1. Future threat
concept to GCC and
C4ISR adaptation
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2. Contents
• Introduction.
• Iran.
• Syria.
• Iraq.
• Yemen.
• Challenges to C4ISR.
• C4ISR Architecture.
• Conclusion.
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3. Introduction
3
Strategic
Environment
Analysis
Iran
SyriaIraq
Yemen
C4ISR
Engineering &
Adaptation
ISIS
AQAP
STM

4. Introduction
• It is time for all GCC countries to acknowledge
Iran as a major threat (politically, religiously
and militarily).
• We should recognize Iraq militias, Hezbollah
as hostel and enemy as ISIS (no difference or
may be worse).
• More human intelligences and surveillance
from (Coast, Boarder Guards) infused into the
C4ISR.
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5. DEALING WITH IRAN AS A
BROAD GULF AND REGIONAL
SECURITY THREAT
IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
IRAN’S MISSILE BUILDUP
CONVENTIONAL AND ASYMMETRIC
DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE
REGIONAL INFLUENCE
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6. IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
• Enrichment 20% to 3.67%
• Stockpile 10,000 to 300 kilograms through
export to Russia
• Centrifuges 20,000 to 6,104
• Duration 10 to 15 years
• Enforcement Iran has a long record of
cheating on its international nuclear
agreements. It has violated international
agreements at least three times in 2014.
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7. • (Iran has skilled and well-educated political
figures and diplomats who know how to talk
to the West does not mean that they are
willing to compromise on U.S. terms, that they
say what they think, or what they say reflects
their true motives. Taqiya – the right to
dissemble or lie to defend the faith – is an all
too familiar part of Iran’s Shiite past).
• Sanctions snap back sanctions.. Easy?
• C4ISR Role. Collaboration with International
entities and Allies to help detect violations?
IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
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8. IRAN’S MISSILE BUILDUP
• The U.S. negotiators dropped demands that
Iran restrict development of intercontinental
ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver
the warheads
• Iran tests-fires ballistic missiles (9 March 2016)
700 and 1400 km.
• Breach of Nuclear Deal or U.N. Security
Council resolution?
• Hundreds if not thousands of ballistic missiles.
Is current C4ISR sufficient to deal with?8

9. CONVENTIONAL AND
ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE
AND DEFENSE
• Iran is using a combination of conventional and
asymmetric means in its military Strategy.
• Concerns only if Iran is attacked or as
retaliation.
• Ballistic Missile.
• Naval Mines.
• Coastal Anti-Ship missiles and artillery.
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10. CONVENTIONAL AND
ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE
AND DEFENSE
• What is more concerning is Iran asymmetrical
means.
• It is using proxies wherever and whenever
possible.
• Armored proxies consist of Hezbollah, Houthis,
Sabreen, etc.. And tens militias in Iraq.
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11. CONVENTIONAL AND
ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE
AND DEFENSE
• Cultural groups and centers with the aim is to
develop these into armored militias in the
future.
• Iran is augmenting this with huge propaganda,
instigation and intimidations.
• Iran is using Shiia ceremonial celebrations (31
days out of 354 days) to preach continuous
hatred and ideology.
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12. CONVENTIONAL AND
ASYMMETRIC DETERRENCE
AND DEFENSE
• Iran has used terrorism in the past and it is
going to use in the future.
• It has tunneled weapons and explosives to
groups in GCC.
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13. REGIONAL INFLUENCE
• Find, follow, warn and eliminate Iranian
presence and its proxies specially the
cultural missions.
• Information war against Iran propaganda.
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14. DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY
THE MIX OF ETHNIC, SECTARIAN,
EXTREMIST THREATS; ONGOING
FIGHTING; AND LONGER-TERM
INSTABILITY IN SYRIA
• Unambiguous designation and declaration of
armed groups as terrorist or legitimate.
• Hezbollah and other foreign militias must be
considered terrorist and should be targeted
during any intervention
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15. DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY
THE MIX OF ETHNIC, SECTARIAN,
EXTREMIST THREATS; ONGOING
FIGHTING; AND LONGER-TERM
INSTABILITY IN SYRIA
• More political and military assistance to
legitimate groups.
• Continuous surveillance and vigilance of
Syrian territories for early warning against
terrorist operations in GCC.
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16. DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY THE MIX
OF ETHNIC, SECTARIAN, AND EXTREMIST
THREATS; ONGOING FIGHTING; AND LONGER-
TERM INSTABILITY IN IRAQ
• It is obvious that Iraq is dominated religiously
and politically by Iran.
• The Iranian system is cloning itself in Iraq.
Ayatollah there and Ayatollah here. An IRCG
there and Shiite Militias here.
• The tone and rhetoric of Iraqis religious and
political figures are not far from their Iranian
compatriots.16

17. DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY THE MIX
OF ETHNIC, SECTARIAN, AND EXTREMIST
THREATS; ONGOING FIGHTING; AND LONGER-
TERM INSTABILITY IN IRAQ
• Iraqi governance is an absolute corrupt and
sectarian. Prosecution continues not only
against Muslims but also against its Shiite.
• Iraqi Army and Militias would not stand ISIS
advances without the massive air strike by the
Allies.
• If they are good at something, they excel in
vengeance from poor civilians and instigating
more violence and prosecution.17

18. DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY THE MIX
OF ETHNIC, SECTARIAN, AND EXTREMIST
THREATS; ONGOING FIGHTING; AND LONGER-
TERM INSTABILITY IN IRAQ
• The future of Iraq is not bright. Destabilization
and terrorism will continue.
• Group terrorism and/or crowd ingression
through Kuwaiti and Saudi borders is a big
possibility.
• Continuous surveillance and vigilance of Iraqi
territories and borders is required.18

19. DEALING WITH THE THREAT POSED BY
THE CIVIL WAR IN YEMEN
• Applying UN 2216.
• Houthis Disarmament.
• Nation building and aids.
• Continuous military operation against AGAP
and ISIS.
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20. Challenges To C4ISR
• Large Forces
• More Integrations
• Collateral Damages
• More Players
• Complications and Training (not only
technological but also conceptual).
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21. GCC C4ISR Architecture
Warning
Ordering
Execution
Assessing
Collection
sharing
Processing
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Strategy
Doctrine
Directions

22. Conclusion
• As we comprehend the future threat concept
and realize their significance and
ramifications.
• We need to asses every element of our C4ISR.
• C4ISR is not an Air Command and Control. It is
a holistic system that include all domains (Air,
Land, Naval, Cyber).
• Latest technology and integrations.
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23. References
• U.S.News http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2015/04/27/10-
ways-obamas-iran-nuclear-agreement-fails
• NPR News http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/07/14/422920192/6-things-you-should-know-about-the-iran-
nuclear-deal
• CSIS http://csis.org/publication/saudi-arabia-and-united-states-common-
interests-and-continuing-sources-tension
• CNN http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/09/middleeast/iran-missile-test/
• CSIS http://csis.org/publication/continuing-duel-iran-containment-
deterrence-and-iranian-arms-control-agreement
• CIA https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ym.html
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