Democracy: the Indonesian Experience

Democracy:
the Indonesian Experience
p

Ginandjar Kartasasmita
Chairman, House of Regional Representatives
of the Republic of Indonesia

40th World Annual Conference
International Association of Political Consultants (IAPC)
Denpasar-
Denpasar-Indonesia, November 13th 2007

Contents
INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

PRE-REFORM INDONESIA

THE END OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

DOES CULTURE MATTER?

INDONESIA AND THE WORLD
CONCLUSION

IAPC Conference 2007 www.ginandjar.com 2

I. INTRODUCTION


Indonesia is emerging from long period of
authoritarian rule to consolidate its status as
one of th world’s largest democratic
f the ld’ l td ti
country.
Although Indonesia has not been on “the
road to democracy,” for long, there is much
democracy,”
y, g,
that has been achieved for which many
citizens may be proud.


In 2004 the Indonesian people for the first
time di tl elected their President.
ti directly l t d th i P id t
In the same year parliamentary elections
were also held for a multiparty House of
Representatives and non-partisan House of
p non-p
Regional Representatives (Senate).


Democracy has already rooted and become
“th only game in town”, although it still
the l i town” lth
t h till
faces various challenges and yet to prove to
be h best— f
b the best—if not the only—way to
b h only—
l
creating the conditions for sustainable
development and enhancement of people’s
people’
welfare.
This presentation is an attempt to highlight
salient aspects of and draw some lessons
of, lessons,
from Indonesia’s experience in democracy.
Indonesia’


II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW


The Indonesian Archipelago
p g

• a country of 220 million (as of 2005),
• an archipelago strung 5000 kilometers along the equator.
g g g
• more than 13,000 islands, 5,000 are inhabited.
• more than 200 ethnic groups and 350 languages and dialects.
• 85 to 90% are Muslims.


Rise of Indonesia’s nationalism
Indonesia’

The Dutch ruled the Indonesian archipelago for
three and a half centuries. They first came to
Indonesia at the end of the 16th century as traders,
I d i h d f h 16 h d
and later as colonizers.
May 20, 1908 the birth of an intellectual organization
20
Budi Utomo, commemorated as the “National
Awakening Day”.
g Day”
y
October 28, 1928 declaration of the Youth Oath: one
country, one nation, one language: Indonesia.
In World War II, the Japanese military drove out the
Dutch and occupied Indonesia as the new colonial
ruler.
ruler

Construction of independence

The d f t f the Dutch t the hands f
Th defeat of th D t h at th h d of an
Asian power fueled the rise of indigenous
resistances.
The Japanese allowed a committee to be
p
established to “investigate the preparation
of independence”.
independence”
What philosophical foundation the
independent Indonesia state should be built
on?


Construction of independence . . .

The founding fathers of Indonesia’s
Indonesia’
independence agreed on Pancasila as th state
i d d d P il the t t
philosophy.
Pancasila:
1) Belief in the One and Only God;
2) Just and Civilized Humanity;
3) The Unity of Indonesia;
4) Democracy;
5) Social Justice.


Birth of a nation
All the necessary elements for an
independent nation had already existed when
the Japanese surrendered to the Allied
p
powers.
August 17 1945, Sukarno and Hatta on
g ,
behalf of the people, proclaimed the
independence of Indonesia.
Indonesia under the 1945 Constitution: A
nationalist non-sectarian, unitarian republic
non-
with a presidential system of government.
ith id ti l t f t


III. PRE-REFORM INDONESIA


Regime Change in Indonesia
Sukarno Suharto

August 1945 - March March 1968 - May 1998
1968 Elected by MPRS
Elected by the PPKI Resigned under pressure
Impeached by MPRS

Abdurrahman Wahid B.J. Habibie
October 1999 – July May 1998-October 1999
1998-
2001 Accountability Speech
Elected by MPR Rejected
Impeached by MPR Declined to run for
President

Megawati Susilo Bambang
July 2001 – October Yudhoyono
2004 October 2004 – 2009
Elected by MPR Directly elected
Lost election to SBY


