McNair Capstone - Integration of Women into the Infantry 12 May 2014

Running head: THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN SOLDIERS 1
The Integration of Women Soldiers into the Army Infantry
Joseph E. McNair
Webster University

THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN SOLDIERS 2
Abstract
The full integration of women soldiers into the US Army infantry occupational specialty
begins in 2015. The purpose of this research project is to determine how effective the US Army
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC)
serves as a microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration of women soldiers into male
Army infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale. LDAC serves as the best
contemporary example of women in the infantry because it is the only useful model of gender
integrated, simulated infantry combat training occurring in the Army today.
An extensive literature review was conducted, and unit cohesion and morale were
determined to be the most problematic to the successful integration of women soldiers into the
infantry. A questionnaire was distributed to a sample of 51 male and female cadets of the
University of Central Oklahoma’s (UCO) Department of Military Science, 11 that had
experienced LDAC gender integrated infantry training and 40 that had not. Additionally,
available faculty of the UCO Department of Military Science, three regular Army or full time
officers and noncommissioned officers, and one retired infantry DA civilian, were polled in
order to provide a more holistic representation of the views of the UCO Department of Military
Science.

Disclaimer
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the United States Department of Defense (DOD) or the
Department of the Army (DA).

Table of Contents
Chapter I - Introduction........................................................................................6
Introduction ..........................................................................................................6
Statement of the problem and sub problems .......................................................6
The hypothesis......................................................................................................7
Delimitations ........................................................................................................8
Definition of Terms..............................................................................................9
Abbreviations .....................................................................................................11
Assumptions .......................................................................................................13
Importance of the study......................................................................................13
Conclusion..........................................................................................................14
Chapter II – Review of Literature......................................................................15
Introduction ........................................................................................................15
Sub problem 1: Army culture ............................................................................17
1975 and 1976 Army ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp..............................21
The role of DGCDAR and Army reorganization in shifting the culture
of the Army ....................................................................................................25
DGCDAR: Co-location of gender integrated non-combat units with
non-gender integrated combat units in OEF/OIF ……………………… 27
DGCDAR: Attaching women soldiers below the brigade level in OEF/OIF ..29
Combat performance of women soldiers in OEF/OIF......................................30
Sub problem 2: Soldier 2020 and retaining Army infantry standards..............33

Soldier 2020 Physical Standards Assessment ...................................................36
Soldier 2020 TRAC Gender Integration Study.................................................38
Conclusion..........................................................................................................38
Chapter III – Research Methodology ................................................................40
Introduction ........................................................................................................40
Research Design.................................................................................................41
Selection of the Sample......................................................................................44
Data Collection...................................................................................................45
Conclusion..........................................................................................................46
Chapter IV – Analysis Results...........................................................................47
Introduction ........................................................................................................47
Summary of Results...........................................................................................48
Summary of Conclusions...................................................................................52
Chapter V – Conclusion and Recommendations ..............................................54
Introduction ........................................................................................................54
Recommendations..............................................................................................54
Conclusion..........................................................................................................55
References ..........................................................................................................56
Appendix A Questionnaire ................................................................................59

Chapter 1
Introduction
On January 24, 2013, the Secretary of Defense rescinded the 1994 Direct Ground Combat
Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCDAR), which prohibited women soldiers from being
assigned to combat units below the brigade level, and prohibited collocation of gender integrated
non-combat units with non-gender integrated combat units, in addition to other restrictions. In
2015, the full integration of women soldiers into the Army’s infantry occupational specialty will
begin, and there are apparent and unintelligible challenges associated with this endeavor,
specifically the effect integration of women in the infantry will have on male infantry units’
cohesion and morale (Burrelli, 2013).
Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this research project is to determine how effective the US Army Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) serves as
a microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration of women soldiers into male Army
infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale. “With the exception of
Noncommissioned Officer training during the Warrior Leader Course, LDAC serves as the best
integrated, simulated infantry combat training occurring in the Army today” (K. Vaughn,
personal communication, April 21, 2014).
Sub Problems

The first sub problem facing the full integration of women soldiers in the infantry is the
Army culture. The Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA), the senior most advisor to the Chief of
Staff of the Army (CSA) on all enlisted-related matters, particularly in areas affecting Soldier
training and quality of life (Wikipedia, 2014), described culture as “the first and largest obstacle
the Army must overcome” (SMA: Review of Standards first step in Soldier 2020) to integrate
women soldiers into combat arms, which consists of the infantry, field artillery, armor, and
special operations occupational specialties. There is still a large proportion of soldiers that
disagree with the integration of women soldiers into combat arms based upon gender differences
and, perhaps, poor past experiences from ineffective, ad hoc gender integration in combat zones.
The second sub problem facing the full integration of women soldiers in the infantry is
retaining tough infantry standards. Based upon an extensive literary review, retaining the highest
infantry standards was identified as the most common refrain for male and female soldiers alike,
and an additional obstacle to the successful integration of women soldiers in the infantry. In
order to mitigate these concerns, Soldier 2020, the Army’s strategic campaign to integrate
women soldiers into combat arms and retain the trust of the American people, has emphasized
that the Army “will not sacrifice warfighting capability, the trust of the Congress, or that of the
American people as we seek to enhance force readiness and capability” (Bromberg, 2013). As a
result, the Army is conducting a review and validation of physical requirements for each military
occupational specialty and, in the future, will require its soldiers, regardless of gender, to pass
these physical requirements in order to be awarded a specialty (Bromberg, 2013).
Hypothesis

The hypothesis for this research paper is that US Army ROTC LDAC serves as a
microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration of women soldiers into male Army
infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale. Additionally, it is presumed that the
questionnaire of UCO cadets will suggest that unit cohesion and morale will not decline
significantly once women are admitted into the infantry in 2015.
Delimitations
The 2013 repeal of the 1994 DGCDAR is a Department of Defense initiative and
therefore not a topic of study because its predominant focus on gender issues. This study is not
focused on gender issues and is limited to the Department of the Army and its efforts to integrate
women into the infantry branch under the auspices of the Army’s Soldier 2020 campaign.
This study is further limited to the University of Central Oklahoma Army ROTC’s
Military Science and Leadership (MSL) I-IV cadets (freshmen through senior cadets); 11 senior
cadets (MSL IV) that had experienced LDAC gender integrated infantry training and the
remaining 40 that had not. The junior and senior cadets (MSL III and MSL IV, respectively),
had more Army and life experience than freshmen and sophomore cadets (MSL I and II,
respectively), and, most importantly, the MSL III and MSL IV cadets were contracted to serve in
the Army, and the majority of MSL I and MSL II cadets were not; the implication being the
MSL I and II underclassmen would provide a more balanced, open minded opinion than the
upperclassmen, which had already formulated personal opinions about the integration of women
soldiers into the infantry. The available regular Army and DA civilians comprising the faculty of
the UCO Department of Military Science were also polled to confirm their opinions generally
reflect those of the Army, and also provide a more holistic representation of the opinions of those

assigned to the UCO Department of Military Science. During research it was discovered that
only a few writers had focused their research on the opinions of ROTC cadets during the
integration of women into ROTC training in 1972, and this lack of ROTC opinion about the
integration of women soldiers into the infantry became the focus of this research paper. Other
university ROTC students were not surveyed based upon a lack of Army Cadet Command
authority to do so.
Because of the researcher’s increased physical proximity to cadets, a largely quantitative,
slightly qualitative questionnaire was used to poll the opinions of MSL I – IV (freshmen through
senior) cadets at UCO, as well as the available regular Army and DA civilians comprising the
faculty of the UCO Department of Military Science. The sample of UCO cadet and ROTC
faculty was small enough to justify a more thorough questionnaire with 12 quantitative, and two
qualitative questions.
The DOD specific literature review was limited because of the sheer breadth of the topic;
the only time DOD literature was reviewed was to gain context and understanding of the DA
problem from a larger perspective. Finally, the integration of women soldiers into the Army
engineers and field artillery was not studied because these efforts are currently ongoing. The
integration of women into the Army infantry is still in the developing phases and this research
has the ability to be integrated into the Army’s literary review efforts headed by the Army
Training and Doctrine Command’s Analysis Center (TRAC).
Definition of terms
US Army infantry mission statement: “The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by
means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault with fire,

close combat, and counterattack. The infantry will engage the enemy with combined arms in all
operational environments to bring about his defeat” (US Army Field Manual 3-21.8, 2007).
Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) mission: “TRADOC recruits and trains
soldiers, supports unit training, develops adaptive leaders - both Soldier and civilian; TRADOC
guides the Army through doctrine, and shapes the Army by building and integrating formations,
capabilities, and materiel” (TRADOC, 2014).
Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCDAR): A January 1994
Department of Defense ruling that defined direct ground combat as,
Engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while
being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact
with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward
on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy by fire, maneuver,
and shock effect.
DGCDAR prohibited the assignment of women to units below the brigade level whose primary
mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground. Additionally, it further restricted the
assignment of women,
-where the Service Secretary attests that the costs of appropriate berthing and
privacy arrangements are prohibitive;
-where units are and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate and
remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women;

