The document discusses several studies examining conscious intentions and the experience of free will. It summarizes that reported time of intention (W-judgment) in tasks like the Libet task is based on inferential processes, not just pre-action brain processes. Studies find action monitoring processes and external feedback influence W-judgment. Another study found that manipulating beliefs about free will impacted early motor preparation processes before conscious intention, as measured by readiness potential amplitude. The document concludes experience of intention incorporates both pre-action and post-action processes, and it is better to believe in free will due to behavioral effects.
2. Free will and science Free will Intentions Decision-making Agency Executive control Internally vs. externally generated actions Philosophy Theology Genetics Brain or mind sciences Physics
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4. The Libet task Used to measure when a person forms the motor intention to execute an action From Haggard, 2008, Nat Rev Neuro Intention reported ~200 ms before movement onset (will judgment, W) RP starts up to 2 s before movement
7. Inferential processes in conscious intentions Post-action events modulate the experience of intention Reported time of intention is based not only on pre-action processes (i.e. motor preparation) W-judgment related to the apparent time of response Role of action monitoring processes Action-effect negativity (Nae) (Band et al., 2009). Reflects the linkage between action and action-effects Associated with changes in the W-judgments
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11. Free will and science: a novel approach Free will Theology Philosophy Physics Genetics Intentions Decision-making Agency Executive control Internally vs. externally generated actions Brain or mind sciences
12. Free will and science: a novel approach Free will Theology Philosophy Physics Genetics Brain or mind sciences Behaviour
14. Free will beliefs and motor preparation The experience of free will is tightly connected with the idea of control (e.g. choices) Human societies are ruled on the idea that we have free will (e.g. personal responsibility, punishment, reward) Theoretical background
15. Free will beliefs and motor preparation Theoretical background Neuroscientific findings challenge the nature of free will W hat would happen if people are induced to disbelieve in free will?
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18. Free will beliefs and motor preparation Free will manipulation (deterministic worldview) Ego depletion (1) Disbelief in free will (2) Reduced RP (EEG activity reflecting voluntary motor preparation) (3) Effect already in the earlier stages of motor preparation Hypotheses Three hypotheses
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21. Free will beliefs and motor preparation Free Will and Determinism scale (22 items, Likert 1-5) In addition, Self-Control (Tangney Self-Control scale) and Social Desirability (Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability scale) were measured Personal free will (8 items) e.g. “I have free will even when my choices are limited by external circumstances” General free will (14 items) e.g. ”Life’s experiences cannot eliminate a person’s free will” Methods and procedure
22. Free will beliefs and motor preparation No-free will group reported weaker free will beliefs (personal FW scale) [t(27)=-2.86, p<.01] Free will manpilation was effective in reducing free will belief in the no-free will group Results
23. Free will beliefs and motor preparation Reduced RP amplitude in the no-free will group [F(1,28) = 4.43, p < .05, η p 2 = .136] Main effect in frontal-central regions (max FCz) Results W-judgment did not differ between the 2 groups Significant effect already at-1300 ms (i.e. early stages of motor preparation)
24. Free will beliefs and motor preparation Results Significant correlation between RP and scores on the personal FWD scale controls no-free will
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26. Free will beliefs and motor preparation Conclusions Dismissing free will belief Less intentional effort and reduced sense of agency Reduced feeling of responsibility Careless and irresponsible behaviour Speculative interpretation Low self-efficacy/control belief Negative emotions?
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30. PRESENZA ASSENZA CONFINE Schizofrenia Disturbo di personalità Alterazioni cerebrali VBM, DTI,ERP, fMRI Alterazioni genetiche Genetica molecolare Assenza di correlati neurali e genetici Infermità di mente
36. Congruent Block for Card 4 choosers Incongruent Block for card 7 choosers Incongruent Block for Card 4 choosers Congruent Block for card 7 choosers Card IAT TRUE FALSE “ I'm in front of a computer” “I'm in front of a television” CARD 4 CARD 7 “ I chose card 4” “I chose card 7” TRUE FALSE “ I'm in front of a computer” “I'm in front of a television” CARD 7 CARD 4 “ I saw the card 7” “I saw the card 4”
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38. Accuratezza IAT Relazione fra il valore del D-IAT e accuratezza diagnostica Dati di 5 esperimenti per un totale di 320 soggetti
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41. Results : Naïve fakers cannot fake the aIAT Instructed fakers are faster in the Incongruent block than the Congruent block. Detecting fakers
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43. Method Results It is possible to identify the participants’ real intentions Intention detection Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 2011 TRUE FALSE “ I'm in front of a computer “I'm in front of a television” True Intention False Intention “ I will sleep in Padua” “I will sleep in Milan” TRUE FALSE “ I'm in front of a computer” “I'm in front of a television” False Intention True Intention “ I will sleep in Milan” “I will sleep in Padua”