Summary of Indonesia’s Political History
Government The Way
President Period Constitution
System Elected Exit
Sukarno 1945-1950
1945 1950 1945 Presidential/ Independence
Parliamentary Committee
1950 Federal Parliamentary
1950-1959 Provisional Parliamentary
1959-1966 1945 Presidential Deposed/
Impeached
Suharto 1966-1998 1945 Presidential MPRS Resigned
g
Habibie 1998-1999 1945 Presidential MPR Accountability
speech not
accepted by the
MPR
Decided not to
run again
Wahid 1999-2000
1999 2000 1945 Presidential MPR Impeached
Megawati 2001-2004 1945 Presidential MPR Lost in general
election
SBY 2004-(2009)
( ) 1945 Presidential Directly
y
Elected


An attempt at liberal democracy

In 1955 a free and fair multiparty election was held to
elect the Parliament and the Constitutional Assemblyy
(Konstituante).
The weak short-lived parliamentary governments created
short-
leadership
l d hi vacuum and indecisiveness at time when
di d i i t ti h
strong leadership was needed.
The Konstituante failed to reach the necessary majority
to get an agreement on a new constitution.
On July 5th, l959, the President Sukarno dissolved the
Parliament and Konstituante with a Presidential Decree
and restored the 1945 Constitution.


Guided Democracy

Sukarno declared that liberal democracy had failed
in Indonesia and had brought only disunity and
g y y
misery to the people.
Sukarno proclaimed “Guided Democracy” as the
Democracy”
suitable system for Indonesia.
Sukarno ended Indonesia’s first attempt at
Indonesia’
d
democracy. Indonesia now joined the group of
I d i j i d th f
countries to reverse from democracy to
authoritarianism
authoritarianism.
The rise of the military role in politics: dual
functions of the military.
y


Sukarno: The romantic revolutionary

Indonesia under Sukarno took a leading role in
I d i d S k t k l di l i
Asian African countries solidarity and fight
against colonialism.
colonialism
Sukarno together with third world leaders
initiated the Non-aligned movement, which until
Non- movement
today still exists.
But his misguided economic policies based on
the notion of a “guided economy” brought chaos
to the economy and increased suffering for the
common people.


The end of Guided Democracy and
the rise of the New Order

On September 30th 1965, an aborted coup d’etat
was allegedly staged by the communist party
party.
Two military figures escaped from the
assassination attempt, General Nasution and
attempt
Mayor General Suharto.
Proceeded to mobilize the loyal military forces,
P d dt bili th l l ilit f
and neutralized the units that were involved in
the
th mutiny.
ti
The rift of President Sukarno and the military.


The end of guided democracy and the rise
of the New Order . . .

On May 11th 1966 President Sukarno, under
pressure from the military and the public issued
public,
a Letter of Instruction to accede authority of
day-to-
day-to-day government to General Suharto
Suharto.
In the 1968 the Provisional MPR dismissed
Sukarno as President and appointed General
Suharto as his successor, hence rise of the New
Order.


Development Trilogy

Stability

Growth Equity


Political stability
The military, the bureaucracy and Golkar (the
y, y (
government party) constituted the political pillars
of the New Order.
Two other political parties were allowed to exist,
h l l ll d
but were politically constrained.
The floating mass concept (depolitization of the
masses) constituted an important aspect of the
political strategy to sustain long-term political
long-
stability.
The political system had produced the intended
p y p
result: political stability that had endured for
three decades, sustaining economic growth which
in turn further reinforced its claim to legitimacy
legitimacy.

Economic Development

With political stability assured, the
Soeharto Government earnestly
e ba ed on economic development,
embarked o eco o c de e op e t,
which was widely considered as
successful using various standard of
g
measurements.


East Asian Miracle
The economic performance of pre-crisis Indonesia could
pre-
be
b seen as part of a general pattern of successful
f l f f l
economic development in Asia.
HPAEs a e
are:
Japan (The Leader)
Hong K
H K Si dT i
the Rep. Of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
Kong, th R
(The Four Tigers ).
Indonesia Malaysia and Thailand (Newly
Indonesia,
Industrializing Economies of Southeast Asia / NIE).
Since 1960 the HPAEs have grown more than:
twice as fast as the rest of East Asia.
three times as fast as Latin America and South Asia.
Asia

Characteristics
High
Hi h average rate of economic growth
t f i th
Rapid productivity growth.
High rates of growth of manufactured exports.
Declines in fertility.
y
High growth rates of physical capital, supported
by high rates of domestic savings and
y g g
investment.
High initial levels and growth rates of human
g g
capital.
Declining levels of poverty.

