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Guess the Number:
A Game on Rational Equilibria and Bubbles in Financial Markets
Elmar Mertens
University of Basel
January 2002
2
RULES OF THE GAME
Pick a number between 0 and 100 (0 ≤≤≤≤ x ≤≤≤≤ 100)
The winning number will be determined as being as close as
possible to two-thirds of the average number chosen
Source: Mertens
In this game, you need to guess a number which is lower than
that of your average competitor
3
EQULIBRIUM SOLUTION
Iterative Reasoning:
The maximum average possible is 100,
2/3 of 100 ≈ 67 . . .
But if everybody picks 67,
I better say 2/3 • 67 ≈ 45 . . .
But if everybody picks 45,
I say 2/3 • 45 = 30 . . .
But if everybody picks 30,
I say 2/3 • 30 = 20 . . .
In the end, we get only a stable solution,
when everybody picks 0 *)
and so on . . . and so on . . .
Definition of Equilibrium:
• No player wants to
change his guess, once
he knows the result of the
game
• We get a stable solution in
repeated plays
• Key is that everybody is
rational, knows that
everybody else is rational,
knows that everybody
else knows that
everybody is rational and
so forth . . .
Should we expect such an
equilibrium as the actual
outcome for our game?
Source: Mertens; *) or 1, depending on rounding convention
A possible outcome could be an equilibrium of everybody's guesses
4
OUTCOME OF NEWSPAPER COMPETITION
From the Financial Times "Mastering Finance" Competition, 1997
• 1,486 FT readers entered a
mailing contest in 1997
• Average Guess: 18.91. Two-
thirds: 12.6 ≈ 13
• Some players from Oxford
tried to „move the market“ by
picking 100. They changed
the winning number from 12 to
13!
• Other plays yield similar
results:
• With MBA students
numbers between 13 - 20
typically win
• Economists tend to pick
numbers close to zero
(Guess why!)
The winner reasoned:
„70 per cent of readers
compute: viable range
0-66.
2/3 of mid-point = 22.
30 per cent of readers
reason: If I bid x, to win:
0.3 • x + 0.7 • 22 = 3/2x.
Solution x=13.“
Source: Mertens; Richard Thaler‘s comments on the FT competition (FT, 16 June 1997)
In a competition of the FT, the winner estimated how deep his
competitors looked at the problem
5
TYPICAL REASONINGS
From the Financial Times "Mastering Finance" Competition, 1997
„So behaviourists observe a bod
An FT reader, ergo clever sod
He knows the competition and will fight em
So reduces the number ad infinitum.“
„The answer should be naught (0)
. . . but Labour won.“
„Over 67 only interests fools;
So over 45 implies innummeracy rules.
1 to 45 random averages 23.
So logic indicates 15, leaving 10 to me.“
„My dad knows an average amount
about numbers and markets and
he bottled out at 10.“
Pick 1, not zero, as a
„hedge“ against irrationality
Finding the „average guy“ Anticipate how far the others think!
Zero as equilibrium solution
Source: Mertens; Richard Thaler‘s comments on the FT competition (FT, 16 June 1997)
The reasonings of contestants in the FT competition varied
6
FORMULAS FOR SIMPLE INTERPRETATIONS
Depth of reasoning
Fooling the smarts by market moving"Winning Formula" of FT contest
Market Power
Source: Mertens; *) Sensible values only for x < 22•2/3 ≈ 15
• "N-S" bid 22, "S-m" plug this into the FT-
formula while "m-1" move the market
and "1" tries to win with "x":
x(N,m,S) = 200 • (m-1) + 44 • (N-S)
• [1 + (S-m) / (3/2•N - S)]
• Market moving is easy, but winning is
not obvious!
• Based on the iterative solution we can
back out the steps "n" taken by the
participants in a game with result "x":
n = ln (x/100) / ln(2/3 )
• With a starting value of 50 we get
n = ln (x/50) / ln(2/3 )
• How many additional votes of "100"
would be necessary to change the
results by "1", given that "N" people
have voted on average "x"?
m(N, x) = N / (99 - x)
• For N<100, a single vote of 100
changes the result!
• Winning number "x" as function of
the share "w" of smart players:
x(w) = 22 • (w-1) / (w-3/2)
• The inverse, w(x), determines the
share of smart players *):
w(x) = (3/2•x - 22) / (x - 22)
With some simple formulas, we can express our first "models" of what
happens in the game
7
GUESS-THE-NUMBER AND FINANCE
• Standard models suppose that markets will tend to be at rational
equilibria, hence the search for equilibrium prices in finance
• The game shows, that it is not sufficient if everybody is rational.
Instead, everybody else has to know about it and everybody has to
know that everybody knows and so forth . . .
