1. 3rd International Disaster and Risk Conference
30 May – 3 June 2010, Davos – Switzerland
Emerging Risks – NATECH Risk Reduction and Its Implementation
Natech Management
in Turkey
Serkan Girgin, Ph.D.
girgink@gmail.com
http://www.teknolojikkazalar.org

2. Major Natural Disasters
Between 1990-2005
Damage
Event Date Dead Injured Homeless Affected
Zone I II (M US$)
Earthquake (Erzincan) 13/03/92 653
PGA 3,850
≥ 0.4 95,000
0.3 – 0.4 250,000 750
Avalance (14 events) 1992 328
Area 53
42% 11,600
66%24% 30,000 25
Avalance (31 events) 1993 135
Pop. 95
45% 1,100
71%26% 3,000 10
Landslide (Senirkent) 13/07/95 74
Ind. 46
51% 2,000
76%25% 10,000 65
Earthquake (Dinar) 01/10/95 94
Dams 240
46% 40,000
69%23% 120,000 100
Flood (Izmir) 04/11/95 63 117 6,500 300,000 1,000
Earthquake (Corum) 14/08/96 - 6 9,000 17,000 30
Flood (West. Blacksea) 21/05/98 10 47 40,000 1,200,000 1,000
Earthquake (Ceyhan) 27/06/98 145 1,600 88,000 1,500,000 500
Earthquake (Kocaeli) 17/08/99 17,480 43,953 675,000 15,000,000 13,000
Earthquake (Duzce) 12/11/99 763 4,948 35,000 600,000 750
Earthquake (Sultandağı) 03/02/02 42 327 30,000 222,000 95
Earthquake (Bingol) 01/05/03 177 520 45,000 245,000 135
TOTAL 19,964 55,802 1,078,200 19,497,000 17,460
Ref: Ergunay, 2007

3. Kocaeli Earthquake, 1999
Date:
17 August 1999, 03:02am
Duration:
45 s
Location:
40.7 N, 29.9 E
Depth: Ref: Gülen and Kalafat, 2000
15.9 km
Magnitude and Intensity:
MW - 7.4, MSK - X
Ref: Özmen, 2000
Dead: Homeless: Damage:
17,480 675,000 15 B US$
Injured: Affected:
43,953 15,000,000

4. TUPRAS Izmit Refinery Fire
Fire at chemical
warehouse
Breaking of containers
and reaction
Fire at crude oil unit
Collapse of 115m tall, 10m
diameter stack breaking
63 pipelines and a heater
Fire at naptha tank farm
Sparks created by
bouncing of the floating
roofs
Started at 4 tanks, spread
to 2 additional tanks

5. TUPRAS Izmit Refinery Fire
Evacuation of nearby
settlements
Marine pollution
No domino effect
No deaths or injuries
during fire fighting
Operational in 2.5
months, full capacity in
12 months
Cost of recovery:
57.8 M $ Ref: Danis and Gorgun, 2005

6. AKSA Acrylonitrile Spill
Acrylonitrile release to air,
sea and groundwater
Damage of 3 storage tanks
Amount: 6400 tons
Death of all animals and
vegetation within 200m radius
Intoxication of 27 workers
Evacuation of nearby villages
Doubts on fatalities due to
increased cancer risk
Clean-up
53,000 m³ GW pumped out for
treatment/recovery in 4 years
Ref: Demir, 1999
Concentration: 80,000ppm to
non-detectable levels

7. Common Shortcomings
Inadequate design and construction
Insufficient emergency planning
Natech events were not foreseen although natural disaster
(earthquake) risks were well known
Insufficient first response
Collapse of relied response mechanisms
Lack of sufficient response equipments
Limited human resources
Poor emergency management
Especially at local level

8. TUPRAS Izmit Refinery
Lessons Learned
Revised emergency Increased response
response plans capacity
Natech events are taken into Portable diesel water pump
consideration (900m³/h), monitor and 6”
Disaster plans hose (2km)
Fire events at four different Water sprinkler and foam
locations systems at all tanks
Fire at the largest storage tank Water canons
with minimal water supply (50 fixed, 10 portable)
Increased fire water capacity
Bi-monthly emergency (5 times)
response practices Sea water connection to fire
Based on probable scenarios water system
including natechs Gas and flame sensors
Participation of all refinery Increased oil barrier stock
personnel (3 km)

9. Legislative Framework
Disaster Management
Evolution of disaster management
1923 – 1942
Response to disasters on a case-specific basis
1943 – 1952
Law on Protection from Floods (1943)
Law on Precautions to be Taken Before and After Earthquakes (1944)
Earthquake Zones Map
Building Code
1953 – 1999
Law on Civil Defense (1958)
Disaster Law (1959)
Settlement Law (1959)
Establishment of G. D. of Disaster Affairs (1965)
1999 onwards
Proactive measures and emergency management oriented regulations