IV. THE END OF
AUTHORITARIAN RULE


It all ended with the 1997 financial crisis.
The economy crumbled under the weight of
the crisis, followed by popular movement
, yp p
against the Soeharto regime.


What went wrong?
Why after
Wh afte 32 years of contin o s and seemingl
ea s continuous seemingly
successful rule, the Soehartos’ government fell?
Soehartos’
Huntington (1991) makes the point that the
legitimacy of an authoritarian regime might be
undermined even if it does deliver on its
promises.
By achieving its purpose, it lost its purpose. This
y g p p , p p
reduced the reasons why the public should
support the regime, given other costs (e.g. lack
of freedom) connected with the regime
regime.
Economic development provided the basis for
democracy.
democracy

What went wrong?...
Huntington maintains that a social scientist who wished
to predict future democratization “would have done
di f d i i ld h d
reasonably well if he simply fingered the non-democratic
non-
countries in the $1,000-$3,000 (GNP per capita)
$1,000-
transition zone” (1991: 63).
zone”
Further studies, in particular an extensive quantitative
h d l d
research and analysis done by Przeworsky et.al. (2000:
b k l (
92) has lent support to Huntington’s threshold argument.
Huntington’
In 1996, the year before the economic crisis swept
1996
Indonesia, its GNP per capita had reached $1,155.
According to Huntington’s theory, at that stage
g Huntington’
g y, g
Indonesia had entered the transition zone, which meant
that eventually sooner or later political change would
happen.
happen

What went wrong?...
Three decades of development had significantly increased
the level and reach of education across the nation and
social classes, resulting in significant social emancipation
of the population.
International commerce brought about the opening up not
of only the Indonesian market to foreign goods but also
the Indonesian society to foreign ideas.
With globalization came not only the integration of
markets but also the introduction and eventual integration
of ideas.
ideas
Thousands of Indonesians who studied at foreign
universities, most of them in western countries, learned
first h d the socio-cultural values that has been the
f hand h socio- l l l h h b h
driving force behind the scientific and technological
advances that resulted in the affluence of the western
societies.

What went wrong?...

They returned home with the spirit of freedom which
freedom,
was a potent source of inspiration and motivation to
change.
They saw that the way the system worked obviously did
not meet the basic principles required in a free society.
The existence of political parties civic organizations and
parties,
interest groups was highly regulated, and only the ones
that were established or recognized by the government
ll d h
were allowed to exist, these including the business, labor,
l d h b l b
journalist, youth, and women organizations.
The absence of effective opposition is one of the
essential arguments refuting the New Order’s claim to
Order’
democracy.


What went wrong?...

At the height of the praise for the New Order
achievement,
achievement many Indonesian’s complained
Indonesian s
of the lack of distributive justice, and
rampant corruption and nepotism.
nepotism
Many argued that the Indonesian economic
success had benefited the urban and
industrial sector while marginalizing the rural
and traditional sectors.
sectors


What went wrong?...
The emerging role of Islam as a force of change should
also not be underestimated.
underestimated
Most Indonesian pro-democracy activists are more than
pro-
nominally Muslim and they often use Islamic discourses
y y
to motivate the struggle for democracy.
Among the social forces that were poised against the
New O d the most consistent and militant were th
N Order, th t i t t d ilit t the
students. They were successful in galvanizing the silent
majority to be concerned about current political issues
confronting the nation.
Student activism of the late 1980s and early 1990s has
y
contributed to a radicalization of the democratic
opposition in Indonesia.


What went wrong?...
Many among the political elites felt that the time had
come for political reforms.
But an opportunity for a renewed start to rebuild the
confidence of the people and engaged in concerted
efforts to regain control of the economy was wasted,
when Soeharto appointed his daughter and cronies to
the cabinet at the height of the crisis.
The cracks in the ranks of the New Order had come to
the surface, as the regime supporters within and
outside the government, including those in the military
had grown alienated by the way Soeharto handled the
crisis, and by his inability or unwillingness to embark on
reforms.


What went wrong?...

Before the crisis there were already forces, in
favor of political change, arrayed against the New
Order regime.
However in the absence of the necessary catalyst
those elements were inert, and even if change
should happen it could take a long while, such as
h ld h ld t k l hil h
when Suharto pass away or Suharto became
physically incapable to lead.
lead
The financial crisis provided the catalyst that set
off a process of change The halving of per capita
change.
income translated into social misery:
unemployment, hunger, riots, and death.
p y , g , ,

What went wrong?...

