1. An analysis of policy conducted by:
Lauren Moloney-Egnatios
Prepared for:
Schools Online
Lebanon’s Draft Law for Service Provider Licensing Regulation
(2009)
Draft Law passed on February 10, 2010
SIS 645: International Communications and Cultural Policy

2. Table of Contents:
I.Executive Summary
II.Background
III.The Issue (as relevant to Schools Online)
IV.Policy Analysis
A.Description
B.Communications Model Analysis
C.Strengths and Weaknesses
V.Recommendations for Policy Improvement
VI. Implications for Lebanon
VII. Implications for International Relations
VII.Bibliography
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3. I. Executive Summary:
Internet penetration rates in Lebanon are low compared to neighboring Arab countries and internet connectivity
is one of the slowest in the Middle East. This report analyzes the 2009-2010 draft law for Service Provider Licensing
Regulation created by the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency. The original objective of the draft law was an
attempt to combat illegal ISPs, improve internet penetration rates and the quality of internet services in Lebanon.
However, this report reveals that there is still a large disparity between the written law and the reality of the
telecommunications sector. The analysis will describe the articles and provisions relevant to Schools Online’s mission,
an international NGO combating the global and regional digital divide in the education sector through the
establishment of Internet Learning Centers. Using global communications models as benchmarks for analysis, the
strengths and weaknesses of this policy will be discussed. This report can be utilized by Schools Online to better inform
the organization’s decision to operate in Lebanon in the future. In the conclusion section, implications of the policy will
be outlined and recommendations will be provided to the Lebanese Government as to how the policy can be improved
to promote a more perfect information environment with healthy competition in the telecommunications sector, as
defined by the participatory model of communication.
Introduction:
For the most part, Lebanon has enjoyed a long history of quality education. Most of the country is literate, often in three
or more languages (Arabic, French and English). However, computer (and Internet) penetration in schools, particularly
public schools, is low. Public school curriculum can be outdated and lacks resources necessary to train the next
generation of Lebanese leaders in the latest tools (Metzger, 2001, 3).
Schools Online, attempts to combat the national digital divide while simultaneously, improving nations’ educational
sectors by establishing Internet Learning Centers in developing countries (http://www.schoolsonline.org/). Schools Online
is part of the educational division of Relief International, a humanitarian non-profit agency that provides emergency relief,

4. rehabilitation, development assistance, and program services to vulnerable communities worldwide. It is the mission of
Schools Online to help students gain access and use the communication and information resources of the Internet for
learning and cross-cultural dialogue.
Thus far, Schools Online has not been able to establish an Internet Learning Center in Lebanon. Its mission is very
difficult to achieve with slow, costly and inadequate bandwidth capacities. In the past, Schools Online showed great
commitment to potentially investing in Lebanon’s educational sector. For example, a 2001 USAID report on Beirut
reports that Schools Online donated a significant sum of money to a Lebanese Foundation expanding internet connectivity
in public schools (Metzger, 200, 10). In addition, an informational interview in 2012 revealed that this educational
organization is merely waiting for adequate signs of “ICT infrastructure stability” before investing in the establishment of
ILCs throughout the country. The policy analyzed below in this paper provides recommendations for better informing the
decision of Schools Online about whether ISP licensing and service regulation will, in fact, yield ICT stability the new
business will need to achieve its mission.
II. Background:
Despite it’s politically complex and sectarian government, Lebanon is one of the more democratic countries in the
Middle East. The country’s business climate is friendly in that it does not distinguish between foreign and domestic
investment in commercial policies (State Department:2011 Business Climate Report,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/index.htm). In this way, it is different from some of the neighboring Arab
countries in that new ICT development projects in Lebanon can enjoy the general business climate in the country: trade is
open, taxation is reasonable, and related commercial policies compare favorably to other countries in the Middle East.
