SOCIAL SELF BY GEORGE HERBERT MEAD

2. INTRODUCTION
 Social and Community Psychology is a graduate level survey course designed to
familiarize students with the social basis of behavior on an
intrapsychic, interpersonal, and community level of experience. Social
Psychology is that branch of human psychology which seeks to understand the
dynamics of individual behavior and mental processes in social situations.
Social psychologists examine, for example, how social factors impact an
individual and how a person’s actions, feelings, and beliefs are determined by
her/his relative positions (real or imagined) in social space. Community
Psychology is a relatively new application of Social Psychology that seeks to
understand the social and cultural influences beyond the individual level.
Themes in Community Psychology emphasize the application of social-
psychological principles to the ecological and environmental
perspectives, cultural relevance, and diversity and the adaptation of these
principles to issues of prevention and community intervention.
 This section provides a basic review of some core concepts of Social
Psychology, particularly those that impact the individual’s experience of
her/his social world.

3. 
Social self, in sociology, refers to the basis of self-
consciousness in human individuals according to the
theory established by G.H. Mead in his work Mind, Self
and Society (1934). The social self is the identity
conferred upon an individual by the reactions of
others. A person achieves self-consciousness by
becoming aware of his or her social identity, this
cannot happen without society.

4. SOCIAL SELF: BY GEORGE
HERBERT MEAD

5.  RECOGNIZING that the self can not appear in consciousness as an “I,” that it is
always an object, i.e., a “me,” I wish to suggest an answer to the question, What is
involved in the self being an object? The first answer may be that an object involves a
subject. Stated in other words, that a “me” is inconceivable without an “I.” And to this
reply must be made that such an “I” is a presupposition, but never a presentation of
conscious experience, for the moment it is presented it has passed into the objective
case, presuming, if you like, an “I” that observes – but an “I” that can disclose himself
only by ceasing to be the subject for whom the object “me” exists. It is, of course, not
the Hegelism of a self that becomes another to himself in which I am interested, but
the nature of the self as revealed by introspection and subject to our factual analysis.
This analysis does reveal, then, in a memory process an attitude of observing oneself
in which both the observer and the observed appear. To be concrete, one remembers
asking himself how he could undertake to do this, that, or the other, chiding himself
for his shortcomings or pluming himself upon his achievements. Thus, in the
reintegrated self of the moment passed, one finds both a subject and an object, but it
is a subject that is now an object of observation, and has the same nature as the
object self whom we present as in intercourse with those about us. In quite the same
fashion we remember the questions, admonitions, and approvals addressed to our
fellows. But the subject attitude which we instinctively take can be presented only as
something experienced – as we can be conscious of our acts only through the sensory
processes set up after the act has begun.

6.  The contents of this presented subject, who thus has become an object in
being presented, but which still distinguish him as the subject of the passed
experience from the “me” whom he addressed, are those images which
initiated the conversation and the motor sensations which accompany the
expression, plus the organic sensations and the response of the whole system
to the activity initiated. In a word, just those contents which go to make up the
self which is distinguished from the others whom he addresses. The self
appearing as “I” is the memory image self who acted toward himself and is the
same self who acts toward other selves.
 On the other hand, the stuff that goes to make up the “me” whom the “I”
addresses and whom he observes, is the experience which is induced by this
action of the “I.” If the “I” speaks, the “me” hears. If the “I” strikes, the “me”
feels the blow. Here again the “me” consciousness is of the same character as
that which arises from the action of the other upon him. That is, it is only as
the individual finds himself acting with reference to himself as he acts towards
others, that he becomes a subject to himself rather than an object, and only as
he is affected by his own social conduct in the manner in which he is affected
by that of others, that he becomes an object to his own social conduct.
 The differences in our memory presentations of the “I” and the “me” are those
of the memory images of the initiated social conduct and those of the sensory
responses thereto.

7. THE LOOKING-GLASS SELF
 In an article entitled “The Social Self,” George Herbert Mead, sociologist at the
University of Chicago at the turn of the 20th century, began a profound and insightful
dialogue about the subjective, intrapsychic self studied by the psychodynamic theorists
of the time and the self of the objective, external social world. According to Mead, the
basic fact that others perceive people differently than they perceive themselves creates a
discourse between the “I” – the subjective self known as actor and agent – and the “me” –
the objective self known by others (Blunder, n. d.).
 Closely related to Mead’s early ideas, more recent social-psychological thinkers have
theorized that the social self is produced through interaction with two or more people.
For example, the self as a mother is a social self because a mother cannot be without a
child.
 Much like the social self, the Looking-Glass Self is a sociological term originally coined
by an American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley in 1902 suggesting that individuals
ultimately gain their social identity by viewing themselves through other’s
perceptions. Cooley’s work expanded James’ notion of the self to include its meta-
cognitive capacity, that is, its capacity to reflect upon itself. The “looking-glass self” is a
self-image based on a dynamic interaction between how others perceive us and how we
perceive ourselves (Cooley, 1902). In his work, Human Nature and the Social
Order, Cooley (1902) describes the following steps in this complex reciprocal process of
social self-perception:

8.  One creates an image of his/her own appearance, traits
and personalities;
 One uses the reactions of others to interpret how
he/she is perceived;
 One develops a self-concept, positive or negative, based
on these interpretations.
 The “looking-glass self” involves, therefore, a process of
self-discovery and self-interpretation that begins at an early
age and continues to be modified throughout one’s life as
long as one engages in social interactions.

9. SOCIAL COMPARISON THEORY
 Leon Festinger (1954) suggested that because there are no objective “yardsticks”
for most traits and abilities, people learn who they are, and what their talents
and abilities are, by comparing themselves with others. Social Comparison
Theory may help explain why people, especially young people, yearn to
emulate those they see in the popular media.
 Social psychologists have provided a great deal of evidence that how people
think about themselves depends on the standard of comparison used. If they
use a downward socialcomparison, or compare themselves to someone who
is less competent on a particular trait or ability, then the result is likely to be a
fairly positive interpretation of their own similar trait or ability. On the other
hand, if people use an upward social comparison, or compare themselves to
someone who is more expert or competent, the result may tend in a more
negative direction in terms of self-interpretation.
 Obviously, if an individual compares him or herself to a model representing an
unrealistic standard – such as a super-thin model or a super-strong weight-
lifter – dysfunctional or pathological behaviors may result. The process of
social comparison can be valuable when the outcome provides the basis for
practicable self-enhancement.

10. GROUP 2