10. Legislative Framework Natechs
Disaster Management
should be
General Staff
National Prime Ministry taken into
Central Disaster
Ministries consideration
Coordination Council
Service Groups:
Province Governor Service Groups:
Emergency Response• •Communication
Communication Response
Emergency Emergency
Committee • •Transportation
Service Groups
Transportation Response Services
• •Rescue and Debris Removal
Rescue and Debris Removal
• •First Aid and Medical
Disaster Office and Medical
First Aid
Response
• •Preliminary Damage Assessment and Temporary Shelter
Preliminary Damage Assessment and Temporary Shelter
Teams
Emergency
• •Public Security
Public Security
Response
• •Approbation, Renting, Confiscation and Distribution
Military
Approbation, Renting, Confiscation and Distribution
Plan
• •Agricultural
Agricultural
• •Lifeline
Lifeline
District Head Official
Emergency Response Emergency Response Emergency
Committee Service Groups Response Services
Emergency
Response
Response Military Teams
Plan

11. Legislative Framework
Emergency Management
Prime Ministry
1997
2009
1999 General Secretariat Crisis Crisis
of National Security Coordination Assessment and
Disaster and Council Council Follow-up Council
Emergency
General Directorate of
Prime Ministry Crisis
Management
Emergency
Management Center
Administration
Management
Secretariat
Ministry of Heath
Regional Crisis
State Minister of Management Center
Economics
General
Staff,
2002 Crisis Management Center Ministries,
Public
Crisis: Institutions
Terrorism, Natural disasters,
Technological accidents, Crisis Management Center Provinces
Epidemics, Economic depression
Emergency: Crisis Management Center Districts
Natural disasters, Technological
accidents, Immigration

12. Responsible Authorities
Risk Assessment and Mitigation
Disaster and Emergency Management Administration
(Earthquakes, Landslides, Rock Falls, Avalanches)
Ministry of Settlement and Public Works
G. D. of Highways (Landslides)
Ministry of Environment and Forestry
(Forest Fires, Industrial accidents)
G. D. of State Hydraulic Works
(Floods)
G. D. of State Meteorological Works
(Storms)

13. Legislative Framework
Management of Industrial Accidents
Circular on Emergency Planning for Major Industrial
Accidents (Ministry of Environment, 1996)
Inspired by 82/501/EEC (Seveso) Directive and UNEP/APELL
Not legally binding
Accident Information Form was incorporated to the Regulation
on Environmental Auditing
Draft Regulation Prevention of Major Industrial Accidents
(Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 1999)
Adaptation of Seveso Directive
Not approved by the Council of Ministries

14. Legislative Framework
Management of Industrial Accidents
Environmental Emergency Action Plan for the Marmara
Region (Ministry of Environment, Middle East Technical University, 2001)
Regional action plan for environmental
emergencies including Natech events
inline with disaster management
framework
Uniformed emergency response
plan format for establishments
Supervision principles
GIS-based information system to
collect data on natural disaster
risks, natural resources and
industrial facilities
Put not into practice

15. Legislative Framework
Management of Industrial Accidents
Approximation of Seveso II Directive in Turkey
(Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Ekodenge, 2006)
DSIP for the Seveso II Directive
Draft Regulation on Control of Major Industrial Accident Hazards
Draft Communiqués on Safety Report and Emergency Plans,
Public Information, Inspection
Web-based information system to collect data on establishments
Regulatory impact assessment of Seveso-II Directive
(Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Regional Environmental Center,
2010)
Technical support projects for Seveso II Directive
(Ministry of Environment and Forestry, EU, 2011)

16. Conclusions
Although not quantified sufficiently, natural disaster
risks are high in Turkey
Serious Natech events have been occurred in the past,
and are quite likely to happen in the future
Preparedness of industrial facilities to natech events:
High in facilities having natech experience
Not only natech, but also major industrial accident
preparedness is limited in majority of facilities

17. Conclusions
Although there have been several efforts, legal
framework for control of major industrial accidents is
lacking
Risky establishments are not known
Data for risk assessment is not sufficient
Legal framework for disaster management still focus on
natural disasters (mainly earthquakes)
Information on natural disaster risks are limited

18. Conclusions
Natech risk assessment is not sufficient
Lack of information on technological and natural disaster
risks hinders Natech risk assessments
Methodologies are required for regional Natech risk
assessment and mapping
Credible Natech scenarios
How to develop realistic Natech scenarios?
What should be the scope?
Preparedness to Natech events
Are we ready for the Istanbul Earthquake?

19. Istanbul Earthquake Scenario
Future Natechs?
Mw=7.0, probability is 41-62% in 25 years
Expected outcomes:
70.000 fatalities
130.000 injured
600.000 homeless
50.000 heavily
damaged buildings
60 billion USD economic losses
(25-28% of GNP)
Natechs?