Historically, the Lebanese Government held a monopoly over the international and national telecommunications
sector. The Ministry of Telecommunications (MOT) solely owned and/or licensed all fixed, mobile, and wireless
networks. OGERO (Organisme de Gestion et d'Exploitation de l'ex Radio Orient) is a 100% government owned
telecommunications company established in 1972 and supervised by the Ministry of Telecommunications
(http://www.ogero.gov.lb/Published/EN/profile.html). In 1996, through the support of the Ministry of
Telecommunications, OGERO played a pioneering role in introducing internet services to the first country in the Levant
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5. region: Lebanon. Before the attempt to privatize the telecommunications sector in 2002, Ogero was the only entity in
Lebanon responsible for the operations, maintenance, sales, marketing, billing and management of the fixed telecom
network in the country (Open Net Initiative: Internet Filtering in Lebanon, 2009).
In 2002, MOT issued a new law for the privatization of the ICT sector (United Nations Report, 2009). In efforts to
transform Lebanon’s telecommunications market and revitalize the economy that suffered from years of civil war, the
Lebanese Government made it a national imperative to turn the telecommunications sector into a competitive market. Tied
to this initiative MOT established an independent regulatory agency, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority.
Upon appointment of its board members in 2007, the TRA began official operation. Established by Law 431 (see below),
it is legally mandated to liberalize, regulate, and develop telecommunications in Lebanon. It’s primary duties are to
encourage investment, competition and transparency in the private and public sector and consequently, ICT growth,
through the regulation of licensing and the monitoring of dominant or abusive activity in the market that inhibit
competition (TRA website: http://www.tra.gov.lb/). At the time of its establishment, the international sphere believed that
development of the TRA was a significant step towards liberalization and restructuring the telecommunications sector.
The 2002 Telecommunications Law 431 is the current law governing telecommunications sector and delineating the
powers and duties of both the TRA and the Ministry of Telecommunications. It recognizes the Lebanese Government’s
monopoly over international telecommunications and national phone network (Open Net Initiative, 2009), yet attempts to
liberalize the national telecommunications sector by opening it up for private participation. For example, the law allows
telecommunications service providers to set their own rates and tariffs based on market prices and conditions
(Telecommunications Law 431, 2002, Article 28). Currently, there are 15 licensed ISPs in Lebanon: Cyberia, IDM,
Fiberlink Networks, Sodetel Internet, Terranet, Trinec, Netlink, Farahnet, Virtual ISP, Lebanon OnLine, Moscanet,
Comnet ISP, Pros-services, Broadband Plus, and Keblon. In 2007, the Ministry of Telecommunications took a major step
and began offering ISP services at the same rates as private sector ISPs. In doing so, it was MOT’s objective to directly
intervene in order to stimulate competition with the private sector (United Nations, 2009).
III. Issue:
Before the 2002 law attempting to privatize the national telecommunications market, the 100% state owned
company, OGERO, set premium rates for internet connectivity. As a result, the internet was a service reserved for the

6. upper socio-economic class who could pay the high connectivity fees. Due to the centralized and limited bandwidth
capacity, internet service was characterized by poor quality and outdated infrastructure.
The centralized ISP and lack of modern ICT infrastructure led to massive inefficiencies for individuals and
businesses in need of quality internet service. Due to poor development of ICT infrastructure, there was (and still is) a
sizable digital divide between rural and urban communities in Lebanon. Those who were able to subscribe to internet
services experienced slow speeds due to a lack of broadband capacity that could accommodate multiple users
simultaneously. The centralized system also increased the presence of illegal ISPs whose quality and service lacked
regulation and monitoring by a governing authority. These illegal ISPs contributed to the problem of internet speed
inefficiency by squeezing bandwidth capacities to their limits, making it increasingly difficult to connect to the internet
with more users sharing constrained broadband width.
Thus, businesses needing a reliable, efficient and affordable internet connection had limited options.
