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Don’t be blinded by
The Light

Jason Hart CISSP CISM

SVP CRYPTOCard
About Me
Legal Disclaimer


 ALWAYS GET PERMISSION IN WRITING.

    – Performing “scans” against networked systems without
      permission is illegal. Password cracking too

    – You are responsible for your own actions!

    – If you go to jail because of this material it’s not my fault,
      although I would appreciate it if you dropped me a postcard.



    – This presentation references tools and URLs - use them
      at your own risk!
Accepted Security Principles




  • Confidentiality
                                  HOW DO I
  • Integrity                  ACHIEVE THIS IN A
                               CLOUDY WORLD?

  • Availability

  • Accountability

  • Auditability
Welcome to the 3rd Age of Hacking (It’s Easier)

• 1st Age: Servers
       •   Servers
       •   FTP, Telnet, Mail, Web.
       •   These were the things that consumed bytes from a bad guy
       •   The hack left a foot print

• 2nd Age: Browsers:
       • Javascript, ActiveX, Java, Image Formats, DOMs
       • These are the things that are getting locked down
           – Slowly
           – Incompletely

• 3rd Age: Passwords: - Simplest and getting easier
       • Gaining someone's password is the skeleton key to their life and
         your business
       • Totally invisible – no trace
Cyber Crime – Cloud Attack


Welcome to the Future of Hacking

• Channels: web, mail, open services

• Targeted attacks on premium resources

• Carpet bombing for most attacks

• Secondary infections through controlled
  outposts
Authentication Mechanisms


• HTTP Authentication

   – Basic Authentication
   – Digest Authentication

• Integrated Windows (NTLM) Authentication

• Certificate-Based Authentication

• Forms-based Authentication
Password Surfing ☺


"login: *" "password: *" filetype:xls



• This returns xls files containing login names and

  passwords.
Auto Meta Data Mining


• Automated doc search via Google/Bing
• Specify domains to target
• Automated download and analysis of docs
The Weapons



  Key loggers both software and hardware



  So easy

  And many more
ToR



• ToR is a network of virtual tunnels that allows people
  and groups to improve their privacy and security on the
  Internet and is being used by Governments World Wide
100 Government & Embassy Passwords

 I uncovered last year on a hacking forum – reported to Hi Tech Crime Unit


 Indian Embassy in Oman 65.109.245.38 da da01877y
Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 akmaral@kazembassy.ru 86rb43
Kyrgyztan Embassy in Iran 212.42.96.15 embiran asdfgh
 Uzbekistan Consulate in France 57.66.151.179 Parij_C p2a2r0i9j
Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 alla@kazembassy.ru vhs35
Kyrgyztan Embassy in kazakhstan 212.42.96.15 kaz_emb W34#eEDd
Kazakhstan Embassy in212.34.224.157 m0006614 Berlin_C b5a6h7o8r9 dol57
 Uzbekistan Consulate in Germany 57.66.151.179
Indian Embassy in Italy Russia 81.176.67.157 askarest@kazembassy.ru
                                                 srpq86m
 Uzbekistan Embassy in Russia57.66.151.179 Dehli_C i1n9d5u6
Kazakhstan   Consulate in India 81.176.67.157 b.kuatbekova@kazembassy.ru bk145
Indian Embassy in Belgium 212.100.160.114 commercial@indembassy.be india01
 Uzbekistan Consulate in New York 57.66.151.179 Nyu_York_UN t2r7d31ln8
Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 baimenche@kazembassy.ru 1956
Mongolian Embassy in USA 209.213.221.249 esyam@mongolianembassy.us temp
 Uzbekistan Consulate in South Korea 57.66.151.179 Seul_C s1e7u0l7c
Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 den@kazembassy.ru bek70
Mongolian Embassy in USA 209.213.221.249 j.mendee@mongolianembassy.us temp
 Uzbekistan Consulate in USA 57.66.151.179 Vashington_c s7a9s5h3a1
Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 emo@kazembassy.ru art35
Mongolian Embassy in USA 209.213.221.249 n.tumenbayar@mongolianembassy.us temp
 Uzbekistan Embassy in Afghanistan 57.66.151.179 AfghanQ a1f2g3h4a5n6q
Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 galikhin@kazembassy.ru aGC4jyfPassword
UK Visa Application Centre in Nepal 208.109.119.54 vfsuknepal@vfs-uk-np.com
The Office ofEmbassy in Afghanistantlc@dalailama.com tsephell
 Uzbekistan Dalai Lama 65.19.137.2 57.66.151.179 afghanm a1f1g0h1a0n2m
LIVE

e-
Next Generation Social Engineering




• http://twitter.com/#search?q=New%20Job%20Role

• http://twitter.com/#search?q=Hacked%20Password
Simple Iphone User Attack ….