-where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and Special
Operations Forces missions; and
-where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast
majority of women Service members.
Soldier 2020: Soldier 2020 is founded on three principles which are closely aligned with this
research topic.
1. To maintain the dominance of our nation’s war fighting forces by preserving unit
readiness, cohesion and morale. 2. Validate both physical and mental occupational
performance standards for all MOSs, initially focusing on those currently closed to
women. 3. Set the conditions so all soldiers, male and female, have an opportunity
to succeed as their talents dictate (Cone, 2013). Soldier 2020 is comprised of two
efforts headed by TRADOC. First, in collaboration with USARIEM, is a study of
the physical demands required for each MOS throughout the Army, beginning with
the MOSs currently closed to women. The second effort, led by TRAC, is an
extensive study of the institutional and cultural factors associated with integrating
women into previously closed MOSs (Haviland, 2013).
Abbreviations
AOC: Army Occupational Code
BCT: Brigade Combat Team
CSA: Chief of Staff of the Army
DA: Department of the Army

DACOWITS: Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Armed Services
DGCDAR: Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule
DOD: Department of Defense
FOB: Forward Operating Base
JFTX: Joint Field Training Exercise
LDAC: Leader Development and Assessment Course
MOS: Military Occupational Specialty
MSL: Military Science and Leadership
NCO: Noncommissioned Officer
OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom
ROTC: Reserve Officer Training Corps
SMA: Sergeant Major of the Army
TRAC: Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center
TRADOC: Training and Doctrine Command
UCO: University of Central Oklahoma
USACC: US Army Cadet Command

USARIEM: United States Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine
Assumptions
1. The first assumption is that UCO Army ROTC MSL IV (senior) cadets have a similar
opinion of infantry gender integration as do the remainder of MSL IV cadets in US
Army Cadet Command (USACC), based upon their shared training experience at
LDAC.
2. The second assumption is that UCO Army ROTC MSL IV cadets experienced the
same gender integrated, simulated infantry combat training at LDAC as the remainder
of the MSL IV cadets in USACC, and therefore, the infantry training experience will
lend a common opinion.
3. The third assumption is that UCO Army ROTC will commission about the same
number of female officers (one) into the Army combat arms as other ROTC units in
USACC (one or two). This assumption implies that the questionnaire will have a
small, but present female combat arms representation in addition to the majority of
non-combat arms female officers.
4. The fourth assumption is that UCO’s next generation of Army officers (MSL I-IV),
based upon their LDAC experience, Joint Field Training Exercise, and witnessing
ROTC leadership training on the UCO campus, will have different views of
integrating women into combat roles than do those officers and senior NCOs
currently serving in the Army.
Importance of the study

This study is important to the Army because it offers TRAC opinions from future officers
tasked to implement Soldier 2020, and specifically, their opinions regarding the integration of
women soldiers into the Army infantry. This research paper has the ability to be integrated into
the Army’s ongoing literary review efforts headed by TRAC.
Conclusion
Gender integration in the military has been debated for many years, and there is ample
research on this topic. However, there has been no research published on the integration of
women soldiers into the Army infantry based upon the views of cadets that have experienced
gender integrated simulated combat infantry training at LDAC, or of ROTC cadets in general.
There is no published, contemporary data of cadets’ views of how infantry gender integration
will affect male infantry units’ cohesion and morale, and this research could serve as another
perspective for TRAC in its ongoing gender integration study that ends in 2016.

Chapter II
Review of Literature
Introduction
The review of literature is comprised of two main sections. The first section explains the
Army’s struggle to overcome cultural bias that suggests women soldiers do not belong in the
infantry. The second section focuses on standards and explains the Army’s effort to equitably
integrate women soldiers into the infantry through a review of the physical requirements for all
military occupational specialties, with a goal of creating a single, gender neutral standard for all
infantry soldiers.
The first section references historical events to understand the culture the Army must
overcome if women soldiers are to be successfully integrated into the infantry. Through the lens
of the 1975 and 1976 ROTC summer camps, the precursor to LDAC, the reader will gain a
historic perspective of how the 1970s Army culture made it difficult to integrate women into
ROTC training, which will lend further perspective on how much farther the culture will need to
change to fully integrate women soldiers into the infantry. The first section continues by shifting
focus to the repeal of DGCDAR, by discussing the Army’s reasons for attaching women soldiers
to combat units in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF),
and housing non-combat gender integrated units with nonintegrated combat units, which
ultimately became a catalyst for the 2013 repeal of DGCDAR, an important step in the culture
shift of the Army and its views of women in the infantry. The first section will close with a
review the combat role women soldiers played in OIF and OEF, and highlight how they
performed in combat.

The second portion of the review of literature focuses on standards and the Army’s role
in figuring out the best way ahead to integrate women soldiers into the infantry. The second
portion will highlight, in detail, the ongoing TRAC Gender Integration Study, and the Physical
Standards Assessment of all Army MOS and AOC.
In order to fully understand the opinions of both faculty and cadets of the UCO
Department of Military Science, it is necessary to first understand what Army ROTC is and its
purpose. According to Neiberg,
ROTC is a scholarship program founded in the 1950s that provides college tuition
to students in exchange for four years of service as a commissioned officer after
graduation. Currently, more than 1,000 colleges and universities across the United
States offer these programs. ROTC is the largest source of officers for the armed
services, providing…75 percent of Army officers. Though embedded in a college
environment, ROTC students take military classes, participate in physical training
sessions, and spend their summers at training camps, all in preparation for
military service after graduation. When they graduate from college, they
commission as officers and serve a minimum of four years in the military.
UCO Army ROTC is representative of US Army Cadet Command and commissions 15
Army lieutenants per year into the regular Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve,
which is a yearly, stipulated commissioning quota for all ROTC departments. These lieutenants
are commissioned into both combat occupations (infantry, armor, field artillery, etc.) and also
combat support occupations (Army nurse, intelligence, communications, logistics, etc.).
Historically, UCO has only commissioned males into combat arms, but 2014 is the first year
UCO commissioned a female combat arms officer. UCO’s first female combat arms officer was

commissioned a field artillery officer because, as of March 4th
, 2014, the Secretary of the Army
issued a directive that opened virtually all field artillery officer jobs to women (Tice, 2014).
UCO’s first female combat arms officer experienced the DA’s first big push to quickly integrate
women officers into combat units.
Sub problem 1: Army culture
Culture is one of the hardest aspects of organizational change, and integrating women
soldiers into male dominated combat units is proving to be a difficult task because the constraints
of Army culture. What is culture, exactly, and why is it so difficult to overcome? Karen O.
Dunivin (1994) defines cultures as, “a way of life that is learned and shared by human beings and
is taught by one generation to the next. Culture is learned from previous generations and broadly
shared by members.” This definition is appropriate for the Army because the status quo culture is
often passed from one generation to the next, and the culture is rarely challenged. Change is
always difficult, and because women soldiers have never before been in combat units, opponents
of infantry gender integration have concerns about integrating women soldiers into the infantry.
These concerns range from practical to political to emotional.
Practical concerns address issues of physiological differences between men and women
soldiers, primarily strength and endurance while conducting infantry tasks. King (2013) reports
that previous physiological testing suggests “approximately one percent of women can equal the
performance of the average man, and about 0.1 percent of the female applicants and one percent
of trained female soldiers would reach the required standards to meet the demands of these combat
roles.” Other practical concerns include the heightened risk for injury for women soldiers during