It is evident that the inability of President
Suharto to bring Indonesia out of the crisis,
crisis
combined with the growing domestic and
international awareness that his response to the
p
crisis—
crisis—economic as well political—was digging
political—
the country into a deeper abyss, destroyed the
Hobbesian compact that had kept the country
united and politically stable on the path of
development.
The conclusion: crisis forced a rewriting of the
social contract.


V. TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY


Laying the foundation for democracy

It was during Habibie’s administration that
most of the initiatives that significantly
g y
accelerated Indonesia’s democratization were
initiated.
The
Th process of d
f democratization had been in
ti ti h d b i
conjunction with the process of economic
recovery,
recovery one reinforcing the other on the way
up, in contrast with the situation when the
confluence of economic and political crises had
brought the country d
b ht th t down d deeper into the
i t th
abyss.


Laying the foundation for democracy . . .
The recognition of the basic principle of the separation of powers of
the ti legislative d j di i l b
th executive, l i l ti and judicial branches of government
h f t
The dual function of the military was revoked
“Political prisoners” were released from detention.
prisoners”
East Timorese were granted a referendum to determine their own
destiny. In July 1999 a multiparty election was held. The election
was supervised by an electoral committee of the participating
l l d
political parties and watched by thousands of foreign observers.
h d b h d ff b
It was universally agreed that the election was open, fair and clean.
The result reflected the will of the people and thus heralded the re-
re-
birth f d
bi th of democracy in Indonesia.
i I d i
In July 1999 a multiparty election was held. The election was
supervised by an electoral committee of the participating political
parties and watched by thousands of foreign observers.
ti d t h d b th d ff i b
It was universally agreed that the election was open, fair and clean.
The result reflected the will of the people and thus heralded the re-
re-
birth of democracy in Indonesia.
Indonesia

Constitutional Reform

The democratization process in Indonesia,
although triggered by the 1997/1998 economic
crisis, has been undertaken relatively peacefully
in conjunction with the reform of the
j
constitution.
The weaknesses in the constitution contributed
heavily to the concentration and abuse of
power, the lack of law and order, shallow citizen
representation, opacity of governance, and the
high incidence of human rights abuses.


Constitutional reform . . .

The constitution was written in a very broad and
general way. It has only 37 articles and 6 transitory
provisions.
There is strength to the way it was written that
makes th constitution fl ibl and easily adaptable.
k the tit ti flexible d il d t bl
The weakness is that it is so broad, general and
flexible, that it can be—and has been—interpreted in
flexible be— been—
different ways.
It gives a lot of room to the incumbent president to
maneuver and concentrate power i hi or her
d t t in his h
hands, as history has shown with Indonesia’s first
a d seco d presidents.
and second p es de ts

The amendment process

The First Amendment 1999
The Second Amendment 2000
The Third Amendment 2001
The Fourth Amendment 2002


The First Amendment 1999

A term limit of two consecutive f -year
f five-
five
terms.
Returned the power of legislation to
parliament.


The Second Amendment 2000
Decentralization and regional autonomy.
Members of the parliament would have to be elected
through public elections. This provision sends the
message that there should be no more appointed
members to the parliament.
The separation of the police from the military.
Through a separate decree that is not part of the
constitution, the appointment of the commander of the
armed forces and the chief of police have to be
confirmed by the parliament. This provision sent a clear
signal that the military is subordinate to civilian authority.
g y y
A new section on human rights was constituted that
incorporated statements from the Universal Declaration
of H
f Human Ri ht
Rights.

The Third Amendment 2001

Provides for direct election by the people of the president and
the vice president as a ticket.
To be elected, the candidate will have to get more than 50%
elected
of the popular vote with at least 20% of the vote in at least
half of all the provinces.
Sets out rules and procedures for the impeachment of the
president.
The parliament can only propose that the president be
impeached after requesting that the (the newly established)
Constitutional Court examine the charges against the
president and after receiving from the court a finding that the
president is guilty as charged.
This mechanism is intended to prevent abuse of impeachment
proceedings by the legislature.


The Third Amendment 2001 . . .