Consequently, Lebanon’s highly educated and creative workforce had limited job opportunities and many citizens began
to seek opportunities elsewhere, causing the economy to suffer greatly after the political turmoil of 2006. Most businesses
chose to invest in other countries with more ICT development, quality ISPs offering available bandwidth capacities at
affordable prices. This is the case of Schools Online. Its mission to spread Internet Learning Centers in rural communities
of ICT developing countries as education development initiatives is impossible to achieve with slow, costly and
inadequate bandwidth capacities.
With the objective of combatting illegal ISPs, improving internet penetration rates and the quality of internet
services in Lebanon, the TRA created the Service Provider Licensing Draft Law in 2009. It was approved by the Ministry
of Telecommunications and passed by the State Council in 2010. It attempts to solidify the privatization process of the
service provider telecommunications market. Pertaining to internet services, the draft law outlines the application process
and procedure, as well as the provisions for ISP licensees. On the surface, this draft law seems to liberalize the ISP market
to stimulate much-needed competition in the telecommunications sector. Given that internet penetration rates were at
almost 40% in 2010, an 11% increase since 2009 (International Telecommunications Union: Statistics, 2012), some even
believe that the TRA’s regulatory framework for service providers has contributed to significant ICT development over
the past 5 years.
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7. However, the policy analysis below reveals that if the Lebanese government wants to truly liberalize the
telecommunications sector, it has a long way to go. In fact, the Ministry of Telecommunications still has a strong hold
over key ICT infrastructure making it impossible for ISPs to operate independently from the government of Lebanon. In
addressing the underlying infrastructure issues of the TRA, its draft law of 2009 and the power of MOT in the
telecommunications sector, this report will reveal how the Lebanese Government can better shape their policies to
improve internet penetration rates and continue to develop ICT infrastructure in Lebanon.
IV.Policy Foundation:
A.Description and Objectives: The main objective of the TRA’s Service Provider Licensing Regulation of 2009 is to
increase competition in the telecommunications service provider market and consequently, lower internet connectivity
prices, improve internet penetration rates and deliver higher quality internet service in doing so. If the draft law achieved
such goals, educational non-profits such as Schools Online could achieve its mission to improve internet connectivity in
public schools. Thus, an analysis of the draft law is needed to reveal if the policy is meeting its set objectives.
The articles that are pertinent to Schools Online’s mission are as follows: article fifteen, section one, regarding the
application process and procedure for class licenses without radio frequencies; and article twenty-one, section one (c)
outlining provisions for all license grantees. In short, the two articles relevant to Schools Online have to do with the TRA
setting up an official application process and procedure for licensing ISPs and holding them accountability to quality
standards upon granting them the license. Below is a description of the relevant articles.
First, article 15, section one is significant in that it legitimizes the Lebanese Government’s imperative to privatize ISP
ownership. Section 1a) declares that “anyone wishing to apply for a Class License without Radio Frequencies” [can do so,
if the person submits in writing the application provided by the TRA] (TRA: Service Provider Licensing Regulation Draft
Law, 2009). In creating low entry barriers for private sector applicants, the policy is encouraging both domestic and
foreign ISP companies to invest in Lebanon. The underlying assumption behind this article is that increased ISP
ownership translates into a more competitive internet service market which would likely decrease prices for internet
service consumers. Consequently, with lower prices, the assumption is that overall net usage in the country would
improve.

8. In creating an open application process for ISPs, the intention behind article fifteen was also to deter internet users
from connecting using illegal ISPs. Privatizing ISPs allows for increased consumer choice when selecting how (and for
how much) consumers will connect to the internet. Moreover, under perfect market conditions, competition in the sector
drives prices down as companies compete for customers. Before ISP licenses were open to private companies, Lebanon
was notorious for illegal ISPs. Illegal ISPs’ connections were not only unreliable and failed to protect their users, but the
lack of monitoring of quality allowed illegal ISPs to squeeze bandwidth capacities to their limits, slowing down internet
efficiency and discouraging users from successfully connecting. Article fifteen’s application process attracts domestic and
foreign ISP companies interested in competing to bring high quality service to its customers.