infantry training. According to Donnelly (2013), “extensive tests in the UK and US have indicated
that efforts to prepare significant numbers of women for potential infantry assignments would
steeply increase debilitating injures in training as well as during deployments…because the gender
free policy leads to higher losses from overuse injuries.” Donnelly (2013) continues her argument
by describing a Marine officer’s testimony to the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the
Armed Services (DACOWITS). “On average, women have 47% lower lifting strength, 40% lower
muscle strength, 20% lower aerobic capacity, and 26% slower road march speed…both female
attrition/injury rates during entry level training and discharge were twice those of men, and non
deployability rates were three times higher.”
Additionally, opponents of the integration of women soldiers into the infantry raise the
issue of cohesion when integrating women soldiers with male soldiers. Alderman (1992) describes
cohesion as the “intangible force that holds an army together in combat.” Alderman (1992) quotes
Stephen Westbrook, a professor of military science at the United States Military Academy, that
cohesion “serves as both a source of power and security, sustaining the soldier physically and
psychologically…helping to ward off feelings of impotence and vulnerability.” Alderman (1992)
argues that “if units have sufficient cohesion then they will…remain combat effective.”
Opponents of the integration of women soldiers in the infantry claim the cohesion of infantry units
are at risk when women are introduced to the infantry. Simons (2001) argues for simplicity in the
infantry, describing that in typical male dominated, heterosexual infantry units, “teammates always
know where they stand with one another, which is on the nonsexual side of intimacy.” She points
out that the “basic, undeniable, unresolvable problem is that heterosexual men like women in ways
that they don’t like other men.” Simons (2001) makes the final point that cohesion is at risk when
the “complementarity and unquestionable mutual trust between infantry soldiers is broken when

rewards are not shared.” Simons (2001) refers to these shared rewards as anything pleasant, like
food, responsibilities, dangers or even sex. Simons (2001) states “what there is to be shared must
be literally shared. If there is sex to be had, then anyone who wants it should be able to get it. If
not, tension mounts.”
Political obstacles to female integration in the infantry are numerous and include issues
like the 1981 Selective Service case Rostker v. Goldberg. This case set the precedent for excluding
women from registering for the Selective Service, but with the January 2013 repeal of DGCDAR,
Rostker was quickly challenged several months later (Donnelly, 2013); as a result, some politicians
are hesitant to be associated with any potential reversal of Rostker for fear of alienating
conservative voters. Feminism and the push for equality at all costs is also a political obstacle for
the integration of women soldiers in the infantry. Conservative politicians are uneasy with the
possibility that the integration of women soldiers into the infantry will diminish infantry training
standards in order to achieve a politically correct, acceptable quota of qualified female infantry
soldiers. According to gender integration opponents like Donnelly (2013), attempts to achieve
gender neutral infantry standards would be impossible because of pressure from feminists or the
DOD. For example, after the January 24, 2013 signing of the repeal of DGCDAR, General Martin
Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, “If a particular standard is so high that
a woman couldn’t make it, the burden is now on the service to come back and explain…why is it
that high? Does it really have to be that high?” (Donnelly, 2013).
The potential increase, whether small or large, of sexual harassment and/or sexual assault
cases after the integration of women soldiers in male dominated infantry units makes integrating
women soldiers in the infantry a political landmine, especially in light of the microscope the media
placed on sexual assault in the DOD after Tail hook in 1991. According to Harrell and Miller

(1997), in light of the stigma associated with sexual harassment in the military, the proverbial
pendulum swung out of whack to the point that gender integrated units found it difficult to get
anything done because “many men had been told not to talk to the women, sit next to them, or even
go near them…these instructions, intended to keep men from sexually harassing women, made life
very difficult in work groups that included both men and women who were expected to
communicate and coordinate their efforts.” Not only can gender integration create an awkward
work environment but, according to Harrell and Miller (1997), inappropriate male and female
relationships can “breed resentment among colleagues based upon jealousy or sexual frustration”
especially in units that are far forward of the rear areas, like the infantry.
Emotional reasons serving as obstacles to female integration in the infantry primarily
revolve around the perceived role of the dominance of masculinity in the military, especially direct
ground combat jobs like the infantry. Titunik (2000), argues, “War has consistently been seen as
an entirely masculine activity and the military experience as an ignition into manhood.” Dunivin
(1994) agrees, stating, “As an institution comprised primarily of men, its culture is shaped by men.
Soldiering is viewed as a masculine role…and as men’s work; thus, a deeply entrenched cult of
masculinity pervades military culture.” MacKenzie (2012) observed this notion of masculinity
when she summarized the 1992 report of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of
Women in the Armed Forces. It was identified that, “Interference with male bonding, cultural
values and the desire of men to protect women, and inappropriate male/female relationships could
negatively impact troop dynamics.” Additionally, General Merrill McPeak, former Air Force
Chief of Staff, admitted that he had a “culturally based hang up. I can’t get over this image of old
men ordering young women into combat…I have a gut-based hang up there. And it doesn’t make
a lot of sense in every way. I apologize for it.” (MacKenzie, 2012).

The culture of the Army can be easily summarized with one quote from one soldier, which
typifies the extent a cultural shift will be required when the Army integrates women soldiers into
the infantry in 2015. “If we have all those problems with women, it is a good thing women are
not in the important units” (Harrell and Miller, 1997). Likewise, civilian opponents of infantry
gender integration will also require an intellectual shift. “There are many reasons why the services
are hesitating and delaying implementation of plans to gender-integrate direct ground combat
units…to state the obvious, this is an unnecessary, bad idea that cannot be justified in terms of
military necessity; there is no empirical evidence, based on actual experience and not theory, to
support assertions that this is the right thing to do.” (Donnelly, 2013)
1975 and 1976 Army ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp
While the regular Army has been recently inundated with requests for opinion regarding
the integration of women soldiers into the infantry in 2015, the review of literature substantiates a
lack of research to obtain the opinions of the nation’s next generation of Army officers tasked to
lead troops in gender integrated infantry units after 2015. This portion of the review of literature
focuses on the experiences of cadets experiencing gender integrated ROTC Advanced
Leadership Camp (precursor to LDAC) training in 1975 and 1976. It serves as a historical
paradigm to understand how ROTC serves as a microcosm of the broader issue concerning
general integration of women soldiers into the Army in the 1970s, and specifically the
integration of women soldiers in the infantry in 2015. This portion of the review of literature
will also provide a glimpse of the Army culture of the 1970s and how ROTC students’ unique

college/ROTC experiences positively or negatively affect their view of unit cohesion and morale
when women soldiers are integrated.
For historical perspective, it is important to know that women were allowed to join
ROTC in 1973. In 1975, female cadets were authorized to attend the ROTC Advanced
Leadership Camp but with separate training events from males, and 1976 was the first year that
ROTC featured the same gender integrated training for both male and female cadets (Mohr,
Rowan, & Reidy, 1978 and Larwood, Glasser & McDonald, 1980).
Dunivin (1994) describes the 1970s and even today’s Army culture as “traditional,
characterized by conservatism; it is a homogenous male force, with masculine values and norms,
and exclusionary laws and policies.” This was the Army culture of the 1970s and the culture that
is requiring a shift in order to accommodate women soldiers in the infantry in 2015. Indicative
of this Army culture, the training experienced by cadets at the Advanced Leadership Camp in
1975 was slow to accommodate women’s inclusion in the Army. Mohr et al. (1978) describe the
1975 training as generally the same, but females were not allowed to “participate in offensive
combat operations or offensive tactical training; train with bayonets, pugil stick, hand grenades,
or hand to hand combat, and not authorized to march farther than six miles or carry more than 25
pounds.” Additionally, women “participated in activities on a reduced level commensurate with
their physical abilities, and received female physical training” (Mohr et al., 1978). Female
cadets were also segregated from their male peers and were “garrisoned with their own female
company. Women’s barracks were separate from and off limits to male cadets” (Mohr et al.,
1978).

At the 1975 ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp, peer ratings were first introduced to
male and female cadets; prior to 1975, peer ratings were male only events (Mohr et al., 1978).
According to Mohr et al. (1978),
Peer ratings have a long tradition of use in the military in evaluating leadership
potential and ability. The basic paradigm involves each group member estimating
the leadership potential or ability of all other group members. This technique has
been shown to be valid, reliable, unaffected by friendship factors, stable across
changing groups, and valid in predicting future performance even when the
groups are established for short periods of time.
In 1975, women cadets’ peer ratings were significantly lower than male cadets for several
reasons. According to Mohr et al. (1978), female cadets were not allowed to be leaders during
training that required offensive tactics, received less rigorous, inferior and incomplete training
that caused the male cadets to feel resentment toward female cadets, and their platoon officer
evaluators, young captains, were biased in their assessments based upon their personal opinions
about women in combat and non-combat Army roles.
As a result of the training female cadets experienced at the 1975 ROTC Advanced
Leadership Camp, the Army self-identified major issues and required necessary changes to the
succeeding years of training. “Problems associated with separate training programs for all cadets
who are competing for the same jobs are obvious. A group receiving inferior or incomplete
training will suffer. The women were disadvantaged when competing with males whose superior
and more complete training made them no longer ‘peers’” (Mohr et al., 1978).