Appointments of the members of the Supreme Court by the
president have to be proposed by a newly constituted
independent judicial commission, and approved by the
parliament.
In a major structural change to the legislative body, although
Indonesia remains a unitarian state, the third amendment
state
constituted a bicameral system of representation.
It established the House of Regional Representatives (Dewan
Perwakilan Daerah- D), ep esenting
Pe akilan Daerah-DPD) representing each of the p o inces
Dae ah provinces
equally, similar to the US Senate.
Established the rules on general election, to be held once
every five years.
The elections are carried out by an independent general
e ect o commission.
election co ss o


The Fourth Amendment 2002

Stipulates universal government-sponsored
government-
primary education, minimum aggregate
i d ti i i t
education spending of 20% from the national
government and regional government s budget
government’s budget,
Incorporates clauses on social justice and
environmental protection.
protection
Defines that the MPR consists of the parliament
(House of Representatives or DPR) and the
Regional Representative Council (DPD).


VI. CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY


I th post-t
In the post-transition period the Indonesian
t iti i d th I d i
polity has to grapple with two key issues in
consolidating its nascent democracy:
lid ti it td
how best to strengthen the political culture,
deepen democracy, and enhance political
institutionalization.
how to improve the performance of the
newly established democratic regime.


Strengthening the Political
Institutions

All political offices are elected through
general elections:
President and Vice President;;
Member of both house of parliaments, and
regional councils;
Governors, Bupati (District Heads), Majors,
Village Heads.
Heads


All important political appointee—except
members of the cabinet—have to be confirmed
by the parliament; i.e.:
ie:
Chiefs of the Military and Police;
Supreme and Constitutional Court Justices;
Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central
Bank.


Members of national commissions such as:
Anti corruption;
Judicial;
Elections;
Fair business competition;
Ambassadors from and to Indonesia;
Human rights;
have to be confirmed by the parliament.


Political Parties
One of the basic requirements or institutions in a
democracy is the existence of a free and active political
parties to represent the people in the governance of a
nation.
nation
In 2004 elections, 42 political participated, 17 parties
won seats in the parliament.
Indonesia is gearing for the next general election in
2009.
The law for parliamentary elections is being deliberated
in the parliament.
Among the crucial issues are the redrawing of the
voting constituencies and the pa t th eshold in
oting constit encies party threshold
parliament.


Civil Society

Democracy requires a public that is organized
for democracy socialized to its values and
democracy,
norms, and committed not just to its owned
myriad narrow interests—although they are
interests—
important and are the raison d'etre for their
existence—
existence—but to a larger, common set of civic
larger
ends.
And h bli i l
A d such a public is only possible with a vibrant
ibl ith ib t
quot;civil society. quot;


Civil Society . . .

Indonesia's civil society has grown in recent years and
has played a role in the political change.
However,
However as a real countervailing force to the state it is
state,
still weak.
Not only is it a relatively new concept in Indonesia's
polity, and thus yet to mature, th quality of th people
lit d th tt t the lit f the l
who are attracted to join it does civil society little good.
Only recently has civil society attracted better-qualified
better-
people from among the graduates of top universities
and among the top ranks.
In the past this class of young people was more
past,
attracted to the bureaucracy, the academia, business
and even the military.


Civil Society . . .

The existence of such a civil society is particularly
important to Indonesia at the present stage of
democratic consolidation, as clean open
consolidation clean, open,
transparent and accountable governance has yet to
be established.
The country needs an active, informed, selflessly
motivated civil society to strengthen the institutions
of governance for checking, monitoring and
governance, checking
restraining the exercise of power of the state, its
institutions and office holders and holding them
accountable to the law and public expectations of
responsible government.


The rise of the middle class
Economic development gave birth to the middle class. class
Urban middle class is a product of wider and higher
education and economic growth. In agrarian Indonesia
the t iddl l h d
th nascent middle class had grown in number and
i b d
influence with the advance of industrialization and
urbanization.
They are businessmen and intellectuals, doctors,
lawyers, managers, technicians, university lecturers,
writers, artists and journalists.
However up until the end of the 1980s the Indonesian
middle class, or families that were able to support a
middle class lifestyle, was still relatively small. Hence,
lifestyle small Hence
some have called this problem the “hollow middle” in the
Indonesian economic and social class structure.