• Otherwise, it could be rational to suppose that an „irrational“ result
occurs. For example, investments in „bubbles“ like the new economy
(if it was really a bubble) might be rational, given we could expect
prices to rise forever. (Of course, prices cannot grow without limits,
that is why economists impose „super-rationality“ in order to rule out
such bubbles)
Economics in general and Finance in particular is not about
mechanical solutions, it is about anticipation of human behavior. And
behavior might change because of our anticipations
. . . and also because of financial models
Source: Mertens
Like in our game, economic problems involve the anticipation
of human behavior
8
KEYNES ON VALUATION
General Theory (1936), p.152ff.
„[P]rofessional investment may be
likened to those newspaper competitions
in which the competitors have to pick out
the . . . prettiest faces . . .
[T]he prize being awarded to the
competitor whose choice most nearly
corresponds to the average preferences
of the competitors as a whole . . .
[In the end, we] have reached the third
degree, where we devote our intelli-
gences to anticipating what average
opinion expects the average opinion to
be“
„[T]he existing market valuation, however
arrived at, is uniquely correct in relation
to our existing knowledge of the facts
which will influence the yield of the
investment, and that it will only change in
proportion to changes in this knowledge .
. .
[T]he only risk [the investor] runs is that
of genuine change in the news over the
near future“
(Please note that Keynes is usually not
regarded as being an advocate of
efficient market theory!)
Prices efficiently reflect fundamentalsPrices anticipate the anticipated
Do you think the
prettiest girl, will win
in this beauty
contest?Source: Mertens
Lord Keynes mentioned both the famous "beauty contests" and
something we now call "efficient markets hypothesis"
9
Intrinsic Value
• An asset is worth, what the next
buyer is willing to pay for it
• Fundamental value is nice, but
our cash-flow from the asset is
tomorrow's price
• There is always a greater fool,
willing to buy the asset. We only
need to get in early
„ Firm Foundation“„Castle in the Air“
TWO MODES OF FINANCIAL VALUATION
• An asset is worth the discounted
value of its cash-flows (DCF)
• There may be short-run fluctuations,
but only the DCF is sustainable
• In "efficient" markets, only
fundamental news change prices by
surprise
Anticipation of tomorrow's price
Source: Mertens, Malkiel (1996) "A Random Walk Down Wall Street", Norton, New York
R
P
R
CF
P
+
+
+
=
11
11
0 ∞
= +
=
+
+
+
+
+
=
1
2
2
2
21
0
)1(
)1()1(1
t
t
t
R
CF
R
P
R
CF
R
CF
P
R
P
+1
1
There are two broad schools of financial valuation

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guessnumberCharts

  • 1. Guess the Number: A Game on Rational Equilibria and Bubbles in Financial Markets Elmar Mertens University of Basel January 2002
  • 2. 2 RULES OF THE GAME Pick a number between 0 and 100 (0 ≤≤≤≤ x ≤≤≤≤ 100) The winning number will be determined as being as close as possible to two-thirds of the average number chosen Source: Mertens In this game, you need to guess a number which is lower than that of your average competitor
  • 3. 3 EQULIBRIUM SOLUTION Iterative Reasoning: The maximum average possible is 100, 2/3 of 100 ≈ 67 . . . But if everybody picks 67, I better say 2/3 • 67 ≈ 45 . . . But if everybody picks 45, I say 2/3 • 45 = 30 . . . But if everybody picks 30, I say 2/3 • 30 = 20 . . . In the end, we get only a stable solution, when everybody picks 0 *) and so on . . . and so on . . . Definition of Equilibrium: • No player wants to change his guess, once he knows the result of the game • We get a stable solution in repeated plays • Key is that everybody is rational, knows that everybody else is rational, knows that everybody else knows that everybody is rational and so forth . . . Should we expect such an equilibrium as the actual outcome for our game? Source: Mertens; *) or 1, depending on rounding convention A possible outcome could be an equilibrium of everybody's guesses
  • 4. 4 OUTCOME OF NEWSPAPER COMPETITION From the Financial Times "Mastering Finance" Competition, 1997 • 1,486 FT readers entered a mailing contest in 1997 • Average Guess: 18.91. Two- thirds: 12.6 ≈ 13 • Some players from Oxford tried to „move the market“ by picking 100. They changed the winning number from 12 to 13! • Other plays yield similar results: • With MBA students numbers between 13 - 20 typically win • Economists tend to pick numbers close to zero (Guess why!) The winner reasoned: „70 per cent of readers compute: viable range 0-66. 2/3 of mid-point = 22. 30 per cent of readers reason: If I bid x, to win: 0.3 • x + 0.7 • 22 = 3/2x. Solution x=13.“ Source: Mertens; Richard Thaler‘s comments on the FT competition (FT, 16 June 1997) In a competition of the FT, the winner estimated how deep his competitors looked at the problem