Article twenty-one, section one c, defines the regulation of ISP services quality by the TRA. The provision states:
“Conditions regarding the protection of Users and Customers, such as the provision of detailed and accurate
information, especially about the quality of services, and the provision of a procedure for complaints and disputes,
publication and adequate notice of any change in access conditions, including tariffs, quality and availability of service”
must be in accordance of the Telecommunications Law 431 and made available to the TRA (TRA: Draft Law, 2009).
Before the operational establishment of the TRA in 2007, there was no monitoring agency acting as a “watchdog” and on
behalf of citizens’ interests. This section of the policy holds ISPs accountable for protecting users’ information and right
to dispute or make complaints regarding the services they receive from the ISP. This section also mandates transparency
from ISP license holders. If quality services are not being delivered by ISPs, the user has the right to make complaints.
Moreover, ISPs cannot change the availability of their services, quality or price, without making the modifications known
to the TRA.
In addition, Article 21 mandates that the TRA has the right to hold ISPs accountable to conditions defined in
accordance to the telecommunications law 431 for delivering quality service. For instance, the Telecommunications Law
holds ISPs responsible for meeting equipment and quality service standards (article 23) and in the case of monopoly
pricing, the TRA can impose prices and tariff standards for ISPs with significant power in the market. This article’s
objective is to encourage a more liberal service provider market, as well as, attempt to promote businesses’ and
individuals’ subscription to legal ISPs by acting as regulators of ISP licensees’ quality standards, pricing structure,
customer complaints and user protection.
B.Assumptions and Communication Policy Models:
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9. The ISP license regulation policy reflects the government’s attempt to transform from a Public Service model (in a
quasi-development model state) to a Liberal model with a public interest tradition. Before 2002, the government had a
monopoly over the domestic and international telecommunications sector. Its actions in the telecommunications sector
reflected the Public Service model in many ways. First, in 1996, the government first introduced the internet in Lebanon
out of “public necessity”. This decision reflects the Public Service model in that the government was the sole provider of
the internet and set the rates for such service (Venturelli, 2012). Using this approach before draft law of 2009, information
services were a “public service” to be provided by the government, not a market commodity.
Recognizing the need to bolster a suffering economy and retain its highly skilled workforce, the government made
a quasi-development communications model decision to develop Lebanon’s ICT infrastructure and informational services
for economic gain. In collaboration with international governments, NGOs and the private sector, Lebanon’s ICT policies
and infrastructure have significantly improved to better reflect its free market economy. The ISP license regulation draft
law of 2009 was a first step towards liberalizing the telecommunications market and moving towards a more Liberal
model of communication.
However, given that the telecommunications sector is far from free of government intervention, the policy more
accurately reflects the Liberal communications model with a public interest tradition than it does the free market tradition.
First, similar to the Liberal model with a free market tradition, the policy assumes that privatizing ISP licensing will
increase competition and help develop the market place of ideas. This is reflected in the policies nondiscriminatory
regulations and low entry barriers for allowing anyone to apply for an ISP license, so long as proper procedure is
followed.
Another feature of the policy that greatly reflects the Liberal Model with a public interest tradition is the fact that
the government established an independent regulatory agency to serve as the “watchdog of public interest”: the
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority. The TRA not only determines who is best financially positioned and equipped
to become an ISP, but it also regulates the quality of internet service each ISP delivers. In this way, the TRA is serving
citizens’ interests in screening the application process for ISPs, and monitoring for potential abuses of the market that
would hinder the ability of citizens’ to access the internet efficiently.