Changes were made to provide female cadets with the same opportunities as men during
the 1976 ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp. Because of these equitable changes, the Army felt
it would have a more holistic cadet opinion about the integration of women into the Army. The
cadets at the 1976 ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp had the opportunity to gauge the
performance of female cadets in simulated combat situations, as well as a more general
observation of women in physical training (Larwood et al., 1980). Larwood et al. (1980)
hypothesized that since the male and female cadets would experience the same training, and
become well acquainted, the male cadets would express more favorable attitudes toward women
in nontraditional roles; however, the empirical data from the 1976 ROTC Advanced Leadership
Camp suggested the inverse was true. Interestingly enough, not only did the cadets’ opinions
reflect the negative opinions of regular Army personnel, but the longer men were in the camp,
the more negative they became toward women in the Army (Larwood et al., 1980). For some
reason, Larwood et al. concluded the summer training process convinced many men that women
do not belong in nontraditional Army roles.
The proffered conclusion was that male cadet attitudes may “partly reflect the unusually
threatening situation of having women superiors for the first time. The previously less negative
attitudes of men in mixed-sex college units may have resulted from the apparent lack of such a
threat on campus” (Larwood et al., 1980). The Army also concluded the study offered a glimpse
into a larger cultural issue, and action was required to ensure these male cadet attitudes did not
perpetuate into the Army force when these cadets graduated from college and commissioned into
the Army in 1976 and 1977. The Army was concerned male cadet reactions to gender
integration would “curtail the effectiveness of mixed-sex units and slow the movement of
women toward many positions for which they are equally suited” (Larwood et al., 1980). The

Army pinned its hope on the idea that the “individuals (1976 male cadets) studied may well be
suited to influence the outcome and are clearly reactive to the (political and social) change
process” (Larwood et al., 1980). Interestingly enough, the individuals studied in 1976 are in fact
well suited to influence the outcome of the current issue of integrating women in the infantry.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, and the Army Chief of
Staff, General Raymond Odierno, commissioned in the Army in 1974, and 1976, respectively
(Wikipedia, 2014).
The role of DGCDAR and Army reorganization in shifting the culture of the Army
The training experienced by women in the 1975 and 1976 ROTC Advanced Leadership
Camps suggested that the societal and political change of the 1970s did not help its future leaders
move beyond the Army culture previously described by Dunivin (1994). However, the
implementation of DGCDAR in 1994 and its eventual repeal in 2013 serve as significant points
that helped shift the culture of the Army to begin to accept women soldiers in combat roles.
Although the 1994 implementation of DGCDAR allowed women soldiers to serve in
direct ground combat units at the brigade or higher level, it still excluded women from serving in
the combat arms (infantry, field artillery, armor, special operations), and prohibited gender
integrated non-combat units (logistics, communications, etc.) from collocating with non-gender
integrated, direct combat units.
The 2013 repeal of DGCDAR was predicated on a requirement to align the ongoing
realities of nonlinear OEF and OIF combat with American law. MacKenzie (2012) pointed out
that the “last few decades had made the (DGCDAR) ban largely irrelevant; increasing counter

insurgency warfare virtually erased the concept of combat front lines and female soldiers’
contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were undeniable.” MacKenzie (2012) credits
the progressive views of the former Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, as essential to remove gender based barriers to service.
Additionally, MacKenzie (2012) credits the media and scientific research as integral to dispelling
perceived myths about women’s physical abilities and the effect the integration of women soldiers
has on unit cohesion (MacKenzie, 2012).
The 2013 repeal of DGCDAR was not the only driving force behind the Army’s cultural
shift. MacKenzie (2012) reports that in 2003, the Army began reorganizing units and increasing
the number of brigades within each division. “Under this system, forward support companies,
which provide logistical support, transportation, and maintenance to battalions, are now grouped
together on the same bases as combat units. Since women are permitted to serve in support units,
a major barrier designed to keep them away from combat has vanished.”
The Army’s reorganization from division focus to brigade focus was in order to create a
lighter, more responsive force, in keeping with the changing threat after the fall of the Soviet
Union. The Army no longer saw itself fighting large scale maneuver warfare against standing
armies, but rather smaller scale engagements that could not afford large, time consuming buildups
like the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Army needed to reorganize and increase its flexibility, and
the inclusive brigade combat team (BCT) was the answer. Instead of having to deploy a division
headquarters and maneuver brigades totaling about 16,000 troops, the Army built its basic fighting
formation around mechanized (armored), infantry (light, airborne and air assault) and Stryker
(light wheeled vehicle) brigade combat teams of about 4,000 troops. BCTs were task organized
with three maneuver battalions, a field artillery battalion, a support battalion, and additional

support elements like communications, intelligence, engineer, military police, Air Force tactical
air control parties, etc. This smaller formation provided more combat power to a lighter, more
flexible brigade, and enabled the Army to deploy smaller formations with enhanced capabilities,
in order to more quickly get troops in a conflict area without requiring a long buildup of troops
and materiel.
This shift from a division to BCT focus placed women soldiers in the support battalions and
forward support companies of direct combat brigade combat teams. When OEF and OIF began in
2001, and 2003, respectively, these new Army formations were front and center in nonlinear
combat zones devoid of front lines. The OEF and OIF counterinsurgency doctrine called for
American troops living among the civilian population, and BCTs occupied forward operating bases
where support units and fighting units were collocated due to the necessity of security and logistics.
In effect, the DGCDAR prohibition against collocation of gender integrated non-combat units, and
non-gender integrated combat units was violated because of operational necessity. Additionally,
the DGCDAR prohibition against assigning women to direct combat units below the brigade level
was challenged as well.
DGCDAR: Co-location of gender integrated non-combat units with non-gender integrated combat
units in OIF/OEF
As a result of combat and operational necessity, gender integrated non-combat units and
non-gender integrated combat units were collocated on forward operating bases in OEF and OIF.

The February 2012 Report to Congress on the Review of Laws, Policies and Regulations
Restricting the Service of Female Members of the US Armed Forces stated what had become the
reality of basing ground forces in the Afghan operating environment:
The DOD…, determined that the dynamics of the modern-day battlefield are non-
linear, meaning there are no clearly defined front line and safer rear area where
combat support operations are performed within a low-risk environment.
Therefore, there is no compelling reason for continuing the portion of the policy
that precludes female Service members from being assigned to units or positions
that are doctrinally required to physically co-locate and remain with direct ground
combat units. Women are now serving at the same operating locations in
Afghanistan as some direct ground combat units, without being assigned to
positions restricted by co-location. Removal of the co-location operating
restriction responds to the current operational environment.
The DOD recommended removal of the co-location restriction based upon the fact the
policy “has become irrelevant given the modern battle space with its nonlinear boundaries” (Report
to Congress, 2012).
Additionally, Burrelli (2013) noted the RAND Corporation reviewed the Army’s OEF/OIF
collocation policies and, in a 2007 report, declared,
While the Army was complying with the DOD assignment policy, it may not have
been complying with the separate Army assignment policy. Further, the report stated
“[w]e find considerable evidence that support units are collocated with direct combat
units if the definition of collocation is based purely on proximity. However, if the
definition of collocation is based on interdependency and proximity, the evidence is

inconclusive.” The report noted that hundreds of female Army members had received
a Combat Action Badge suggesting that regardless of what the report concludes, the
Army recognizes that females have been in combat (Burrelli, 2013).
While the 2007 RAND Corporation study proved the Army’s collocation policies were not
technically in violation of DGCDAR, the fact that women soldiers were receiving Combat Action
Badges led the DOD to attempt to align American law with the realities of combat in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Another necessity of nonlinear combat, characteristic of Afghanistan and Iraq, was the
prohibition against assigning women to direct combat units below the brigade level. This policy
too was challenged by the Army in OEF/OIF.
DGCDAR: Attaching women soldiers below the brigade level in OEF/OIF
When the Army reorganized from division to BCT as the primary fighting formation, the
Army established gender integrated brigade support battalions and forward support companies in the
same BCT as male only combat battalions. These hybrid BCTs consisted of non-combat and combat
units that trained together, deployed together, and fought together, often on the same forward
operating bases in Afghanistan and Iraq. The proximity of female non-combat soldiers on the same
forward operating bases as the combat battalions provided a combat multiplier for the maneuver
commanders conducting counterinsurgency operations, and, according to Burrelli (2013), “The
Army…utilized women to search Iraqi females for weapons, and to patrol with foot soldiers, usually
in door-to-door-type operations. Also, women have…served in female engagement teams which
helped units deal with female locals while operating in Afghan villages.”

