Call challenges
⢠Call divided into four challenges:
1. Dissuade Improving the effects of influence
2. Detect Improving the identification of intent
3. Prepare Improving the effectiveness of training
4. Protect Improving Force Protection
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
65. Call challenges
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
Increase
understanding
Identify the
underlying
causes
Reduce probability
of situation
escalating
Influence
Dissuade
Protect
Prepare
Detect Understand
human behaviour
Training
Force Protection/
equipment
66. Next steps
⢠Proposals are sought to address one or more of these
challenges
⢠Current and possible future operations
⢠Short-term studies for delivery by end January 2014
⢠Proposals involving human participants will require MOD ethics
approval
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
67. Exploitation
⢠Current work often exploited rapidly through changes to pre-
deployment training
⢠Technical Partner will be assigned to each successful proposal
â Provide interface with MOD
â Assist with exploitation
⢠Stakeholder Day will be held on completion of all successful
proposals
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
68. Timescales, funding
⢠21 May 2013 Webcast published
⢠27 June 2013 Call closes 1700 hrs
⢠£400k available for this CDE themed call
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
69. Background information
⢠Proposed work must be unclassified
⢠Data sources
â Open sources
â BBC3 Our War
â Online
â Analogous communities
â MOD website
⢠Operations & Deployments
⢠Thinking differentlyâŚ
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
71. Improving the effects of Influence
âHow can people be dissuaded from undertaking
insider attacks, both before and during an
incident?â
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
72. Improving the effects of Influence
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
Increase
understanding
Identify the
underlying
causes
Reduce probability
of situation
escalating
Influence
Dissuade
Protect
Prepare
Detect Understand
Human behaviour
Training
Force Protection/
equipment
73. Background
⢠Identify underlying causes of Insider Attacks
â Understand Afghan National Security Forces troops
â Understand the Afghan people
â Wider applicability to other crises
⢠Social sciences disciplines
â Anthropology, Psychology, Law History,
International Relations, Economics, Theology
⢠Output
â Operations: eg Cultural Specialists, Human Terrain Teams
â Education: HQ, unit and individual training
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
74. De-escalation
⢠De-escalation (Dissuasion)
â Reduce underlying grievances
â Broader, longer-term, higher-level issues
⢠De-escalation (Detection, Prevention, Protection)
â Defuse confrontation
â Local, immediate, tactical-level issues
â Often language constrained
⢠Social science can inform both categories
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
75. Potential avenues of research
⢠Novel ways to understand Afghan culture
⢠Novel tools to help understand what might influence someone
⢠Novel methods to understand someoneâs level of discontent
⢠Novel methods to disseminate information to Afghans
particularly if they canât read
⢠Afghan cultural awareness of ISAF
⢠Afghan personnel selection
⢠Afghan sentiment
⢠Building rapport
⢠Afghan media
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
77. Detecting deception
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
Increase
understanding
Identify the
underlying
causes
Reduce probability
of situation
escalating
Influence
Dissuade
Protect
Prepare
Detect
Training
Force Protection/
equipment
Understand human
behaviour
78. Detecting deception
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
Increase
understanding
Identify the
underlying
causes
Reduce probability
of situation
escalating
Influence
Dissuade
Protect
Prepare
Detect
Training
Force Protection/
equipment
Understand human
behaviours
79. Behavioural detection
⢠Person or vehicle-borne IEDs or intention of firing into a crowd
â No reliable generic indicators for suspicious intent
â Post hoc analysis is potentially problematic
â Different motivations manifest in different indicators
â Suicide bombers psychologically different to criminals
â No evidence that guilt or stress are reliable indicators of suspicious
intent
â Cultural differences
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
80. What affects behavioural cues?
⢠Variety of motivations
â Personal grievance
â Planned insurgent activities
â Medical issues
â Instant emotional reaction to a particular event
⢠Variety of emotional states
â Calm
â Angry
â Fearful
â Elated
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
81. Pattern of life recognition
⢠Expectancy Violations Theory
â Establish baseline behaviour for context
â Identify behaviour that deviates from this baseline within this context
⢠Skills required
â Perception
â Question
â Act
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
82. Feedback from the front line
⢠BBC3 Our War
â This was deemed to be very useful prior to deployment because it
provided head cam footage of real life in theatre
⢠Development of:
â Empirically underpinned synthetic environments?
â Empirically underpinned interactive skills training?