10. In addition, the TRA regulates the licensing of public airwaves such as radio frequencies. The Liberal model with
a public interest tradition assumes that public airwaves are a public resource that requires regulation. In this way, the TRA
is serving as a regulatory agency or a “watchdog by monitoring who is using public airwaves and how they are being
utilized. Furthermore, in outlining the conditions of services for ISP license holders in article twenty-one, the TRA is also
acting as the regulatory agency for protecting users’ personal information and right to dispute services provided by ISP
owners.
Yet another feature of the policy is characteristic of the government’s attempt to transform the
telecommunications sector from reflecting a Public Service model to a Liberal model with a public interest tradition. The
ISP licensing regulation policy assumes the characteristic notion that the, “marketplace of ideas works most of the time
but not always” (Venturelli, 2012). This assumption is reflected in observing the monopoly over key ICT infrastructure
that the operating arm of the Ministry of Telecommunications, Ogero, has in the telecommunications sector. It has almost
total control over international telecommunications, buying and selling bandwidth capacity, national telephone fixed line
connections, and even an advantage over DSL services. Since 2007, MOT became an ISP, as well. Therefore, the
government is directly intervening in the market, driving competition with private companies, and forcing the free market
to behave the way that the free market theory says it should.
Lastly, it is clear that the policy reflects the Liberal communications model with a public interest tradition in that
there are clear provisions for protecting the newly privatized market against monopolies on telecommunications service.
Under article twenty-one, section h, the TRA requires all license holders to “promote competition” and “comply with
specific conditions which may be imposed on Service Providers with Significant Market Power”(Draft Law 2009). The
Significant Market Power law defines “criteria for identifying a significant market power”, potential abuses of service
providers with SMP and regulations to be applied to service providers with SMP” (Significant Market Power, 2009).
Clear regulation and monitoring of internet service providers market power is a strong indication that preventing
monopoly is a major issue for Lebanon’s ICT policies at this time. Strong anti-trust laws are the only way the Lebanese
Government is able to support the competitive open telecommunications market the government is striving to achieve.
C.Strengths: Utilizing the participatory model as a benchmark of success in analyzing policies such as the 2009 ISP
Licensing Regulation Draft Law, one is able to better comprehend this policy’s strengths. The first is that it demands
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11. greater transparency of laws and regulations between the private sector, government and public sector. Article twenty-
one, section one mandates that quality of service is reported to the TRA, as well as requiring ISPs to provide users with
fair and equal opportunity to report complaints and disputes regarding the services provided. In addition, ISP licensees
must report any changes in tariffs, quality or availability of services, as well as provisions regarding the quality of
equipment being utilized (TRA: Draft Law, 2009).
Another strength of this policy as it relates to the participatory model is that it supports low structural barriers for
new entrants and competitors. Article fifteen, section one, does not distinguish between foreign and domestic ISP license
applicants. So long as proper procedure is followed for the application process, the policy reflects open and
nondiscriminatory regulations in allowing anyone to apply for an ISP license. Since this policies inception in 2010, fifteen
ISPs, have received licenses and are fully operating in Lebanon.
An additional strength of the policy is that diverse capital sources have been sought by the TRA and the Lebanese
Government to promote local entrepreneurship in information services. For example, Lebanon’s Government passed the
“The Investment Development
Law” in 2001. It authorizes the “Investment Development Authority of Lebanon” (IDAL) to award licenses and grant
special incentives, exemptions and facilities to larger enterprises making new investments in information services (TRA:
Investment Institutions. http://www.tra.gov.lb/Investment-institutions). In an attempt to attract foreign investments, IDAL
launched in 2003 the "Investors Matching Service" to facilitate the creation of strategic international-local partnerships
through joint venture, equity participation, acquisition, and others. In the last few years, many factors have encouraged
foreign companies to set up offices in Lebanon. According to statistics from the Lebanese Ministry of Economy and Trade
45 foreign companies launched offices, representative offices or branches in Lebanon in 2005 (Lebanese Ministry of
Economy: Statistics on Foreign Companies, http://www.economy.gov.lb/index.php/subCatInfo/2/143/8/3).