King (2013) provides insight on how the Army skirted the DGCDAR prohibition regarding
the assignment of women soldiers to combat units below the brigade level. Instead of “assigning”
women to combat units to provide additional combat power, the Army “attached” women soldiers
to combat units below the brigade level in order to provide the maneuver commander a required
capability that he otherwise could not have. According to DOD Joint Publication 1-02, assigned
implies “to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively
permanent;” attached implies “to place units or personnel in an organization where such placement
is relatively temporary and the detailing of individuals to specific functions where such functions are
secondary or relatively temporary.”
According to King (2013), “In Iraq and Afghanistan, the official rule (rescinded in 2011)
on women’s exclusion from combat units was regularly breached by the semantic method of
describing female soldiers working on the frontline as attached, rather than assigned, to combat units.
In the close confines of a patrol base or FOB, the distinction was academic.”
As a result of the counterinsurgency realities of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, in 2012 the
DOD formally requested an exception to policy. “The exception requested would allow women to
be assigned to select units below brigade level, but not below the battalion level, within specific
military occupational specialties currently open to women. The request is based on 10 years of recent
combat experiences” (Report to Congress, 2012).
Combat performance of women soldiers in OEF/OIF
Since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq began in 2001, and 2003, respectively, women
soldiers deployed to combat zones in noncombat roles, either as part of maneuver BCTs or support

brigades in both the regular Army, Army Reserve and National Guard units. Because of the nature
of OEF/OIF nonlinear, counterinsurgency warfare, many women found themselves involved in
combat while performing their noncombat jobs.
According to MacKenzie (2012),
Around 280,000 women have worn American uniforms in Afghanistan and Iraq,
where 144 have died and over 600 have been injured. Hundreds of female soldiers
have received a Combat Action Badge, awarded for actively engaging with a hostile
enemy. Two women, Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester and Specialist Monica Lin Brown,
have been awarded Silver Stars - one of the highest military decorations awarded for
valor in combat - for their service in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Sergeant Hester and Specialist Brown are examples of how several events coalesced to
provide the right catalyst to witness women soldiers’ performance in combat. OEF/OIF’s nonlinear,
counterinsurgency warfare, coupled with the Army’s modular reorganization from divisions to BCTs
as the primary fighting force, combined with the necessity to collocate noncombat gender integrated
units with nonintegrated combat units on deployed forward operating bases, provided an entry point
for women soldiers to be inadvertently placed in combat situations, despite DGCDAR’s prohibition
against women serving in combat. Sergeant Hester’s and Specialist Brown’s heroism in combat
reinvigorated the gender integration debate in favor of providing women the opportunity to serve
their country in combat roles. Wikipedia (2014) provides some insight on their actions on the
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan:
Sergeant Hester, while assigned to the 617th Military Police Company, a Kentucky
Army National Guard unit out of Richmond, Kentucky, received the Silver Star for
her actions on March 20, 2005 during an enemy ambush on a supply convoy near the

town of Salman Pak, Iraq. Hester…is the first female U.S. Army soldier to receive
the award for exceptional valor since World War II and the first ever to be cited for
valor in close quarters combat.
SPC Monica Brown, a United States Army medic, became the first woman in
Afghanistan and only the second woman since World War II to receive the Silver
Star, the United States' third-highest medal for valor. After a roadside bomb
detonated near a convoy of Humvees in the eastern Paktia Province of Afghanistan,
Brown saved the lives of fellow soldiers in April 2007 by running through insurgent
gunfire using her body to shield wounded soldiers while mortar rounds fell nearby.
Because women are not formally allowed to participate directly in combat, Brown
was pulled back to the base…shortly after the incident.
While MacKenzie (2012) is quick to illustrate Sergeant Hester’s and Specialist Brown’s
valorous actions on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, the capture and subsequent rescue of
former Private First Class Jessica Lynch in Iraq in 2003 is an example of how the integration of
women soldiers in combat and the infantry has been vehemently opposed, despite the bravery and
heroism of Sergeant Hester and Specialist Brown.
According to Wikipedia (2014),
Former Private First Class Jessica Lynch served in the 2003 invasion of Iraq…and
on March 23, 2003…,was serving as a unit supply specialist with the 507th
Maintenance Company when her convoy was ambushed by Iraqi forces during the
Battle of Nasiriyah. Lynch was seriously injured and captured. Her subsequent
recovery by U.S. Special Operations Forces on April 1, 2003 received considerable
media coverage and was the first successful rescue of an American prisoner of war

since Vietnam and the first ever of a woman. Initial official reports on Lynch's
capture and rescue in Iraq were incorrect. On April 24, 2007, she testified in front of
Congress that she had never fired her weapon, her M16 rifle jammed, and that she
had been knocked unconscious when her vehicle crashed.
The combat stories of Sergeant Hester, Specialist Brown, and former Private First Class
Lynch has lent much to the ongoing debate regarding the role of women soldiers serving in combat
units like the infantry. Like all soldiers, regardless of gender or conflict, these are but three examples
of both valorous and questionable conduct on the modern, nonlinear, counterinsurgency battlefield.
Percy (2013) reiterated the impact these three stories have made to the ongoing, larger debate
concerning women soldiers serving in combat roles. “The idea that a woman could be a combat
soldier would be unthinkable without advances in gender equality; however, the reality that women
were already acting as combat troops in all but name brought the change to fruition” (Percy, 2013).
General Robert Cone, the current commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command,
summarized a common sentiment from many currently serving OEF/OIF veteran soldiers when he
stated, “…Most men who had worked and fought beside women expected them to do well in combat
roles…and most soldiers agree that women, based upon their wartime performance, have earned the
opportunity to stand in any one of our formations for which they qualify…; our recent wartime
experience indicates there are few practical limits to the vital contributions women make” (Cone,
2013).
Sub problem 2: Soldier 2020 and retaining Army infantry standards

General Cone’s sentiment reflects the opinion of a majority of currently serving soldiers, and
most agree that women soldiers have earned the opportunity to stand in any formation they qualify.
However, there are dissenting views how the Army can broaden opportunities for women soldiers
while simultaneously “not sacrificing warfighting capability, the trust of the Congress, or that of the
American people as we seek to enhance force readiness and capability” (Bromberg, 2013).
According to Lieutenant General Bromberg, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, “The
Army’s Soldier 2020 campaign will aid leadership in selecting the best-qualified soldiers, regardless
of gender, for each job within the Army profession and ensuring future force capability and
readiness. Per General Cone (2013), Soldier 2020 is founded on three principles. “1. To maintain
the dominance of our nation’s warfighting forces by preserving unit readiness, cohesion and morale.
2. Validate both physical and mental occupational performance standards for all MOSs, initially
focusing on those currently closed to women. 3. Set the conditions so all soldiers, male and female,
have an opportunity to succeed as their talents dictate.” Haviland (2013), further clarifies the scope
of Soldier 2020. “Soldier 2020 is comprised of two efforts headed by TRADOC. First, in
collaboration with USARIEM, is a study of the physical demands required for each MOS throughout
the Army, beginning with the MOSs currently closed to women. The second effort, led by TRAC,
is an extensive study of the institutional and cultural factors associated with integrating women into
previously closed MOSs.”
A significant challenge to Soldier 2020’s stated goal of “integrating women leaders and
soldiers into recently opened positions and units as expeditiously as possible” (Bromberg, 2013), is
the idea of critical mass, and its perceived effect on infantry standards. The online dictionary,
Merriam Webster (2014) defines critical mass as, “The size, number, or amount of something that is
needed to cause a particular result.” In regard to Soldier 2020, the term critical mass implies a pre-

determined amount of female soldiers integrated into infantry units in order to facilitate the reception
of female infantry soldiers, which is the particular result critical mass provides the Army. In order
to integrate women leaders and soldiers in infantry units as expeditiously as possible, some argue
that infantry standards will be lowered in order to accommodate a critical mass of women leaders to
serve as a cadre for younger, junior enlisted female infantry soldiers arriving in 2015, the Army’s
proposed date for opening infantry training to female soldiers.
Donnelly (2013) is a critic of the critical mass requirement that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, previously stated was a requirement prior to the arrival of junior
enlisted female soldiers in all male infantry units. Donnelly (2013) states her concern with critical
mass; “On January 24th, 2013, General Martin Dempsey called for a critical mass or significant
cadre of women in previously all male units – a phrase usually interpreted to mean 10-15 percent.
To assign even half that number into direct ground combat units, commanders will have to
incrementally modify male oriented programs of instruction to accommodate women.” Further,
Donnelly (2013) criticized ongoing efforts to achieve a critical mass of female soldiers in all male
infantry units by stating, “Efforts to achieve the goal of critical mass of women in formerly all-
male DGC [direct ground combat] battalions would have the inevitable effect of modifying and
lowering standards over time, making ground combat training programs less effective in preparing
both men and women for the contingencies of war” (Donnelly, 2013).
Because there are critics of the Army’s plan to integrate female infantry leaders prior to
female junior enlisted infantry soldiers, there is a perception that infantry standards will be dropped
to achieve a critical mass or diversity metrics and the Army has taken great lengths to ensure that
infantry standards are maintained to “ensure we maintain the world’s premiere land power, ready
and capable to defend this great nation at home and abroad” (Bromberg, 2013).