The rise of the middle class . . .
At that stage the Indonesian middle class political attitude
g p
was not necessarily anti-government; in fact until the end of
anti-
the 1980s the majority of the middle class who owed their
economic advancement to the government’s development
g p
efforts believed in the government’s development creed and
strongly favored political stability.
By the mid-1990s the Indonesian middle class had reached
mid-
the “critical mass” in number as well as in resources to play a
significant role at political change. And they had increasingly
b iti l f th t th i
become critical of the government; their writings, plays and
iti l d
discourses had provided for intellectual inspiration towards
democratization.
They have now become the backbone of Indonesia’s civil
society as well as filling the growing demand for intellectual
professional members of political parties.


Decentralization
One f th h ll
O of the challenges facing Indonesia is keeping the
f i I d i i k i th
country united.
The threat of separation has always plagued the country
since the first days of independence.
One of the main grievance is income and regional
g g
disparity. It is a complex problem and would take time
and effort to resolve, but at the heart of the problem
was the overly centralized government structure and
decision making process.
Devolvement of central authority should be the first step
y p
toward addressing the problem.


Decentralization . . .

Therefore decentralization constitutes one of the
most important aspect of quot;reformasiquot; in Indonesia.
p p
The principles are now embedded in the
constitution.
Decentralization enhances the efficacy, quality and
efficacy
legitimacy of democracy; hence decentralization is a
necessity for democracy.
It is even more so for large—and particularly
large—
multiethnic and multicultural—countries such as
multicultural—
Indonesia,
Indonesia as decentralization will close the distance
between the citizens, the stakeholder, and the
power and the process of policy making.


Since 1999 Indonesia has two sets of
decentralization laws before the amendment
to constitution:
1) law No 22/1999 and Law No 25/1999 and;
2) after the amendment consisting of set Law No
32/2003 and Law No 33/2003. Both set of laws
put the d
h decentralization focus on the District and
li i f h Di i d
City level for the purpose of getting public
services and decision making process closer to
i dd i i ki l t
the people.



After the
Aft th regional elections, a new pattern of
i l l ti tt f
relationship between the local and central
governments will emerge. The locally elected leader
emerge
will consider himself to be more independent and
more predisposed to oppose the central government
if its policies are considered to be against the
interests of his community.
D t li ti i t l liti l di t
Decentralization is not merely political expedience to
deal with rebellious regions. It has more basic value
to democracy and democratic consolidation. Thus
consolidation
decentralization enhances the legitimacy and hence
stability of democracy.
y y


The Role of Islam
The threat to the unity and integrity of the country has
recently been perceived as not only to come from ethnic or
regional separatism but also from fundamental and political
Islam.
Islam Many have speculated about the political implication of
the rise of the social standing of Islam in Indonesia.
In actuality, however, Indonesian Islam is embedded in a
y, ,
culture of tolerance that can be traced back to the history of
Islamization of the archipelago.
Islam originally came to Indonesia and religiously quot;conqueredquot;
conquered
the people not through war, but through trade, marriage and
education.
Hence th absorption of I l
H the b ti f Islam by the societies in this vast
b th i ti i thi t
archipelago was generally peaceful and involved little
coercion.


The Role of Islam . . .
In fact, in the propagation of Islam there was a
fact
tendency to adjust the new religion to older beliefs that
resulted in moderate and tolerant—some may say
tolerant—
syncretic— ttit d
syncretic—attitudes among th majority of I d
ti the j it f Indonesiani
Muslims.
It is true that fundamentalist Islamic groups some of
groups,
them militant, do exist in Indonesia, but they are
marginal and have little popular support.
Despite the recurrence of incidents involving some
Islamic extremists, for many years, Indonesia, the
country with the largest Muslim population in the world
world,
has been well known as a pluralistic society
characterized by religious moderation and tolerance.


Although Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim Country,
Country
Islamic political parties in Indonesia has never been able to
attain more than 40% of the votes, since the election of 1955
up to the last election in 2004 Therefore, most Indonesian
2004. Therefore
Muslim voted for parties not based in religion.
The different from one election to another is the composition
p
of the votes garnered by the Islamic parties, which constantly
changes reflecting the political mood and environment of the
time.
In the, short run, however, the revival of Islamic values in the
minds and lives of the population, most importantly among
the intelligentsia and the political elite, and the young, may
elite young
affect, attitudes or responses to political issues that involve
Islam such as international terrorism.