  • 5. 5 TYPICAL REASONINGS From the Financial Times "Mastering Finance" Competition, 1997 „So behaviourists observe a bod An FT reader, ergo clever sod He knows the competition and will fight em So reduces the number ad infinitum.“ „The answer should be naught (0) . . . but Labour won.“ „Over 67 only interests fools; So over 45 implies innummeracy rules. 1 to 45 random averages 23. So logic indicates 15, leaving 10 to me.“ „My dad knows an average amount about numbers and markets and he bottled out at 10.“ Pick 1, not zero, as a „hedge“ against irrationality Finding the „average guy“ Anticipate how far the others think! Zero as equilibrium solution Source: Mertens; Richard Thaler‘s comments on the FT competition (FT, 16 June 1997) The reasonings of contestants in the FT competition varied
  • 6. 6 FORMULAS FOR SIMPLE INTERPRETATIONS Depth of reasoning Fooling the smarts by market moving"Winning Formula" of FT contest Market Power Source: Mertens; *) Sensible values only for x < 22•2/3 ≈ 15 • "N-S" bid 22, "S-m" plug this into the FT- formula while "m-1" move the market and "1" tries to win with "x": x(N,m,S) = 200 • (m-1) + 44 • (N-S) • [1 + (S-m) / (3/2•N - S)] • Market moving is easy, but winning is not obvious! • Based on the iterative solution we can back out the steps "n" taken by the participants in a game with result "x": n = ln (x/100) / ln(2/3 ) • With a starting value of 50 we get n = ln (x/50) / ln(2/3 ) • How many additional votes of "100" would be necessary to change the results by "1", given that "N" people have voted on average "x"? m(N, x) = N / (99 - x) • For N<100, a single vote of 100 changes the result! • Winning number "x" as function of the share "w" of smart players: x(w) = 22 • (w-1) / (w-3/2) • The inverse, w(x), determines the share of smart players *): w(x) = (3/2•x - 22) / (x - 22) With some simple formulas, we can express our first "models" of what happens in the game
  • 7. 7 GUESS-THE-NUMBER AND FINANCE • Standard models suppose that markets will tend to be at rational equilibria, hence the search for equilibrium prices in finance • The game shows, that it is not sufficient if everybody is rational. Instead, everybody else has to know about it and everybody has to know that everybody knows and so forth . . . • Otherwise, it could be rational to suppose that an „irrational“ result occurs. For example, investments in „bubbles“ like the new economy (if it was really a bubble) might be rational, given we could expect prices to rise forever. (Of course, prices cannot grow without limits, that is why economists impose „super-rationality“ in order to rule out such bubbles) Economics in general and Finance in particular is not about mechanical solutions, it is about anticipation of human behavior. And behavior might change because of our anticipations . . . and also because of financial models Source: Mertens Like in our game, economic problems involve the anticipation of human behavior
  • 8. 8 KEYNES ON VALUATION General Theory (1936), p.152ff. „[P]rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the . . . prettiest faces . . . [T]he prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole . . . [In the end, we] have reached the third degree, where we devote our intelli- gences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be“ „[T]he existing market valuation, however arrived at, is uniquely correct in relation to our existing knowledge of the facts which will influence the yield of the investment, and that it will only change in proportion to changes in this knowledge . . . [T]he only risk [the investor] runs is that of genuine change in the news over the near future“ (Please note that Keynes is usually not regarded as being an advocate of efficient market theory!) Prices efficiently reflect fundamentalsPrices anticipate the anticipated Do you think the prettiest girl, will win in this beauty contest?Source: Mertens Lord Keynes mentioned both the famous "beauty contests" and something we now call "efficient markets hypothesis"
  • 9. 9 Intrinsic Value • An asset is worth, what the next buyer is willing to pay for it • Fundamental value is nice, but our cash-flow from the asset is tomorrow's price • There is always a greater fool, willing to buy the asset. We only need to get in early „ Firm Foundation“„Castle in the Air“ TWO MODES OF FINANCIAL VALUATION • An asset is worth the discounted value of its cash-flows (DCF) • There may be short-run fluctuations, but only the DCF is sustainable • In "efficient" markets, only fundamental news change prices by surprise Anticipation of tomorrow's price Source: Mertens, Malkiel (1996) "A Random Walk Down Wall Street", Norton, New York R P R CF P + + + = 11 11 0 ∞ = + = + + + + + = 1 2 2 2 21 0 )1( )1()1(1 t t t R CF R P R CF R CF P R P +1 1 There are two broad schools of financial valuation