          User




                               www




 Hacker
What is the Solution?
What’s the solution


Some options are more secure than others

• Create a password policy

• Improve your password security

• Implement Two-Factor Authentication
Solving the password problem
User productivity requires simple, flexible, continuous and
secure access to information




     Internal people        Branch Offices            PDA Users             Remote Users               3rd Party Access


                                             Users and their workspaces



                                 Password                                    Solution to password problem
                                                                          Two-factor authentication – a unique identity
                                                                          for every user, every time they log in, using:
                                                                          something they know + something they have




                  Your Cloud
                  Business processes,
                  applications and company
                  assets
Jason Hart CISSP CISM

Blog: www.twofactor.blogspot.com
Jason.Hart@CRYPTOCard.com
           Thank you

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E Crime Mid Year Meeting London

  • 1. Don’t be blinded by The Light Jason Hart CISSP CISM SVP CRYPTOCard
  • 3. Legal Disclaimer ALWAYS GET PERMISSION IN WRITING. – Performing “scans” against networked systems without permission is illegal. Password cracking too – You are responsible for your own actions! – If you go to jail because of this material it’s not my fault, although I would appreciate it if you dropped me a postcard. – This presentation references tools and URLs - use them at your own risk!
  • 4. Accepted Security Principles • Confidentiality HOW DO I • Integrity ACHIEVE THIS IN A CLOUDY WORLD? • Availability • Accountability • Auditability
  • 5. Welcome to the 3rd Age of Hacking (It’s Easier) • 1st Age: Servers • Servers • FTP, Telnet, Mail, Web. • These were the things that consumed bytes from a bad guy • The hack left a foot print • 2nd Age: Browsers: • Javascript, ActiveX, Java, Image Formats, DOMs • These are the things that are getting locked down – Slowly – Incompletely • 3rd Age: Passwords: - Simplest and getting easier • Gaining someone's password is the skeleton key to their life and your business • Totally invisible – no trace
  • 6. Cyber Crime – Cloud Attack Welcome to the Future of Hacking • Channels: web, mail, open services • Targeted attacks on premium resources • Carpet bombing for most attacks • Secondary infections through controlled outposts
  • 7. Authentication Mechanisms • HTTP Authentication – Basic Authentication – Digest Authentication • Integrated Windows (NTLM) Authentication • Certificate-Based Authentication • Forms-based Authentication
  • 8.
  • 9.
  • 10. Password Surfing ☺ "login: *" "password: *" filetype:xls • This returns xls files containing login names and passwords.
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 13. Auto Meta Data Mining • Automated doc search via Google/Bing • Specify domains to target • Automated download and analysis of docs
  • 14. The Weapons Key loggers both software and hardware So easy And many more
  • 15.
  • 16. ToR • ToR is a network of virtual tunnels that allows people and groups to improve their privacy and security on the Internet and is being used by Governments World Wide
  • 17. 100 Government & Embassy Passwords I uncovered last year on a hacking forum – reported to Hi Tech Crime Unit Indian Embassy in Oman 65.109.245.38 da da01877y Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 akmaral@kazembassy.ru 86rb43 Kyrgyztan Embassy in Iran 212.42.96.15 embiran asdfgh Uzbekistan Consulate in France 57.66.151.179 Parij_C p2a2r0i9j Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 alla@kazembassy.ru vhs35 Kyrgyztan Embassy in kazakhstan 212.42.96.15 kaz_emb W34#eEDd Kazakhstan Embassy in212.34.224.157 m0006614 Berlin_C b5a6h7o8r9 dol57 Uzbekistan Consulate in Germany 57.66.151.179 Indian Embassy in Italy Russia 81.176.67.157 askarest@kazembassy.ru srpq86m Uzbekistan Embassy in Russia57.66.151.179 Dehli_C i1n9d5u6 Kazakhstan Consulate in India 81.176.67.157 b.kuatbekova@kazembassy.ru bk145 Indian Embassy in Belgium 212.100.160.114 commercial@indembassy.be india01 Uzbekistan Consulate in New York 57.66.151.179 Nyu_York_UN t2r7d31ln8 Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 baimenche@kazembassy.ru 1956 Mongolian Embassy in USA 209.213.221.249 esyam@mongolianembassy.us temp Uzbekistan Consulate in South Korea 57.66.151.179 Seul_C s1e7u0l7c Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 den@kazembassy.ru bek70 Mongolian Embassy in USA 209.213.221.249 j.mendee@mongolianembassy.us temp Uzbekistan Consulate in USA 57.66.151.179 Vashington_c s7a9s5h3a1 Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 emo@kazembassy.ru art35 Mongolian Embassy in USA 209.213.221.249 n.tumenbayar@mongolianembassy.us temp Uzbekistan Embassy in Afghanistan 57.66.151.179 AfghanQ a1f2g3h4a5n6q Kazakhstan Embassy in Russia 81.176.67.157 galikhin@kazembassy.ru aGC4jyfPassword UK Visa Application Centre in Nepal 208.109.119.54 vfsuknepal@vfs-uk-np.com The Office ofEmbassy in Afghanistantlc@dalailama.com tsephell Uzbekistan Dalai Lama 65.19.137.2 57.66.151.179 afghanm a1f1g0h1a0n2m
  • 19.
  • 20. Next Generation Social Engineering • http://twitter.com/#search?q=New%20Job%20Role • http://twitter.com/#search?q=Hacked%20Password
  • 21. Simple Iphone User Attack …. User www Hacker
  • 22. What is the Solution?
  • 23. What’s the solution Some options are more secure than others • Create a password policy • Improve your password security • Implement Two-Factor Authentication
  • 24. Solving the password problem User productivity requires simple, flexible, continuous and secure access to information Internal people Branch Offices PDA Users Remote Users 3rd Party Access Users and their workspaces Password Solution to password problem Two-factor authentication – a unique identity for every user, every time they log in, using: something they know + something they have Your Cloud Business processes, applications and company assets
  • 25. Jason Hart CISSP CISM Blog: www.twofactor.blogspot.com Jason.Hart@CRYPTOCard.com Thank you