Increased competition in the ICT sector is expected as the TRA financial division incentivizes more domestic and
foreign investments. The ICT sector of Lebanon is increasingly attractive after a World Bank report assessed that a “10%
increase in broadband infrastructure could result in a 1.2-1.5% increase in GDP” (The Business Year: Off the Blocks,
2012). A more robust ICT infrastructure will attract local and foreign businesses and encourage them to invest and
establish offices in Lebanon.

12. Lastly, one of the greatest strengths of Lebanon’s communications policy is that there is a complete absence of
censorship and technical filtering by ISPs and government (Open Net Initiative, 2009). The lack of content regulation on
the internet reflects the overall liberal media scene and free market economy. This strength aligns with Lebanese press
laws which do not restrict freedom of speech (Open Net Initiative, 2009). The country is home to many religions and
sectarian political parties. It is no surprise that the Lebanese Government and telecommunications sector do not attempt to
regulate expression among these diverse voices and offers a plethora of outlets both on the web and among other media
sources for diverse perspectives and voices to be freely expressed.
C.Weaknesses: Though the Service Provider Licensing Regulation draft law has strengths, there are many fundamental
weak points of the policy. First, while it was the policy’s objective to improve the quality of internet service provided and
increase internet penetration rates by increasing competition and lowering costs for internet services, the draft law does
not actually take into account the availability of bandwidth capacity for sale to ISPs. ISPs have the option to buy
bandwidth capacity from the government owned company, Ogero, or private international bandwidth providers. Due to
the government’s strong hold on key ICT infrastructure and equipment such as bandwidth capacity, the policy is actually
strengthening ISPs dependency on the government when purchasing bandwidth capacity.
Moreover, the government has the potential to control the market by withholding bandwidth capacity for sale,
causing prices to rise in the private market. As a result of the government’s power in the market, bandwidth pricing in
Lebanon is extremely high relative to other countries. Because the policy fails to take into account this unequal power
structure, ISPs incur high costs for bandwidth capacity and these costs are passed down from ISPs to the customer. The
high pricing restricts economic growth as businesses invest in more ICT developed countries with larger bandwidth for
cheaper prices. This pricing structure also reduces net usage so that only upper socio-economic classes can afford to
subscribe to internet service. Thus, the policy is weak in that it does not allow for high levels of internet penetration, fails
to provide access of internet services to all social groups and consequently, only the upper and middle socio economic
class are represented on the internet.
On that same note, the policy does not address that key components of the ICT infrastructure that favor the
government owned company, OGERO. For example, in 2007, the Ministry of Telecommunications launched DSL service
in Lebanon. In order to launch the service, the Ministry and ISPs signed a memorandum agreeing that Ogero would
compete “on equal footing” with the private sector in bringing DSL services to Lebanon (Abbassi, 2011). However, given
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13. that OGERO maintains ownership over key infrastructure such as landlines, it was and has been much quicker and easier
for OGERO to provide DSL service to customers than for ISPs. Thus, in failing to address these significant market power
inequalities, the policy weakens the private sector and increases the power of the state who is a merchant both buying and
selling key ICT infrastructure to its competitors.
The last weak point of the policy has to do with a lack of transparency around minimum services that ISP
licensees are required to provide. Though the Service Provider Licensing Regulation law defines the applications process
and mandates that ISPs provide the TRA with information regarding the quality, availability and price of its services, it
does not set a minimum bandwidth speed that the ISP has to provide its customers. According to surveys by the regulatory
agency, TRA, the average broadband access speed was at less than 1Mbps (TRA: Broadband Access-Economic Benefit
and Challenges, 2009). Resulting, both individual and business users cannot benefit from broadband during peak net use
hours: the more people online, the slower the internet. In efforts to enhance the Service Provider Licensing policy, the
State Council passed a decree in August 23, 2011 to set a minimum speed to 1 MB per second and decrease the monthly
cost of internet services for ISP subscribers. The decree is expected to improve the internet penetration rate and challenge
the two main issues that have hindered the ICT sector and economy from developing in the past.