The September 11 act of terrorism against the US was
almost unanimously condemned by organized Muslims and
by the public in general.
Except for a few very vocal fanatics, Indonesia's Muslims
were outraged by with happened in New York.
The feeling of outrage against terrorism that had taken the
lives of innocent people was heightened when Indonesia
also became a victim of international terrorism with the
bombing in Bali on 12 October 2002, the more recent
2002
Marriot bombing in Jakarta on 5 August 2002, and the
second Bali Bombing in 2005.
F many I d
For i M li
Indonesian Muslims, terrorism had only
t i h d l
succeeded in creating the wrong image of Islam and
Islamic values.


The Role of the Military
Observers of Indonesia have paid much attention to the role of
the military in post-New Order politics and how the military
post-
perceive its role in democracy.
Events surrounding the fall of Soeharto showed that the military
had been supportive of political change. Its role was crucial in
the peaceful transition from an authoritarian regime to real
democracy.
democracy
In the political transition period, the military lent its political
weight to the institutionalization of democracy, that dismantled
the ld th it i t t d l
th old authoritarian structures and replaced it with a democratic
d ith d ti
system.
The military has shown its commitment to democracy when it
accepted the consensus of the polity that it should no longer
take an active role in politics and therefore no longer hold seats
in the elective political institutions.
p


The Role of the Military . . .

In the post-Soeharto period, the military had been
post-
steadfast in refusing to be used as an instrument to
subvert the constitution and resisted the pressure to
reverse to authoritarianism.
Although many retired senior officers were against
g y g
changing the constitution, the serving military
establishment fully supported the amendments that have
become the foundation for a stronger and more stable
democracy.
Therefore it is safe to say that at p
y present the military is
y
not a threat-but an asset to Indonesia's democracy.
threat-


VII. ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE


After the dramatic economic, political and social
upheavals at the end of the 1990s Indonesia has
1990s,
started to regain its footing. The country has largely
recovered from the economic crisis that threw millions of
its citizens back into poverty in 1998 and saw Indonesia
regress to low-income status.
low- status
Recently with GNP per capita of $1280 (2005), it has
once again become one of the world's emergent middle-
o ld's eme gent middle-
income countries. Poverty levels that had increased by
over one-thi d during the crisis are now back to pre-
one-third d i th i i b k t pre-
crisis levels.


Poverty in Indonesia fell rapidly until the 1990s,
and has declined again since the crisis


Macroeconomic Update
p

Indonesia: Economic Growth 1998-2006

6.5 6.5
5.7 6
5.6 5.6
5.2
4.9 5.1 4.9 4.9 5.1
4.4
5 3.8

0.9 1.2

0
.a

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
P rc nt p
e e

-5

-10

- 13.8 14.1
-15 -

GDP Non Oil and Gass


Positive Growth Trajectory

Sustained economic growth despite difficult environment

Economy is on a steady upward
E i t d d
> 7% trend. Indonesia’s performance
6-7% is very much comparable in the
5-6% region
5.25 %
Over the medium term, this
acceleration process should
4%
continue assuming that all
reform programs are
implemented.
The Indonesia’s economy is still
fragile and sensitive to external
2001-2003 2004-2005 2006 2007 - 2009 2010 -
shocks (financial turbulence,
Source: CBS
beyond
.
high oil price, etc)

VIII. DOES CULTURE MATTER?


Does culture matter? . . .

All the discussions on democracy are based on the
th di i d b d th
works of western scholars. Is democracy a
monopoly of the west? Are there no cultural variants
of democracy? On the other hand, is culture a
legitimate (or genuine) justification or merely an
excuse (or apology) for authoritarianism?
Indonesia, under both Sukarno and Soeharto
i i t d that culture was indeed th di ti ti
insisted th t lt i d d the distinctive
variable of any political system, and launched
concepts for the political systems that would
respond best to what they claimed to be the intrinsic
values characterizing Indonesia’s society.
g y



Lee K Y th f
L Kwan Yew, the former P i Prime Minister of Singapore,
Mi i t f Si
the founding father of the country and its political
a c tect, as been a g
architect, has bee making a very st o g case about t e
e y strong the
Asian values as an important element in the political
system of the East Asian countries. He believes that
adversarial politics is out of place in a multiracial society
such as Singapore.
Many scholarly works have been devoted on the subject
of cultural paradoxes in democracy; most concluded that
indeed culture exerts a certain influence on how
democracy is adapted among countries (see Alagappa
Alagappa,
1996; Fukuyama, 1996; Lipset, 1996; Huntington, 1996:
Inglehart, 2000; Sen, 2001).