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
83. How you can help
⢠Tools or techniques to enhance awareness of behaviour that
violates the relevant pattern of life
⢠These must be:
â Validated
â Mobile
â Easy to use
â Based on current scientific evidence
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
85. Prepare â Training solutions
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
Increase
understanding
Identify the
underlying
causes
Reduce probability
of situation
escalating
Influence
Dissuade
Protect
Prepare
Detect Understand human
behaviour
Training
Force Protection/
equipment
86. The problem
⢠We do not know why insider
attacks occur
â Infiltration by the enemy
â Poor relations
â Attackers feel insulted
â Revenge
â Stress
⢠Hence, providing a training solution will be difficult and
challenging
UNCLASSIFIED
Š Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
87. Insider Threat training
⢠Currently
â All personnel receive initial Insider Threat awareness training
â Specialist training to select high-risk groups
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
88. Insider Threat training
⢠Can training
â Improve relationships?
â Enhance the ability of a person to perceive the Insider Threat?
â Improve the âcourse of actionâ decision?
â Optimise that course of action?
UNCLASSIFIED
Š Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
89. Improve relationships
⢠Enhance cultural understanding
â How is your wife?
â Passing in front of you when praying
⢠Active listening skills
⢠Enhancing empathy
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
90. Enhance ability to perceive Insider
Threat
⢠Can you perceive insider attack behavioural cues
â Months before
â Days before
â Imminently
⢠What are the cues? Do they exist?
⢠Behavioural science
⢠Cultural understanding
⢠Observation skills
UNCLASSIFIED
Š Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
91. Improve decisions about Insider
Threat
⢠Decision making under pressure
⢠High-risk decision making
⢠Enable or enhance heuristics
â Mental short cuts to aid decision making
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
92. Optimise response
⢠De-escalation (physical/verbal)
⢠Tactical communication skills
⢠Physical unarmed combat skills
⢠Close quarter armed combat skills
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
93. Possible avenues
⢠Training Needs Analysis for specific and generalist roles
⢠Observation skills training
⢠Sound decision making
⢠De-escalate (tactical verbal communication/physical
intervention)
⢠Close quarter combat with firearms
⢠Provision of realistic training scenarios (tabletop/role play)
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
95. Force Protection
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
Increase
understanding
Identify the
underlying
causes
Reduce probability
of situation
escalating
Influence
Dissuade
Protect
Prepare
Detect Understand human
behaviour
Training
Force Protection/
equipment
96. Introduction
⢠What is Force Protection?
⢠Outline of threat
⢠Prevention
⢠Options
⢠Considerations
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
97. What is Force Protection?
⢠"It is easier and more effective to destroy the enemy's aerial
power by destroying his nests and eggs on the ground than to
hunt his flying birds in the air." - General Giulio Douhet (1869-
1930) Italian army air officer known as the father of strategic air
power.
⢠In simple terms, Force Protection is preventive measures taken
to mitigate hostile actions in specific areas or against a specific
population
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
98. Outline of threat
⢠Good range of Force Protection at ground level
â Barriers
â Partitions
â Manned/Gated entrances
⢠Elevated positions pose more of a threat
â Building roofs
â Sangars/Watchtowers
⢠However solutions enhancing
ground protection should not
be discounted
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
99. Prevention
⢠Defeat of the Insider Threat could be achieved through
addressing three separate topics
â Countering the initial Insider Threat
â Prevent the Insider Threat from locating or engaging targets
â Prevent injury to Insider Threat targets
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
100. Option 1 â Countering the initial
Insider Threat
⢠Ensure day to day activities are not denied
â 360 degree coverage on sentry duty within Sangar
â Normal activities at checkpoints
⢠Could also include early detection of a possible event
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
101. Option 2 â Prevent the Insider Threat
from locating or engaging targets
⢠Masking the locations of individuals
â Screened areas
⢠Hanging screens
⢠Walls
⢠Prevention of munitions reaching the target
â Barriers
â Concrete walls
â Detonation screens
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
102. Option 2 â Continued
⢠Need to be considerate of potential threat directions
â Where is the Insider Threat likely to come from?
â Can whatever measures be orientated to the likely threat
direction?