V.Recommendations
The Service Provider Licensing Regulation of 2010 can be greatly improved. First, the government should consider
some qualitative changes in the policy itself before looking to increase the overall quantity of service providers in the
country. The Lebanese Government assumed that increasing the quantity of ISPs without releasing its stronghold over
key ICT infrastructure, such as bandwidth capacity, would positively impact the overall internet penetration in the
country. However, it is clear through this analysis report that until the government releases its stronghold on bandwidth
capacity and/or increases total bandwidth capacity available in Lebanon, non-profits like Schools Online will continue to
have issues with slow internet speeds at high prices.
• It is not recommended that Schools Online establish offices in Lebanon until the telecommunications
sector reflects a truly liberal, free market, free from government intervention and stronghold over key
ICT infrastructure.

14. Today, the Lebanese Government has already begun to improve the Service Provider Licensing Regulation of
2010 in issuing the August 23, 2011 decree that sets a minimum broadband speed to 1 MB/second and lowers the monthly
cost of internet service. The more efficient internet speed will help businesses and individual users alike, improving the
quality of services (in setting a minimum broadband access speed) that ISPs must provide at a regulated price. The
lowered monthly cost will induce populations from lower socio-economic classes to subscribe to ISPs and consequently,
the total net penetration will rise. The Service Provider Licensing Regulation in conjunction with this new decree should
incentivize initiatives such as Schools Online to establish Internet Learning Centers throughout Lebanon. The two policies
will liberalize ISP ownership, providing a variety of services to choose from and qualitatively improve ISP services in
setting a minimum broadband access speed to 1MB/second.
As a means to incentivizing development in the education sector and ICT infrastructure of Lebanon, the policy
could provide even lower monthly cost for new businesses and non-profits with missions such as Schools Online that
help developing countries bring internet connectivity to schools and rural communities. With less operational funds
from which to develop their initiative, Schools Online would be more likely to establish and sustain Internet Learning
Centers in Lebanon if the monthly internet subscription costs lowered overall operational costs. Providing financial
incentives to non-profits like Schools Online would aid in the development of the ICT infrastructure of Lebanon in that
there would be a significant increase in multiple public access points for internet services in more isolated, rural
communities. In other words, a policy that lowers cost for non-profits developing the education or ICT sector would
contribute to the reduction of the national digital divide in Lebanon.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the policy could be enhanced by providing increased regulation over the
market power of the state owned fixed telecommunications company, OGERO. OGERO is the only merchant in
Lebanon that buys and sells bandwidth in the local market. Due to its dominant position in the telecommunications market
over land lines, DSL services and its ability to supply bandwidth capacities to private ISPs and companies, OGERO has
weakened the private sectors’ ability to compete with the government (Chakrani, 2012). With a policy that more explicitly
regulates the power of OGERO and defines the terms for bandwidth supply, the private sector will be better positioned to
compete freely with the government without having to worry about the state owned company abusing its market power.
More specifically, the policy should ban OGERO from withholding available bandwidths from sale to competing ISPs,
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15. forcing ISPs to buy at higher prices from the market or, worse, buy from illegal bandwidth supplies. In doing so, the
policy would be more reflective of a liberal, free market model of communication. This approach would ensure that the
ISP market more closely mirrors Lebanon’s free market economy and is protected from any monopolies over key ICT
infrastructure fundamental to the telecommunications sector’s growth.
VI.Implications:
Lebanon: Further government action is needed to transform Lebanon’s telecommunications sector into a liberal, free
market economy. Implementing the aforementioned recommendations would yield several opportunities for the nation. By
helping the private sector compete on equal footing with the government and increasing available bandwidth capacity in
Lebanon, the government is creating a truly liberal, free telecommunications market. This thriving market would provide
jobs to thousands of the highly educated and skilled Lebanese workforce in need of employment opportunities. With the
retention of its skilled labor and IT trained youth, Lebanon could become a regional ICT powerhouse in the future.