In the
I th case of A i countries there has been much
f Asian t i th h b h
serious discourse about Asian values being the
determinant factor in the remarkable economic
achievements of the East Asian countries. But in the
wake of the economic crisis, the argument for the
Asian values has somewhat lost its credence.
The fact that countries in Asia have abandoned
attaching certain values to d
tt hi t i l t democracy and d
embraced the western style of democracy, such as
the Philippines, Korea Thailand Taiwan and most
Philippines Korea, Thailand,
recently Indonesia have further muted the cultural
argument.
g



However culture does matter
Although there are certain intrinsic values of democracy
that are universal in nature, without which the term
nature
democracy does not apply, cultural values are still
regarded as important variables and providing more than
g p p g
just local color for democracy.
As Inglehart (2000: 96) says that “in the long run,
democracy is not attained simply by making institutional
changes or through elite level maneuvering. Its survival
also depends on the values and beliefs of ordinary
p y
citizen”.


IX. INDONESIA AND THE WORLD


Indonesia and the world . . .

Indonesia has always been an active member of
the international community.
Being (in t
B i (i term of population):
f l ti )
the fourth largest;
the largest Muslim country;
the third largest democracy;
the third largest market economy in the world;
the largest in ASEAN;
calls for certain involvement, responsibility and
influence in the world affairs.


Indonesia has been the host and one of
initiators of many international or regional
undertakings, such as:
AA: Bandung Conference (1955);
APEC: Bogor Declaration (1994);
Bali Conference on Climate Change (2007).
Indonesia is currently a member of the UN
Security Council.
y
Indonesia has contributed to UN peace keeping
missions since 1950 s.
1950’s.


Indonesia is actively participating in regional affair:
ASEAN
South East Asia Community
APEC
While keeping close ties with western countries,
Indonesia maintains good relationship with
countries,
countries that are deemed to be “adversaries” of
adversaries
the west, such as:
Iran
North Korea
(Venezuela)
( )


In the Middle Eastern affairs, Indonesia projects
a moderate stance although it always fully
stance,
supports the rights and the struggle of the
Palestinian people.
people
Indonesia can play a significant role—and is in a
role—
good position—t contribute t th attainment
d position—to
iti t ib t to the tt i t
of world peace.


X. CONCLUSION


Conclusion . . .
In conclusion, much has been achieved, but even more
remains to be done. The past few years have been extremely
i t b d Th tf h b t l
eventful for Indonesia.
Following the maelstrom of political, economic and social
g p ,
crises, economic stability has now returned though the
economy has not returned to the heady levels of the boom
years.
Most significantly of all, the country is charting new political
waters with a comprehensively amended constitution a
process that again marks a dramatic break from the past.
past
To overcome the challenges ahead, whether from political
corruption, violent communal strife and terrorism in the name
p ,
of God or external economic shocks, the new tools of
government and democratic governance will face their
definitive test.


Conclusion . . .

What is significant about Indonesia s democracy that it
Indonesia’s democracy,
is “homegrown”.
Indonesia’s a e adap g democratic models and values
do es a s are adapting de o a ode s a d a ues
that are universal in nature, but the democratization
process in Indonesia had been initiated and carried out
by political forces within the country.
country
In certain stages of process such as in implementing the
general election, Indonesia receives foreign assistance
such as in observations of the balloting, or such as in
Aceh, in foreign facilitation in peace negotiation. But in
the case of Indonesia democracy was not imposed by
foreign powers.


Conclusion . . .
Indonesia still needs to strength its democratic foundations
and practices, which greater executive accountability to the
law, to other branches of government, and to the public; a
reduction in the barriers to political participation and
mobilization by marginal groups; decentralization of power to
f
facilitate broader political access and accountability; vigorous
independent action by civil society; and more effective
protection f the political and civil rights of citizens.
for h l l d l h f
The fledging democracy still faces serious challenges, such
p
political corruption, the rule of law, as well as accelerating its
p , , g
economic reform and improving its governance to sustain
growth and poverty reduction. However the course of the
country is heading into the right direction.
The Indonesian experience, its successes and failures maybe
worthy of some lessons to other, especially those who at the
stage of or entering the same “zone of transition”.


Thank you
y


Democracy: the Indonesian Experience

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