Soldier 2020: Physical Standards Assessment
As the first of two efforts of Soldier 2020, the Army has ordered TRADOC and USARIEM
to conduct an ongoing, three year physical standards study which concludes in 2015 (Robinson,
2013). The Army will review the most critical, physically demanding MOS specific tasks using
scientific methods in laboratories, and as Haviland (2013) reports, “These measurements will
determine the physiological capabilities (strength, endurance, and energy) that a soldier must have
to complete specific tasks to acceptable standards. These measurements will also help the Army to
establish clear, updated standards across the force.” Echoing the purpose of the physical standards
assessment, Robinson (2013) identifies that “not only are these gender-neutral standards, but they’re
also age-neutral and body-type neutral standards…in other words, it’s purely physical. (Robinson,
2013).
Representative of the Army’s larger problem of distinguishing between general fitness and
combat fitness, Harrell and Miller (1997) described the Army physical fitness test’s primary
problem; the current physical fitness test is merely a gauge of general physical fitness and not an
indicator of how a soldier will perform in a given MOS. As a result, Harrell and Miller (1997) report,
“Many personnel favor an occupation specific qualification test to screen both women and men for
the strength requirements for specific jobs…The current physical fitness test does not test for the
ability to perform specific jobs and is thus not a test of qualification.” Additionally, Harrell and
Miller (1997) illustrate that, because the Army physical fitness test has separate grading scales for
men and women, males are susceptible to premature judgment of the ability of female soldiers to
perform combat duties alongside their male counterparts. “Many troops believe that that the physical

fitness standards relate to the ability to perform in combat environment; thus the different physical
standard for all military women means to them that women will perform less well in a combat
environment” (Harrell and Miller, 1997). Further, Harrell and Miller (1997) describe the need for a
physical standards assessment that would properly gauge a soldier’s suitability for a specific MOS,
which in turn would level the playing field and make entrance into combat fields a gender neutral
assessment. “Men were generally unable to accept the degree of difference between the men’s and
women’s physical fitness requirements. We were told repeatedly that, if relevant and realistic
physical tests existed so that only qualified women (and men) were assigned to these positions,
gender integration would not be an issue” (Harrell and Miller, 1997 p. 80).
The Army’s Soldier 2020 physical standards assessment helps mitigate cultural concerns
associated with opening the infantry to women soldiers in 2015. By specifically identifying the
physical requirements for the infantry, the Army will strengthen its infantry branch by accepting
only the most physically and mentally capable soldiers, regardless of gender. Additionally, the
physical standards assessment will serve as a better quality control to mitigate the injuries associated
with combat MOSs, like the infantry. According to Robinson (2013), “having a more defined
requirement, not just mental, but physical, will lead to less attrition, lower injury rates and better
performance of our soldiers, which allows them to be more successful when they get to a unit,
thereby making the unit more successful.”
Robinson (2013) concludes, “Through a standards based approach, success will not be defined
by numbers, such as having 5 or 10 percent of women in infantry, but rather it will be defined as the
opportunity for women to be able to serve.” General Cone and majority of currently serving soldiers
agree, “Soldiers are OK with this, as long as we maintain standards” (Robinson, 2013).

Soldier 2020 TRAC Gender Integration Study
The second effort of Soldier 2020 is the ongoing TRAC gender integration study, which
began in January 2013 and ends in March 2015. (Robinson, 2013). This part of Soldier 2020 will
address how the implementation of women in combat jobs, like the infantry, will affect the Army
culturally, and will “analyze cultural factors, expectations, customs, and social behaviors of the
Army associated with integration, as well as institutional factors, which include Army processes and
policies that may be affected or changed because of integration” (Robinson, 2013). Colonel Lynette
Arnhart, TRAC’s Fort Leavenworth, Kansas deputy director and senior military analyst, states the
integration of women soldiers into combat MOSs must be done so “with the understanding that the
leadership and culture of a unit, the history, lineage and social dynamics, are crucial to successfully
dealing with changes that will occur” (Haviland, 2013). Robinson (2013) reports, “The end goal is
to proactively identify the problems and solutions before integration begins.”
Conclusion
Characteristic of any transformational change is instability and the requirement to lead
through adversity; leaders are required to have a solid change plan but must also remain flexible
enough to adapt to the realities of unforeseen consequences. Often, critics will allow the leader to
see his or her blind spots, and diagnose potential issues in the change plan. Unfortunately,
sometimes critics purposely try to derail the plan before it is implemented. Such is the case
involving the Army’s efforts to implement transformational change as a result of the 2013 repeal of

DGCDAR. Army leaders at all levels are tasked to lead their troops through this cultural shift,
because there is no choice but to work together to solve the gender integration problem.
The first section in the review of literature was to understand the Army culture through
the lens of the 1975 and 1976 ROTC summer camps. The reader gained a historic perspective of
how culture made it difficult to integrate women into ROTC training, which lent further
perspective on how much farther the culture will need to change to fully integrate women
soldiers into the infantry. The first section continued by shifting focus to the repeal of
DGCDAR, by discussing the Army’s reasons for attaching women soldiers to combat units in
OEF and OIF, and housing non-combat gender integrated units with nonintegrated combat units,
which ultimately became a catalyst for the 2013 repeal of DGCDAR, an important step in the
culture shift of the Army and its views of women in the infantry. The first section closed with a
review of the combat role women soldiers played in OEF and OIF, and highlighted their combat
performance therein.
The second portion of the review of literature focused on infantry standards and the
Army’s role in figuring out the best way ahead to integrate women soldiers into the infantry.
The second portion highlighted the ongoing TRAC Gender Integration Study, and the physical
standards assessment of all Army MOS and AOC.

Chapter III – Research Methodology
Introduction
The purpose of this research project is to determine how effective the US Army Reserve
Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Leader Development and Assessment Course (LDAC) serves as
a microcosm of the broader issue concerning the integration of women soldiers into male Army
infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale. “With the exception of
Noncommissioned Officer training during the Warrior Leader Course, LDAC serves as the best
integrated, simulated infantry combat training occurring in the Army today” (K. Vaughn,
personal communication, April 21, 2014).
The hypothesis for this research paper is that US Army ROTC LDAC serves as a
microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration of women soldiers into male Army
infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale. Additionally, it is presumed the
questionnaire of UCO cadets will suggest that unit cohesion and morale will not decline
significantly once women are admitted into the infantry in 2015.
The UCO Department of Military Science is comprised of regular Army officers,
noncommissioned officers, DA civilians and cadets. The gender breakdown of faculty and
cadets follows:

Figure 3-1. Faculty, UCO Department of Military Science
As of 7 May 2014 Officer Enlisted DA Civilian
Male 4 2 3
Female 0 0 0
The cadets are further divided into freshmen through senior cadets (MSL I-IV, respectively).
Figure 3-2. Cadets, UCO Department of Military Science
As of
7 May 2014
MSL I
(Freshmen)
MSL II
(Sophomore)
MSL III
(Junior)
MSL IV
(Senior)
Total
Male 14 7 7 8 36
Female 6 4 4 4 18
Total 20 11 11 12 54
Research Design
In order to accurately assess the opinions of the cadets and faculty of the UCO
Department of Military Science, one questionnaire consisting of 12 quantitative, multiple choice
questions and two qualitative, short answer questions was developed using a combination of
questions derived from several sources identified during the review of literature; all address how
effective ROTC LDAC serves as a microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration of
women soldiers into male Army infantry units and its effect on unit cohesion and morale.