Development of Communications Policies in Other Countries: Analysis of the Service Provider Licensing Regulation of
2009-2010 yields several implications for international relations and development of communications policies in other
countries. For one, the policy demonstrates to the international public sphere that while many collaborative efforts have
been made to create regulatory framework and policies liberalizing the telecommunications sector, in practice, the
telecommunications sector is still not a truly free market. So long as the government continues to have a strong hold over
key ICT infrastructure and supply, the private sector will not be able to successfully compete against the state. Thus,
international businesses and government seeking to collaborate with Lebanon need to be aware of this large discrepancy
between the written law and reality.
Many lessons can be gleaned from this policy’s strengths. In viewing the Service Provider Licensing Regulation, other
countries with governments that have historically had a monopoly over the telecommunications sector and/or whose
communications policies reflected that of the Public Service model can observe ways that they can begin to shift the
sector toward a more liberal model of communications model. First, these countries should begin to privatize service
provider ownership through the removal of structural barriers for new entrants and competitors as Lebanon’s TRA did in
the draft law. Second, by establishing an independent public agent as the “watchdog” of citizen interests, the government
is removing itself from the regulatory role. A public, independent agency like TRA allows for a balanced regime of

16. checks and balances in determining non-discriminatory, standard and transparent policies around who enters the private
market and holds a license to compete to provide services. However, contrary to the case of Lebanon’s TRA, international
governments should make every attempt to allow the regulatory agency to act as independent from national government
influence as possible.
International governments can also learn from the shortcomings of the Service Provider Regulation policy. For
example, the TRA failed to take into account the speed caps that ISPs often establish in their terms of user service due to
limited broadband capacity. Governments seeking to transform their telecommunications sector into a liberal, free market,
while simultaneously developing their ICT infrastructure, need to explicitly define the minimum acceptable bandwidth
speed to be made available for ISP subscribing customers. Policy makers must also be aware of who the main suppliers
are of key ICT infrastructure and equipment. If it is the objective of international governments to completely liberalize the
telecommunications market, they must be sure policies and regulatory frameworks privatize all key ICT infrastructure and
give incentive (in the form of reduced prices or easy access to ICT resources) to private companies entering a market
formerly monopolized by the government.
VII. Bibliography
1. Metzger, Jonathon. “Review of the ICT Sector in Lebanon and ICT Opportunities for
USAID/Beirut”.USAID/BEIRUT, March 2001, pg. 10. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacu381.pdf.
2. Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs: Department of State 2011 Business Climate Report,
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2011/index.htm Accessed June 15, 2012).
3. OpenNet Initiative: Internet Filtering in Lebanon, 2009. Accessed June 12, 2012.
4. United Nations Report: National Profile of the Information Society in Lebanon, New York: 2009. (Access via the web:
http://isper.escwa.un.org/Portals/0/National%20Profiles/2007/English/Lebanon-07-E.pdf).
5. Telecommunications Regulatory Agency website: http://www.tra.gov.lb/, accessed June 16, 2012
6. OGERO website: http://www.ogero.gov.lb/Published/EN/profile.html. Accessed June 12, 2012.
7. International Telecommunications Union: Statistics: https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/index.html, updated in 2012.
Accessed June 14, 2012.
8. Telecommunications Regulatory Authority: Service Provider Licensing Regulation Draft Law, 2009.
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17. 9. Telecommunications Regulatory Authority: Investment Institutions. http://www.tra.gov.lb/Investment-institutions.
Accessed June 14, 2012.
10. The Business Year: Off the Blocks, 2012. http://www.thebusinessyear.com/publication/article/2/50/lebanon-2012/off-
the-blocks. Accessed June 17, 2012.
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