â Multiple directions eg Sangars in camps
â Specific directions eg Checkpoints
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
103. Option 3 â Prevent injury to Insider
Threat targets
⢠Elimination or reduction of injury causing threat from
â Small arms fire
â Rocket-propelled grenades
â Other fragmenting devices
⢠Increased personal or area protection
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
104. Considerations
⢠Need to avoid any potential of alienation
⢠May help to harbour any perceived culture clash
⢠Solutions should make the maximum use of
materials that are readily available to forces on
operations
UNCLASSIFIEDŠ Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
13 May 2013
105. Introduction to CDE 1030
Programme overview 1050
Military context 1100
Current research 1120
Technical challenges 1140
Ethics 1230
Submitting a CDE proposal 1240
Q&A 1250
Networking lunch (book
surgery appointments)
1300
Surgery sessions 1400
Event close 1600
Agenda
106. Ethics approval
⢠Some of the proposals may require ethics approval
â Any research involving human participants in MOD research, both clinical
and non-clinical requires ethics committee approval
13 May 2013
Š Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
UNCLASSIFIED
⢠Conduct research upon the human participant, including (but not limited to)
administering substances, taking blood or urine samples, removing biological
tissue, radiological investigations, or obtaining responses to an imposed stress or
experimental situation
Clinical
⢠Conduct research to collect data on an identifiable individualâs behaviour,
either directly or indirectly (such as by questionnaire or observation)
Non-Clinical
107. Ethics approval
⢠All proposals should declare if there are potential ethical hurdles to
address
⢠A proposal must, in the first instance, be scientifically robust in order for
it to be, prima facie, ethical
⢠If the proposal may require ethics approval, please make a three-part
proposal
â Milestone 1: Produce research protocols
â Milestone 2: Obtaining ethics approval for the project
â Milestone 3: Proposed research (subject to ethics approval)
⢠More information
â http://www.science.mod.uk/engagement/modrec/modrec.aspx
13 May 2013
Š Crown copyright 2013 Dstl
UNCLASSIFIED
108. Introduction to CDE 1030
Programme overview 1050
Military context 1100
Current research 1120
Technical challenges 1140
Ethics 1230
Submitting a CDE proposal 1240
Q&A 1250
Networking lunch (book
surgery appointments)
1300
Surgery sessions 1400
Event close 1600
Agenda
109. Crown Copyright (c) 2012
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
UNCLASSIFIED / FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Centre for Defence Enterprise
Submitting a Successful Proposal
Centre for Defence Enterprise (CDE)
111. Dstl is part of the
Ministry of Defence
UNCLASSIFIED / For Public Release
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
Crown Copyright Dstl 2012
Know what is available
112.
113. Dstl is part of the
Ministry of Defence
UNCLASSIFIED / For Public Release
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
Crown Copyright Dstl 2012
Know what is available
114. Dstl is part of the
Ministry of Defence
UNCLASSIFIED / For Public Release
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
Crown Copyright Dstl 2012
Know what is available
115. Dstl is part of the
Ministry of Defence
UNCLASSIFIED / For Public Release
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
Crown Copyright Dstl 2012
Read available
information
Start with â
Quick Start Guide
plus other CDE manuals â
Account Manual, User
Manual, Technology
Application Manual
Know what is available
116. Dstl is part of the
Ministry of Defence
UNCLASSIFIED / For Public Release
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
Crown Copyright Dstl 2012
Know what is available
117. Dstl is part of the
Ministry of Defence
UNCLASSIFIED / For Public Release
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
Crown Copyright Dstl 2012
Developing a CDE proposal
118. Crown Copyright (c) 2012
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
UNCLASSIFIED / FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Proposal health check
128. MOD Performance Assessment Framework
Five criteria:
Operational relevance
Likelihood of exploitation
Builds critical S&T capability to meet UK
needs
Scientific quality/innovation
Science, innovation and technology risk
130. Dstl is part of the
Ministry of Defence
UNCLASSIFIED / For Public Release
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
Crown Copyright Dstl 2012
Government-furnished X
135. Dstl is part of the
Ministry of Defence
UNCLASSIFIED / For Public Release
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
Crown Copyright Dstl 2012
This call closes:
17:00 hrs on
Thursday 27 June 2013
Deadline
136. Crown Copyright (c) 2012
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
UNCLASSIFIED / FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
cde@dstl.gov.uk
Call process queries
137. Dstl is part of the
Ministry of Defence
UNCLASSIFIED / For Public Release
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
Crown Copyright Dstl 2012
support-to-ops-CDE@dstl.gov.uk
Call technical queries
138. Dstl is part of the
Ministry of Defence
UNCLASSIFIED / For Public Release
Centre for Defence Enterprise
www.science.mod.uk/enterprise cde@dstl.gov.uk
Crown Copyright Dstl 2012
www.science.mod.uk
Events and Calls > Current calls
for proposals > Countering Insider
Threat Attacks
Further information