Additionally, in some fashion, sub problems previously identified as Army culture and retaining
infantry standards are addressed in the questionnaire. Finally, the questionnaire attempts to
discern if UCO cadets believe unit cohesion and morale will decline significantly once women
are admitted into the infantry in 2015.
Of the 54 total cadets assigned to UCO Army ROTC, 18 MSL I (freshmen), 10 MSL II
(sophomore), 12 MSL III (junior), and 11 MSL IV (senior) cadets participated in the
questionnaire, for a total of 51 cadet respondents. The missing cadets were unavailable for
various reasons when the questionnaire was administered. Additionally, three regular Army,
and one DA civilian employee of the UCO Department of Military Science were respondents;
total cadet and faculty respondents was 55.
Several questions from the research from Larwood, et al. (1980) were used in the
questionnaire to identify any similarity or difference in cadet opinions of gender integration
between the 1976 ROTC Advanced Camp and ROTC LDAC 2013. One question was derived
from a quote from MacKenzie’s (2012) work concerning male bonding; one question was
derived from Wojack’s (2002) concern about separate shower/living accommodations in the field
and on deployment; a task and social cohesion question was posed, one question asked about the
impact gender integration would have on sexual harassment and sexual assault in infantry units;
one question asked the effect gender integration has on mixed gender bonding; several questions
specifically asked about the effect women soldiers would have on infantry units in combat;
several questions asked about female versus male cadet tactical performance at LDAC, and one
question asked about the general leadership abilities of female versus male cadets at LDAC;
Finally, The two short answer questions were designed to provide the respondent a final
opportunity to provide a general response of any kind to the broader issue concerning integration

of women soldiers into male Army infantry units. The preceding multiple choice questions were
designed to initiate creative thought about the problem and encourage the respondent to either
affirm the thoroughness of the multiple choice questions through no response, or identify
additional issues not previously mentioned in the multiple choice questions.
On April 24, 2014, all UCO MS I-IV cadets were assembled at a lecture hall on the
UCO campus and instructed on the purpose of the questionnaire, briefed the instructions of the
questionnaire, and advised their responses were in support of academic research, completely
voluntary, and could be potentially influential in TRAC’s ongoing review of literature as part of
the gender integration study. The 12 multiple choice questions and two short answer questions
included in the questionnaire were tailored to fit the experience level of all MSL I-IV cadets at
UCO. The majority of the 12 multiple choice responses were based upon Likert items, but some
deviated from Likert item responses because of the type of question asked. The freshmen and
sophomore (MSL I, and MSL II, respectively) cadets were instructed their questionnaire
responses were to be from their experience observing MSL III (junior) cadet leaders conducting
weekly physical training on the UCO campus, and their experience participating as squad
members during leadership laboratory, a weekly opportunity for the MSL III (junior) cadets to
train on map reading, land navigation and squad and platoon level tactics in preparation for
LDAC. The MSL III (junior) cadets were instructed their questionnaire responses were to be
from their experience participating in a Joint Field Training Exercise (JFTX) conducted several
weeks prior at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, which involved MSL III cadets from local Oklahoma
universities. The JFTX is designed to replicate the training at LDAC, and provides the MSL III
cadets with an opportunity to lead MSL III cadets from other universities in squad and platoon
level tactics. The MSL IV (senior) cadets were instructed that their responses were to be from

their experience the previous summer at LDAC 2013. LDAC 2013 was a 28 day training event
designed to develop and assess cadets’ leadership abilities through non-tactical garrison
leadership positions, and tactical, platoon based field exercises.
Available faculty of the UCO Department of Military Science were instructed to answer
the questionnaire based upon their years of Army experience. The available Military Science
faculty represent 85 combined years of Army experience in combat and non-combat occupations;
the four faculty respondents were two regular Army senior infantry NCOs, one retired infantry
senior NCO, and a field grade logistics officer.
Selection of the Sample
This study is limited in scope to UCO ROTC’s Military Science and Leadership (MSL)
I-IV cadets (freshmen through senior cadets); 11 senior cadets (MSL IV) that had experienced
LDAC gender integrated infantry training and the remaining 40 that had not. The junior and
senior cadets (MSL III and MSL IV, respectively), had more Army and life experience than
freshmen and sophomore cadets (MSL I and II, respectively), and, most importantly, the MSL III
and MSL IV cadets were contracted to serve in the Army, and the majority of MSL I and MSL II
cadets were not; the implication being the MSL I and II underclassmen would provide a more
balanced, open minded opinion than the upperclassmen, which had already formulated personal
opinions about the integration of women soldiers into the infantry. All available regular Army
and DA civilians comprising the faculty of the UCO Department of Military Science were also
polled to confirm their opinions generally reflect those of the Army, and also provide a more
holistic representation of the opinions of those assigned to the UCO Department of Military

Science. Other university ROTC students were not surveyed based upon a lack of Army Cadet
Command authority to do so.
Data Collection
The questionnaire was collected from all UCO cadets on April 24th
, 2014. In order to
maintain respondent anonymity and encourage honest feedback, respondents turned in
questionnaires at the front of the lecture hall in folders corresponding to their MSL class, and
departed the lecture hall; there was purposely no attempt to collect data by gender because the
purpose of the questionnaire was to only gain an understanding of cadet opinion by MSL class.
Early in the research it was determined necessary to maintain MSL class integrity in order to
more easily understand the how each MSL class perceives the integration of women soldiers into
the infantry in 2015. It is important for UCO and USACC faculty to understand how each MSL
commissioning year feels about female officers serving in combat arms AOCs like infantry.
With useful data derived from the questionnaire, UCO and USACC faculty have discussion entry
points to better engage with each MSL class.
Because the hypothesis presumes the questionnaire will suggest that unit cohesion and
morale will not decline significantly once women are admitted into the infantry in 2015, it is
assumed there will be a deviation in opinion across freshman through senior cadets based upon
their level of Army experience; it is critical to compare results from the senior cadets that have
experienced gender integrated LDAC infantry training, the junior cadets that have not yet
attended LDAC, and the freshmen and sophomore cadets that only have limited, campus based
opinions.

Conclusion
Gender integration in the military has been debated for many years, and there is ample
research on this topic. However, there has been no research published on the integration of
women soldiers into the Army infantry based upon the views of cadets that have experienced
gender integrated simulated combat infantry training at LDAC, or those of cadets in ROTC in
general. There is no published, contemporary data of cadets’ views of how infantry gender
integration will affect male infantry units’ cohesion and morale, and this research could serve as
another perspective for TRAC in its ongoing gender integration study that ends in 2016.

Chapter IV Analysis Results
Introduction
On April 24th
, 2014 questionnaires from 55 cadets and faculty of the UCO Department of
Military Science were gathered to determine how effective ROTC LDAC serves as a microcosm of
the broader issue concerning integration of women soldiers into male Army infantry units and its
effect on unit cohesion and morale. The purpose of the questionnaire was to gauge how LDAC’s
infantry training is viewed by future Army officers, and if there is reason to suspect that unit
cohesion and morale would decline once women soldiers are admitted into the infantry in 2015.
In order to fully understand the results of the analysis, it is important to recall the assumptions
of the research:
1. The first assumption is that UCO Army ROTC MSL IV (senior) cadets have a similar
opinion of infantry gender integration as do the remainder of MSL IV cadets in US Army
Cadet Command (USACC), based upon their shared training experience at LDAC.
2. The second assumption is that UCO Army ROTC MSL IV cadets experienced the
same gender integrated, simulated infantry combat training at LDAC as the remainder of
the MSL IV cadets in USACC, and therefore, the infantry training experience will lend a
common opinion.
3. The third assumption is that UCO Army ROTC will commission about the same
number of female officers (one) into the Army combat arms as other ROTC units in
USACC (one or two). This assumption implies that the questionnaire will have a small,

but present female combat arms representation in addition to the majority of non-combat
arms female officers.
4. The fourth assumption is that UCO’s next generation of Army officers (MSL I-IV),
based upon their LDAC experience, Joint Field Training Exercise, and witnessing ROTC
leadership training on the UCO campus, will have different views of integrating women
into combat roles than do those officers and senior NCOs currently serving in the Army.
Summary of Results
Figure 4-1. Questionnaire results of 55 cadet and faculty respondents from the UCO
Department of Military Science
MSL I
(18 resp.)
MSL II
(10 resp.)
MSL III
(12 resp.)
MSL IV
(11 resp.)
Faculty
(4 resp.)
Upon the integration
of female soldiers in
the infantry… (by majority)
What will be the most problematic issue?
Sexual
assault/
harassment
Sexual
assault/
harassment
Sexual
assault/
harassment
Sexual
assault/
harassment
Sexual
assault/
harassment
Would social or task cohesion
be most jeopardized? (social, task,
both, neither)
Both Neither Neither Both Neither
Will there be an increase in
sexual assault and/or harassment?
(increase, decrease, remain the same)
Increase Increase Increase Increase Increase
Will separate shower/living
areas be required? (yes, no)
Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Kingsley Browne quote: “Women do not
evoke in men the same feelings of
comradeship & followership that men do”
(agree, disagree)
Agree Disagree Even split Disagree Disagree
Which type of bonds would be most
prevalent: sexual or brother-sister bonds?
Sexual
bonds
Brother-
sister
bonds
Brother-
sister
bonds
Brother-
sister
bonds
Brother-
sister
bonds
In combat, would you rely on a female
battle buddy like you would a male?
(definitely, probably, no unsure)
No Probably
Even split
(D,P,N)
No
Even split
(D & N)
If properly trained, would
female infantrymen be just as
good as male infantrymen?
(yes, no)
Even split Yes Yes Yes No

ROTC specific (by majority)
Are female cadets better than males
at tactical patrol orders? (yes, no, same)
No Same Same No
Even split
(No &
same)
at land navigation? (yes, no, same)
Same Same No No Same
at leadership? (yes, no, same)
Same Same Same No Same
Short answer (by majority)
Can the integration of women
soldiers in the infantry work? (yes, no)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
What are your concerns regarding the
integration of women soldiers in the infantry?
(by majority of response)
Even split
(cohesion
& women
physically
incapable)
Reduction
of infantry
standards
Even split
(reduction
of infantry
standards
& increase
in sexual
assault)
Reduction
of infantry
standards
Even split
(reduction
of infantry
standards
& increase
in sexual
assault)
The responses to the short answer questions yielded results comparable to those found during
the review of literature. During the first short answer, open ended question, 69% of respondents
agreed that the integration of women soldiers in the infantry would work, which is an opinion most
readily encountered during the review of literature. Additionally, while conducting the review of
literature, it was identified that the most commonly cited barrier to the integration of women soldiers
into the infantry is a fear of the reduction of infantry standards to accommodate female soldiers.
During the second short answer, open ended question, when asked to identify a single primary
concern regarding the integration of female soldiers into the infantry, 31% of the respondents
answered their primary concern was also the reduction of infantry standards; this response was the
most prevalent to the second short answer question.
The second most prevalent response to the cadets’ primary concern to the integration of
female soldiers into the infantry was an increase in sexual assault and/or harassment in infantry units.
22% of all respondents answered an increase in sexual assault and/or harassment as a concern to this
second open ended question. A possible explanation for this response is because of the heavy

emphasis the Army places on training its force to intervene and/or act in response to allegations or
actual sexual misconduct; currently, UCO ROTC cadets and Army soldiers experience sexual assault
and sexual harassment training annually, and participate in sexual assault awareness month activities
to promote cadet and soldier awareness.
Interestingly, there were some majority responses that did not support my hypothesis that
UCO cadets will suggest that unit cohesion and morale will not decline significantly once
women are admitted into the infantry in 2015. When asked if there would be an issue if women
soldiers were not provided separate shower and living facilities, with the exception of the faculty,
which was predicted, 76% of the respondents agreed there would be issues. This in contrast to
my hypothesis, because when the MSL III (junior) cadets go to the field during JFTX and
LDAC, there are limited separate shower and living facilities for female cadets. At JFTX there
are no separate living or shower facilities, and at LDAC, all cadets are advised of a separate
shower facility for female cadets while in garrison, but the majority of female cadets do not use
them because they are a separate facility from the barracks and not as convenient. LDAC cadets
quickly realize it is easier to divide the latrine and shower time into male and female times;
additionally the female cadets understand the negative perception of male cadets regarding the
use of separate female shower facilities. At LDAC during the field portion of training, there are
no separate female shower facilities, and, while there are male cadet complaints about the
amount of shower time and hot water allotted to the minority female cadets, versus the amount of
time and hot water allotted to the majority male cadets, there were no concerns about the
requirement for separate shower and living facilities for female cadets. Based upon the
researcher’s personal experience at LDAC 2013, male and female cadets were housed together
by platoon and squad in both garrison barracks and field tents with no effect on small unit

cohesion and morale; in fact, billeting male and female cadets together had a positive effect on
small unit cohesion and morale.
The fact that each MSL class agreed there would be issues not having separate shower and
living facilities for female soldiers is questionable given the experiences of the MSL IIIs and
MSL IVs (junior and senior cadets). It is assumed that the question was insufficiently posed, or
misleading, and the cadets inferred the question was reflecting opposite genders showering
together, at the same time, in the same facility. There was the expectation the MSL I and II
(freshmen and sophomore) cadets would agree there would be issues based upon their lack of
knowledge of how cadets solve living and shower arrangements at JFTX and LDAC training, but
there was an expectation that the MSL III and MSL IV cadets, having experienced JFTX and
LDAC, would agree there would be no issues, and this would not affect cohesion or morale at
the small unit level.
Of similar interest is the response received when asked about the types of bonds that
would develop between male and female soldiers when integrated together in the infantry. With
the exception of the MSL I freshmen cadets, 61% of the faculty and each MSL class agreed
brother-sister bonds would be most prevalent over sexual bonds. This is in contrast to the open
ended question asking for a primary concern with integrating female soldiers in the infantry;
22% of respondents felt there would be an increase in sexual assault and/or harassment.
Additionally, as previously discussed, 76% of total respondents elected there would be an issue
with not having separate shower and living facilities for female soldiers, which is in contrast to
the 61% of respondents declaring there would be predominantly brother-sister bonds over sexual
bonds when integrating male and female soldiers into the infantry.

Summary of Conclusions
Based on the cadets’ 31% response stating they are concerned about the reduction of infantry
standards, and the cadets’ 22% response that a potential increase in sexual assault and/or harassment
would occur in infantry units after female soldiers are integrated into the infantry, as well as the 76%
majority of respondents that agreed there would be issues if women soldiers were not provided
separate shower and living facilities, it is apparent that ROTC LDAC’s infantry training, and
ROTC experiences in general, serve as a microcosm of the broader issue concerning integration
of women soldiers into male Army infantry units and its effect on infantry units’ cohesion and
morale. As evident in the review of literature, the perceived reduction of infantry standards and
increase in sexual assault and/or harassment are both directly linked to cohesion and morale in
currently all male infantry units. It seems ROTC cadets represent the views of currently serving
Army soldiers, that the integration of women soldiers into the infantry will work, but there is also a
concern the integration of female infantry soldiers will disrupt infantry unit cohesion and morale
when assimilated into the infantry in 2015.
The responses of the available faculty of the UCO Department of Military Science (two
regular Army senior infantry NCOs, one retired infantry DA civilian, and one field grade logistics
officer) do not generally reflect those of currently serving Army soldiers; because UCO ROTC
faculty responses were largely infantry and not representative of the diverse total Army force, it is
assumed the predominantly career infantry soldier responses skewed the faculty results in ways a

larger, more diverse faculty sample would not. However, the faculty responses were representative
of accomplished, career infantrymen that understand the implications of integrating women soldiers
into the infantry, and should be valued as representative of the infantry community.

Chapter V – Conclusion and Recommendations
Introduction
This study is important to the Army because it offers TRAC opinions from future officers
tasked to implement Soldier 2020, and specifically, their opinions regarding the integration of
women soldiers into the Army infantry. This research paper has the ability to be integrated into
the Army’s literary review efforts headed by TRAC; however, further research is required to
understand how the Army culture must be changed to mitigate cohesion and morale issues in
infantry units prior to the integration of women soldiers in 2015.
Recommendations
Further research is required to more fully understand how ROTC cadets perceive
the introduction of female soldiers into the infantry. While the regular Army has been inundated
with requests for opinion regarding the integration of women soldiers into the infantry in 2015, the
review of literature substantiates a lack of research to obtain the opinions of the nation’s next
generation of Army officers tasked to lead troops in gender integrated infantry units after 2015. In
similar fashion to the research of Mohr et al. (1978) and Larwood et al. (1980) to understand the
implications of cadets experiencing gender integrated ROTC Advanced Leadership Camp
(precursor to LDAC) training in 1975 and 1976, further research needs to be done to understand
ROTC cadets’ opinions about the integration of women soldiers in the infantry in 2015. In the
same way that Mohr et al. (1978) and Larwood et al. (1980) provided a glimpse of the Army
culture of the 1970s and how ROTC students’ unique college/ROTC experiences negatively

affected their view of unit cohesion and morale when women soldiers were integrated in ROTC
training in the 1970s, similar research needs to be done to gain an understanding of how the
present Army culture needs to change to reduce the impact women infantry soldiers will have on
the cohesion and morale of currently all male infantry units.
Conclusion
Based upon evidence from the review of literature, and the results of the questionnaire
from the UCO Department of Military Science, it is more than likely that cohesion and morale of
currently all male infantry units will suffer when female infantry soldiers are integrated in the
infantry in 2015, but the integration of women soldiers in the infantry will work. How much
cohesion and morale will suffer, and how long, requires further research. If the Army heeds the
opinions of both currently serving soldiers, as well as current ROTC cadets tasked with leading
troops in gender integrated infantry units after 2015, and ensures that current, tough infantry
standards are retained, the cohesion and morale of infantry units, as well as the total Army force,
will likely be mitigated. However, manipulation of infantry standards to accommodate a
preliminary critical mass of female infantry cadre, or a diversity quota to fill the infantry ranks with
female infantry soldiers will likely further impede infantry units from fully accepting their new
female infantry team mates once integrated in 2015.

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